In his recent book, the well-known Cypriote scholar K. Hadjioannou comes back to a disputed verse of Nonnus, Dionysiaca 13.432. For a long time the usual text has mentioned two obscure Cypriote heroes, Litros and Lapethos: Κνπριδας δ φλαγγας κσμεε Λτρος γνωρ | εχατης τε Λπηθος. Obviously the second is the legendary eponym of the town of Lapethus . But what are we to say of the first one, Litros? Hitherto the name is unknown, either for a figure or (...) for a city. Nevertheless we know something which is not very different, in the ancient name of Λδρα, Λδρα, previous designation of the modern city of Nicosia, which was for a few centuries the capital of a small kingdom in central Cyprus. Thus, independently, Pierre Chuvin in his study of the geography of Nonnus and the present writer in a detailed discussion of the name of Ledra, etc., both put forward the hypothesis that ‘Λτρος’ is nothing but a light distortion of Λδρος, which could simply be the eponymous hero of the city . As P. Chuvin observes: ‘Les deux formes sont pratiquement homophones: Lapéthos et Lèdros auraient été fabriqués de la même façon’. We thus think that the easy correction here is not misplaced. But now K. Hadjioannou objects that the poet did not allude to the town of Ledra and that the singular κσμεε cannot support two subjects. On the first point I would answer that the poet is not obliged to afford symmetrical allusions, on the second that the verb is here correctly in agreement with the nearest subject . And what does our Cypriote colleague propose? Another kind of correction by which the first hero completely disappears in favour of a new epithet of Lapethos, the text being; κσμεε λνγρς, γνωρ/εχατης τε Λπηθος. The idea is indeed ingenious, but does not convince: the rather negative adjective λνγρς. (shrink)

Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as (...) why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists’ explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success . The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success. (shrink)

This paper raises the questions: 'What do we expect from nursing ethics?' and 'Is the literature of nursing ethics any different from that of medical ethics?' It is suggested that rather than develop nursing ethics as a separate field writers in nursing ethics should take a lead in making the patient the central focus of health care ethics. The case is made for empirical work in health care ethics and it is suggested that a good way of setting about this (...) is to ask practising nurses about the real ethical problems they encounter. (shrink)

The author proposes a method of verification for moral statements. (staff).

Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I critically examine (...) Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions. (shrink)

A partir de son apparemment étrange observation d'une influence cachée des étoiles sur l'action humaine une attentive reconsidération du concept de l'actus humanus de Saint Thomas dans la Prima Secundae révèle une vue plus ample des processus internes à l'agent humain qui contribuent à la spécification individuelle de l'action humaine et, donc, de la liberté humaine. Il semble que parmi les adeptes de la théorie thomiste de l'action, l'influence importante que l'appétit sensible peut exercer en cette direction, tout en restant (...) entièrement caché aux actes conscients de l'intellect et de la volonté de la personne, n'a pas été reconnue jusqu'aujourd'hui. Dans sa théorie de l'action Saint Thomas fournit un cadre solide pour une réflexion ultérieure sur l'influence de l'inconscient dynamique sur la liberté et pour une intégration critique interdisciplinaire des intuitions valides de la psychologie des profondeurs. En plus, il semble que la redécouverte de son concept plus large de l'actus humunus rende possible de repenser à profit certains éléments classique de son éthique. (shrink)

The Catalogue of Palm Leaf Manuscripts kept in the Otani University Library. Otani University Library, Kyoto 1995. lxxxi, 778 pp. No price given.

In Praise of Mount Samanta by Vedeha Thera, Tr. Ann Appleby Hazlewood. Sacred Books of the Buddhists XXXVII, Pali Text Society, London 1986. xiv + 122 pp. £8.95.

Indexes to the Dhammapada. Compiled by Moriichi Yamazaki, Yumi Ousaka and Masahiro Miyao. Pali Text Society, Oxford 1995. vii, 139 pp. £12. ISBN 0-86013-337-0.

The Sutra of Golden Light. Translated by R. E. Emmerick. Second revised edition, Pali Text Society, Oxford 1990. xvi, 116 pp. £10.00.

This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered (...) and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying. (shrink)

Journal of the Pali Text Society, Volume XXV. Ed. by O. von Hinuber & R. F. Gombrich. Oxford 1999. £17.25. ISBN 0 86013 372 9.

Volume 2 is made up primarily of unpublished material from the Bradley Papers held at Merton College since Bradley’s death in 1924. The 587 pages of this volume are divided into eight sections with an Introduction by the editor and an Appendix: Introduction by Editor 1. MS Book α : a notebook on metaphysical and psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 2. MS BK T ): one notebook on mainly metaphysical topics with Bradley’s index. 3. Two untitled notebooks containing sketches of (...) chapters for Appearance and Reality. 4. MS BK Z one notebook on psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 5. Draft of a reply to Alfred Sidgwick’s article “Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics” in Mind, vol. 3 ns, July 1894 6. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Alexander Shand’s article “Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action” in Mind, vol. 4 ns, October 1895. 7. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Bertrand Russell’s article “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” in Mind, vol. 10 ns, July 1901. 8. Selections of Bradley’s reading notes on works read from 1883–1902, taken from 5 separate notebooks. Appendix: What Bradley Read. This is a chronological list of works for which there is some positive evidence that Bradley read something from them. The evidence used to determine what he read includes “his correspondence, papers and/or publications”. An acknowledgement of receipt and a promise to read a work is not considered adequate evidence that he actually read the work in question. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the ontological argument as a theoretical construction that is connected with understanding of the reflexive relationship of thinking and existence. The author concludes that the consistent implementation of this approach requires an appeal to the historically transitory forms of the ontological argument which reconstructs the logic of the evolution of reflexive systems. The ontological argument is considered as a developing theoretical construct. Therefore, theoretical constructs conceptualized as non-classical versions of the ontological argument (...) will constantly re-emerge. Emergence of the first non-classical version of the ontological argument is related to need of overcoming apriority of introduction of the idea of the absolute being which is typical for Cartesianism. This issue was realized in the Kantian doctrine of transcendental ideas, which presented mind as an independent essence that creates its own content. Thus, the metaphysical construction, conditionally referred to as “the moral proof of the existence of God,” is revealed in the paper as a non-classical variant of the ontological argument. However, while Kant could be content with faith in reality of other subjectivity as an object of moral action, Fichte’s scientific doctrine demanded a proof of objective reality of the concept of the other I. This issue was identical to a basic problem of an ontological argument. “The ontological argument of the other I” offered by Fichte was devoid of mysticism as it is indissolubly connected with the disclosure of the social nature of the human subjectivity. The last step in formation of the concept “non-classical version of the ontological argument” was taken in Hegelian philosophy, where the reflexive relations between the multitude of I’s were transformed to reflexive interconnection between God and man. The versions of ontological argument are considered in the paper as necessary stages which any theoretical model of reflexive systems has to pass in its formation. (shrink)

Die Arbeit betrachtet die verschiedenen Ansichten, die über wissenschaftliche Objektivität bestehen: Etwa als Charakteristik einer gesamtwissenschaftlichen Praxis, als Gesamtfortschritt, der durch die Struktur der Institution bestimmt ist, oder als etwas, was auf subjektivem Glauben, subjektivem Verfahren und kollektiven Meinungen begründet ist. Sie betrachtet die Objektivität der Wissenschaft auch in bezug auf den Sinn wissenschaftlicher Behauptungen und bezüglich des allgemeinen erkenntnistheoretischen Hintergrundes. Mit Blick auf einige neuere Thesen innerhalb der Quantenphysik und in der Sprache der Quantenphysik versucht die Arbeit herauszustellen, daß (...) die Praxis der tatsächlichen Wissenschaft über historische und logisch-methodologische Rechenschaftsablegung hinausgeht, um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit in einer kontinuierlich sich erweiternden Erfahrung unter Beweis zu stellen. Wissenschaft als ein systematisches öffentliches Unternehmen, dessen Zweck es ist, Behauptungen über die Natur zu formulieren, erreicht dies durch einen Bedeutungswandel von Objektivität und indem sie neue "Sprachen" übernimmt, die durch solchen Wandel erfordert werden. (shrink)

This is an essay review of Andersen, Barker and Chen's The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.