This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of lawmaking. Elaborations of the process of lawmaking have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in lawmaking. (...) This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems-and some possible solutions-as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of lawmaking taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection. (shrink)

This chapter examines Richard Rorty's conception of what it means to be a public intellectual in the modern world and how this conception is related to his pragmatist approach to philosophy. It also discusses the influence that this conception and approach had on Central Europe. In doing so, it outlines for the first time, and in some detail, the close contact that Rorty had, through his books, and more personally through conferences, lectures, and seminars, with philosophers in countries such as (...) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. (shrink)

Porter and Kramer :78–92, 2006; Harv Bus Rev 89, 62–77, 2011) introduced ‘shared value’ as a ‘new conception of capitalism,’ claiming it is a powerful driver of economic growth and reconciliation between business and society. The idea has generated strong interest in business and academia; however, its theoretical precepts have not been rigorously assessed. In this paper, we provide a systematic and thorough analysis of shared value, focusing on its ontological and epistemological properties. Our review highlights that ‘shared value’ has (...) spread into the language of multiple disciplines, but that its current conceptualization is vague, and it presents important discrepancies in the way it is defined and operationalized, such that it is more of a buzzword than a substantive concept. It also overlaps with many other concepts and lacks empirical grounding. We offer recommendations for defining and measuring the concept, take a step toward disentangling it from related concepts, and identify relevant theories and research methods that would facilitate extending the knowledge frontier on shared value. (shrink)

Sixteen years ago, Prahalad and Hart introduced the possibility of both profitably serving the poor and alleviating poverty. This first iteration of the Bottom/Base of the Pyramid approach focused on selling to the poor. In 2008, after ethical criticisms leveled at it, the field moved to BoP 2.0, instead emphasizing business co-venturing. Since 2015, we have witnessed some calls for a new iteration, with the focus broadening to a more sustainable development approach to poverty alleviation. In this paper, we seek (...) to answer the question: How has the BoP approach evolved over the past 16 years, and has it delivered on its early promise? We conducted a systematic review of 276 papers published in journals in this period, utilizing a rigorous correspondence analysis method to map key trends, and then further examined the 22 empirical studies conducted on the BoP approach. Our results suggest that the field has evolved, passing through a number of trends and coming full circle—with our analysis pointing to more recent BoP literature emphasizing similar themes to those espoused in the initial BoP iteration, rather than reflecting the principles espoused in either BoP 2.0 or BoP 3.0. Our analysis also points to a lack of clear evidence that the BoP concept has delivered on its promise either to businesses or to BoP participants. (shrink)

This article discusses places and practices of young heterosexual Malaysian Muslims dating in non-private urban spaces. It is based on research conducted in Kuala Lumpur (KL) in two consecutive summers 2016 and 2017. Malaysian law (Khalwat law) does not allow for two unrelated people (where at least one of them is Muslim) of opposite sexes to be within ‘suspicious proximity’ of one another in public. This law significantly influences behaviors and activities in urban spaces in KL. In addition to the (...) legal framework, the beliefs of Malaysian muslims significantly influence the way they perceive space and how they behave in the city. The article discusses the empirical theme, beginning with the participants’ narratives of their engagement with the dominant sexual and gender order in non-private spaces of KL. Utilizing questionnaires, interviews and observations, this paper draws upon a qualitative research project and questions the analytical usefulness of the notion of public space (as a Western construct) in the context of an Islamic, postcolonial, tropical, global city. (shrink)

The proposal that probabilistic inference and unconscious hypothesis testing are central to information processing in the brain has been steadily gaining ground in cognitive neuroscience and associated fields. One popular version of this proposal is the new theoretical framework of predictive processing or prediction error minimization, which couples unconscious hypothesis testing with the idea of ‘active inference’ and claims to offer a unified account of perception and action. Here we will consider one outstanding issue that still looms large at the (...) core of the PEM framework: the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones. In order to fulfill the promise of becoming a unifying framework for describing and modeling cognition, PEM needs to be able to differentiate between conscious and unconscious mental states or processes. We will argue that one currently popular view, that the contents of conscious experience are determined by the ‘winning hypothesis’, falls short of fully accounting for conscious experience. It ignores the possibility that some states of a system can control that system’s behavior even though they are apparently not conscious. What follows from this is that the ‘winning hypothesis’ view does not provide a complete account of the difference between conscious and unconscious states in the probabilistic brain. We show how this problem for the received view can be resolved by augmenting PEM with Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness. This move is warranted by the similar roles that attention and internal competition play in both the PEM framework and the multiple drafts model. (shrink)

Hobson & Friston (2014) outline a synthesis of Hobson's work on dreaming and consciousness with Friston’s work on the free energy principle and predictive coding. Whilst we are sympathetic with their claims about the function of dreaming and its relationship to consciousness, we argue that their endorsement of the Cartesian theatre metaphor is neither necessary nor desirable. Furthermore, if it were necessary then this endorsement would undermine their positive claims, as the Cartesian theatre metaphor is widely regarded as unsustainable. We (...) demonstrate this point and then develop an alternative formulation of their position that does not require the Cartesian theatre metaphor. Our positive goal is to clarify Hobson & Friston’s confusing usage of philosophical terminology, replacing it where possible with the more transparent language of the forward models framework. This will require some modifications to their account, which as it stands is philosophically and empirically unsustainable. (shrink)

"Working from newly available texts in Heidegger's Complete Works, Krzysztof Ziarek presents Heidegger at his most radical and demonstrates how the thinker's daring use of language is an integral part of his philosophical expression. Ziarek emphasizes the liberating potential of language as an event that discloses being and amplifies Heidegger's call for a transformative approach to poetry, power, and ultimately, philosophy."--Publisher's website.

The aim of the paper is to determine the role of intuitions in Gettier cases. Critics of the Method of Cases argue that arguments developed within this method contain a premise that is justified by its intuitiveness; they also argue that intuitions are unreliable sources of evidence. By contrast, Max Deutsch argues that this critique is unsound since intuitions do not serve as evidence for premises. In Gettier cases, an intuitive premise is justified by other arguments called G-Grounds. I propose (...) a different view on the role of intuition in Gettier cases. I introduce a distinction between concept-revision arguments and concept-application arguments. On the basis of this distinction and Craig's and Spicer's distinction between intuitions of intension and intuitions of extension, I show that (1) intuitions of extension do not serve as evidence for any G-Grounds; (2) intuitions of intension do play an evidential role for all G-Grounds, but (3) in the case of G-Grounds which are used as concept-application arguments, they are a poor source of evidence, while (4) in the case of G-Grounds used as concept-revision arguments, they could be a reliable source of evidence if they are intuitions of intension of a speaker immersed in philosophical discourse. (shrink)

The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = (...) 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries. (shrink)

In this paper, I present main theses of Aquinas Way to God: The Proof in the De Ente et Essentia by Gaven Kerr. The book in question is a contemporary interpretation and defence of Thomas Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God, based on the real distinction between the essence of the thing and its act of being. I stress the fact that Kerr underlines the metaphysical character of Thomas’s argument and the role of participation in Aquinas’s understanding of the (...) act of being. In the last part of the article, I discuss Kerr’s interpretation of Aquinas’s argument for the real distinction between essence and an act of being, as well as Kerr’s own argument. These arguments are of particular importance since they provide metaphysical presuppositions for the argument for God’s existence considered in Kerr’s book. As for the first argument, I argue that the first part of Aquinas’s argumentation pertains to the real order rather than conceptual. Concerning the second argument, I attempt to highlight the difficulties of Kerr’s understanding of Thomist esse as a principle of the existence of a thing. (shrink)

Investigating meta-programming within the logic programming paradigm, Meta-Logics and Logic Programming presents original research on an important extension of logic programming that makes it more amenable for knowledge representation and programming in general. The 12 contributions, many written especially for this book, explore the foundations, language design issues, and applications of meta-programming in logic programming. Meta-programming—the process of writing computer programs that can manipulate representations of other programs—has been key both in the foundations of computer science and in its practical (...) developments. Examples of meta-programs include compilers, interpreters, program analyzers, and partial evaluators. The choice of logic programming as a basis for meta-programming offers several practical and theoretical advantages: among them, the possibility of tackling critical foundational problems of meta-programming within a strong theoretical framework, and the surprising ease of programming. The usual framework of logic programming (and more generally first-order logic), however, has to be modified and extended to formally deal with meta-programs, extensions the editors call "meta-logics." Along with an exploration of meta-programming in logic programming, the definitions, formal properties, and use of these extensions constitute one of the book's main themes. The first part of the book, Foundations, focuses on the representation problem—how object programs are represented within meta-programs. The second part, Language Support for Meta-Logics, is concerned with language extensions that make meta-programming easier and more elegant. The third part, Meta-Logics for Knowledge Management, deals with the use of meta-logic for advanced knowledge representation purposes. Logic Programming series. (shrink)

Let [Formula: see text] be a monster model of an arbitrary theory [Formula: see text], let [Formula: see text] be any tuple of bounded length of elements of [Formula: see text], and let [Formula: see text] be an enumeration of all elements of [Formula: see text]. By [Formula: see text] we denote the compact space of all complete types over [Formula: see text] extending [Formula: see text], and [Formula: see text] is defined analogously. Then [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see (...) text] are naturally [Formula: see text]-flows. We show that the Ellis groups of both these flows are of bounded size, providing an explicit bound on this size. Next, we prove that these Ellis groups do not depend on the choice of the monster model [Formula: see text]; thus, we say that these Ellis groups are absolute. We also study minimal left ideals of the Ellis semigroups of the flows [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. We give an example of a NIP theory in which the minimal left ideals are of unbounded size. Then we show that in each of these two cases, boundedness of a minimal left ideal is an absolute property and that whenever such an ideal is bounded, then in some sense its isomorphism type is also absolute. Under the assumption that [Formula: see text] has NIP, we give characterizations of when a minimal left ideal of the Ellis semigroup of [Formula: see text] is bounded. Then we adapt the proof of Theorem 5.7 in Definably amenable NIP groups, J. Amer. Math. Soc. 31 609–641 to show that whenever such an ideal is bounded, a certain natural epimorphism 863–932]) from the Ellis group of the flow [Formula: see text] to the Kim–Pillay Galois group [Formula: see text] is an isomorphism. We also obtain some variants of these results, formulate some questions, and explain differences which occur when the flow [Formula: see text] is replaced by [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual analysis. However, in our paper, we argue that closer scrutiny reveals not only the falsity but also the inherent ambiguity of this narrative. We explore four interpretations of the "Anti-Novelty Claim", the claim that conceptual engineering is not a new way of doing philosophy. Discussing the Anti-Novelty Claim from the perspective of a text’s producer, the text’s consumers, and the exegetical potential of the text, we (...) examine each perspective’s metaphilosophical implications and demonstrate that taking each perspective requires different methods. Adopting these different methods, we argue that the different interpretations of the Anti-Novelty Claim range from nearly trivially true to unlikely but untested. Importantly, we emphasize that each interpretation offers unique philosophical insights, yet addressing them requires diverse types of evidence, preventing a singular, straightforward answer to whether conceptual engineering is new. (shrink)

We solve two problems from a work of Haskel and Pillay concerning maximal stable quotients of groups ∧-definable in NIP theories. The first result says that if G is a ∧-definable group in a distal theory, then Gst=G00 (where Gst is the smallest ∧-definable subgroup with G∕Gst stable, and G00 is the smallest ∧-definable subgroup of bounded index). In order to get it, we prove that distality is preserved under passing from T to the hyperimaginary expansion Theq. The second result (...) is an example of a group G definable in a nondistal NIP theory for which G=G00, but Gst is not an intersection of definable groups. Our example is a saturated extension of (R,+,[0,1]). Moreover, we make some observations on the question whether there is such an example which is a group of finite exponent. We also take the opportunity and give several characterizations of stability of hyperdefinable sets involving continuous logic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that Curry’s recent defence of the interpretivist approach to beliefs is unsuccessful. Curry tries to argue that his version of interpretivism, which is based on the model-theoretic approach to folk-psychological attributions, is well-suited to resisting the epistemological argument that is directed at interpretivism. In this paper, I argue that even if Curry’s defence is successful in this case, his theory does not have enough resources to solve the metaphysical problems of interpretivism. In (...) particular, I argue that the model-theoretic version of interpretivism that Curry espouses does not explain the claim that beliefs are constituted by the process of attribution, which is central to the interpretivist project. In the final parts of the paper, I discuss the issue of the relation between interpretivism and other forms of the broadly superficial/deflationary approach to beliefs, especially dispositionalism. I contend that if one wants to adopt a superficial/deflationary approach, it is best not to adopt interpretivism as it is an unnecessarily complex and problematic version of this broad view. (shrink)

The paper engages in two metaphilosophical disputes. The first concerns the importance of studying original texts to establish the methods used by philosophers. The second addresses the role of intuitions in philosophical arguments. In this paper, I argue that a close reading of original texts is crucial for the methodological dispute on the role of intuitions in philosophy. I refer to the critique of this stance proposed by Landes, discuss it, and justify my claim by presenting the results and benefits (...) of a corpus study concerning the practice known as “intuition-talk” in the theory of reference. The study consists of an in-depth qualitative analysis of this practice with respect to four parameters: indicators of intuition-talk, the subject of that talk, the mode of that talk (whether intuition-talk is used by formulating a judgment on a particular case or ascribing a general property to a given phenomenon), and the issue of whether intuitive claims are supported by arguments. I discuss the results, their consequences, and outline some challenges that need to be addressed in future studies conducted within the proposed approach and thereby demonstrate why such a study, focused on the content of original texts, should be seen as metaphilosophically valuable. (shrink)

Choć teorie C.G. Junga i J. Hillmana były już dogłębnie analizowane w licznych tekstach, prezentowany artykuł ma na celu wprowadzenie nowego spojrzenia na genealogię ich koncepcji. Śledząc historię pojęć obrazu psychicznego oraz archetypu, tekst rekonstruuje ewolucję ich myśli na kanwie dwóch jakościowych podejść psychologii: freudowskiej Metapsychologii (pierwotnie rozumianej jako psychoanalityczną naukę skoncentrowaną na zastąpieniu metafizyki) oraz diltheyowskiej Psychologii Realnej (deskryptywnej psychologii badającej aktywność duszy). Prezentowane studium skupia się na okresie 1912-1979 rozciągającym się od ustanowienia integralnej szkoły jungowskiej do ustanowienia przez (...) J. Hillmana Psychologii Archetypowej. Tak też niniejszy test ma na celu przedstawienie krytycznego i historycznego podejścia do psychologii głębi oraz psychologii obrazu. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the problem of animal consciousness. Our folk interpretations and explanations of animal behaviour appeal to conscious mental states like e.g. fear or anger. Scholars, however, do not agree as to whether animals do in fact have conscious mental states similar to humans. According to Shettleworth, one may distinguish three positions in relation to this problem: radical opponents of the concept of animal consciousness who claim that animal are not conscious in any interesting sense; sceptics (...) who believe that some species probably do have consciousness yet it cannot be subject to scientific investigations due to subjective nature of conscious mental states; cognitive ethologists who believe that most species are potentially conscious and the central task for behavioural biologists is the investigation of the nature of their consciousness ; cognitive ethologists argue that their claims are supported by four arguments connected with gradual evolution; flexible and complex behaviour; animal communication, and neurophysiological similarity. These arguments have to face strong philosophical counter-arguments, especially the one from multiple realizability and the zombie hypothesis. In response, a new methodological approach is proposed to avoid these difficulties. It is based on Morgan’s Canon, interpreted here as a kind of zoo-psychological Ockham’s razor. Key words ANIMAL, CONSCIOUSNESS, SHETTLEWORTH. (shrink)

The paper investigates to what extent the method of cases can be interpreted as either a descriptive or a normative enterprise. I demonstrate that although most instances of the method of cases in most philosophical theories could be interpreted as being intended to either discover or revise the meaning of their target concepts, within a theory of reference this method cannot be used to shift the meaning of the concept of reference. The reason for this is that intuitions of extension (...) in a theory of reference constitute a set of data that needs to be explained, while in most other philosophical theories they could either be abandoned in favor of intuitions of intension or serve as a criterion for the adequacy of the proposed definition of the target concept. This feature of a theory of reference is caused by the fact that an implicit understanding of what reference is in a theory of reference is usually assumed and is out of discussion. In effect, the claim in paradigmatic instances of the method of cases within a theory of reference does not concern whether an expression does or does not refer in particular cases, but rather what the reference of a certain expression is, and therefore it cannot be justified by intuitions of intension. (shrink)

George Santayana (1863-1952), a Spanish-American philosopher, is an influential personage on the cultural stage in English- and Spanish-speaking countries. His numerous books and papers on topics as varied as epistemology, ontology, aesthetics, ethics, anthropology, value theory, and American studies, along with his best-selling novel, his sophisticated poetry, and his famous autobiography, make him a vivid and profound source of reflection on the history of American and European thought, as well as a stimulus for future work. Santayana's exceptionality was appreciated by (...) William James and Josiah Royce, his most eminent colleagues in Harvard University's Department of Philosophy, and has been discussed by such respected authors as John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Charles Hartshorne, Eric Voegelin, Alfred Schutz, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Arthur Danto, and Ferdinand Savater, among others. This book aims to understand Santayana by considering his often provocative views on America. Other scholars have reconstructed his thought at various times and in a variety of ways, but no one has yet considered Santayana's approach toward America in a serious and profound way (at least not in the English language). This book attempts to convince the reader that the impartiality of Santayana's philosophy, its transcendence of cultural limits and mental borders, makes it a living philosophy, and that this is the strongest aspect of Santayana's thought. (shrink)

This paper introduces three model-theoretic constructions for generalized Epstein semantics: reducts, ultramodels and $\textsf {S}$ -sets. We apply these notions to obtain metatheoretical results. We prove connective inexpressibility by means of a reduct, compactness by an ultramodel and definability theorem which states that a set of generalized Epstein models is definable iff it is closed under ultramodels and $\textsf {S}$ -sets. Furthermore, a corollary concerning definability of a set of models by a single formula is given on the basis of (...) the main theorem and the compactness theorem. We also provide an example of a natural set of generalized Epstein models which is undefinable. Its undefinability is proven by means of an $\textsf {S}$ -set. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about (...) truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs. (shrink)

In the paper I introduce and discuss the interpretative procedure; a stage of investigation in thought experiments in which it is determined which states of affairs are genuine realizations of the described story. I show how incorporating the interpretative procedure to the reconstruction of a certain kind of thought experiments, i.e., the method of cases, provides a solution to the so-called problem of deviant realizations. According to this problem it is hard to formulate the logical structure of the method of (...) cases that excludes far-fetched interpretations of a particular thought experiment's description that are inconsistent with the expected conclusion of the experiment. As I show, if we agree that the interpretative procedure precedes the act of establishing whether the thing which is at issue (e.g., knowledge) appears within a certain state of affairs, deviant realizations could be ruled out, since within interpretative procedure we establish the set of states of affairs that are compatible with the intentions of the author of the thought experiment. In the paper I provide a general explanation of how this task could be fulfilled by semantic intuitions and discuss their contextual dependence. (shrink)

Author: Rogucki Krzysztof Title: PERFORMATIVES IN PHILOSOPHY LANGUAGE OF EUGENIUSZ GRODZIŃSKI (Wypowiedzi performatywne w filozofii języka Eugeniusza Grodzińskiego) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 123-137 Keywords: JOHN L. AUSTIN, EUGENIUSZ GRODZIŃSKI, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGAUAGE, PERFORMATIVES Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article is focused on the works of Eugeniusz Grodziński that concern performatives. The problem is if Austin’s theory of illocution is continuation of his theory of performatives (...) or to a degree contradicts it. Grodziński took the second. He claimed that the first theory is logically independent from the second and that it is possible to distinguish utterances that are informative (reporting, descriptive) from these that are performatives. (shrink)

The aim of the article is the analysis of the principle of fair play which co-creates an axiological basis of contemporary sport as well as its basic moral category. The constituents of fair play are, first of all, responsibility and justice. Both values are central values, connected with each other, and also closely connected with other values inscribed in fair play, e.g. respect, solidarity, care or honesty. The conducted analysis shows that the rules of fair play connected with formal responsibility (...) and justice, i.e. following the rules and caring for the integrity of sport, are constituent for both sport and esports, whereas the rules of fair play connected with acting responsibly, i.e. respect and avoiding victory at all costs, are hard to realise in esports. It results from the fact that contact between the players is digitally mediated. Hence, apart from gestures and verbal communication, display of respect towards a player during a game is impeded, as is still more a spontaneous reaction to his or her being hurt. Also, avoiding winning at all costs is impeded in esports, as activities directed at obtaining victory are built into the content of the game and therefore should be carried out in accordance with the regulations, from the technical and tactical side and according to the possessed skills. However, it is possible to stop the game when the connection with the other player is suddenly interrupted. From a fair-play perspective also the content of some games employed in esports is questionable, as it assumes contesting moral rules, which in turn is at variance with the realisation of integrative, educational and formative functions of esports in society. (shrink)

The paper defends the view that that a significant part of metaphysics should be understood as conceptual engineering, and explores its epistemological advantages and metaphysical implications. It discusses the challenge raised by moderate modal skepticism, which points out the lack of reliable methods for verifying modal statements through thought experiments. As I argue, a normative stance on metaphysical methodology, understanding it as engaging in conceptual engineering project, justifies the use of this method. By adopting an approach where the method of (...) cases offers reasons for adopting specific normative constraints on concept usage, the method becomes justifiable. Consequently, it can be employed to justify the revision of conceptual schemes and, in turn, validate certain modal claims about entities falling under the scrutinized concepts. The paper explores how this approach can methodologically enrich conceptual engineering-focused perspectives in metaphysics and examines its metaphysical consequences. In particular, it demonstrates that despite the mind-dependency of the method of cases results, it still leaves room for a metaphysically realistic viewpoint. (shrink)