Timely and accurate information is vital to the success of row crop farmers in the United States. Information access is also critical to conservation efforts due to its influence on best management practice adoption. Public information sources like extension educators have been declining in importance for farmers, raising concerns around what information farmers receive on conservation practices and the accessibility of agronomic information. In this study we investigate farmers’ changing information source consultation by broadly considering the agricultural information landscape, exploring (...) whether farmers have displayed clear trends in access between public and private sources and whether certain farmer or operational characteristics predict public or private source access. We utilize data from a 2018 survey of farmers in four Corn Belt states to examine farmers’ information seeking behaviors and predict the number of total, public, and private sources accessed using structural equation modeling with latent variables. Our findings elaborate on the public-to-private source shift and reveal that farmers continue to seek information from both private and public sources, though the frequency, mode of contact, and types of farmers contacting these sources differ. Results suggest public information sources are still influential, but they are accessed less frequently, tend to appeal to farmers with stronger environmental concerns, and have less appeal to older farmers compared to private information sources. Our findings indicate the potential for extension and other public sources to diversify modes of communication to further their reach. (shrink)

In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. -/- Examining theories (...) of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. -/- After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel. (shrink)

Orthodox Christianity has often been understood as not pertaining to Modernity due to its different historical and theological trajectory. This essay disputes such a view with regard to 20th century Orthodox thought, which it examines from the point of view of a sociology of Modernity in order to identify where Orthodox thinkers of the Russian Diaspora and in Russia today position themselves in relation to modern society and philosophy. Two essentially modern positions within Orthodoxy are singled out: an institutional and (...) an ontological response to the modernist paradigm. (shrink)

This paper is about conflicts of rights, and the particularly difficult challenges that such conflicts present when they entail women’s equality and claims of cultural recognition. South Africa since 1994 has presented a series of challenging—but by no means unique—circumstances many of which entail conflicting claims of rights. The central aim of this paper is, to make sense of the idea that the institution of traditional leadership can be sustained—and indeed given new, more concrete powers—in a democracy; and to explore (...) the implications that this has for women’s equality and equal human rights. This is a particularly pertinent question in the South African context, and I think it is worth reiterating from the outset that there is a distinct impression that women’s equality is always “up for grabs” when other, perhaps more powerful interests, come into play, in a way that would be unacceptable for other aspects of identity, and therefore signifiers of equality. It would be inconceivable, for example, to countenance a claim for a hierarchical racial arrangement in a given community, no matter how deeply culturally entrenched that arrangement was, and regardless of how much support it (ostensibly) had from the community concerned. I think therefore that we are obliged to ask difficult questions about the new legislation on traditional leadership, and to put it under the microscope of political theory in assessing the claim that this is one way of recognizing people’s rights and freedoms in a new democracy. (shrink)

Introduction. The paper considers a wide range of monetary policy rules: integral stabilization, NGDP targeting, price level targeting, raising the inflation target, introducing negative nominal interest rates etc. The author also considers discretionary policy used by central banks when the nominal rate is close to zero, such as dramatic preventive cut of the key interest rate and interventions in the open markets with the aim of cutting long-term interest rates. The relevance of this problem is supported by global long-term macroeconomic (...) and demographic factors, such as the dynamics of oil prices and the aging of the population. The aim of the paper is to identify the most effective monetary policy rules in order to reduce the risk of a nominal interest rate falling to zero. Methods. Analysis of the background and the results of general equilibrium models modeling monetary policy is carried out. Analysis of the role of current global trends (based on statistics) in aggravating the problem of declining interest rates. Scientific novelty of the research. The author systematizes the conclusions of modern macroeconomic theory, which offers a number of monetary rules making it possible to reduce the likelihood of falling into the zero bound of interest rate. Results. The effectiveness of monetary rules such as targeting nominal GDP and price levels in preventing the nominal interest rate from falling to zero is shown, primarily due to more efficient public expectations management which is a weak point of discretionary intervention. Conclusions. Under the current global factors for many developed countries and some oil-exporters, the downward trend in nominal rates persists. Combined with slowdown in economic growth, such threat may have negative consequences for the Russian economy. In this case, it seems reasonable to stick to the inflation target above 2% per year and in the future to consider switching to targeting the price level or nominal GDP. (shrink)

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first 3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others (...) to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerner’s (1980) just-world theory and J. Piaget’s (1932/1965) immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes. (shrink)

This paper explores the development of an ethical guardrail framework for AI systems, emphasizing the importance of customizable guardrails that align with diverse user values and underlying ethics. We address the challenges of AI ethics by proposing a structure that integrates rules, policies, and AI assistants to ensure responsible AI behavior, while comparing the proposed framework to the existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By focusing on practical mechanisms for implementing ethical standards, we aim to enhance transparency, user autonomy, and continuous improvement in (...) AI systems. Our approach accommodates ethical pluralism, offering a flexible and adaptable solution for the evolving landscape of AI governance. The paper concludes with strategies for resolving conflicts between ethical directives, underscoring the present and future need for robust, nuanced and context-aware AI systems. (shrink)

This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.

It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...) better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis. (shrink)

An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...) and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable. (shrink)

In today’s pandemic, many countries have experienced shortages of medical resources and many healthcare providers have often been faced with dramatic decisions about how to allocate beds, intensive care, or ventilators. Despite recognizing the need for triage, responses are not the same everywhere, and opinions and practices differ around what guidelines should be used, how they should be implemented, and who should ultimately decide. To some extent, triage issues reflect community values, revealing a given society’s moral standards and ideals. Our (...) goal is to study two countries which share many common features—Italy and France—as they deal with the pandemic, revealing the moral organization of medicine and healthcare, the power structures, and the nature of the disruptions in each context. (shrink)

Does matter consist of the simple or is it divisible into infinity? This is the question posed by the second antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. In this first comprehensive systematic study of the antinomy of division, its derivation, the proofs for thesis and antithesis as well as the resolution are analysed. The developmental and historical dimensions of the topic are also discussed. The study shows that although the antinomy of division is on the one hand a critique of (...) metaphysics, it nevertheless achieves a positive result for Kant's transcendental philosophy: On the one hand, the resolution of the antinomy represents a conceptual sharpening of realism and idealism as well as of the transcendental concept of appearance. On the other hand, it shows that the structure of matter is conditioned by a priori determinations of reason and understanding. These insights are highly relevant not only for Kant's enterprise of an a priori foundation of the natural sciences, but also for the problem of the soul. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija’s book Democracy and Truth, and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

When forecasting their own behavior, people are often inaccurate and tend to predict that they will engage in more socially desirable behavior than they actually do. The problem with inaccurate behavioral forecasts is that they can lead to negative consequences both for the self and for others. One particularly negative consequence may be that such errors can produce overly harsh evaluations and condemnation of others who do not act in a way that most people predict they themselves would act. This (...) paper identifies these common behavioral forecasting errors, why they occur, and the negative interpersonal and unintended, unethical consequences they can have. (shrink)

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Kritik und spezifischer um verschiedene Begründungsformen der kritischen Theorie spielt die kritische Theorie der Anerkennung, wie sie von Axel Honneth über die letzten 25 Jahre entwickelt worden ist, eine zentrale Rolle. Diese Theorie soll im vorliegenden Beitrag vorgestellt werden. Um den Aufbau und die Funktionsweise dieser Theorie richtig zu verstehen, ist es unabdingbar, sich zunächst zu vergegenwärtigen, wie sich Honneth in der Tradition der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie positioniert, also innerhalb jenes Theorieprojekts, das seine Wurzeln bei Hegel (...) und Marx findet und durch Horkheimer in den 1930er Jahren Programm geworden ist. Nach der Lesart, die ich vertreten möchte, entwickelt Honneth seine Anerkennungstheorie vor dem Hintergrund eines wahrgenommenen Scheiterns der ersten und zweiten Generation der Frankfurter Schule an der methodischen Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, die für das Projekt einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie definierend ist. Beides – die methodische Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, wie sie Honneth begreift, und das Scheitern, das Honneth bei Horkheimer, Adorno und Habermas wahrnimmt – wird Gegenstand des ersten Teils (1) dieses Beitrags sein. „Anerkennung“ wird von Honneth als der Begriff eingeführt, mit dem das Kernproblem einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie gelöst werden soll. Mit dem Begriff der Anerkennung soll es nämlich, wie wir im zweiten Teil (2) eingehender nachvollziehen werden, möglich sein, Zugang zu konkreten Ansprüchen auf Befreiung zu finden, die von der Gesellschaft geschaffen und zugleich verletzt werden. In einer Diskussion ideologischer Anerkennung werde ich zuletzt (3) mögliche Grenzen der kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung Honneths aufzeigen, die sich unmittelbar aus dem Erbe der Frankfurter Schule, wie Honneth es begreift, ergeben. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 231-238.

Straipsnyje analizuojami interviu, atlikti su priverstinę migraciją dėl Rusijos pradėto karo Ukrainoje patyrusiomis migrantėmis iš Ukrainos, kurios atvyko į Lietuvą po 2022 m. vasario 24 d. Gilinamasi į pasakojimus apie karo bei priverstinės migracijos patirtis bei aiškinamasi, kokios situacijos įvardijamos kaip kritinės individualiame, šeimos bei bendruomenės lygmenyse, taip pat – kokios strategijos pasitelkiamos minėtoms krizėms įveikti.

The paper deals with mutual conditionality of existence between the civil society and legal state. The paper is based on the 1918-1940 doctrine of independent Lithuania, the models of the legal state and the tentative models of the civil society created at that time. In the first part of the article, the concept of the legal state is discussed. In terms of creation of the model of the legal state, M. Romeris works are of exceptional importance. It his works, M. (...) Romeris related the legal state in essence with the legal, procedural system for ensuring the lawfulness. On the basis of works of European scholars of the 19th–20th centuries, M. Romeris conducted a critical analysis of the legal state and elucidated its most significant traits. It is notable that M. Romeris was able to make a correct insight into the strategy of advancing towards the legal state. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses role functionalism about color and suggests that it is not such a sui generis position as it is often considered to be. The discussionfocuses upon one, hopefully, central point. The main proponent of the idea of role functionalism is Jonathan Cohen who in his book The Red and the Real (2009)suggests a Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. Namely, his proposal implies that color ontology should be divided into relationalist and non-relationalist accounts. Generally, he endorses (...) the relationalist theory of color which roughly claims that colors are constituted in terms of some relation between objects and subjects (inter alia). Specifically, Cohen defends Role Functionalism as the best version of relationalism according to which the relations that constitute colors are functional relations. Based on his role functionalist stance, he distances himself from dispositionalists. However, in this paper I show that he could be interpreted as one and therefore needs to reconsider his Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. (shrink)

This collection of essays offers twelve innovative approaches to contemporary literary criticism. The contributors, women scholars who range from undergraduate students to contingent faculty to endowed chairs, stage a critical dialogue that raises vital questions about the aims and forms of criticism- its discourses and politics, as well as the personal, institutional, and economic conditions of its production. Offering compelling feminist and queer readings of avant-garde twentieth- and twenty-first-century texts, the essays included here are playful, performative, and theoretically savvy. Written (...) for students, scholars, and professors in literature and creative writing, Reading and Writing Experimental Texts provides examples for doing literary scholarship in innovative ways. These provocative readings invite conversation and community, reminding us that if the stakes of critical innovation are high, so are the pleasures. (shrink)

In artificial intelligence (AI), responses generated by machine-learning models (most often large language models) may be unfactual information presented as a fact. For example, a chatbot might state that the Mona Lisa was painted in 1815. Such phenomenon is called AI hallucinations, seeking inspiration from human psychology, with a great difference of AI ones being connected to unjustified beliefs (that is, AI “beliefs”) rather than perceptual failures). -/- AI hallucinations may have their source in the data itself, that is, the (...) source content, or in the training procedure, i.e. the way the knowledge was encoded in the model’s parameters, so that errors in encoding and decoding textual and non-textual representations can cause hallucinations. In this paper, we will observe how such errors come to life and how they might be mitigated. For this purpose, we will analyze the usability of justification logics, to behave as a proof checker for validating the correctness of large language models’ (LLM) responses. Justification logic was developed by S. Artemov, and later on mostly by Artemov and M. Fitting, deriving its main idea from the logic of proofs (LP): knowledge and belief modalities are seen as justification terms, i.e. t:X stands for t is a (proper) justification for X. Justification logic originated from attempts to create semantics for intuitionistic logic where proofs were the most proper justifications, but in further development, justification logic could be applied to different kinds of justifications). With the recent attempts to mitigate incorrect LLM responses, we will analyze various guardrails that are currently used for LLM responses, and see how the logic of justification may provide its benefits as an AI safety layer against false data. (shrink)

Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two (...) arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representations one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation and argues that the latter is required for self-consciousness. It is further argued that self-consciousness requires an awareness of other minds and that this awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format.

La critique de la métaphysique dans la Dialectique transcendantale de la Critique de la raison pure débouche sur la doctrine de l’usage régulateur des idées transcendantales de la raison pure. La théorie de l’usage régulateur de ces idées est relativement abstraite et demande à être clarifiée. Kant affirme que ces idées ont un usage dans les sciences empiriques. Cependant il ne spécifie pas quel usage les sciences peuvent faire de ces idées. Dans cet article je compare les caractéristiques des idées (...) transcendantales aux caractéristiques des modèles scientifiques. Ainsi la thèse principale de mon article est que la théorie kantienne de l’usage régulateur des idées est comparable à la modélisation en science. C’est ce que je nomme « l’approche modélisatrice des idées transcendantales chez Kant ». D’après cette interprétation, on trouve chez ce dernier une conception relativement élaborée de la modélisation que l’on peut comprendre comme signifiant que la métaphysique fournit aux sciences les formes les plus universelles de modèles qui peuvent être spécifiés pour des objectifs particuliers par les sciences. (shrink)

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...) called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible. In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question. In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed. I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants. (shrink)

Spinoza scholars have claimed that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza's definitions in his Ethics are real, in spite of indications to the contrary, or the definitions are nominal and the propositions derived from them are false. I argue that Spinoza did not recognize the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Rather, Spinoza classified definitions according to whether they require a priori or a posteriori justification, which is a classification distinct from either the real/nominal or the intensional/extensional classification. (...) I argue that Spinoza uses both a priori and a posteriori definitions in the Ethics and that recognizing both types of definitions allows us to understand Spinoza's geometric method in a new way. We can now understand the geometric method as two methods, one resulting in propositions that Spinoza considers to be absolutely certain and another resulting in propositions that Spinoza does not consider certain. The latter method makes use of a posteriori definitions and postulates, whereas the former method uses only a priori definitions and axioms. (shrink)

I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists’ recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars’ concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approaches will lead to fragmentation and the (...) assumption that an imposed consensus on a theoretical approach is needed to maintain the unity of the discipline. (shrink)