In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between (...) knowledge and understanding are briefly explored, including one in which an analogue to the KK-principle for knowledge, the “UU-principle”, does not hold for a different reason than that for which the former principle fails. (shrink)

Moral progress is often modeled as an increase in moral knowledge and understanding, with achievements in moral reasoning seen as key drivers of progressive moral change. Contemporary discussion recognizes two (rival) accounts: knowledge-based and understanding-based theories of moral progress, with the latter recently contended as superior (Severini 2021 ). In this article, we challenge the alleged superiority of understanding-based accounts by conducting a comparative analysis of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. We assess (...) them based on their potential to meet the following criteria: (i) moral progress must be possible despite evolutionary and epistemic constraints on moral reasoning; (ii) it should be epistemically achievable to ordinary moral agents; and (iii) it should be explainable via doxastic change. Our analysis suggests that both accounts are roughly equally plausible, but knowledge-based accounts are slightly less demanding and more effective at explaining doxastic change. Therefore, contrary to the prevailing view, we find knowledge-based accounts of moral progress more promising. (shrink)

What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird’s epistemic account of scientific progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird’s epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of the episode than (...) at the beginning. This account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart. (shrink)

Bird argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if (...) acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop and refine the idea that understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Specifically, we defend the idea that S understands why p if and only if S knows that p, and, for some q, S’s true belief that q correctly explains p is produced/maintained by reliable explanatory evaluation. We then show how this model explains the reception of James Bjorken’s explanation of scaling by the broader physics community in the late 1960s and early (...) 1970s. The historical episode is interesting because Bjorken’s explanation initially did not provide understanding to other physicists, but was subsequently deemed intelligible when Feynman provided a physical interpretation that led to experimental tests that vindicated Bjorken’s model. Finally, we argue that other philosophical models of scientific understanding are best construed as limiting cases of our more general model. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary (...) class='Hi'>understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of (...) knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge. (shrink)

Efforts to improve student–teacher education have recently focused on developing adequate Pedagogical Content Knowledge as a critical element for effective preparation. Despite many initiatives implemented in teacher education programs, however, their effectiveness in developing student–teachers’ PCK and factors affecting the PCK development are under-researched and evidenced. Drawing upon theories about and research on PCK, this study examined whether a recently updated 2-year teacher education program could develop student–teachers’ PCK effectively and explored what factors influencing the PCK development of student–teachers (...) with different developmental trajectories. Forty English-as-foreign-language student–teachers on the program were involved as participants. This study employed a longitudinal research design. Data were collected at four different stages along with the program through the content representation matrix, interviews with all the participants, and focus group interviews with four particularly sampled participants. Findings revealed that the current teacher education program successfully enhanced student–teachers’ PCK and the factors influencing different PCK developmental trajectories were varied and personalized. Implications for teacher education are also discussed. (shrink)

The concept of practical knowledge is central to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument in Intention, yet its meaning is little understood. There are several reasons for this, including a lack of attention to Anscombe's ancient and medieval sources for the concept, and an emphasis on the more straightforward concept of knowledge "without observation" in the interpretation of Anscombe's position. This paper remedies the situation, first by appealing to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to develop an account of practical knowledge (...) as a distinctive form of thought that "aims at production" of things that lie within an agent's power; and then by showing how this Thomistic understanding of practical cognition seems to have been Anscombe's, too. Having done this, I question whether the thesis that agential knowledge is practical knowledge entails that an agent always has non-observational knowledge of what she is intentionally doing. I answer "Not": Anscombe's claims to the contrary rest on a misleading assimilation of human beings' finite agency to that of an infinite agent like God. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral (...) reasons. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission. (shrink)

Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of "grasping" (...) that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge. Zagzebski's account Kvanvig's account Two problems Comanche cases Unreliable sources of information The upper-right quadrant So is understanding a species of knowledge? A false choice. (shrink)

Since the 1970s Barry Stroud has been one of the most original contributors to the philosophical study of human knowledge. This volume presents the best of Stroud's essays in this area. Throughout, he seeks to clearly identify the question that philosophical theories of knowledge are meant to answer, and the role scepticism plays in making sense of that question. In these seminal essays, he suggests that people pursuing epistemology need to concern themselves with whether philosophical scepticism is true (...) or false. Stroud's discussion of these fundamental questions is essential reading for anyone whose work touches on the subject of human knowledge. (shrink)

Whit Stillman’s films depict characters attempting to gain relevant knowledge of their historical situation so that they can shape their lives. Through an analysis of scenes from each of Stillman’s films, this essay demonstrates that historical knowledge is presented as a kind of self-understanding in the films. That historical knowledge is useful for gaining control over one’s future as well as for properly evaluating one’s life reveals a philosophically interesting approach to self-knowledge. Stillman’s complex approach (...) of layering contexts further suggests an elusive account of the self. (shrink)

I show that from common views about propositions as sets of possible worlds and knowledge requiring a sufficiently strong safety condition one can derive a condition stating that self-knowledge of belief is only possible if the content of that belief is fully understood. I show this by a reductio. If a subject S lacks full understanding of a proposition p, then S’s belief about believing that p cannot amount to knowledge. Even though my argument is based (...) on particular views about propositions and knowledge, I argue that the same kind of argument is also available for other knowledge conditions that rule out relevant luck and other accounts of propositions. However, for many of these other accounts of knowledge the requirement for understanding p will not be full understanding, but only sufficiently high understanding. These results tell us how self-knowledge, ruling out luck and understanding belief contents relate. (shrink)

It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view (...) of understanding language. The theoretical appeal of this view for the philosophy of language is that it provides for an attractive account of the project of the theory of meaning. If understanding language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of the meanings of expressions, then a meaning theory amounts to a theory of what speakers know in virtue of understanding language. In this paper I argue that, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal, the epistemic view is false. Propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding language, not even tacit knowledge. Unlike knowledge, I argue, linguistic understanding does not fail in Gettier cases, does not require epistemic warrant and does not even require belief. The intuitions about knowledge that have been central to epistemology do not seem to hold for linguistic understanding. So unless epistemologists have been radically mistaken about what knowledge requires, knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. (shrink)

Hume thinks that scepticism is “a malady, which can never be radically cur’d.” By this he means that scepticism is theoretically unassailable. Thus.

Many have suggested that understanding is a worthier goal for theoretical reflection than is propositional knowledge. Some have even claimed that, unlike knowledge, understanding is always intrinsically valuable. In this essay, I aim only to show that there is a basic value in understanding and that when knowledge conduces to understanding, it gets this basic value extrinsically from understanding. After distinguishing two kinds of understanding, namely, teleological and non-teleological understanding, I (...) will conclude that teleological understanding has more of this basic value than does non-teleological understanding. (shrink)

Testimony, the transmission of knowledge through communication, requires a shared understanding of linguistic expressions and utterances of them. Is this understanding itself a kind of knowledge, knowledge of meaning? The intuitive answer is ‘yes’, but the nature of such knowledge is controversial, as is the assumption that understanding is a kind of knowledge at all. This article is a critical examination of recent work on the nature and role of semantic knowledge (...) in the generation of the linguistic understanding needed for testimony. After describing a default view – that linguistic understanding partially consists in the possession and application of knowledge of a compositional theory of truth conditions – it scrutinizes two recent charges against this view: that linguistic understanding and knowledge of meaning are conceptually distinct, and that semantic ‘knowledge’ is knowledge without an object. (shrink)

Understanding Everyday Life All of sociology necessarily begins with the understanding of everyday life, and all of sociology is directed either to ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:UNDERSTANDING ST. THOMAS ON CHRIST'S IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD Guy MANSINI, O.S.B. Saint Meinrad Seminary St. Meinrad, Indiana HE International Theological Commission's 1985 statement on " The Consciousness of Christ Concerning Himel £ and His Mission " undertakes to state what by faith Christians hold about the knowledge of Jesus. Jesus of Nazareth knew : first, that he was the Son of God, and that he (...) possessed divine and not merely prophetical authority; second, that his mission was to preach the Kingdom and die for the salvation of all; third, that he was founding a Church. Fourth and last, since he was dying for all, he knew the " all" he was dying for in such a way as to enable each Christian to say truly " he died for me " (see Gal. 2 :20). Beyond this the bare statement that Jesus was conscious of his identity and mission, the Commission declines to go, and expressly avoids " theological elaborations calculated to give an account of this datum of faith." 1 The traditional account of this datum is, of course, the theory of Christ's immediate (or " beatific") knowledge of God, and usually as elaborated by St. Thomas. It is an approach to pre1 " The Consciousness of Christ Concerning Himself and His Mission," in International Theological Commission: Texts and Documents, 1969-1985, ed. Michael Sharkey (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989), 307. Again, the Commission " rules out any a priori philosophical terminology " (p. 307). Hence I take the liberty of using " knowledge " where the Commission speaks of " consciousness." The Commission characterizes the cognitional state of affairs it imputes to Christ merely as a "presence" of the knowing-conscious subject to itself in its " heart." I take it that the Commission means to avoid being specific with regard to any distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual modes of knowledge, and that this is the reason it prefers "consciousness" to " knowledge." 91 92 GUY MANSINI, O.S.B. cisely this account of St. Thomas's that I would like to outline in the second part of this article. There are three things especially that seem to stand in the way of approaching St. Thomas's account today. First, there is some difficulty in seeing it precisely as that, an account of what the Commission calls the datum of faith. Second, a key distinction upon which St. Thomas's account depends, that between faith and knowledge, tends to be obliterated in contemporary analytic epistemology, where knowledge is described as "justified true belief." This makes it hard to see the difference St. Thomas supposes there is between the cognitive state of Christians, on the one hand, and that of Jesus, on the other. Third, some modern biblical theology discovers Jesus himself as the ·exemplar of Christian faith. Thus, even supposing we have kept the distinction between faith and knowledge, the required application of the distinction becomes impossible.2 I will be unable to deal at any length with these last two difficulties, but will advert to them briefly within the outline of an approach to St. Thomas's account that I mean to give here.3 I. St. Thomas's Position as an Account of the Datum of Faith The first difficulty, however, is to be addressed at the outset and at some length. It arises from the way in which St. Thomas presents his teaching on the knowledge of Christ in the Summa 2 Another cause of confusion as to what St. Thomas means by Christ's immediate knowledge of God might be said to be the popularity of Karl Rahner's " Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ,'' Theological Investigations V (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966) ; 193-215, where Rahner conflates consciousness and knowledge in a context where they need to be distinguished. This has been nicely sorted out, however, in a study by Raymond Moloney, "The Mind of Christ in Transcendental Theology: Raimer, Lonergan and Crowe," H eythrop Journal 25 (1984) : 288-300. s There is also the difficulty for this question of modern exegesis, a difficulty mentioned by the International Theological Commission. But this is a difficulty for the original apprehension of the datum of faith itself rather than for understanding St. Thomas... (shrink)

This paper presents a framework to understand the impact of scientific knowledge on the policy-making process, focusing on the conceptual impact. We note the continuing dissatisfaction with the quality and effects of science-policy interactions in both theory and practice. We critique the current literature’s emphasis on the efforts of scientists to generate policy impact, because it neglects the role of ‘user’ policymaking organisations. The framework offered in the paper develops an argument about the essential role of institutional conditions of (...) policy ‘users’ for scientific knowledge to achieve impact. The framework is informed by the reflexive institutionalist and the neo-institutionalist theoretical approaches. Its main contribution is in outlining the intra- and inter-organisational conditions of policymaking organisations, along with personal characteristics of individual policy officials that influence the likelihood of scientific knowledge to generate conceptual impact. We also offer an operationalisation of the framework. The wider relevance of the paper is in moving the focus from the activities of scientists and the incentive structure in scientific organisations to the policy user side. (shrink)

Through structural analysis of 8-year tag networks from online knowledge-sharing platforms, this study finds that, with the scale of tag networks growing quickly, the growth trend of number edges indicates that tag network follows densification law. The clustering coefficient and the average shortest path of the network show that the rapid growth of network size does not bring about the compartmentalization of the knowledge network, and the degree distribution of tag networks shows a truncated power-law distribution. According to (...) the structural characteristics of the tag network, this study proposes a tag network model based on the BA model. Based on the preference attachment, the triadic closure mechanism is employed to construct the edges between the old nodes, which revises the limitation that the BA model only connects edges between old and new nodes. The results show that the simulation model matches the actual tag network structure well. The generation mechanism of the tag network model provides a reference for understanding the knowledge construction process of the online knowledge-sharing platform to a certain extent. (shrink)

We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to (...) decide what is at issue between these explanations. (shrink)

Cognition Through Understanding presents a selection of Tyler Burge's essays on cognition, thought, and language. The essays collected here use epistemology as a way of interpreting underlying powers of mind, and focus on four types of cognition that are warranted through understanding: self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, and reflection.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 78-98 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetic Understanding as Informed Experience:The Role of Knowledge in Our Art Viewing Experiences Richard Lachapelle, Deborah Murray, and Sandy Neim [Figures] Thinking calls for images, and images contain thought. Therefore, the visual arts are a homeground of visual thinking. 1A common misconception about the nature of art and of aesthetic appreciation is that these activities (...) are essentially a question of "feeling," as if tuning in to the right feeling will automatically lead to a full understanding of the work of art. Another widespread misunderstanding essentially reduces art viewing to a simple question of perception, as if looking long and hard isalways enough to apprehend the work of art's message. Fortunately, a growing body of research into adults' art viewing experiences is debunking these widely held beliefs as oversimplifications of the art viewing process. We can now assert, with a good degree of certainty, that our art viewing experiences solicit four key areas: the affective, perceptual, communicative, and cognitive dimensions of human experiencing. 2 Therefore, we would be hard-pressed not to agree with Rudolph Arnheim's reflections, presented above, on the important role of thought in shaping our artistic and aesthetic experiences.While acknowledging at the outset the essential roles of affect, perception, and communication in our art viewing experiences, this paper focuses more specifically on aspects of the intellectual dimension of this experience. First, we will present and discuss a model that we have developed over the last several years. This model identifies the kinds of knowledge and learning involved in art viewing activities. Second, we will present the results of an empirical study conducted to provide support for the model. Finally we will briefly discuss the model's usefulness for the purposes of aesthetic education. [End Page 78] The Model of Aesthetic Understanding as Informed Experience The Model of Aesthetic Understanding as Informed Experience provides an explanation of the process of understanding and appreciating a work of art from an educational perspective: it identifies the types of knowledge involved and it also pinpoints the kinds of learning at each stage in the process leading to an understanding of the aesthetic object.In this model, the process of viewing and understanding a work of art is visualized as a two-phased type of informed experience. Through a process of experiential learning, the viewer first encounters the work of art and formulates an initial interpretation. Then, through a process involving theoretical learning, the viewer compares his or her first interpretation with a related body of external, scientific information. This second step in the learning process leads to a reconstruction of knowledge about the work of art. Tandem use of the two processes assists the viewer in furthering his or her understanding of the art object; it also promotes growth in his or her art viewing skills. In the course of each new encounter with an aesthetic object, the interplay of experiential and theoretical learning leads to additional development of the viewer's background knowledge in art, resulting in better preparedness to successfully engage the next work of art. 4 Theoretical Foundations of the Model Three different theories informed the development of the model. 5 By using anecdotal evidence obtained from a group of fifty-two museum professionals, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Rick E.Robinson were able to identify the four major dimensions of aesthetic experience: intellect, communication, perception, and emotion. Each one of these dimensions constitutes, to some extent, a challenge that the work of art addresses to the viewer. According to these researchers, the intellectual dimension of aesthetic experience consists of all aspects of the viewer's attempts to use knowledge in order to find meaning in the work of art (TAS, 27-71). Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson also propose a model that describes the aesthetic encounter in terms of an interaction between the viewer, the work of art, and the artist. To this encounter, the viewer brings his skills in aesthetic appreciation; these may be... (shrink)

The currently fashionable professional ideal of reflective practice has focused on how good teaching might be informed by theoretical (invariably social scientific) enquiry and has been commonly construed as a matter of the effective application of theory. This paper rejects technicist assumptions underpinning the idea of applied theory, tracing them to confusion between two different sorts of practical deliberation, phronesis and techne. Understanding professional reflection primarily in term of phronesis calls into doubt both the precise role of genuine theoretical (...) studies in professional reflection and the very status as theoretical of the sort of the principled understanding and deliberation required for the wise conduct of education. (shrink)

Cognition Through Understanding presents a selection of Tyler Burge's essays that use epistemology to illumine powers of mind. The essays focus on epistemic warrants that differ from those warrants commonly discussed in epistemology--those for ordinary empirical beliefs and for logical and mathematical beliefs. The essays center on four types of cognition warranted through understanding--self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, and reflection. Burge argues that by reflecting on warrants for these types of cognition, one better understands cognitive powers that are distinctive (...) of persons, and of human beings. The collection presents three previously unpublished independent essays, in addition to substantial, retrospective commentary. The retrospective commentary invites the reader to make connections that were not fully in mind when the essays were written. (shrink)

A number of existing researches agree that digitalization would facility firms to launch ambidextrous innovations. Digitalization is not only about technological change, but more importantly, the reshaping of the firms’ knowledge structure and routines to percept and integrate knowledge. Thus, some researchers suggest that whether firms could benefit from digitalization varies across firms and industries, since innovation in different firms and industries relies on differentiated level of cognitive and reasoning of knowledge. However, existing studies mainly focus on (...) exploring the firm-level differences, and leave the industry-level difference underdeveloped. In response, this study integrates knowledge-based view to examine how a firm’s digitalization affects ambidextrous innovation, and further explore the conjoint effect of industrial knowledge bases—the knowledge base of the industry the firm is located in—on the relationship between firm digitalization level and ambidextrous innovation. This study uses Python to conduct text mining of firms’ annual reports, and obtains data of 394 listed companies from the year 2014 to 2020. The empirical results show that digitalization level has positive effect on both exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation, and the effect on exploitative innovation is stronger than on exploratory innovation. Moreover, the moderating effect of industrial knowledge base is significant on “digitalization–exploratory innovation” but not on “digitalization–exploitative innovation” relationship. By doing so, this study refines the research on the relationship between digitalization and firm innovation, and confirms that the usage of digitalization may lead to achieve an ambidextrous situation. This study also provides a theoretical basis for industrial differences of the effectiveness of digitalization, suggesting firms considering industrial characteristics to implement digitalization-assisted innovation practices. (shrink)

Given the high advances done in the scientific field, especially with regard to the quantum fields of study, the epistemic approach to doing science changed drastically. Thus, it is reasonable and necessary to create a model of thought for explaining possible solutions. Such a solution can be understood through the implementation of a new dialectic method that is promising to a descriptive approach to how knowledge is processed and handled cognitively and what roles synthetic apriorisms and intuition play in (...) this process. (shrink)

Matthew Boyle’s Transparency and Reflection articulates and defends what might be called a ‘transformative’ view of self-awareness. The human capacity for self-awareness is part of the very nature of our minds, not added to a form of mentality we share with subjects lacking that capacity. Yet, in his recent work Boyle introduces a striking ‘additive’ element into the overall transformative picture. While ‘non-positional’ self-awareness is an essential aspect of ‘human mindedness’, the capacity for reflection is a further, additional accomplishment. I (...) raise some questions about this additive element — in particular, about its compatibility with a reflectivist account of self-knowledge, and about its motivation. (shrink)

Chris Letheby argues in Philosophy of Psychedelics that psychedelics and knowledge are compatible. Psychedelics may cause new mental states, some of which can be states of knowledge. But the influence of psychedelics is largely psychological, and not all psychological processes are epistemic. So I want to build on the distinction between processes of discovery and processes of justification to criticise some aspects of Letheby’s epistemology of psychedelics. Unarguably, psychedelics can elicit processes of discovery. Yet, I hold, they can (...) hardly contribute either to the epistemic success of a mental state or to processes of justification. As these are central for a mental state to be a state of knowledge and are largely uninfluenced by psychedelics, the contributions of psychedelics to knowledge are rather indirect than direct: The heavy epistemic lifting—what turns a mental state into a state of knowledge—is, in its epistemic aspects, independent of any influence of psychedelics on our psyche. Positively, while the mechanisms that Letheby points to need not be associated with knowledge, they do provide crucial epistemic benefits if they are associated with understanding. Reading them as facilitating understanding covers also those cases where truth or justification is missing and thereby provides a broader picture of the epistemic contributions of psychedelics. (shrink)

We agree with Rendell and Whitehead that cetaceans acquire knowledge from caretakers and peers, and that a clear understanding of this process can provide insight into the evolution of mammalian cognition. The passive observational methods they advocate, however, are inadequate for determining what cetaceans know. Only by experimentally investigating the cognition of cetaceans can we hope to understand what they learn through social interactions.

Julian Schlöder (2018) examines Timothy Williamson's proposal that knowledge is the norm of assertion within the context of deontic logic. He argues for two claims, one concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is a norm of assertion and another concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is the only norm of assertion. On the basis of these claims, Schlöder goes on to raise a series of problems for Williamson's proposal. In response, I argue that (...) both of Schlöder's claims can—and should—be rejected. (shrink)

This article addresses the demand for global content knowledge that the process of internationalization has placed on the preparation of social studies teachers. Drawing on scholarship about global perspectives in teacher education, this study examined what one cohort of preservice teachers learned about globalization during participation in a three-week, web-based, international relations simulation. The unit was part of a methods course designed to prepare preservice teachers to teach global issues and internationalize the curriculum. International simulations have long been touted (...) as a means for learning challenging knowledge about global issues yet are rarely studied in teacher education. This qualitative study drew on concept maps and written responses completed before and after the simulation to document the preservice teachers’ learning. The analysis generated two findings: (1) preservice teachers acquired a shared, conceptual vocabulary for globalization that included the events and actors represented in the simulation; and (2) they also demonstrated a more systematic and critical understanding of the ways that power and conflict shaped the events and actors. The study contributes to the question of what teachers need to know to teach with global perspectives and how efforts to internationalize teacher education programs can foster such knowledge. (shrink)

Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the five-term understanding complex at the end of Chapter 1, Part II of his Theory of Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarifying what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In this paper I present and (...) develop some of the central issues that arise from Russell’s map, and I offer an interpretation of it that reflects his evolving views in the manuscript. I argue that multiple lines in the map are not meant to represent many relations, but rather one comprehensive multiple relation of understanding. And I argue that such a relation relates in a complex way due to the distinctive nature of its relata. (shrink)

This research employs Description Logics in order to focus on logical description and analysis of the phenomenon of ‘concept understanding’. The article will deal with a formal-semantic model for figuring out the underlying logical assumptions of ‘concept understanding’ in knowledge representation systems. In other words, it attempts to describe a theoretical model for concept understanding and to reflect the phenomenon of ‘concept understanding’ in terminological knowledge representation systems. Finally, it will design an ontology that (...) schemes the structure of concept understanding based on the proposed semantic model. (shrink)

This is a textbook in philosophy aimed at school kids doing the International Baccalaureate. One important aim of Theory of Knowledge in the International Baccalaureate is to teach students how to think for themselves. The student is encouraged to reflect on what they are learning and to reflect on themselves as learners. Theory of Knowledge is different from other areas in the International Baccalaureate because there are few hard facts to be learned. The Theory of Knowledge program (...) aims to develop a certain attitude of questioning and the skills needed to ask these questions and find answers to them. Another aim of Theory of Knowledge is to ask students to look at the whole of what they are learning and relate their knowledge to themselves as individuals and to life as they know it outside of the classroom. This book is an attempt to achieve both of these aims. (shrink)

"Knowing how we know" is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and new social and cultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword (...) by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the years since its first publication. (shrink)

Twenty-seven semi-guided conversations between lecturers and Spanish-speaking undergraduate students were recorded at five different universities in Europe where English is the medium of instruction. Examination of the metaphorical language used in these conversations revealed that SIGHT plays an important role in academic mentoring in English. Lecturers often frame their advice to undergraduate students in terms of what has been called “UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING,” on the face of it a somewhat unsurprising finding. If one takes it that the correlation between (...) mental and visual activity is somehow “primary” then this way of reasoning about learning and knowledge should be common ground in conversations between English- and Spanish-speaking interlocutors. However, we found no such alignment between the two groups of participants in an academic setting. The Spanish speakers not only used words and terms associated with vision significantly less frequently t.. (shrink)

Considerable attention has been given to the accessibility of legal documents, such as legislation and case law, both in legal information retrieval (query formulation, search algorithms), in legal information dissemination practice (numerous examples of on-line access to formal sources of law), and in legal knowledge-based systems (by translating the contents of those documents to ready-to-use rule and case-based systems). However, within AI & law, it has hardly ever been tried to make the contents of sources of law, and the (...) relations among them, more accessible to those without a legal education. This article presents a theory about translating sources of law into information accessible to persons without a legal education. It illustrates the theory by providing two elaborated examples of such translation ventures. In the first example, formal sources of law in the domain of exchanging police information are translated into rules of thumb useful for policemen. In the second example, the goal of providing non-legal professionals with insight into legislative procedures is translated into a framework for making available sources of law through an integrated legislative calendar. Although the theory itself does not support automating the several stages described, in this article some hints are given as to what such automation would have to look like. (shrink)

What Babies Know outlines a compelling case for why infancy research is fundamental for conceptualizing what it is to be human. There is another period in human development that is relatively inaccessible, yet is more important. In order to truly understand the nature of core knowledge, perception, and cognition, we must start not with the infant, but with the fetus.

Background: Ethics consultants (ECs) are increasingly expected to possess core knowledge and skills. Few data address whether ECs actually possess recommended core knowledge. We aimed to measure pediatric ECs’ understanding of ethical principles, identify knowledge gaps, and explore associations between experience/training and knowledge in pediatric ethics consultations. Methods: We identified the 2 ECs most knowledgeable in pediatric ethics from each of 45 freestanding children's hospitals and an equal number of general teaching hospitals in the United (...) States. This yielded a sample of 159 eligible pediatric ECs. Pediatric ECs were sent a survey measuring ethics training, characteristics of the ethics consultation service, and EC knowledge, as assessed by a previously validated scale entitled the Test of Residents’ Ethics Knowledge for Pediatrics (TREK-P). Of 102 completed surveys received, 99 were used in the analysis. Results: Seventy-three percent of ECs had completed ≥1 formal training modality, most commonly bioethics mini-courses, master's degrees, or certificate programs (20–30% each). Respondents infrequently received salary support (32%) or had a budget (28%) to support ethics work. The median TREK-P score was 19 (interquartile range [IQR] 17–21). Forty percent of subjects scored ≥20, surpassing the threshold of adequate performance proposed in previous work. Median scores were significantly higher among ECs with formal training in ethics but did not differ significantly by other variables. In secondary analyses, high scores (≥20) were significantly more common among ECs receiving salary support (55% vs. 33%, p = 0.04) and who had formal ethics training (47% vs. 22%, p = 0.02). Items pertaining to privacy, genetic testing, and assent, were answered incorrectly by >33% of ECs. Conclusions: High scores on a validated ethics knowledge scale were more common among ECs with salary support or formal ethics training. The study highlights knowledge gaps that warrant consideration as EC becomes a professionalized endeavor. (shrink)

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if (...) it is able to bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof. (shrink)