Alice Walker’s The Color Purple dramatizes African American women’s plight through the experience of a black girl, Celie, caught in the turmoil of the patriarchal system of her community. Leaning on the epistolary form and also choosing to address the black woman’s oppression first within the black community itself, the author detaches herself from the mainstream African American literary tradition to create a personal style. One of the characteristic traits of the novel is language as a communicative tool in the (...) characters’ interrelation. In the narrative, this tool is mostly used to oppress the female protagonists, demonstrating thus its violent aspect. But sometimes, even though very rarely in the novel, it helps the oppressed subject to claim a voice. Finally, the epistolary form serves to create more emotion in the readers and consequently produces more reaction in them. (shrink)

Le présent article se propose de mettre en lumière non seulement la critique platonicienne de la poésie telle qu’elle se déploie dans les livres II, III et X de la République, mais aussi - et surtout - la lecture qu’en fait le néoplatonicien Proclus dans son vaste Commentaire sur la République. Le principal enjeu de cette lecture est le lien entre le mythe et l’éducation. Nous verrons d’abord comment Platon s’emploie à lier ces deux éléments, puis comment Proclus cherche pour (...) sa part à relativiser ce lien, au point où mythe et éducation en viennent, sinon à s’exclure mutuellement, du moins à n’entretenir qu’un faible commerce. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that social anxiety symptoms are maintained and intensified by inflexible emotion regulation (ER). Therefore, we examined whether trait-level social anxiety moderates ER flexibility operationalised at both between-person (covariation between variability in emotional intensity and variability in strategy use across occasions) and within-person (associations between emotional intensity and strategy use on a given day) levels. In a sample of healthy college-aged adults (N = 185, Mage = 21.89), we examined overall and emotion-specific intensities (shame, guilt, anxiety, anger, sadness) (...) and regulatory strategies (i.e. experiential avoidance, expressive suppression, and rumination) in response to each day’s most emotionally intense event over 6 days. During the study period, we found a positive association between variability in emotional intensity and variability of experiential avoidance in individuals with lower, rather than higher, levels of trait social anxiety after controlling for key covariates (i.e. gender, personality traits, and stress exposure). However, we did not find evidence for the moderating role of trait social anxiety in ER flexibility assessed at within-person levels. Our findings highlight the need to delineate dynamic ER flexibility across everyday events. (shrink)

Cette communication est une interprétation personnelle du livre de Jacques Monod. Mais cette interprétation est beaucoup plus interrogative qu'affirmative et n'est que l'occasion, sinon le prétexte, d'entendre d'autres voix se prononcer sur ce qui me semble être d'un très grand intérêt philosophique actuel. Cet exposé sera donc bref: s'il recueille quelques citations essentielles, étayées des références qui les prolongent et ramifient le courant de leurs penseées, il se contente le plus souvent de simples références aux pages qu'il interprète. Pour faciliter (...) l'échange des idées, il se divise en énonciations et interrogations numérotées. (shrink)

Dans son livre American Philosophy and the Future, Michael Novak nous rappelle que nous vivons sous la menace des conflits nucléaires. Si nous n'y prenons garde, nous dit-il, nous serons bientôt dans l'impossibilité de philosopher. Cet avertissement a de quoi nous étonner. Y aurait-il des bombes atomiques sans une philosophie de la bombe?Il y aurait bien d'autres objets, les uns plus extraordinaires que les autres, que nous apporte à un rythme toujours plus accéléré la nouvelle technologic et sur lesquels il (...) nous faudrait aussi philosopher et même davantage. Ainsi, un éditorial de Journal of the American Medical Association nous fait part des craintes que provoquent, chez médecins et biologistes, les expériences faites en vue de la fabrication des bébés-éprouvette — ‘test-tube babies’. (shrink)

En la primera parte de este artículo Marc Richir plantea el problema fenomenológico central de la Crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental de Edmund Husserl y que encuentra en El origen de la geometría su prueba concreta: el problema del irreductible hiatus o laguna en la continuidad fenomenológica entre la Lebenswelt y la ciencia. La exposición de este problema se desarrolla en la segunda parte mostrando que el primer problema fenomenológico fundamental de la Krisis es el del (...) movimiento de la formación de sentido originario (Sinnbildung), es decir del despliegue de la temporalidad concreta de una conciencia irreductible a la presencia, conciencia de la que es coextensivo un fenómeno-de- lenguaje consistente en fases de presencia de sentido originariamente plurales y múltiples, en un tiempo lacunar originariamente estallado. En la tercera parte, y en relación esta vez con la institución simbólica como el segundo problema fenomenológico fundamental de la Krisis, Richir problematiza el paso de la Sinnbildung originaria a la sedimentación con el que Husserl, en un gesto metafísico clásico de estructuración, compromete a la fenomenología. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte Richir se aventura a explicar, con el ejemplo concreto del Origen de la geometría, las condiciones fenomenológicas bajo las cuales nace la institución simbólica de la geometría como ciencia al encajarse en la institución simbólica del mundo de la pre-geometría, es decir en el orden de una Sinnbildung originaria en operación en un trazado de figuras que no conduce ipso facto a la institución propiamente geométrica. (shrink)

Childhood adversity is associated with altered or dysregulated stress reactivity; these altered patterns of physiological functioning persist into adulthood. Evidence from both preclinical animal models and human neuroimaging studies indicates that early life experience differentially influences stressor-evoked activity within central visceral neural circuits proximally involved in the control of stress responses, including the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus (PVN), bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and amygdala. However, the relationship between childhood adversity and the (...) resting-state connectivity of this central visceral network remains unclear. To this end, we examined relationships between childhood threat and childhood socioeconomic deprivation, the resting-state connectivity between our regions of interest (ROIs), and affective symptom severity and diagnoses. We recruited a transdiagnostic sample of young adult males and females (n= 100; mean age = 27.28,SD= 3.99; 59 females) with a full distribution of maltreatment history and symptom severity across multiple affective disorders. Resting-state data were acquired using a 7.2-min functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) sequence; noted ROIs were applied as masks to determine ROI-to-ROI connectivity. Threat was determined by measures of childhood traumatic events and abuse. Socioeconomic deprivation (SED) was determined by a measure of childhood socioeconomic status (parental education level). Covarying for age, race and sex, greater childhood threat was significantly associated with lower BNST-PVN, amygdala-sgACC and PVN-sgACC connectivity. No significant relationships were found between SED and resting-state connectivity. BNST-PVN connectivity was associated with the number of lifetime affective diagnoses. Exposure to threat during early development may entrain altered patterns of resting-state connectivity between these stress-related ROIs in ways that contribute to dysregulated neural and physiological responses to stress and subsequent affective psychopathology. (shrink)

Ever since Ph. Kohlmann in his Teubner edition of the Thebaid asserted that he had used cod. Parisinus 13046, one of the MSS. formerly of St. Germain des Prés, this MS. has been known by reputation to his successors and other students of Statian textual problems, and, designed by the letter S, it is alluded to and cited in the edition of Garrod and in the newer Teubner of Klotz, which appeared in 1908. The two later editors confessed that (...) they themselves had not examined the MS., but were relying upon the information accessible in Kohlmann's edition. Doubts having been cast from more than one source upon Kohlmann's accuracy and the soundness of his reports, while at the same time the importance of S as a member of the ω group was emphasized by Mr. Garrod and Dr. Klotz in spite of the incomplete evidence at their disposal, it seemed worth while to the writer to examine the MS. for himself and to make a thorough collation of it. This has been done in the summer of 1932. (shrink)

Le 21 avril 1949 à l’aube, une femme de 32 ans, est guillotinée dans la cour de la prison d’Angers. Condamnée à mort pour homicide conjugal, Germaine Leloy est la dernière femme à être exécutée en France. Tout l’intérêt du nouveau livre de l’historienne Catherine Valenti est de mettre en avant le parcours de cette femme en déroulant sous la forme d’un récit une affaire criminelle. En effet, son nom s’est effacé de la mémoire collective. Germaine Leloy n’appartient pas aux (...) figures des personna... (shrink)

"Bernard Groethuysen (1880-1946), philosophe d'origine allemande, partage, dès 1904, sa vie entre Berlin et Paris où il étudie la Révolution française et rencontre, grâce à Bergson, Alix Guillain (1876-1951), traductrice et journaliste à L'Humanité. Vivant avec leurs compagnes dans le phalanstère de la rue Campagne-Première, Groethuysen et Paulhan, devenus amis, oeuvrent à partir de 1920 à La Nouvelle Revue francaise, dont ce dernier prend la direction cinq ans plus tard : ils font découvrir Hôlderlin, Kassner, Kafka, Büchner, Musil... En 1927, (...) ils inaugurent leur collection "Bibliothèque des Idées" par l'essai majeur de Groethuysen, Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France, "notre premier enfant", écrit-il à Paulhan. Dans son ultime lettre d'Allemagne, de 1931, il s'inquiète : "L'Histoire devrait nous donner des vacances. On en profiterait pour reprendre la vie." En août 1932, devant l'essor du nazisme, Groethuysen s'exile en France. Quant à Paulhan, le Front populaire le voit s'engager aux côtés de Jean Longuet, maire socialiste de Châtenay-Malabry. Arrive la guerre : Germaine et Jean Paulhan quittent leur maison, leur jardin, leurs animaux, dont Alix Guillain et Groethuysen, naturalisé en 1938, prennent soin. Après la défaite de l'Allemagne, le philosophe rêve encore d'utopie, mais il meurt le 17 septembre 1946. Les travaux de Groethuysen m'intéressaient, il s'intéressait aux miens", confiera Paulhan à Ponge. Ce volume prouve leur affectueuse amitié, fondée sur le travail en commun pour la NRF. Mais c'est également un document sur les réseaux intellectuels et politiques de l'entre-deux-guerres: Maria Van Rysselberghe et les amis de Gide, la princesse de Bassiano et la revue Commerce, Paul Desjardins et les Décades de Pontigny, Henry Church et la revue Mesures, Alix Guillain et le Parti communiste, Aline Mayrisch et le groupe de Colpach... "Je n'ai pas connu d'autre homme, écrira Paulhan, pour qui une idée, fût-elle évidemment fausse ou absurde, dès l'instant qu'un homme l'avait inventée, eût un tel prix. Il disait: "C'est une idée" d'un ton de gourmet. C'est qu'il pensait que la vérité ayant été une fois dans la suite des temps atteinte (par Hegel et - pour ce qui concernait son application au monde moderne - par Marx), il ne nous restait qu'à former des idées - plus ou moins agréables, curieuses, attendrissantes de faiblesse." (Mort de Groethuysen à Luxembourg, rédigé en 1946)."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book explores contributions by some of the most influential women in the history of philosophy, science, and literature. Ranging from Sappho and Sophie Germain to Stebbing and Evelyn Fox Keller, this work ultimately demonstrates the impact these non-canonical, sometimes unknown or hidden, sources had, or may have had, on the recognized male leaders in their fields, from Aristotle to Pascal, Kant, Whitehead, and Russell. Chapters reflect philosophical pluralism, both analytic and continental themes, and cover figures reaching across the (...) entire history of ideas in the West, from pre-historic times to the twentieth century. Anyone interested in coming to know or in preparing to teach women in the history of philosophy, science, and literature will appreciate this collection and its myriad insights into the still unrecognized voices of non-canonical sources across these disciplines. (shrink)

Essays in Arabic Literary Biography, 925–1350. Edited by Terri DeYoung and Mary St. Germain. Mîzân: Studien zur Literatur in der islamischen Welt, vol. 17,1. Wiesbaden: haRRaSSoWitz, 2011. Pp. vii + 371. €68.

L'A. soutient, contre Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis et William May, que le contrôle naturel des naissances pratiqué avec une intention mauvaise n'est pas contraception. Il montre que les auteurs identifient de façon incorrecte la fin prochaine de la contraception comme choix qu'il n'y ait pas d'enfant, alors que la fin prochaine véritable est d'empêcher un enfant de venir au monde . Ainsi donc, puisque en NFP un couple ne cherche pas à empêcher la venue au monde d'un (...) enfant, NFP n'implique pas d'action contraceptive. L'A. soutient aussi qu'identifier la fin prochaine comme choix qu'il n'y ait pas d'enfant ne spécifie pas de façon adéquate une classe homogène d'actes objectifs, bien que cela spécifie une classe homogène d'actes moraux. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ARISTOTELIAN FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. Pontijicia Universitas Gregoriana Rome, Italy INTRODUCTION* I N THE Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2,1 Thomas Aquinas identifies what is often spoken of as "the first principle of practical reason"-that is, "that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Thomas explains: All other precepts of the natural law are based upon (...) this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) *I am grateful to Peter Ryan, S.J. and Stephen Brock for commenting on a draft of this paper. 1I shall use a number of abbreviations: ST= Summa Theologiae; An.Post. =Posterior analytics; An.Pr. =Prior analytics; DA =De anima; EE =Eudemian ethics; EN = Nicomachean Ethics; GA =De generatione animalium; lnsomn. =De insomniis; Int. = De interpretatione; Metaph. =Metaphysics; MM= Magna moralia; Phys. =Physics; R. =Republic; Rhet. =Rhetorica; SE =Sophistici elenchi; FPPR =the first principle of practical reason; PNC =the principle of non-contradiction. I also use a number of transliterated Greek terms such as akolasia (depravity), akolastos (depraved person), akrasia (weakness of will), akrates (person subject to weakness of will), egkrateia (continence in spite of temptation), egkrates (person who remains continent in spite of temptation ), and phronesis (practical wisdom). I use them for brevity's sake and since they have also found their way into the standard philosophical vocabulary, at least in Aristotelian studies. I also speak in this essay as if Aristotle was the author of MM. For an argument in favor of a qualified understanding of this thesis, see note 14. For the Greek text of the works of Aristotle I have for the most part used the Oxford Classical Texts. The one major exception is Susemihl's edition of the MM: Franz Susemihl, ed., Aristotelis: Magna moralia (Leipzig: Tuubner, 1883). For most (but not all) of the translations from Aristotle, I have made use of Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For English translations of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, I have used the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920). 441 442 KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.' As its name suggests, the first principle of practical reason (FPPR) is no incidental tenet. Thomas compares it in this same article to the first principle of theoretical reason, better known as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): "that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time."3 On the other hand, it is also commonly acknowledged that Thomas's (philosophical) ethical theory is Aristotelian. How is it then that we never hear of an Aristotelian first principle of practical reason, either in the secondary literature or (as it seems) in Aristotle himself? I shall argue in this essay that there is such a principle in Aristotle's ethical theory and that it has the logical status that Thomas attributes to it. It is none other than the well-known paradoxical Socratic principle that no one deliberately does wrong4-understood in a certain way. (I shall refer to this principle as "the Socratic Principle.") I shall also argue that Aristotle has a fairly elaborate theory about how, psychologically, a person accommodates himself to a violatiqn of the first principle of practical reason. I shall leave one issue unaddressed: whether (as in the question from ST above) Aristotle's FPPR includes "all other precepts of the natural law." It will be apparent, however, 2 The best exegesis of this article of ST is Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A... (shrink)

On le sait depuis les travaux de Germaine Tillon, le « destin » fait aux femmes dans les sociétés méditerranéennes n’est pas seulement spécifique à une religion. Tous les Dieux ont eu en commun de ne faire que peu de place aux femmes, jamais à égalité avec les hommes qui ont interprété le Verbe en leur faveur. On pourrait ainsi expliquer l’un des partis pris du volume qui est présenté ici : considérer l’espace méditerranéen comme un espace commun, avec des (...) différences et des ressemblances, de... (shrink)

Droit et morale Sous la direction de Dominique Bureau, France Drummond et Dominique Fenouillet Véritable « pont aux ânes de la pédagogie juridique », la question des relations qu'entretiennent Droit et Morale appelle une réponse doctrinale presque invariable: la séparation de principe n'exclurait pas l'influence réciproque. Le droit contemporain semble pourtant traversé par deux courants a priori antinomiques: ici, la référence morale est invoquée comme une sorte de « tabou » qui justifierait le retrait du droit, alors que, là, elle (...) est appelée en renfort pour justifier telle solution ou fonder telle réforme. C'est de cette étrange coexistence du « retour offensif » et du « tabou » qu'est née l'idée d'organiser un colloque sur le thème « Droit et Morale. Aspects contemporains » en privilégiant une approche interdisciplinaire. Le 4 juin 2010, dans le cadre des journées d'étude qu'il consacre au pluralisme, le Laboratoire de sociologie juridique de l'Université Paris II accueillait donc les réflexions croisées d'Olivier Descamps, Dominique Fenouillet, Michel Germain, Valérie Malabat, Horatia Muir Watt, Cécile Pérès, Marc Pichard, Jean-Emmanuel Ray et Jean-Louis Sourioux. L'ouvrage ici présenté s'est enrichi des contributions supplémentaires d'Éric Martin-Hocquenghem et de Mustapha Mekki. Puisse cette publication contribuer à éclairer les relations singulières qu'entretiennent le Droit et la Morale. Contributeurs Olivier Descamps Dominique Fenouillet Michel Germain Valérie Malabat Éric Martin-Hocquenghem Mustapha Mekki Horatia Muir Watt Cécile Pérès Marc Pichard Jean-Emmanuel Ray Jean-Louis Sourioux. (shrink)

L'article critique la position de Gerard Bradley sur la peine capitale. Bradley essaie de lire Veritatis Splendor et Evangelium Vitae comme rejetant des responsabilités morales distinctes pour des agents moraux publics ou privés. L'article montre qu'il n'en est rien. Il montre en plus que Evangelium Vitae reconnaît dans le criminel une dignité jusqu'ici apparemment ignorée par ceux qui ont maintenu la légitimité de la peine capitale. L'auteur lit Bradley comme critiquant St. Thomas d'Aquin, et en conséquence entend montrer l'appréciation de (...) la dignité du criminel qui se trouve dans les écrits de St. Thomas. Bradley, en agrément avec Germain Grisez, prétend aussi que toute mise à mort d'une personne humaine, même de la part de l'autorité publique, doit être non intentionnelle de même que l'acte de tuer d'une personne privée agissant en sa propre défense. L'article analyse les textes de St. Thomas sur le châtiment, le châtiment divin inclus, en vue de clarifier le sens dans lequel l'autorité publique légitimement exercée peut vouloir le mal en punissant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT AND THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL THINKING IN A RECENT analysis of the Catholic scene, Lutheran Richard John Neuhaus described the controversy over authority and dissent in the Catholic Church as " theologically debased and ecumenically sterile." My own reading of the literature on dissent inclines me to concur with the substance of this judgment. Broad historical, cultural, and theological contexts have inevitably been neglected as the (...) issues raised by public dissent have come to be narrowly conceived in terms of academic policy and ecclesisastical law and discipline. The objective of this paper is to explore the larger theological context of the topic of public dissent and in particular to consider Neuhruus' judgment that the "present Roman Catholic preoccupation with church authority is... theologically debased because it fixes attention not upon the truth claims derived from God's self-revelation but upon who is authorized to set the rules for addressing such truths, if indeed they are truths." 1 A Perspective on the Current Debate The attitude of " dissent " as such would normally be expected to occupy only a subordinate place in accounts of the nature of theological thinking. Intellectual inquiries are usually undertaken with a view to affirmation and oonstruction rather than critique and dissent. Despite the volume of literature which it has spawned, the current debate in fact reflects this expectation. The theological substance of the issue of dissent qua dissent has been thorough1 Richard John Neuhaus, The OathoUc Moment: The Paradow of the Church in the Postmodern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 89. 185 186 J. A. DI NOIA, O.P. ly rehearsed.2 The dissident case for the legitimacy of public dissent has been stated forcefully and exhaustively.3 Important defenses of the classical Catholic position have been advanced by bishops and theologians alike.4 Increasingly the literature on both sides has become repetitive-a sign that, in its present form, the debate has reached something of a theological impasse. What clarity has been achieved in the theological discussion of the specifics of the Curran case continues to be threatened by confusions about the crucial differences between public and private dissent, between an ecclesiastically chartered university and other Catholic institutions of higher learning, and between the withdrawal of the canonical dicense to teach and the imposition of silence upon a theologian.5 The issues have come 2 Bp. Juan Arzubs, "Criteria for Dissent in the Church," Origins 7 (1978), 748-750; Archbp. Joseph L. Bernandin, "Magisterium and Theologians: Steps Towards Dialogue," Ohicago Studies (1978), 151-158; Yves Congar, O.P. The Magisterium and Theologians: A Short History, Theology Digest (1977), 15-20; John Connery, S.J., "The Non-Infallible Moral Teaching of the Church," Thomist 51 (1987); 1-16; Hans Kiing & Jiirgen Moltmann eds., The Right to Dissent: Concilium 158 (1982) ; Archbp. William J. Levada, "Dissent and the Catholic Religion Teacher," Origins 16 (1986), 195-200; Bp. James Malone, "How Bishops and Theologians Relate," Origins 16( 1986), 169-174; Archbp. Daniel Pilarczyk, "The Church and Dissent," Origins 16 (1986), 175178 ; Karl Rahner, "Theology and the Magisterium," Theology Digest 29 (1981)' 257-61. s Charles E. Curran, Faithful Dissent (Sheed & Ward, 1986) ; "Authority and Dissent in the Roman Catholic Church," in William W. May, ed., Vatican Authority and American Oatholie Dissent (New York: Crossroad, 1987), pp. 27-34, and in the same volume essays by Richard McCormick and Anne Patrick. A markedly alarmist collection of essays pressing the dissident case is Hans Kiing and Leonard Swidler, eds., The Ohuroh in Anguish (Harper & Row, 1987). 4 Patrick Granfield The Limits of the Papacy (New York: Crossroad, 1987), esp. pp. 153-168; Archbp. Roger M. Mahony, "The Magisterium and Theological Dissent," in May, pp. 16-26; William E. May, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Limits of Dissent," ibid., pp. 87-102; Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), Vol. I, pp. 849-856, 871-916; Francis -Sullivan, Magisterium (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 1983) passim. s Joseph A. O'Hare's "Faith and Freedom in Catholic Universities" points to the significance of the second distinction, while Margaret Farley's "Moral AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT, THEOLOGICAL THINKING 187 to be framed in an idiom in which... (shrink)

L'auteur accepte la position d'auteurs comme Germain Grisez et John Finnis selon laquelle l'immoralité de l'homosexualité est connectée en quelque manière au dualisme esprit-corps de la recherche du plaisir. Il s'efforce pourtant, par une analyse de ce que Platon et Aristote disent au sujet du plaisir dans le Philebus et l'Ethique de Nichomaque, de décrire le genre - ou, plutôt, les genres - de dualisme dont il s'agit. Le résultat, pense-t-il, est une analyse qui évite la position insoutenable selon (...) laquelle le plaisir n'est en aucune manière à être poursuivi pour lui-même. Il est d'accord avec Aristote et Thomas d'Aquin que le plaisir est «une sorte de fin», qui reçoit son intelligibilité complète seulement lorsqu'elle accompagne des pratiques humaines pleinement intelligibles de façon isomorphique. (shrink)

En répondant aux questions personnelles que ses correspondants n'hésitent pas à lui poser (Peut-on épouser sa cousine germaine? Deux mulâtres peuvent-ils engendrer un enfant plus foncé qu'eux? ), Jean Rostand a été amené à exposer ses idées sur un certain nombre de sujets qui lui tiennent à coeur : Le Présent et l'avenir de la personne humaine - Les Limites de l'humain - L'Evolution de la génétique - L'Histoire des idées sur l'origine de la vie - Sur la biogénèse - (...) Sur l'Histoire des sciences. Le point de vue du biologiste tient compte de celui du philosophe et du moraliste. Jean Rostand n'est pas seulement un homme de science, mais aussi un homme, avec ses passions, ses engagements et ses doutes. Il est un humaniste des temps modernes. (shrink)

In its last round of publications in September 2012, the Encyclopedia Of DNA Elements (ENCODE) assigned a biochemical function to most of the human genome, which was taken up by the media as meaning the end of ‘Junk DNA’. This provoked a heated reaction from evolutionary biologists, who among other things claimed that ENCODE adopted a wrong and much too inclusive notion of function, making its dismissal of junk DNA merely rhetorical. We argue that this criticism rests on misunderstandings concerning (...) the nature of the ENCODE project, the relevant notion of function and the claim that most of our genome is junk. We argue that evolutionary accounts of function presuppose functions as ‘causal roles’, and that selection is but a useful proxy for relevant functions, which might well be unsuitable to biomedical research. Taking a closer look at the discovery process in which ENCODE participates, we argue that ENCODE’s strategy of biochemical signatures successfully identified activities of DNA elements with an eye towards causal roles of interest to biomedical research. We argue that ENCODE’s controversial claim of functionality should be interpreted as saying that 80 % of the genome is engaging in relevant biochemical activities and is very likely to have a causal role in phenomena deemed relevant to biomedical research. Finally, we discuss ambiguities in the meaning of junk DNA and in one of the main arguments raised for its prevalence, and we evaluate the impact of ENCODE’s results on the claim that most of our genome is junk. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz’s belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz’s later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant’s work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel’s phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant (...) or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"EVERY MARITAL ACT OUGHT TO BE OPEN TO NEW LIFE'': TOWARD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING I. INTRODUCTION NE FREQUENTLY encounters misinterpretations of the statement " Every marital act ought to be open to new life " and similar statements in recent Catholic teaching concerning contraception.1 There are two common misinterpretations. One is: No couple may engage in marital intercourse without the intention to procreate. The other is: No couple may (...) engage in marital intercourse at times when they think procreation is impossible. As interpretations of the Church's teaching, these must be mistaken. For the Church teaches that contraception is always wrong and that natural family planning (NFP) is not always wrong. But NFP facilitates intercourse without the intention to procreate at times when procreation is thought to be impossible. Moreover, the Church has never taught that marital intercourse is good only if the couple desires to procreate; indeed, couples known to be sterile have never been forbidden to marry. We think that the only plausible interpretation of "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" is: It is wrong for those who engage in marital intercourse to attempt to impede the transmission of life which they think their act otherwise might bring about. For if they do try to impede that to which their act of itself might lead, they choose to close it to new life. 1 The proposition is formulated somewhat differently by Paul VI, Humanae vitae, 11, AAS 60 (1968), 488 (with references to Gasti connubii and to Pius XII's.Allocution to the Society of Italian Catholic Midwives); and by John Paul II, Familiaris consortia, 29, AAS 74 (1982), 115, following proposition 22 of the 1980 session of the Synod of Bishops. Moreover, the different formulations also are translated diversely. We do not think these differences matter for our present purpose. 365 366 GRISEZ, BOYLE, FINNIS AND MAY Un.derstood in this way, "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" expresses the same proposition as " Contraception is always wrong." Nevertheless, the affirmative formulation helps to clarify what contraception is, for it indicates the precise object of the contraceptive act. "Contraception" signifies only the prevention of conception, but the contraceptive act seeks to impede the beginning of the Zife of a possible person. The distinction is only conceptual, but we think it important, for the explicit reference to new life calls attention to the fact that contraception is a contralife act. The characterization of contraception as a oontralife act is one major element of the unbroken Christian tradition condemning contraception as always wrong. For example, a canon, Si aliquis, concerning contraception was included in the Church's universal law from the thirteenth century until 1917: " I£ anyone for the sake of fulfilling sexual desire or with premediated hatred does something to a man or to a woman, or gives something to drink, so that he cannot generate, or she cannot conceive, or offspring be born, let it be held as homicide." 2 This canon does not say that contraception is homicide ; the tradition made no such mistake. The canon rather says that contraception sihould be regarded as homicide is regarded. To regard contraception as homicide is regarded is not only to make it clear that.contraception is wrong, but also to point to its being contralife as the reason why it is wrong. When contraception is regarded as contralife, it is seen as evil outside marriage as well as within. Historically, contraception probably was more common among the unmarried than the married, and much of the tradition condemned contraception without distinguishing between its uses in and outside mar2 Deoret. Greg. IX, lib. V, tit. 12, cap. v; Oorpus iuris oanonioi, ed. A. L. Richter and A. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 2, 794: "Si aliquis causa explendae libidinis vel odii meditatione homini aut mulieri aliquid fecerit, vel ad potandum dederit, ut non possit generare, aut concipere, vel nasci soboles, ut homicida. tenea.tur." Some transla.te "ca.usa explendae libidinis," which is broad enough to cover all motivation by sexual impulse, "to satisfy lust," which unnecessarily limits the motive to habitual vice. " OPEN TO NEW LIFE " 367 riage. But. Casti oonnubii dealt with contraception... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HISTORY AS ARGUMENT FOR REVISION IN MORAL THEOLOGY: A REVIEW DISCUSSION GERMAIN GRISEZ Mount Saint Mary's College; Emmitsburg, Maryland, JOHN MAHONEY, S.J., forme11ly a professor of moral theology at Heythrop College and now the Frederick Denison Maurice Pro£essor 0£ Moral and Social Theology at King's Col1ege, London, presented the Martin D'Arcy Memorial Lectures in Campion Hall, Oxford, in the spring of 1982. He now has expanded these lectures (...) and published them, with extensive notes, in a book which is both erudite and readable.1 To save space, I shall not summarize Mahoney's book here,2 nor shaH I deal with various interesting ideas in it which deserve discussion among professional theologians. Rather, I shall evaluate the book from a single, rather narrow point of view: its appropriateness for use as a historical introduction to Catholic moral theology. I. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: SOME COMMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS DR. BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.Ss.R., pays particular attention to some of my early work in his recent article, " The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions." 1 He plainly tries to present my views accurately. Still, Johnstone has overlooked some important things I said about the questions he considers. Moreover, in some cases he either misunderstands the (...) positions I tried to explain and defend or, at least, puts matters in ways likely to cause others to misunderstand those positions. They still seem sound to me, although no doubt open to refinement and development. Therefore, since Johnstone is.seriously trying to use my work to advance understanding of important questions, I offer these comments and clarifications to help keep open the way to a more adequate theory of practical reason. I. The first question Johnstone considers is: What is the specific truth of practical reason? To explore this question, he compares the theory of practical reason which I articulated with a " traditional" theory, exemplified by the work of Labourdette. E·arly in this comparison, in pointing out differences, Johnstone offers a summary and criticism: If I understand Grisez correctly, he seeks to develop a theory of practical reason such that practical reason, in itself, can be understood -must be understood-without reference to the will FP,2 1 Tkomist, 50 (1986), pp. 417-46. Johnstone's article will be referred to henceforth as BVJ. 2 FP refers to: Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason : A Commentary on the Summa tkeologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," 9t69 270 GERMAIN GRISEZ p. 193). Further, he places such stress on the distinct way of knowing proper to practical reason, that he implies that the two (practical and theoretical reason) are quite disparate. These distinctions, I would suggest, are too sharply drawn. (BVJ, p. 4~5) I agree with Johnstone in rejecting these positions, for, as formulated, neither is what I tried to explain and defend. For practical reason precisely is reason directed to a work, which will not be done without an intervening act of an appetitive power corresponding to reason, and that power is the will. Hence, volition is included in the very concept of practical reason, and so it cannot be understood without reference to the will. But in the place Johnstone cites (FP, p. 193), I did not say that practical reason can be understood without reference to the wilL Rather, having argued that, because practical principles are self-evident truths, they do not presuppose a divine command, I said: "Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason." The argument for this is: The first operations of will are natural volitions of ends; these volitions presuppose knowledge directing to these ends; the directive knowledge is the principles of practical reason; therefore, the principles of practical reason do not presuppose any operation of our will.3 Moreover, I pointed out: "Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our inNatural Law Forum, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201. Although I personally agreed with all of the propositions asserted in this article at the time I wrote it, and still agree with almost all of them, I did not and do not consider the theory proposed in it to be my theory, but that of St. Thomas (and, even more importantly, a very good theory) which I tried to understand, explain, and defend. Moreover, had the article not been a commentary, I would have put many things somewhat differently, and would have provided arguments for certain positions which can be taken for granted within the Thomistic framework. s In FP, p. 193, this argument is introduced by the sentence: "At any rate this is Aquinas's theory," and accompanied by references to his work, to signal the reader that assumptions are being made here which outside the Thomistic framework would require additional support..Johnstone overlooks the signal. THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON 271 tention toward the end " (FP, p. 193). One essential function of practical reason is to reach such judgments (concerning means), which... (shrink)

Gil Germain's Spirits in the Material World reflects on the vital role technology plays in liberating humankind from the real world of space and time, and examines the broad implications of this development for contemporary society. Germain argues that we ought to be wary of our spiritual sojourn and suggests ways to offset technology's otherworldly impulse.

This paper studies the capture of organisms and materials in soil construction – a branch of ecological engineering dedicated to making soil in order to compensate for soil degradation. This approach takes all organisms to be ‘ecosystem engineers’, and often refers to earthworms as ‘collaborators’ in making soil. I examine the claim that such a convocation of worms amounts to a redistribution of agency and the underlying assumption that form-taking is the shaping of raw matter according to pre-existing forms. Drawing (...) on processual anthropology, I question the distinction between living and material components of soils, and between growing and making. I elaborate on soil scientists’ description of soil growth as pedogenesis in order to propose a view in which soil materials, along with organisms, participate in soil’s transformative and generative fluxes. I envisage the process as a concrescence, an experimentation that brings humans, worms, and soil materials together in new ways. (shrink)

Modern thinking about the ground tends to take it as a purely material base for the unfolding of history and ideas emerging on its surface. In this article, I question above-ground visions of city building by drawing on both the history of ground engineering and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Paris with geotechnicians. I address the difficulties that theorists have faced over past centuries in modelling soils, and the contemporary practice of building piles underneath buildings to anchor them. From this (...) unfolds an understanding of the ground as produced through an equilibrium between forces and materials in which buildings become participants, rather than a solid base upon which they stand. Looking at the activities of foundation builders, we find that the inertia of the urban soil no longer betokens an absence of activity or movement, but is rather a continuous achievement, a slow and dangerous process of balancing tensions. (shrink)

The ways in which other animal species can be informative about human biology are not exhausted by the traditional picture of the animal model. In this paper, I propose to distinguish two roles which laboratory organisms can have in biomedical research. In the more traditional case, organisms act as surrogates for human beings, and as such are expected to be more manageable replicas of humans. However, animal models can inform us about human biology in a much less straightforward way, by (...) being used as measuring devices—what I call their instrumental role. I first characterize this role and provide criteria for it, before illustrating it with some examples from biomedical research, especially cancer research. In such an instrumental role, phenotypes are not expected to phenocopy human phenomena, but instead have the purely instrumental value of detecting or measuring differences. I argue that the instrumental role is more prevalent than might first be suspected, and that some characteristics of contemporary biomedical research are increasingly shifting the use of laboratory organisms to the instrumental role. Finally, in light of the distinction proposed, I discuss the meaning of the expression “animal model”. (shrink)

Our commentary aims to show that the COVID-19 pandemic has amplified existing barriers to healthcare in England for ethnic minority and migrant women. We expose how the pandemic has affected the allocation of healthcare resources leading to the prioritisation of COVID-19 patients and suspending the equal access to healthcare services approach. We argue that we must look beyond this disruption in provision by examining existing barriers to access that have been amplified by the pandemic in order to understand the poorer (...) health outcomes for women in ethnic minority and migrant communities. The reflection focuses on racialised medical perceptions, gendered cultural norms including information barriers and stigma, and specific legal barriers. (shrink)

In response to Germain argument that evolution by natural selection has a limited explanatory power in cancer, Lean and Plutynski have recently argued that many adaptations in cancer only make sense at the tumor level, and that cancer progression mirrors the major evolutionary transitions. While we agree that selection could potentially act at various levels of organization in cancers, we argue that tumor-level selection is unlikely to actually play a relevant role in our understanding of the somatic evolution of (...) human cancers. (shrink)

Quizá no sea desacertado destacar que cuando Étienne Balibar afirma que el sujeto-ciudadano rousseauniano constituye una «figura propiamente revolucionaria», no está simplemente mencionándolo desde una perspectiva teórico-política, pues está haciendo ver que la dualidad que comporta supone una figura revolucionaria en un sentido lingüístico y especulativo. En este artículo, nuestro propósito no es otro que analizar el triple alcance de la «invención teórica de Rousseau». Que las significaciones conceptuales no puedan ser simples o unívocas, es lo que en buena medida (...) intentaremos poner de relieve siguiendo su interpretación de algunas de las nociones medulares del Contrato social de Rousseau. (shrink)

The Abidjan School is a school of thought that developed in the 1980s and 1990s in the Côte d'Ivoire inspired by the work of Louis-Joseph Lebret and Amartya Sen. It follows the empirical approach i...

Certitudes et incertitudes du déterminisme.--La crise de l'esprit.--Le drame.--La tour de Babel.--Le crépuscule.--L'aube.