On the History and Transmission of Lacanian Psychoanalysis addresses key questions about the history and transmission of Lacan's work in North America through discussions with experienced psychoanalysts (who are also trained psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychotherapists). Chris Vanderwees presents conversations with clinicians about their psychoanalytic formation and about the development of Lacanian psychoanalysis in North America over the past several decades. With oral narrative brought out through the technique of free association, then transcribed and annotated, each discussion is a trace of (...) Vanderwees' encounter with each clinician and the result of collaborative efforts involving speech, writing, translation, and transmission. The conversational tone makes these discussions accessible not only for those already well-versed in Lacan's thinking, but also for anyone discovering his work for the first time. The range of contributions spans both French and English-speaking Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Complemented by On the Theory and Clinic of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, this book of conversations conveys the diversity of historical and pedagogical perspectives on theory and practice as inspired by Lacan's system of thought. It will be of great interest to all psychoanalytic practitioners as well as academics and scholars of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Genome editing in livestock could potentially be used in ways that help resolve some of the most urgent and serious global problems pertaining to livestock, including animal suffering, pollution, antimicrobial resistance, and the spread of infectious disease. But despite this potential, some may object to pursuing it, not because genome editing is wrong in and of itself, but because it is the wrong kind of solution to the problems it addresses: it is merely a ‘technological fix’ to a complex societal (...) problem. Yet though this objection might have wide intuitive appeal, it is often not clear what, exactly, the moral problem is supposed to be. The aim of this paper is to formulate and shed some light on the ‘technological fix objection’ to genome editing in livestock. I suggest that three concerns may underlie it, make implicit assumptions underlying the concerns explicit, and cast some doubt on several of these assumptions, at least as they apply to the use of genome editing to produce pigs resistant to the Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome and hornless dairy cattle. I then suggest that the third, and most important, concern could be framed as a concern about complicity in factory farming. I suggest ways to evaluate this concern, and to reduce or offset any complicity in factory farming. Thinking of genome editing’s contribution to factory farming in terms of complicity, may, I suggest, tie it more explicitly and strongly to the wider obligations that come with pursuing it, including the cessation of factory farming, thereby addressing the concern that technological fixes focus only on a narrow problem. (shrink)

This essay discusses methods of pedagogy and educational philosophy stirred up by the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement/Occupy-Hong Kong Movement at the end of 2014. It situates these events as a way to envision a new type of public university. To this end, the essay proposes a model of ‘wandering scholarship,’ in which educators and activists walk through urban environments and use dialogic esthetics to reclaim them as ‘Commons.’ Wandering means a multisensory exploration and learning based on the historical concept of (...) ‘psychogeography,’ a drifting through sites and interpellation of their embedded ideologies. As opposed to traditions of introspective wandering, this kind of ‘dialogic wandering’ is done within groups and encourages people to talk to fellow-walkers or random bystanders. As will be shown, these modes of wandering while addressing publics were pioneered in the 1960s student movements and also adopted in a unique manner by the young activists of the Umbrella Movement. Dialogic wandering le... (shrink)

Current and past pandemics have several aspects in common. It is expected that all members of society contribute to beat it. But it is also clear that the risks associated with the pandemic are different for different groups. This makes that appeals to solidarity based on technocratic risk calculations are only partially successful. Objective ‘risks of transmission’ may, for example, be trumped by risks of letting down people in need of help or by missing out certain opportunities in life. In (...) this paper we argue that a rapprochement of the insights of standpoint epistemology with pandemic science and pandemic policy making may be an important step toward making pandemic science more accurate and pandemic calls for solidarity more effective. (shrink)

Western societies are confronted with a growing number of overweight and obese children. Past studies have pointed to excessive television viewing as one of the causes of this phenomenon. The aim of the current study was to examine the influence of parental mediation and modeling on TV use and obesity among pre-school children. A survey conducted among 608 parents of two-and-a-half to six year olds shows that obese children watch significantly more television, show more affinity towards television and more often (...) have a TV set in their bedroom than normal weight and overweight children. For girls, parental restrictions on television viewing are negatively associated with their BMI. For boys, no similar relationship can be found. This study suggests that taking into account possible differences in television viewing behavior between pre-school boys and girls and paying attention to a wide range of television viewing variables can be fruitful for further research. (shrink)

Texts from the Late Old Babylonian Period. By Seth F. C. Richardson. The Journal of Cuneiform Studies Supplemental Series, vol. 2. Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, 2010. Pp. ix + 221.

We don’t always know why we do the things we do. Some of the greatest stories in the history of mankind are built on that tragic fact of human life . A first important theoretical account of this fact was given by ‘les maîtres du soupçon’ at the end of the 19th century . They argued that unconscious motives, social structures and cultural particularities guide our actions beyond our knowledge, a fortiori beyond our control. The last three decades have witnessed (...) the rise of a new generation of masters of suspicion, this time with a background in experimental psychology. Many of these suspicion-inducing experiments will be discussed throughout the special issue. Let us just mention one paradigmatic study by the psychologists Nisbett and Wilson from 1977. One study will suffice to open up the full range of philosophical questions addressed in the contributions to follow.In the Nisbett and Wilson study people are invited .. (shrink)

This innovative text addresses the lack of literature regarding intersectional approaches to psychoanalysis, underscoring the importance of thinking through race, class, and gender within psychoanalytic theory and practice. The book tackles the widespread perception of psychoanalysis today as a discipline detached from the progressive ideals of social responsibility, institutional psychotherapy, and community mental health. Bringing together a range of international contributions, the collection explores issues of class, politics, oppression, and resistance within the field of psychoanalysis in cultural, theoretical, and clinical (...) contexts. It shows how, in contrast to this misperception, psychoanalysis has been attentive to these ideals from its origins, as well as demonstrating how it continues to be relevant today, through wide-ranging conceptual discussions of the anti-globalisation, Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements. Written in an accessible style, Psychoanalysis, Politics, Oppression and Resistance will be essential reading for practicing psychoanalysts as well as academics and students in a range of humanities and social sciences fields. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIs the question ‘will you regret it if you do this?’ helpful when people face difficult life decisions, such as terminating a pregnancy if a disability is detected or deciding to become a parent? Despite the commonness of the question in daily life, several philosophers have argued lately against its usefulness. We reconstruct four arguments from recent literature on regret, transformative experience and the use of imagination in deliberation. After analysis of these arguments we conclude that the prospect of regret (...) remains a useful deliberative heuristic, provided four conditions are fulfilled. If the prospect of regret is arrived at via reflection on one’s values, in a non-coercive context, when well-informed about factual circumstances, and in a process of self-commitment, the question of what one will regret is a helpful device to get in touch with one’s deepest concerns that give reasons to act in a particular way. (shrink)

Woud, Becker, and Rinck (2008) asked participants to repeatedly push pictures of certain faces away and to pull pictures of other faces towards them using a joystick. Performance in a subsequent affective priming task showed that previously pulled faces evoked more positive implicit evaluations then previously pushed faces. We report five studies in which we failed to find consistent evidence for the effect of approach–avoid training on implicit evaluations. We also failed to reproduce the effect reported by Woud et al. (...) when reanalysing their data. An overall analysis that included our data, the data of Woud et al. and additional data provided by Woud and colleagues also did not reveal a significant effect of approach–avoid training on implicit evaluations. We conclude that the impact of approach–avoid training on implicit evaluations is subject to subtle boundary conditions. (shrink)

Shortly before and during the Second World War, Japanese doctors and medical researchers conducted large-scale human experiments in occupied China that were at least as gruesome as those conducted by Nazi doctors. Japan never officially acknowledged the occurrence of the experiments, never tried any of the perpetrators, and never provided compensation to the victims or issued an apology. Building on work by Jing-Bao Nie, this article argues that the U.S. government is heavily complicit in this grave injustice, and should respond (...) in an appropriate way in order to reduce this complicity, as well as to avoid complicity in future unethical medical experiments. It also calls on other U.S. institutions, in particular the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, to urge the government to respond, or to at least inform the public and initiate a debate about this dark page of American and Japanese history. (shrink)

We argue in this essay that (1) the embryo is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and its ambiguity casts serious doubt on the arguments claiming its full protection or, at least, its protection against its use as a means fo research, (2) those who claim the embryo should be protected as "one of us" are committed to a position even they do not uphold in their practices, (3) views that defend the protection of the embryo in virtue of its potentiality to (...) become a person fail, and (4) the embryo does not have any rights or interests to be protected. Given that many are willing to treat the embryo as a means in other practices, and that human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research holds the potential to benefit many people, one cannot but conclude that hESC research is permissible and, because of its immense promise for alleviating human even obligatory. (shrink)

In the previous chapter, Stephen Levick presents several reasons for thinking that human reproductive cloning would be unacceptable even if it were safe. His main concern is that it is likely to have adverse psychological and social consequences. Levick takes an interesting approach. He discusses five existing situations that are analogous in some respect to human reproductive cloning. In each case he argues that human reproductive cloning is likely to involve either the same or more serious adverse consequences than those (...) associated with the putatively analogous situation. Using analogies is a common method in applied ethics and philosophy. Analogies allow us to think more clearly about situations that are otherwise difficult to imagine, or about which we do not have any empirical information, as in the case of cloning. I will, however, argue that Levick's analogies do not establish the conclusions he wishes to draw from them. (shrink)

This is an in-depth study of two exceptional seals impressed on tablets from late Sukkalmah-early Kidinuid Susa and Haft Tepe. Both seals have exceptionally long inscriptions in Akkadian, mentioning Išme-karāb and Inšušinak, respectively, followed by penalty and curse clauses resembling those used in the economic and legal texts and royal charters of Sukkalmah Susa. Analysis of the inscriptions implies that both seals must have been official seals, used by legal bodies during appeals to the supreme court. The Išme-karāb sealing, which (...) mentions the deities Išme-karāb, escort of the dead to the underworld, and Inšušinak, judge of the dead, evokes divine judgement. The Inšušinak seal has a more secular and “national” character, invoking in the curse formula four important Elamite rulers, including the illustrious Šilhaha. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

A love-based reason theory as a new perspective in the debate on practical reasons. Reasons and obligations pervade our lives. The alarm clock gives us a reason to get up in the morning, the expectations of colleagues or clients give us a reason to do our jobs well, the misery in developing countries gives us a reason to donate money, headaches give us a reason to take an aspirin. Looking for unity in variety, philosophers wonder what makes a consideration count (...) as a reason to do something. The nature and source of practical reasons has been debated intensively over the last three decennia in analytic philosophy. This book discusses the three most influential theories in current debates, referred to as the desire-based, the value-based, and the rationality-based theories of practical reasons. The author argues that all three are defective because they overlook the role of what agents care about. (shrink)

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos ('discarded-created-distinction', from now on d-c-d). I will (...) point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main focus is that the 'revealed beliefs' of its defenders are inconsistent with their 'professed beliefs', more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering. (shrink)

Embryonic stem cell research holds great promise for biomedical research, but involves the destruction of human embryos. Katrien Devolder explores the tension between the view that embryos should never be deliberately harmed, and the view that such research must go forward. She provides an in-depth analysis of major attempts to resolve the problem.

This book brings together new essays that explore the connection between love and reasons. The observation that considerations of love carry significant weight in the deliberative process opens up new perspectives in the classic discussion about practical reasons, and gives rise to many interesting questions about the nature of love’s reasons, about their source and legitimacy, about their relation to moral and epistemic reasons, and about the extent to which love is sensitive to reasons. The contributors to this volume orient (...) questions related to love within the broader context of the contemporary discussion on practical reasons, and move forward the conversation about the normative dimensions of love. _Love, Reason and Morality _will be of interest to philosophers working on issues of normativity, meta-ethics and moral psychology, and especially those interested in the source of practical reasons and the role of attachments in practical deliberation. (shrink)

Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common (...) sense view can be given a principled basis. We first show how existing explanations for the problematic nature of compromise fall short of vindicating the common sense view, before offering our own explanation, which, we claim, comes closer to vindicating that view. We argue that defending a compromise will typically have two epistemic costs: it will corrupt attempts to use the claims of ethicists as testimonial evidence, and it will undermine standards that are important to making epistemic progress in ethics. We end by suggesting that the epistemic costs of compromise could be reduced by introducing a stronger separation between ethical debate aimed at fulfilling the epistemic role of ethics, and ethical debate that aims to directly produce good policy or practice. (shrink)

Many countries or jurisdictions have legally banned human cloning or are in the process of doing so. In some countries, including France and Singapore, reproductive cloning of humans is a criminal offence. In 2005, the United Nations adopted a ‘Declaration on Human Cloning’, which calls for a universal ban on human cloning. The debate on human reproductive cloning seems to have drawn to a close. However, since reproductive cloning of mammals has become routine in several countries, there is reason to (...) believe that at some point in the future, humans will be cloned too. Moreover, even if reproductive cloning will not be possible in the near future, cloning for research and therapeutic purposes is likely to be. -/- This entry describes the most important areas of disagreement regarding the ethics of cloning. I will focus on human cloning (as opposed to animal cloning), since human cloning has been the focus of the cloning debate. (shrink)

AI has numerous applications and in various fields, including the military domain. The increase in the degree of autonomy in some decision-making systems leads to discussions on the possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A central issue in these discussions is the assignment of moral responsibility for some AI-based outcomes. Several authors claim that the high autonomous capability of such systems leads to a so-called “responsibility gap.” In recent years, there has been a surge in philosophical literature (...) around the concept of responsibility gaps and different solutions have been devised to close or bridge these gaps. In order to move forward in the research around LAWS and the problem of responsibility, it is important to increase our understanding of the different perspectives and discussions in this debate. This paper attempts to do so by disentangling the various arguments and providing a critical overview. After giving a brief outline of the state of the technology of LAWS, I will review the debates over responsibility gaps using three differentiators: those who believe in the existence of responsibility gaps versus those who do not, those who hold that responsibility gaps constitute a new moral problem versus those who argue they do not, and those who claim that solutions can be successful as opposed to those who believe that it is an unsolvable problem. (shrink)

Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Internalism and externalism: some terminology 1.1 Introduction 5 1.2 Falk and Frankena 5 1.3 The internalist position modified 9 1.4 The externalist position elaborated 12 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism 15 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism 17 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism 19 1.8 Conclusion 26 Chapter 2 Bernard Williams on practical reasons 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 The internal reason theory 27 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model 29 2.4 Objections against (...) external reasons 40 2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection 41 2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection 44 2.4.3 The obscurity objection 55 2.5 Conclusion 59 Chapter 3 Michael Smith on practical reasons 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 The moral problem 60 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism, and Humean motivation 65 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations 65 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgments 67 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation 70 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons 73 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons 73 3.4.2 The advice model 76 3.4.3 ‘If fully rational’-condition: Smith versus Williams 79 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes 84 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem 88 3.6 Smith’s analysis of normative reasons evaluated 91 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence 92 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective? 94 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality 96 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude 98 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational 100 3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis 102 3.7 Conclusion 106 Appendix 1: Michael Smith between moral realism and moral nihilism 107 Appendix 2: Michael Smith’s fetishism objection against judgment externalism 111 Chapter 4 Derek Parfit on practical reasons 4.1 Introduction 132 4.2 Parfit’s externalism 132 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected 133 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected 135 4.2.3 The no-motivation-fuel objection rejected 136 4.3 Parfit’s value-based reason theory 139 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory 139 4.3.2 Parfit’s argument against reductive desire-based reason views 143 4.3.3 Parfit’s argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views 148 4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory 154 4.4 Parfit’s normative non-naturalism 161 4.4.1 Korsgaard’s criticism of realism 163 4.4.2 Korsgaard’s constructivism 166 4.4.3 Parfit’s criticism of constructivism 168 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated 174 4.5 Conclusion 179 Appendix: Varieties of moral realism 180 Chapter 5 Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons 5.1 Introduction 194 5.2 Frankfurt’s theory of care and love 194 5.2.1 The hierarchical model 195 5.2.2 Care 200 5.2.3 Love 211 5.3 The love-based reason theory 215 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated 225 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural 225 5.4.2 The groundlessness objection 227 5.4.3 The authority of love 239 5.4.4 The objection of normative triviality 244 5.4.5 The love-based reason theory and morality 248 5.5. Conclusion 254 Bibliography 256. (shrink)

Reasons for love: why we can’t do otherwise than love what is lovable Harry Frankfurt famously argues that loving someone is not done for reasons. While focusing on the (plausible) claims that parents need no reasons for loving their children and that it is absurd to ascribe a duty (or reason) to love X to someone who does not happen to love X, he overlooks an aspect of love that does connect it to reasons in a particular way: in daily (...) conversation human beings spend enormous amounts of time and reflection to explaining and trying to understand love. I interpret the omnipresence of ‘love-talk’ as an indication of the nature of love in human beings: we love someone or something for reasons. Drawing on insights from the guise of the good-debate on the nature of desire, I argue that regardless of the infinite variety of things and persons that can be loved, the objects are all loved under the same form: the form of being lovable. The notion of a ‘lovability characterization’ entails a notion of ‘reasons’ that does not require reasons to be universalisable and that allows the loving-for-reasons view to avoid the fungibility-objection. In reply to the objection that the loving-for-reasons view makes love overly rationalistic, I point out that reason should not be understood as an external authority that commands us to do certain things, but as an internal power, integral to who we are, that shapes our conscious life, our mental attitudes and their objects. (shrink)

Inleiding tot het gedachtegoed van de Amerikaanse filosoof.

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

On March 8, 2005, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning in which Member States are called upon toa) protect adequately human life in the application of life sciencesb) prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human lifec) prohibit the application of genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary to human dignityd) prevent the exploitation of women in the application of life sciencese) adopt and implement (...) national legislation to bring into effect paragraphs a to df) take into account the pressing global issues such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which affect in particular the developing countries. a. (shrink)

How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A first approach, which we refer to as “elitist,” is inspired by Joshua Greene’s work in moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have if (...) they were committed to implementing public policies regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second approach, which we refer to as the democratic approach, defended by Francoise Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al., emphasizes the importance of including the public’s expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favored approach—the “enlightened democracy” approach—which attempts to combine the strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. (shrink)

The majority of embryos created in natural reproduction die spontaneously within a few weeks of conception. Some have argued that, therefore, if one believes the embryo is a person (in the normative sense) one should find ‘natural’ reproduction morally problematic. An extension of this argument holds that, if one accepts embryo deaths in natural reproduction, consistency requires that one also accepts embryo deaths that occur in (i) assisted reproduction via in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and (ii) embryo research. In a recent (...) paper in this journal, Timothy Murphy criticises both the initial argument and its extension. Murphy argues that double-effect reasoning can justify embryo deaths both in natural reproduction and IVF, but not in embryo research. Thus, according to Murphy, one can, without being inconsistent, (1) believe the embryo is a person and accept natural reproduction and IVF, and (2) accept natural reproduction and IVF, while rejecting embryo research on the ground that it involves embryo deaths. I show that Murphy's argument is problematic because double effect cannot justify embryo deaths in standard IVF practices. The problem is that the proportionality criterion of double effect is not met by such practices. Thus, Murphy's argument fails to support (1) and (2). An implication of his argument failing to support (2) is that it does not defeat the position I have defended in the past—that if one accepts standard IVF practices one should also accept embryo research, including research with embryos created solely for that purpose. (shrink)

In 2011, Frank Van Den Bleeken became the first detainee to request euthanasia under Belgium’s Euthanasia Act of 2002. This article investigates whether it would be lawful and morally permissible for a doctor to accede to this request. Though Van Den Bleeken has not been held accountable for the crimes he committed, he has been detained in an ordinary prison, without appropriate psychiatric care, for more than 30 years. It is first established that VDB’s euthanasia request plausibly meets the relevant (...) conditions of the Euthanasia Act and that, consequently, a doctor could lawfully fulfill it. Next, it is argued that autonomy-based reasons for euthanizing VDB outweigh complicity-based reasons against doing so, and that, therefore, it is also morally permissible for a doctor to carry out the euthanasia request. (shrink)

Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought (...) into existence even if gene editing had not been employed. Our argument relies on a standard account of comparative benefit which has recently been criticised on the grounds that it succumbs to the so-called ‘pre-emption problem’. We end by considering how our argument would be affected were the standard account revised in an attempt to evade this problem. We consider three revised accounts and argue that, on all three, our critique of the benefit argument stands. (shrink)