Over the past few years we have witnessed a sharp resurgence in feminist activism as young women have become increasingly interested in feminist ideas as a means of making sense of their lives. This resurgence in feminist practice is evidenced by the formation of myriad groups and networks across Britain and the initiation of various feminist projects and campaigns, reported regularly and widely in local and national media. This article examines the renaissance of this new feminism through the example of (...) one of the most active and publicly visible organisations, UK Feminista. It draws on ethnographic research into young women’s feminist activism, exploring the emergence of UK Feminista as part of this new wave of feminist activism in Britain. We argue that the wave metaphor has multifarious meanings and that to understand how the political practice of a small feminist organisation contributes to the amplification of this wave of feminist activism it is helpful to draw on concepts developed within social movement theory such as cycles of protest, repertoires of action and collective identities. We show how UK Feminista mobilises young women and provides resources to existing and new feminist organisations and activist groups, commenting particularly on its use of the Internet and social media as a mobilising device. We explore the role of the Internet in young women’s engagement with feminism, the forms of activism in which they take part and the importance of feminist cultural memory to the construction of a collective feminist identity. Our analysis reveals the significant part played by a small mobilising structure, UK Feminista, in the resurgence of feminist activism in the UK. (shrink)

I. Professor William L. Rowe begins an interesting paper on the Cosmological Argument by stating that his ‘purpose …is not to resurrect it’ but ‘to uncover, clarify, and examine some of the philosophical concepts and theses essential to the reasoning exhibited in the argument’. However, in the concluding pages of his paper, Rowe is at some pains to show that his discussion does at least demonstrate that the Cosmological Argument is beyond the reach of criticisms levelled against it in the (...) works of its classical critics, Hume and Kant and their modern-day counterparts. To quote his concluding remark: ‘Like most important philosophical arguments, it appears that the Cosmological Argument is neither as good as its supporters have claimed it to be nor as bad as its critics have believed.’ Now I have long suspected that some such estimate of the Cosmological Argument was correct; however I do not think that Rowe's discussions in his paper establish his contention that the reports of the death of the Cosmological Argument have been premature. Nevertheless, Rowe's uncovering of the reasoning that lies behind the argument does have the merit of laying bare the precise point from which, as well as the direction in which, the defence of the argument should proceed if we are to truly make some headway on this hoary topic. In what follows, I will first try to show why I think Rowe's discussion fails to establish his conclusion and thereafter try to give the outline of a more successful strategy for arriving at the same conclusion. (shrink)

MY PAPER EXAMINES THE ’VIOLATION’ CONCEPT OF THE MIRACULOUS, INVOLVING THE OCCURRENCE OF AN EVENT RULED OUT BY A LAW OF NATURE. ANY BELIEF IN THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH AN EVENT IS IRRATIONAL, IN THE SENSE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE IRRATIONAL FOR YOU TO BELIEVE AT THIS MOMENT THAT YOU WERE NOT READING THIS ABSTRACT BUT WERE HALLUCINATING. TO SHOW THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS IRRATIONAL TO BELIEVE IN MIRACLES, ONE MUST ASSERT THAT TO KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THAT AN (...) EVENT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE, IS NOT TO KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, ON GROUNDS THAT ITS OCCURRENCE DOES NOT INVOLVE A SELF-CONTRADICTION. BUT SUCH A PREMISE LEADS TO A FORM OF GENERAL SKEPTICISM WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE EVER TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY EVENT HAD OCCURRED. (shrink)

In a previous article, Professor abelson contended that the mind-Body identity theory was 'mathematically impossible' inasmuch as the number of possible mental states of a finite thinking organism are infinite, While the number of possible bodily states of such an organism are necessarily finite. I argue that this refutation does not succeed because although it is true that a finite brain can have only a finite number of brain states, Abelson had not demonstrated that there was a limitation on what (...) type of brain state could be generated by a finite brain. Thus, For instance, Although the number of natural numbers that such a brain could think of was necessarily finite, This in itself did not militate against the possibility of the brain producing a brain state corresponding to any natural number, Out of a possible infinite set, That can be thought of. (shrink)

Few people would care to deny, whether within India or without, that Buddha is the greatest Indian of all times. Whether from the standpoint of the purity of his life, the daring originality and novelty of his thought, or the extent of his influence in shaping the culture of the world, it would be hard to beat the record of Buddha. Even making every allowance for the common idea that no man is a prophet in his own land, it is (...) difficult to believe that for the last thousand years Buddha has been practically an exile from the land of his birth. It is nothing short of an irony of history, and nothing short of a tragedy for India, that the great unifying force that he represented in his time and does represent even to-day has been allowed to run waste and the great moral stamina that he sought to supply failed in its historic mission. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:104 COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR TWEYMAN ' S 'HUME ON EVIL' Philo concludes his long and celebrated debate with Cleanthes on the problem of evil (Parts X and Xl of Hume's Dialogues) with the assertion that the "true conclusion" to be drawn from the "mixed phenomena" in the world is that "the original source" of whatever order we find in the world is "indifferent" to matters of good and evil. (...) From what Philo says immediately thereafter it is clear that by the phrase "The true conclusion is..." he does not mean 'The truth is...' but rather something like 'The conclusion best supported by the available evidence is....' (D 212) Now according to both Nelson Pike and Stanley Tweyman, the claim made by Philo in these passages involves him in a shift or departure from the procedure he adopted in earlier dialogues when he examined the design argument set forth by Cleanthes. It is claimed that whereas in the earlier dialogues Philo emphatically professed a sceptical outlook — "the view requiring that one embrace no metaphysical position of one's own" (to quote Nelson Pike ) — in the quoted passage he seems to abandon this scepticism in favor of embracing what amounts to being a metaphysical position in natural theology. Pike thinks that this alleged shift is only an apparent one, that the central import of these passages is sceptical rather than metaphysical, and that here, as elsewhere in the earlier dialogues, Philo's sole purpose in offering a more plausible counter-hypothesis is to show that Cleanthes' hypothesis is false. Tweyman, on the other hand, argues that the shift is a very real one and that Hume does indeed "intend Philo's conclusion in Part XI to be a truth in natural theology [.]... Philo is 105 not arguing as a sceptic; rather he is employing the hypothetico-deductive method for testing Cleanthes' 2 hypothesis. " Let me say at once that I agree with Tweyman, as against Pike, that in these passages Philo does claim to put forward a truth Jji natural theology, and I also agree with just about everything that Tweyman says in his paper concerning the proper interpretation of Philo's views in Parts X and XI leading up to this conclusion. I follow the lead of those scholars who, at least since Kemp Smith, have argued that Philo's whole purpose in demonstrating such "truths" is to discredit natural theology in the eyes of a true Christian believer by dramatizing the enormous gulf between the very attenuated form of theism ("diaphonous deism" one scholar calls it), which is the most one can hope to get out of Cleanthes' experimental approach to religion, and the claim of Christian theism to which Cleanthes aspires. But I do not accept the view that Philo's claim in these dialogues represents any sort of sudden departure (and certainly not a "fundamental methodological difference") from his critical stance against the design argument in earlier dialogues. What I hope to show below is that not only does this view distort what Philo does in the earlier dialogues, but it also distracts our attention from the true nature of Hume's achievement in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues. (Incidentally, I will assume throughout the sequel that Kemp Smith's identification of Hume with Philo is essentially correct. ) It would indeed be extremely paradoxical, in the face of Philo's famous (or notorious) peroration at the end of Part VIII proclaiming the "complete triumph of the sceptic" in regard to "all religious 106 systems," to raise any doubts about Philo's acceptance of the sceptical import of his own earlier arguments. But this still leaves unsettled the question as to what sort of scepticism it is whose triumph Philo proclaims at this point and whether it is inconsistent with the conclusion he reaches at the end of his discussion of evil. One would have hoped that at this late stage in the scholarship on the Dialogues, if there is one issue on which all of us could agree it is that Philo at no time in the Dialogues takes the (easy) Pyrrhonian line against Cleanthes' "hypothesis of experimental theism." I mention this because at several places... (shrink)

IN the final section of his chapter on ‘Perception’ in The Problem of Knowledge, Ayer makes the statement that ‘The failure of phenomenalism does not mean, however, that there is no logical connection of any kind between the way physical objects appear to us and the way they really are’. To prove his contention, he sets out ‘a pair of limiting cases’ of conditions in which the truth of premises referring exclusively to ‘appearance’ would allegedly afford logical guarantees for the (...) existence, or the non-existence, of physical objects. In this paper I wish to raise some serious reservations concerning the viability of the second of these two limiting conditions, which reads. (shrink)

IN this note I propose to make some general remarks concerning the analytical forays carried out into moral discourse by some leading figures in the modern ‘linguistic’ tradition. The philosophers I am going to speak of, may all be said to be attempting some sort of ‘descriptive’ analysis, but my thesis is that philosophers such as Toulmin and Baier are attempting something that is significantly different from what a philosopher such as Nowell-Smith is attempting. I will suggest, in the following (...) section, that the expression—‘the logic of moral discourse’—seems to be understood by these two groups of linguistic philosophers in two different ways and that one of these ways involves a more ambitious claim, than does the other, on behalf of the philosopher embarking upon a conceptual analysis of moral discourse. The manner in which, it seems to me, Toulmin and Baier understand this expression is the one that involves the more ambitious claim. In the final section of this paper I suggest that the more ambitious claim involves overloading the so-called Linguistic method to force it do a job that it seems at least not suited to perform. (shrink)

IT has been some time now since anyone professing himself to be a phenomenalist has characterized physical objects as ‘logical constructions out of sense-data’ in the strict sense of this expression. If he is to be justified in applying the expression in the strict sense, the phenomenalist must demonstrate that there exists a relation of mutual entailment between a statement implying the existence of a physical object and a statement referring exclusively to our ‘sense-experiences’. As a matter of historical fact, (...) no phenomenalist has ever succeeded in doing this; and it is now generally acknowledged, even by those who still wish to adhere to some form of a phenomenalistic analysis of physical object statements, that there are difficulties in principle why the reductivist programme of the early phenomenalists cannot be carried out. The modern-day phenomenalist, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls in his predecessors’ position, tends to regard physical objects as fruitful and convenient theoretical constructions for interpreting and predicting our sense-experiences. Thus, although still committed to the view that physical objects are ‘constructed’ out of sense-data, he is no longer committed to the thesis of a strict logical equivalence between statements about objects and statements about experiences. Professor A J Ayer, perhaps the foremost exponent of this type of view today, put the matter this way not so long ago. (shrink)

My attention in this paper will be focused almost exclusively on the interpretation of Part III of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion suggested by Professor Nelson Pike at the very close of his excellent recent commentary on that enduring classic. 1 As I will show briefly in Section II below, Pike's interpretation of Part III emerges from the wider context of his quarrel with Kemp Smith in regard to the final outcome of these Dialogues . I find much in Pike's (...) commentary to applaud and to agree with, especially in its earlier sections, but on this whole question of Hume's final position in the Dialogues , I find his views less than convincing. But in this paper I will confine myself to showing what I think is wrong with his reading of Part III, and no more. 2 In particular, I will make no effort to challenge Pike's disagreement with Kemp Smith in regard to the final dialogue. Though Pike himself regards Part III as crucial, I am well aware that to make anything like a successful case against the kind of interpretation he favours of the upshot of the Dialogues much more would have to be done than I attempt in this paper. I submit this attempt, then, in partial fulfillment of a larger task to be completed at some future time. (shrink)

A Student of ethics cannot but be struck by some fundamental difference of outlook in the ethics of the East and the West. This has a particular bearing on the problem of the relation of the individual to society. In practice this has given rise to a question of supreme importance to every thinking man: is an individual completely subservient to society, or is society completely subservient to the demands of individuality? I.e., is the moksha of any individual impossible till (...) all the needs of society have been completely satisfied, or is an individual free to use or not to use society as a field for his own spiritual expansion? There is no doubt a fundamental discrepancy in these outlooks as thus conceived, and the problem is : can we reconcile them? (shrink)

The author sides with the linguistic philosophers in that to analyse 'moral reasoning' is to provide a conceptual description of a prescriptive or normative area of language. He considers the question of why we should adopt a "moral point of view" in terms of toulmin (who thinks it is a meaningless question) and baier and nelson (who think it is legitimate). The author argues that it is a crucial question which must be answered. He concludes that baier has not proven (...) that the normative criteria of justification involved in morality constitute a question for the philosopher. (wstaff). (shrink)

Donna Haraway views being a cyborg rather than a ‘goddess’ desirable. This feminist slogan can be seen in terms of the democratising power of a hybrid identity facilitated by technology as a substantial alternative to traditional notions of gendered identity. This paper aims to study S. B. Divya’s 2021 novel Machinehood to analyse how technology and identity are tied up in the context of the novel. The paper benefits from the insights from critical posthumanism by analysing how the transformation into (...) a cyborg is problematised by the moral and ethical overtones facilitated by dakinis (mythological figures in Buddhism). While providing tactical advantage, cyborg may become the negation of one’s gender and flesh. The cyborg has been viewed as a capitalist desire. Thus, a cyborg society benefits from the transformative acts that resist such erasure and preserve one’s sense of identity rooted in their body. (shrink)

Donna Haraway views being a cyborg rather than a ‘goddess’ desirable. This feminist slogan can be seen in terms of the democratising power of a hybrid identity facilitated by technology as a substantial alternative to traditional notions of gendered identity. This paper aims to study S. B. Divya’s 2021 novel Machinehood to analyse how technology and identity are tied up in the context of the novel. The paper benefits from the insights from critical posthumanism by analysing how the transformation into (...) a cyborg is problematised by the moral and ethical overtones facilitated by dakinis (mythological figures in Buddhism). While providing tactical advantage, cyborg may become the negation of one’s gender and flesh. The cyborg has been viewed as a capitalist desire. Thus, a cyborg society benefits from the transformative acts that resist such erasure and preserve one’s sense of identity rooted in their body. (shrink)

What role does love--of cinema, of cinema studies, of teaching and learning--play in teaching film? For the Love of Cinema brings together a wide range of film scholars to explore the relationship between cinephilia and pedagogy. All of them ask whether cine-love can inform the serious study of cinema. Chapter by chapter, writers approach this question from various perspectives: some draw on aspects of students' love of cinema as a starting point for rethinking familiar films or generating new kinds of (...) analyses about the medium itself; others reflect on how their own cinephilia informs the way they teach cinema; and still others offer new ways of writing with a love of cinema in the age of new media. Together, they form a collection that is as much a guide for teaching cinephilia as it is an energetic dialogue about the ways that cinephilia and pedagogy enliven and rejuvenate one another. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:155. REMARKS ON P. S. WADIA" S 'PHILO CONFOUNDED' In responding to Professor Wadia's paper in McGiIl Hume Studies, I will attempt to show why his analysis of the illustrative analogies in Part III of the Dialogues fails to capture what it is that Cleanthes sought to accomplish through them. On p. 285, Wadia begins his discussion of Part III and admits to being bewildered because (...) one expects Cleanthes to confine his illustrations to familiar things in the world around him. One wonders, however, why Wadia thinks the ilustrations should be so confined, since it is precisely matters such as these for which the Design Argument is attempting to account through the hypothesis of an intelligent external artificer - an hypothesis which Philo refuses to accept in this regard. Contrary to what Wadia maintains, there is one occasion in Part III where Cleanthes' defense does have recourse to natural phenomena. On p. 154 he asks Philo to consider, anatomise the eye, and behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions and whole course of life before and after generation to be persuaded that the most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of design! Cleanthes explains Philo's resistance to this most obvious conclusion as due to too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. (DNR155) On two occasions in Part III-in the first paragraph and once again toward the end of the seventh - Cleanthes comments on Philo's 'blindness' in rejecting the inference from natural phenomena to an intelligent cause of design. Given this assessment of Philo by Cleanthes, the employment of imaginary examples is easily appreciated inasmuch as actual examples have been impotent in convincing Philo. Just how these imaginary examples are relevant to his position has yet to be discussed; but the use of imaginary illustrations is not bewildering. 156. In setting the stage for his central claim on Cleanthes* intended use of his illustrations, Wadia seriously misrepresents the disagreement between Philo and Cleanthes. At one point (p. 286) he takes Philo to be arguing that empirical evidence regarding an intelligent designer is actually inconceivable. But, in fact, this was not Philo's position in Part II at all. Philo finds it easy indeed to conceive of the empirical evidence required to support the conclusion of the Design Argument, namely, the world must sufficiently resemble some thing which is known to be intelligently contrived to enable us to classify it as a further instance of that kind of thing. If this could be done, the principle 'like effects prove like causes' could be used to infer an intelligent cause for the design of the world. Philo, of course, denies that the required resemblance can be found. However, as I have shown, he never denies that it is conceivable. One page earlier, Wadia offers an account of Philo's position in Part II which is also incorrect. He argues that since, for Philo, an inference to the existence of an intelligent designer of the world requires having seen worlds formed under our eyes, this claim amounts to saying that it is impossible for there to be empirical evidence relevant to the conclusion of the Design Argument, because no one can satisfy this condition. Philo's argument in Part II, however, is not this one. He begins by considering how the world must present itself to justify reasoning by analogy to an intelligent designer. And it is only because the required resemblances between the world and objects of human contrivance are not present, that he offers 'seeing worlds formed under our eyes' as a condition which must be satisfied if the inference to an intelligent designer is to be acceptable. Now since Philo himself entertains possible states of the world which, if they existed, would constitute evidence for an intelligent designer, Wadia is mistaken in attributing "the impossibility claim* 157. to Philo. For Wadia to argue successfully regarding Philo's adoption of 'the impossibility claim' he must show that Philo has argues that it is impossible for the world to resemble objects of human contrivance - a position which Philo never... (shrink)

Recently there have been in the journals a large number of papers on miracles. The issue debated centred on whether miracles, as violations of natural law by a deity, are possible. Alstair McKinnon, George D. Chryssides and P. S. Wadia contend that the concept of a violation of natural law is defective. Others like Guy Robinson and Malcolm Diamonds claim that the acceptance of miracles constitutes a challenge to scientific autonomy. There have also been defenders of miracles, to name (...) just a few: R. F. Holland, Richard Swinburne and R. C. Wallace. What is, however, overlooked in these polemical discussions is whether theist religions require miracles, and if they do, whether the concept of a miracle required is that of a violation of a law of nature by God. In the present paper I shall argue for an affirmative response to both questions. (shrink)

Gandhi, M. K. [Answers to three questions]--Tagore, Rabindranath. The religion of an artist.--Abhedānanda, swāmi. Hindu philosophy in India.--Bhattacharyya, K. C. The concept of philosophy.--Chatterji, G. C. Common-sense empiricism.--Coomaraswamy, Anada K. On the pertinence of philosophy.--Das, Bhagavan. Ātma-Vidya, or The science of the self.--Dasgupta, Surendranath. Philosophy of dependent emergence.--Haldar, Hiralal. Realistic idealism.--Hiriyanna, M. The problem of truth.--Radhakrishnan, S. The spirit in man.--Ranade, R. D. The evolution of my own thought.--Subrahmanya Iyer, V. Man's interest in philosophy: an Indian view.--Wadia, A. R. (...) Pragmatic idealism. (shrink)

This volume has a misleading title: one might think that the material in this long work is by the great Indian spiritual leader. But it is not. Rather it is a collection of essays by A. R. Wadia, M.P., and it is only the first essay in the tome which is about Gandhi. Wadia is obviously some kind of Renaissance man, an interpreter of all knowledge--philosophical and religious, western and eastern--to the Indian mind. In one volume can be (...) found Wadia on "Pragmatic Idealism," "Philosophy and Religion," "Science and Philosophy," "Buddha as a Revolutionary Force in Indian Culture," "The Psychological Background of Politics and Sociology," "The Problem of Population in India," and there is lots more.--W. A. J. (shrink)