There is a significant range of ongoing challenges in artificial intelligence dealing with reasoning, planning, learning, perception and cognition, among others. In this scenario, many-valued logics emerge as one of the topics in many of the solutions to some of those AI problems. This special issue presents a brief introduction to the relation between logics and AI and collects recent research works on logic-based approaches in AI.

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the (...) particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that formal analysis and reconstructions may be useful to discuss and shed light on substantive meta-theoretical issues. We proceed here by exemplification, analysing and reconstructing as a case study a paradigmatic biochemical theory, the Monod-Wyman-Changeux theory of allosterism, and applying the reconstruction to the discussion of some issues raised by prominent representatives of the new mechanist philosophy. We conclude that our study shows that at least in this case mechanicism and more traditional (...) accounts are not rivals but complementary approaches. (shrink)

Lines 25–30 of the hypothesis to Euripides′ Hippolytus read as follows.

Therapeutic strategies capable of inducing and enhancing prosthesis embodiment are a key point for better adaptation to and acceptance of prosthetic limbs. In this study, we developed a training protocol using an EMG-based human-machine interface that was applied in the preprosthetic rehabilitation phase of people with amputation. This is a case series with the objective of evaluating the induction and enhancement of the embodiment of a virtual prosthesis. Six men and a woman with unilateral transfemoral traumatic amputation without previous use (...) of prostheses participated in the study. Participants performed a training protocol with the EMG-based HMI, composed of six sessions held twice a week, each lasting 30 mins. This system consisted of myoelectric control of the movements of a virtual prosthesis immersed in a 3D virtual environment. Additionally, vibrotactile stimuli were provided on the participant’s back corresponding to the movements performed. Embodiment was investigated from the following set of measurements: skin conductance response, crossmodal congruency effect, ability to control the virtual prosthesis, and reports before and after the training. The increase in the skin conductance response in conditions where the virtual prosthesis was threatened, recalibration of the peripersonal space perception identified by the crossmodal congruency effect, ability to control the virtual prosthesis, and participant reports consistently showed the induction and enhancement of virtual prosthesis embodiment. Therefore, this protocol using EMG-based HMI was shown to be a viable option to achieve and enhance the embodiment of a virtual prosthetic limb. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis prompted philosophers to think about the different shapes our minds can take as they reach beyond our brains and stretch into new technologies. Some of us rely heavily on the environment to scaffold our cognition, reorganizing our homes into rich cognitive niches, for example, or using our smartphones as swiss-army knives for cognition. But the thesis also prompts us to think about other varieties of minds and the unique forms they take. What are we to make (...) of the exotic distributed nervous systems we see in octopuses, for example, or the complex collectives of bees? In this paper, I will argue for a robust version of the extended mind thesis that includes the possibility of extended consciousness. This thesis will open up new ways of understanding the different forms that conscious minds can take, whether human or nonhuman. The thesis will also challenge the popular belief that consciousness exists exclusively in the brain. Furthermore, despite the attention that the extended mind thesis has received, there has been relatively less written about the possibility of extended consciousness. A number of prominent defenders of the extended mind thesis have even called the idea of extended consciousness implausible. I will argue, however, that extended consciousness is a viable theory and it follows from the same ‘parity argument’ that Clark and Chalmers first advanced to support the extended mind thesis. What is more, it may even provide us with a valuable paradigm for how we understand some otherwise puzzling behaviors in certain neurologically abnormal patients as well as in some nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Los científicos suelen diferenciar entre teorías científicas explicativas y descriptivas. Para poder dar cuenta de esta diferencia es necesario contar con un análisis riguroso de las teorías científicas y la concepción estructuralista es una herramienta metateórica de análisis capaz de brindar los elementos metateóricos requeridos para abordar este tipo de estudios. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar una teoría que trata de dar cuenta de la actividad cooperativa de las proteínas, la teoría de Hill (tanto la originalmente publicada como (...) la presentada en los libros de texto) con el fin de elucidar el concepto de explicación utilizado en este caso. Usually, scientists differentiate between explanatory and descriptive scientific theories. To be able to analyze this difference is necessary to provide a rigorous analysis of scientific theories - the structuralist point of view is a metatheoretic tool capable of offering the metatheoretic elements needed for this. The aim of the present work is to analyze Hill's theory (both as originally published and as presented in textbooks), a theory about the cooperative activity of the proteins, in order to elucidate the concept of explanation used in it. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack argue that children are incapable of reasoning about time until age 5. However, their dual timing perspective does not address non-symbolic timing, or timing in the absence of symbols/language. Given substantial evidence that infants and children are capable of non-symbolic timing, I argue that infants and children are well-tuned timers prior to age 5.

Political Insults proposes a theory of international insult that focuses on interrelations between social identity and power. The book analyses conflicts between the U.S. and North Korea, sovereignty contestations around islands in the Japanese sea, Pussy Riot in Russia, veterans in Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper is about even in downward entailing contexts. Karttunen and Peters (1979) have shown that there are two different sets of implicatures of even in such contexts. They argue that the two sets of implicatures are derived by allowing even to take scope either higher or lower than a negative polarity licenser. Rooth (1985) argues that even is lexically ambiguous, that is, there is a negative polarity even. I argue against Rooth's ambiguity theory and show that within Rooth's theory (...) of focus, a scope theory of even has better empirical coverage. I also answer objections to the scope theory raised by Rooth (1985) and Karttunen and Karttunen (1977). (shrink)

Discussions of patient-centred care and patient autonomy in bioethics have tended to focus on the decision-making context and the process of obtaining informed consent, leaving open the question of how patients ought to be counselled in the daily maintenance of their health and management of chronic disease. Patient activation is an increasingly prominent counselling approach and measurement tool that aims to improve patients’ confidence and skills in managing their own health conditions. The strategy, which has received little conceptual or ethical (...) analysis, raises important questions about how clinicians ought to foster confidence and a sense of control in their patients without exposing them to blame, stigma and other harms. In this paper, we describe patient activation, discuss its relationship to personal responsibility, autonomy and health disparities, and make recommendations regarding its use and measurement. (shrink)

Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body: this is their extended mind thesis (EM). But they maintain that consciousness relies on processing that is too high in speed and bandwidth to be realized outside the body (see Chalmers, 2008, and Clark, 2009). I evaluate Clark’s and Chalmers’ reason for denying that consciousness extends while still supporting unconscious state extension. I argue that their (...) reason is not well grounded and does not hold up against foreseeable advances in technology. I conclude that their current position needs re-evaluation. If their original parity argument works as a defence of EM, they have yet to identify a good reason why it does not also work as a defence of extended consciousness. I end by advancing a parity argument for extended consciousness and consider some possible replies. (shrink)

Gender, age, and culturally specific beliefs are often considered relevant to observed variation in social interactions. At present, however, the scientific literature is mixed with respect to the significance of these factors in guiding moral judgments. In this study, we explore the role of each of these factors in moral judgment by presenting the results of a web-based study of Eastern (i.e., Russia) and Western (i.e., USA, UK, Canada) subjects, male and female, and young and old. Participants ( n = (...) 659) responded to hypothetical moral scenarios describing situations where sacrificing one life resulted in saving five others. Though men and women from both types of cultures judged (1) harms caused by action as less permissible than harms caused by omission, (2) means-based harms as less permissible than side-effects, and (3) harms caused by contact as less permissible than by non-contact, men in both cultures delivered more utilitarian judgments (save the five, sacrifice one) than women. Moreover, men from Western cultures were more utilitarian than Russian men, with no differences observed for women. In both cultures, older participants delivered less utilitarian judgments than younger participants. These results suggest that certain core principles may mediate moral judgments across different societies, implying some degree of universality, while also allowing a limited range of variation due to sociocultural factors. (shrink)

Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or ‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instantiated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the cognitive. In this paper (...) we develop one aspect of Menary’s vehicle externalist theory of cognitive integration—the process of enculturation—to respond to this longstanding objection. We offer examples of how expert mathematicians introduce new symbols to represent new mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood, and we argue that these new symbols have genuine non-derived content, that is, content that is not dependent on an act of interpretation by a cognitive agent and that does not derive from conventional associations, as many linguistic representations do. (shrink)

Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and social phobia (SP) are major anxiety disorders identified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV). They are comorbid, overlap in symptoms, yet present with distinct features (worry in GAD and fear of embarrassment in SP). Both have also been explained in terms of conditioning-based models. However, there is little reasoning currently to believe that GAD in adulthood reflects heightened conditionability or heightened threat processing—though patients with SP may show heightened processing (...) of social threat stimuli. Moreover, the computational architectures that maintain these disorders in adulthood are different. For GAD this may reflect the development of an inefficient “worrying” strategy of emotional regulation. For SP this appears to reflect the atypical processing of self-referential information. (shrink)

W. Dilthey’s program of “criticism of historical reason” was formed in a polemic with the legacy of I. Kant on the basis of transcendental reflection of the data of descriptive psychology. It was focused on understanding the radical difference between the sciences of the spirit and the sciences of nature. Starting from a critical rethinking of Kant's legacy within the boundaries of his own version of the academic philosophy of life, Dilthey began to talk about the fact that the reason, (...) directing the cognitive activity of the subject, is characterized, first of all, not by the theoretical “purity”, but by its involvement in the “open” flow of history, which it gives meaning and sense through language. It interacts with historical experience, which arises through the synthesis of actual events perception in the time flow and memory images with real categories and concepts constructed by the intellect of the human subject. The ability to judge what is happening in history, its assessment in a humanistic perspective, is also considered by Dilthey as inseparable from the work of historical reason. The reason involved in the flow of time and life cannot be a carrier of theoretical “purity” and acts as inherently hermeneutic in its nature. Dilthey presented an interesting analysis of the main levels of hermeneutical procedure - emotional perception, expression and understanding, aimed at comprehension of the diversity of spiritual and cultural worlds in synchrony and diachrony of their existence. Denying the possibility of comprehending the meaning and sense of history by constructing substantialist schemes, he asserted the importance of narrative representation of the past in the light of the present. Dilthey's project of “criticism of historical reason” was based on the idea of the “openness” of the meaning of the past, due to its rootedness in the very way of human existence in time. This idea was inherited and further developed in the horizon of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger and other contemporary thinkers of hermeneutical orientation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a (...) question-begging stance. We propose thereby to modify the criterion in such a way as to exclude the character of the non-virtuous agent from the morally relevant circumstances. Finally, we examine the implications of our proposal for the issue of moral development. (shrink)

Your smartphone is much more than just a phone. It can tell a more intimate story about you than your best friend. No other piece of hardware in history, not even your brain, contains the quality or quantity of information held on your phone: it ‘knows’ whom you speak to, when you speak to them, what you said, where you have been, your purchases, photos, biometric data, even your notes to yourself – and all this dating back years. In this (...) piece I ask whether, given the role they play in our lives, our devices deserve the same legal protections as our brains and bodies? (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es presentar los primeros pasos de una reconstrucción estructuralista de la teoría alostérica MWC. Esta teoría fue presentada en dos artículos publicados en Journal of Molecular Biology, en el primero de ellos “Allosteric proteins and cellular control systems”, de 1963, una versión simplificada, y en el segundo, “On the nature of allosteric transitions: a plausible model”, publicado en la misma revista en 1965, una versión más acabada. En estos trabajos, el ganador del premio Nobel en (...) Fisiología, Jacques Monod, introduce por primera vez un nuevo concepto que revolucionará la bioquímica y biología de la época: el alosterismo. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es poner de manifiesto cómo la ciencia y la filosofía reflexiva son insuficientes para Merleau-Ponty, fenomenólogo que pretende dar con lo que el mundo vivido es. La ciencia no sirve a sus fines porque ha olvidado su raigambre en el universo experimentado por un sujeto y ha construido un supra-mundo susceptible de un conocimiento cierto y evidente. Por su parte, la filosofía reflexiva tampoco le resulta apropiada porque también ha olvidado su cuna en el mundo (...) vivido y, para obtener un conocimiento verdadero de aquello que estudia, se ha centrado únicamente en un "mundo-representación" depurado de cualquier elemento contaminante que imponga limites a un saber plenamente racional. Merleau-Ponty deja de lado ambos procederes y busca un método que le permita contactar con el mundo tal cusí es, en toda su riqueza y esplendor. (shrink)

From the traditional point of view, power and truth are not related. Since 20th century there has been a social and historical breach in conventional assumptions about the relationship between power and truth. On one hand, it is generally accepted that scientific facts are considered artificial, in the sense of being constructed. This assumption neither implied any kind of fraud nor did it mean that they could be created ex-nihilo. But the interpretation of Kuhn as well as the subsequent developments (...) of the Strong Programme, successfully postulates that truth is merely a social issue. Since then, it has been increasingly suspected that any objective or neutral description of society is too difficult, rendering it completely illusory. That is why it is necessary to ask again for the relation between the structures of truth and the social structures of power and what kind of impact they have on contemporary sociological theory. In this paper, it is given two examples of that kind of enterprise related to two major leading sociologists: Bourdieu and Giddens. Desde el punto de vista tradicional, no hay asociación entre poder y verdad. Pero desde el Siglo XX existió un quiebre social e histórico en las presuposiciones convencionales acerca de la relación entre poder y verdad. De un lado, en general se acepta que los hechos científicos son artificiales en el sentido que son construidos y se asume que esto no implica algún tipo de fraude ni significa que ellos son creados ex-nihilo. Pero la interpretación de Kuhn, así como también los desarrollos posteriores del Programa Fuerte, permite postular que la verdad es un asunto puramente social. Desde entonces, se ha sospechado cada vez más que cualquier descripción neutral u objetiva de la sociedad es tan difícil que llega a ser completamente ilusoria. Por eso, es necesario preguntarse nuevamente por la relación entre las estructuras de la verdad y las estructuras sociales del poder y qué tipo de impacto ellas tienen en la teoría sociológica contemporánea. En este trabajo, se discuten dos ejemplos de ese tipo de empeño, relacionado con las obras de los sociólogos Bourdieu y Giddens. (shrink)

The year 2010 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the Recherches de Science Religieuse and provides an opportunity for the journal to explore its past, present, and prospects for the twenty-first century. In order to celebrate the event, this special commemorative issue calls upon authors from many different fields. "Commemoration" involves not only examining the past, however rich it may be, but also taking up the challenge of analyzing the present and reflecting upon the future. In the first section, diverse approaches (...) -- theological, sociological or historical -- are applied to an in-depth diagnosis of the present. The second part is dedicated to memory: the founding years during the modernist crisis and the major stages in the development of the journal under various directors until today, among them, Henri de Lubac and Joseph Moingt. Finally, this special issue is rounded off by a series of broad perspectives tracing out paths for the future of the disciplines at the heart of theology and religious science today, thus remaining faithful to the journal's original mission of "research in movement". (shrink)

JUSTIÇA RESTAURATIVA: UMA ANÁLISE SOCIOLÓGICA DOS FINS QUE OS MEIOS PUNITIVOS NÃO ALCANÇAM.