For sociologists, interpretations of cultural objects, whether grouped into genres or taken individually, are intermediate steps toward understanding more fully the contexts in which they are produced. This does not deny the satisfaction implicit in grasping the significance of aspects of objects themselves; I hope that the analysis I have presented lends viewing the Sangatsu-dō sculptures a degree of comprehension, and pleasure, not present before. The ultimate test, however, and the justification for undertaking any sociological examination of cultural objects, is (...) the usefulness of the resulting account in confirming or rejecting ideas about the social conditions surrounding their production. The important question in judging the appropriateness of examining individual objects is therefore not whether sociologists (as opposed, for example, to art historians) ought to concern themselves with such analysis; it is whether such analyses increase the ability of objects to serve as evidence in investigations of interesting social phenomena. My goal is not therefore to supplant generic analysis with a focus on individual objects: it is as possible to fetishize the study of the object as it is to ignore its potential. In fact, it is most useful to see the two approaches as complementary, making possible fuller analyses than each can enable separately. We would do well to take more seriously the benefits of locating objects in the contexts in which people deal with them most commonly: as distinct elements in more inclusive fields, in which meaning and appeal are closely tied to difference. (shrink)

This brief 1994 book review essay (5500 words) examines Telford Taylor's memoir, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992). The review is a personal one, set against two things - the author's work, while reading Taylor's memoir, in Iraq for Human Rights Watch leading a forensic team excavating Kurdish victims of the 1988 al-Anfal campaign, and the diplomatic discussions leading to the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. The essay argues that the Nuremberg trials, according to Taylor, had (...) a certain deflationary emotional affect - deliberately ratcheting down the emotions of what had occurred to the limited world of the courtroom. It was able to do that because the WWII allies had been willing to pay the price of victory and had 'earned' the right to conduct a trial. The Yugoslavia tribunal, by contrast, and at that time, was premised on a claim to universal justice that did not depend upon the willingness of its sponsors to intervene in the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia. "Nuremberg was a lovely hood ornament," said one of the author's unnamed sources, a senior European military judge advocate, "on the ungainly vehicle that liberated Western Europe, but it was not a substitute for D-Day.". (shrink)

Jules Coleman has shown that positivism’s pedigree thesis has a semantic sense and an epistemic sense. The semantic sense states the conditions a proposition must satisfy in order to be law. The epistemic sense constitutes a standard that can be used to identify the community’s law. In this article, I argue the epistemic sense is considerably more modest than has often been supposed. At most, it provides a means for conclusively identifying those legislative utterances that give rise to statutory law. (...) Accordingly, it is false that the pedigree thesis provides a test for deciding even questions of settled law. (shrink)

Explores the history, culture, and lifestyle of Alaska's Aleutian Islands and features dozens of full-color photographs of the region's natural and man-made features.

Report on Charles Sanders Peirce and his contributions to a newspaper, includes yearly breakdowns of his contributions, analysis of his writings, his contributions to philosophy, and more.

‘The Strong Arm of the Law’ seeks to explain how the identification with military power that is produced through corporate mass mediated spectacles such as bodybuilding threatens democratic identifications. What is more, the militarized body aims at ever-greater control over the physical world yet results only in evergreater estrangement from it. The article begins by illustrating the martial dimensions of the bodybuilder’s body. Then, it reveals the extent to which the built body promises safety, security, and freedom while contributing to (...) the militarization of civil society – a process at odds with democratization. Next, it demonstrates the logic behind the bodybuilder’s identification and appeal as not merely soldier but weapon. The article concludes by raising the possibility of imagining the democratized body. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of a broad class of biomedical theories which I have termed "middle-range theories." I define them and relate the nature of biomedical theorizing to other investigations, such as a recent inquiry by the National Academy of Sciences. I also suggest that some of the knowledge representation tools from artificial intelligence may give us a purchase on this type of biological theorizing, and try to show in a rather preliminary and exploratory manner by using (...) the lac operon model of genetic control, what some of those AI applications, such as frames and semantic nets, might look like in this context. Finally, I suggest some difficulties, such as the non-monotonicity of reasoning, which such tools may generate. (shrink)

I comment on Amartya Sen's study of the relations between the analysis of freedom and the theory of social choice. Two of his themes are analysed with regard to their contribution to an analytic understanding of the issues. These are: (1) the multiple interpretations of the concept of ‘preferences’ as a foundation for the formal conceptualizations of social choice and freedom; and (2) some issues in the formalization of freedom as a value to be compared with outcomes. Under (2), I (...) mainly point out some difficulties in the existing analyses and mildly support a ‘flexibility’ interpretation of freedom that I have advanced earlier. I conclude with some observations drawn from history and literature which complicate the value bien-pensant thinkers are prone to place on freedom. (Published Online February 16 2006). (shrink)

The present paper proposes to discuss three passages in Tacitus, Histories 3 where current interpretations have led to difficulties which can be shown to be baseless so soon as it is realized that Tacitus is willing on occasion to sacrifice truth and clarity to stylistic effect. In each of these passages the same literary device lies at the root of the matter, a device which may be labelled ‘die grouping of participles’: the juxtaposition of participles in a sentence to die (...) detriment of strict chronological order. (shrink)

In this brief essay, I attempt to reply to Wilfrid Waluchow’s critique of my positivist theory of legal obligation, which appear in his contribution to this volume, Lessons from Hart. Waluchow argues, with insight and elegance, that my theory fails to distinguish between the internal and external point of view, and gives an account of legal obligation from the external point of view. I attempt to rebut this interesting criticism by arguing that the distinction between the internal and external point (...) of view was made inside Hart’s analysis of the concepts central to law, and that I am attempting to give an account from the same point of view that Hart takes when he analyzes legal concepts —that of the methodology of traditional conceptual analysis.Resumen:En este breve ensayo, intento responder a la crítica de Wilfrid Waluchow sobre mi teoría positivista de la obligación jurídica, crítica que aparece en su colaboración de este número, Lessons from Hart. Waluchow sostiene, con perspicacia y elegancia, que mi teoría fracasa al no distinguir entre el punto de vista interno y externo, y que ofrece una explicación de la obligación jurídica desde el punto de vista externo. Intento refutar esta interesante crítica al argumentar que la distinción entre el punto de vista interno y externo fue hecho dentro del análisis de Hart de los conceptos centrales del derecho y que yo intento proporcionar una explicación desde el mismo punto de vista que toma Hart cuando analiza conceptos jurídicos, el de la metodología tradicional del análisis conceptual. (shrink)

According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's (...) version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world. (shrink)