On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

Study of rationalism in Urdu literature.

The concept of experience has been central to European philosophy since Descartes. He was the first to use experience to distinguish between two kinds of substance, mental and material, on the basis of the fact that one kind of substance is extended but does not think, while the other kind thinks, doubts, wills, imagines and feels, but is not extended. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume, made the concept of experience the basis of their analysis of knowledge. These (...) ideas have become part of common sense, and provide the background for a range of philosophical problems from Descartes’ time to the present. While the concept of experience is important for philosophy, philosophers do not all have the same understanding of the nature of experience. (shrink)

Purpose: Several accounts like Ernst von Glasersfeld's Who Conceives of Society? (2008) locate empirical research in the social sciences and radical constructivism in almost parallel universes. The main purpose of this paper is to argue for more inter-active relations and to stress the importance of establishing weak, medium and strong ties between radical constructivism and empirical social research in general. Findings: The article shows that that weak, medium and strong ties between radical constructivism and empirical research in the social sciences (...) can be established. Moreover, these weak, medium and strong ties play a crucial role for increasing and maintaining the relevance of radical constructivism within the social sciences and for contributing to the viability of radical constructivism in the long run. Implications: The most important consequence for radical constructivism lies in a new research agenda. In the course of this article weak, medium and strong ties to empirical research have been specified specifically and exclusively for the social sciences. But these specific links cannot be simply generalized or transferred to other disciplinary fields outside the social sciences. Since interactive links between radical constructivism and empirical research are currently missing in practically all disciplines, these weak, medium and strong links, as a new RC-agenda, have to be developed separately for each major scientific research arena. (shrink)

Translation and interpretation of selected Hadith on Islamic ethics and coduct.

Islamic ethics in the light of Qurʼanic teaching and Hadith; Customs and practices.

Context: The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem: In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is “second-order science.” Method: We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows (...) second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the contributions that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science. Results: These six initial contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications: Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular, and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Luhmann and the Constructivist Heritage: A Critical Reflection” by Armin Scholl. Upshot: The comment starts with Buchinger’s assessment that Luhmann’s contribution to constructivism is original and inspiring, but raises more questions than answers. In three variations, the comment tries to show that Luhmann can indeed be viewed as a big question-generator and that his heritage for radical constructivism may lie in the original and inspiring effects these new and additional questions can produce.

Context: Although second-order cybernetics was proposed as a new way of cybernetic investigations around 1970, its general status and its modus operandi are still far from obvious. Problem: We want to provide a new perspective on the scope and the currently available potential of second-order cybernetics within today’s science landscapes. Method: We invited a group of scholars who have produced foundational work on second-order cybernetics in recent years, and organized an open call for new approaches to second-order cybernetics. The accepted (...) contributions are discussed and mapped. We also investigate the relations between second-order cybernetics and second-order science. Results: We present a coherent outlook on the scope of second-order cybernetics today, identify a general methodology of science and show that second-order cybernetics can be used in a large number of disciplines that go well beyond purely scientific domains. These results are based on a new epistemic mode “from within,” which can be traced back directly to von Foerster. We also arrived at the conclusion that from its early years onwards second-order cybernetics was developed in two different ways, so that second-order cybernetics and second-order science operate in different domains. Implications: Both the coherent perspective of the scope of second-order cybernetics with a new five-part agenda and the outline for a general methodology of science based on a new epistemic mode that was created within and for second-order cybernetics demonstrate the growing importance of reflexivity in science, which, so far, has not been widely recognized. (shrink)

Purpose: The article pursues three aims. First, it intends to differentiate between two different approaches for knowledge studies, namely an empirical and a normative mode. In a second move, two different epistemologies in the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld will be introduced under the labels of “Epistemology I” and “Epistemology II.” Epistemology I relates to empirical research, Epistemology II is normative in nature. Third, the article makes the point that while Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology II has already been presented in (...) a finite and mature form, his empirical analysis of cognitive processes still provides a rich pool of tools and designs that should be further developed and advanced in the years and decades ahead. Method: The article is analytical in nature, identifying the different building blocks and relational networks of von Glasersfeld’s two epistemologies. By this, the article intends to contribute to a further advancement of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I. Results: The main finding lies in recognizing the radical and innovative elements of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I and on the still-challenging research designs of Epistemology I. (shrink)

Objective: This paper describes the variety of ways that information about ethics-related methods are included or not included in public health research articles. Methods: Information about the ethics-related content of all articles published in nine highly-respected public health journals in 2006 was extracted. Results: Of 989 primary analyses, 73% of the articles commented on ethics committee approval or exemption, 63% mentioned participant consent and 9% indicated whether or not inducement or compensation was given. 84% of articles mentioned a funding source, (...) but fewer than 4% identified any potential conflict of interest. Reporting rates for committee review and consent were higher for experimental than for observational studies and were comparatively higher in studies conducted among potentially vulnerable populations like children and residents of low income countries. Conclusions: More complete reporting would facilitate the design, evaluation and comparison of future research studies. (shrink)

Successful applications of a conceptually novel setup of Quantum Field Theory, that accounts for all subtheories of the Standard Model (QED, Electroweak Interaction and Higgs, Yang–Mills and QCD) and beyond (Helicity 2), call for a perspective view in a broader conceptual context. The setting is “autonomous” in the sense of being intrinsically quantum. Its principles are: Hilbert space, Poincaré symmetry and causality. Its free quantum fields are obtained from Wigner’s unitary representations of the Poincaré group, with only physical and observable (...) degrees of freedom. A “quantization” of an “underlying” classical theory is not needed. It allows renormalizable perturbation theory with interactions whose detailed structure, and in some cases even the particle content, is predicted by internal consistency. The results confirm and extend observable predictions for the interactions of the Standard Model without assuming a “principle” of gauge invariance. (shrink)

Volume 2 is made up primarily of unpublished material from the Bradley Papers held at Merton College since Bradley’s death in 1924. The 587 pages of this volume are divided into eight sections with an Introduction by the editor and an Appendix: Introduction by Editor 1. MS Book α : a notebook on metaphysical and psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 2. MS BK T ): one notebook on mainly metaphysical topics with Bradley’s index. 3. Two untitled notebooks containing sketches of (...) chapters for Appearance and Reality. 4. MS BK Z one notebook on psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 5. Draft of a reply to Alfred Sidgwick’s article “Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics” in Mind, vol. 3 ns, July 1894 6. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Alexander Shand’s article “Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action” in Mind, vol. 4 ns, October 1895. 7. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Bertrand Russell’s article “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” in Mind, vol. 10 ns, July 1901. 8. Selections of Bradley’s reading notes on works read from 1883–1902, taken from 5 separate notebooks. Appendix: What Bradley Read. This is a chronological list of works for which there is some positive evidence that Bradley read something from them. The evidence used to determine what he read includes “his correspondence, papers and/or publications”. An acknowledgement of receipt and a promise to read a work is not considered adequate evidence that he actually read the work in question. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is not just a (...) mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

Study on logic from an Islamic perspective; includes study on presentation of teachings of Islam according to science and nature.

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The subtitle of “An Austrian Contribution” emphasizes a basic distinction between German and Austrian traditions in the philosophy of fields of science. In S. J. Schmidt’s genuinely German way of writing, one can observe a high emphasis on terminology and a specific arena of heavy philosophical problems that have to be solved in a strictly philosophical manner, whereas the (...) Austrian tradition places its importance on scientific progress, especially in the natural sciences, and on the clarifying, mediating, and self-reflecting role of philosophy within the overall context of scientific evolution. (shrink)

In the last few years there has been a revival of interest in F.H. Bradley and particularly the account of judgment contained in The Principles of Logic. Many of those who discuss Bradley’s theory of judgment mistakenly assume that it can best be seen as a linguistic account. They insist that what Bradley says can be understood as an account of the meaning and reference of words or sentences. In this paper I will argue that Bradley’s theory of judgment is (...) essentially a psychological theory. Judgment is the union of part of the content of an image or other mental particular with our immediate experience. There is no evidence for the linguisitc interpretation and its defenders cannot make sense of Bradley’s discussion of a number of technical points, particularly his criticism of the view that judgment is the synthesis of ideas, and his comments on the idea of “this.” I will also argue that Bradley’s account of judgment cannot be separated from his later metaphysics and is essentially Hegelian in character. To explain Bradley’s theory I will begin where he does, with an examination of the nature of ideas. (shrink)

On the eminence and dignity of parents; in the light of Koran and Hadith (Islamic traditions).

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: I will make the point that radical constructivism von Glasersfeld style unnecessarily plays only a passive or an inactive role. Quite obviously, I want to demonstrate that there is life for radical constructivism outside its seemingly irrelevant function in empirical social research and that it is possible to develop radical constructivism in designs with tangible consequences and effects for the cognitive routines in the social (...) sciences. In short, it is conceivable, despite “Who Conceives of Society?”, that radical constructivism matters. (shrink)

Purpose: Josef Mitterer's essays are considered to be important philosophical advancements of radical constructivism. The main purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to structure the RC landscape and, on the other hand, to investigate the relations of Mitterer's work to radical constructivism in particular and to philosophy in general. Findings: In this short essay focusing on Mitterer's Das Jenseits der Philosophie, I would like to stress two major points. First, Mitterer's book should be considered as one of (...) several contemporary variants of a radical critique of the semantic turn in the philosophy of science that has taken place since the mid-thirties with the works of Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, Hilary Putnam, Alfred Tarski and others. Second, it is by no means clear how to determine the relevance of the new semantic critique for the present and future cognitive status of radical constructivism. The degree of relevance depends crucially on the use of the term "radical constructivism." If radical constructivism, as I will argue, is seen as an umbrella term for a group of empirical research programs, then, by sheer necessity, the relevance can be marginal only. If, however, radical constructivism is viewed as a special form of philosophy of language and/or as a new epistemology, then the importance of Josef Mitterer's approach must be judged within the context of available functional alternatives. Implications: An immediate consequence of this article lies in a renewed emphasis on advancing an empirical research agenda for radical constructivism and in an effective downsizing of radical constructivism as a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Context: The main problem is the rather marginal status of radical constructivism within its core domains of brain research, cognition and learning. Problem: The basic goal is to provide a short history of radical constructivism and its institutionalization processes. Additionally, the article specifies critical conditions that should be met in order for radical constructivism to become a mainstream endeavor. Method: The main methods used are those of comparative historical research. Results: The main results lie in the specification of missing elements (...) that have blocked radical constructivism becoming a mainstream endeavor. Implications: The paper might serve as a common reference for necessary steps to be taken over the following years in order to move radical constructivism out of its current weak position. (shrink)

Not only does Klemmt succeed in showing the importance of Reinhold as a key figure between Kant and Fichte, but he also establishes the originality of his work; especially interesting is his analysis of Reinhold's philosophy of consciousness, which anticipated important tenets of phenomenology. To regard this study as merely historical would be a mistake, for it is an impressive attempt to investigate some of the fundamental principles of theoretical philosophy.--K. H.

Bergler argues for the all-pervasiveness of a repressed psychic masochism. The argument is supported by a great wealth of clinical material. Nevertheless it seems doubtful whether this quite justifies the sweeping thesis. The writing is somewhat loose and the tone of Bergler's attack on his critics unfortunate.--K. H.

Fink attempts to give an introduction to the problem of Being and appearance in the light of the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. There is very little in this volume which is new; Fink's work is hampered by prolixity and by a difficult language which is opaque in spite of attempts to be poetic.--K. H.