Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

The Covid‐19 pandemic has revealed myriad social, economic, and health inequities that disproportionately burden populations that have been made medically or socially vulnerable. Inspired by state and local governments that declared racism a public health crisis or emergency, the Anti‐Racism in Public Health Act of 2020 reflects a shifting paradigm in which racism is considered a social determinant of health. Indeed, health inequities fundamentally rooted in structural racism have been exacerbated by the Covid‐19 pandemic, which calls for the integration of (...) antiracist praxis to promote ethical public health research processes. This commentary describes ways in which antiracist praxis—which emphasizes empowerment of traditionally marginalized populations—offers strategies to explicitly address power imbalance, stigmatization, and other consequences of structural racism in public health research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rhetorical Investigations: Studies in Ordinary Language CriticismJeffrey WalkerRhetorical Investigations: Studies in Ordinary Language Criticism. Walter Jost. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004. Pp. xiii + 346. $55.00, hardcover.As the sixth-century BCE poet Theognis once wrote, "Hearken to me, child, and discipline your wits; I'll tell / a tale not unpersuasive nor uncharming to your heart; / but set your mind to gather what I say; there's no necessity (...) / to do what's not according to your will" (Theognidea 1235–38; my translation). While this poem ostensibly is a pederastic proposition, it is also and more fundamentally (as I have argued elsewhere) a poem about poetry as a rhetorical transaction. Poetry is the poet's act of heart-charming persuasion or seduction; the duty of the audience, the object of the poet's seduction, is to "discipline your wits," that is, to exercise hermeneutic and critical judgment on the way to understanding fully and being persuaded or unpersuaded to think or do as the poet asks (for seduction is not compulsion). Finally, and as Theognis's poetry elsewhere suggests, the audience's act of being-persuaded or unpersuaded ultimately is an enactment of, a rehearsal of, an ethical or intellectual position (stance, schêma) that is on its way (with further, repeated rehearsals) to becoming part of the audience's ethical-intellectual performative repertoire, or in other words its êthos, or what Kenneth Burke would call its identity.This richly researched, densely argued, excellent book by Walter Jost could well be understood as a modern (or postmodern) instantiation of a "Theognidean" rhetorical poetics. At one point early on, for example, Jost invokes Angus Fletcher to sum up the activities of an ordinary-language approach to poetry as "thinking the poem": "taking the poem as an occasion for thought; thinking through the poem; being aware of one's thoughts as one reads the poem; looking for some logic in the poem; allowing the poem to trigger certain lines of thought," and so forth (Fletcher, Colors of the Mind, 111–12; Jost 9–10). This is "disciplining one's wits" to "gather what the poet says" and to follow out its implications on the way to judging what Jost calls "the meaning and quality... of an experienced artifact or event or performance" (10). As Jost develops his theoretical frame, which draws most heavily from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanely Cavell, and Kenneth Burke—as well as a host of others in a basically pragmatist tradition—this becomes an explicitly rhetorical approach to poetry, and specifically to Robert Frost's poetry, understood as an epideictic "showing forth" of thought that invites its audience, like Theognis's addressee, to "think [End Page 178] the poem" through and to form a relationship (whether identificational or contestatory) with the system of topoi that underwrites its judgments.Rhetorical Investigations is divided into two main parts. "Book I," titled "Rhetoric: An Advanced Primer," consists of four chapters that attempt to lay out the conceptual framework for, and to philosophically justify, Jost's rhetorical-hermeneutic approach to poetry, while also setting up Robert Frost as a distinctive exemplar of a "low modernist" practice that demonstrates the central themes of ordinary-language and pragmatist philosophy, essentially by dramatizing them, and that stands as a significant (if under-appreciated) alternative to the "high modernist" mode of Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, and their successors. Frost, in other words (though Jost does not say this explicitly) takes the less-traveled modernist path that Kenneth Burke embarked on in Counter-Statement and pursued for the rest of his career. The key topoi for the framework laid out in these four chapters are: dialectic/dialogue as the medium for an ordinary-language philosophical practice (chap. 1); rhetorical invention as what is missing from "high modernism's" sense of epistemological crisis and anomie (chap. 2); "grammar" as the system of topoi, or commonplaces, that underwrite ordinary language-use and are instantiated by it, and that provide the grounds (what speakers "acknowledge") for deliberation and judgment in practical thought and action (chap. 3); and logic as the implicatures of ordinary-language thought that enable epideictic argument in poetry and that make it something... (shrink)

In this book, Westphal offers an original interpretation of Hegel's moral philosophy. Building on his previous study of the role of natural law in Hume's and Kant's accounts of justice, Westphal argues that Hegel developed and justified a robust form of civic republicanism. Westphal identifies, for the first time, the proper genre to which Hegel's Philosophical Outlines of Justice belongs and to which it so prodigiously contributes, which he calls Natural Law Constructivism, an approach developed by Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and (...) Hegel. He brings to bear Hegel's adoption and augmentation of Kant's Critique of rational judgment and justification in all non-formal domains to his moral philosophy in his Outlines. Westphal argues that Hegel's justification for the standards of political legitimacy successfully integrates Rousseau's Independence Requirement into the role of public reason within a constitutional republic. In these regards, Hegel's moral and political principles are progressive not only in principle, but also in practice. Hegel's Civic Republicanism will be of interest to scholars of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, Hegel, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy. (shrink)

Picking up the question of what FLaK might be, this editorial considers the relationship between openness and closure in feminist legal studies. How do we draw on feminist struggles for openness in common resources, from security to knowledge, as we inhabit a compromised space in commercial publishing? We think about this first in relation to the content of this issue: on image-based abuse continuums, asylum struggles, trials of protestors, customary justice, and not-so-timely reparations. Our thoughts take us through the different (...) ways that openness and closure work in struggles against violence, cruel welcomes, and re-arrangements of code and custom. Secondly, we share some reflections on methodological openness and closure as the roundtable conversation on asylum, and the interview with Riles, remind us of #FLaK2016 and its method of scattering sources as we think about how best to mix knowledges. Thirdly, prompted by the FLaK kitchen table conversations on openness, publishing and ‘getting the word out’, we respond to Kember’s call to ‘open up open access’. We explain the different current arrangements for opening up FLS content and how green open access, the sharedit initiative, author request and publisher discretion present alternatives to gold open access. Finally drawing on Franklin and Spade, we show how there are a range of ‘wench tactics’—adapting gifts, stalling and resting—which we deploy as academic editors who are trying to have an impact on the access, use and circulation of our journal, even though we do not own the journal we edit. These wench tactics are alternatives to the more obvious or reported tactic of resignation, or withdrawing academic labour from editing and reviewing altogether. They help us think about brewing editorial time, what ambivalence over our 25th birthday might mean, and how to inhabit painful places. In this, we respond in our own impure, compromised way to da Silva’s call not to forget the native and slave as we do FLaK, and repurpose shrapnel, in our common commitments. (shrink)

This book is written for the non-philosophy major taking 'Contemporary Moral Issues' or 'Intro to Ethics' courses. It provides a method to research any complex moral issue in hundreds of print, periodical, and Internet research sources, and gives a model of the method applied to the question of capital punishment.

Jack Goody’s work on the origins, spatial extent and defining characteristics of modernity has vigorously questioned claims that only European history led to assorted modern characteristics: capitalism, science, democracy, romantic love, and inwardly-motivated personal restraint. He argues that many societies which experienced the Bronze Age urban revolution share certain important material similarities (and some differences) which set them apart from others, and are best understood by constructing an analytical grid rather than categorical stages. With respect to alleged affective differences, Goody (...) takes a more strongly relativist stance, rejecting any developmental divide in the prevalence of romantic love, internalized self-discipline, etc. These useful steps nonetheless generate new problems. One concerns the relationship between material/technical changes, which seem to suggest a few very general historical periods (one marked by early metallurgy, writing, etc., and another by the modern energy revolution), and affective traits, which have no history in this schema. A second concerns periodization itself; while agreeing that periods defined by the experience of one region (e.g. a feudal era) are usually unhelpful, some general terms (such as early modern) do seem essential for conceptualizing developments that, though less epochal than writing or fossil fuels, are nonetheless important. (shrink)

Few if any of Kant’s critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled ‘the Moral World View’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to ‘the moral world view’. I concentrate on five of Hegel’s main objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics. First, Kant’s problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) (...) is contrived. Kant denies that there is any inherent connection between acting rightly and being happy, but his denial depends on his defining happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, rather than in terms of achieving ends in general. Second, Kant’s view of moral motivation is contrived; he ultimately admits that we cannot resolve to act without taking inclinations into account. (We cannot resolve to act apart from the matter of our maxim.) Third, Kant’s idea about perfecting our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Kant defines virtue, and evidence of virtue, in terms of overcoming inclinations. Inclinations die with the body. Therefore there can be neither virtue nor evidence of virtue after death. Fourth, Kant’s view of the autonomy of moral agency is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kant’s moral principles cannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances because he supplies inadequate guidance for classifying acts. I conclude that Hegel’s objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics are sound, and I show that the problems Hegel raised against Kant’s account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora O’Neill’s Constructions of Reason. (shrink)

The complementary deaths of the thinking subject and of the citizen subject -- Producing a Marxist concept of liberation -- Postpolitical politics and global capitalism -- The exacerbation of uneven development : analysis of the current -- The possibility of a new state I : delinking -- Models of liberation I : the politics of identity -- Models of liberation II : the politics of subjectivity -- Models of liberation III : the politics of the event -- Models of liberation (...) IV : the religious transcendent -- Models of liberation V : nomad politics -- The possibility of a new state II : Heterotopia -- Prospects for the new political subject and liberation. (shrink)

This article grew out of a profound disinclination to make the kind of comment that I was invited to make on Angus Fletcher's article in a previous issue [June 1975]. I felt that such a writer as Mr. Fletcher, who clearly understands me, and, more important, himself, ought to be allowed the last word on both subjects. Besides that, I have a rooted dislike of the "position paper" genre. In all arts, adhering to a school and issuing group (...) manifestoes and statements of common aims is a sign of youthfulness, and to some degree of immaturity; as a painter or writer or other creative person grows older and acquires more authority, he tends to withdraw from all such organizations and become simply himself. Others in the same field become friends or colleagues rather than allies. I see no reason why that should not be the normal tendency in criticism and scholarship also. About twenty years ago I was asked, in a hotel lobby during an MLA conference, "What is your position relative to Kenneth Burke?" I forgot what I mumbled, but my real answer was, first, that I hadn't the least idea and, second, that anyone who could really answer such a question would have to be a third person, neither Burke nor Frye. Northrop Frye's contribution to contemporary thought has been discussed by prominent critics in Northup Frye in Modern Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute . The most comprehensive bibliography of his publications and of commentaries on them has been compiled by Robert D. Denham in Northup Frye: An Enumerative Bibliography . Angus Fletcher's interpretation of Professor Frye's works, "The Critical Passion," appeared in the June 1975 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

In this article I challenge the widely held assumption that human culture is inherited by means of social learning. First, I address the distinction between “social” learning and “individual” learning. I argue that most cultural ideas are not acquired by one form of learning or the other, but from a hybrid of both. Second, I discuss how individual learning can interact with niche construction. I argue that these processes collectively provide a non-social route for learned ideas to be inherited and (...) cumulatively modified. I conclude that human culture is not inherited by social learning alone; the capacities to learn from and modify our environments also play a significant role. (shrink)

Der lebende Organismus stellt einen bestimmten, individuellen Teil des Universums dar, indem er seine Selbständigkeit abgetrennt von dem übrigen Universum erhält, durch den Teilungseffekt, welcher durch die Anordnung seiner Teile bestimmt wird. Es ist anerkannt, dass die Teilung nicht vollständig ist, jedoch eine beschränkte gegenseitige Beziehung zulässt. Es ist auch anerkannt, dass der Grad der Organisation in einer verwandten Reihe sich ändert von den tiefen Verwickelungen der einfachen Zelle zu den mannigfachen Abwandlungen wie sie beim Menschen auftreten. Die Auffassung von (...) effektiver Teilung ist ausserdem auch fest und substantiell auf der Tatsache begründet, die durch das Vorhandensein der Plasmamembran und Grenzflächen kolloidaler Aggregaten gegeben ist. Betont ist die dynamische Natur der charakteristischen Gleichgewichtszustände und es wird aufmerksam gemacht auf die kontinuierliche Bildung von effektiven Teilungen bei verschiedenen Gleichgewichtszuständen. Weitere Untersuchung der Bedeutung dieser Teilungen ergibt viele interessante Folgerungen. Schwierigkeiten finden sich, wenn man eine derartige Beschreibung auf geistige Phänomena ausdehnt. Zwar bestehen grundlegende Übereinstimmungen, aber es ist schwer sie genau zu definieren. Es ist klar, dass eine Synthese dieser Art notwendigerweise unvollständig ist, aber es schien wertvoll den Versuch zu machen, L'organisme vivant est présenté ici comme une partie définie et individualisée de l'univers maintenant son individualité propre au moyen de „l'effet de partition” déterminé par l'arrangement de ses parties. Il est entendu que la partition n'est pas complète mais permet encore des relations réciproques mais limitées. Il est reconnu aussi que le degré d'organisation varie dans le cours d'une série, des complexités profondes de la cellule aux innombrables modifications exhibées par l'organisme humain. Le concept de la partition effective est basé solidement sur l'évidence présentée par la membrane plasmatique et les limites de phases dans les aggrégations colloidales. De plus il est important de noter spécialement la nature dynamique des équilibres caractéristiques et l'on ne saurait manquer d'attirer l'attention sur la formation continue de partitions effectives aux différents niveaux d'équilibre. L'étude ultérieure de la signification de ces partitions présente un grand nombre d'implications intéressantes. Il est à noter que des difficultés sont rencontrées quand on essaie d'inclure en une description de ce genre les phénomènes mentaux et psychiques. Des stabilités fondamentales existent, mais elles sont difficiles à définir avec précision. Il est évident du reste au lecteur qu'une synthèse telle que celle-ci est nécessairement incomplète mais néanmoins intéressante à faire. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Categories and Concerning Interpretation, translated and with commentary.