Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)

Diverse lines of evidence point to a basic human aversion to physically harming others. First, we demonstrate that unwillingness to endorse harm in a moral dilemma is predicted by individual differences in aversive reactivity, as indexed by peripheral vasoconstriction. Next, we tested the specific factors that elicit the aversive response to harm. Participants performed actions such as discharging a fake gun into the face of the experimenter, fully informed that the actions were pretend and harmless. These simulated harmful actions increased (...) peripheral vasoconstriction significantly more than did witnessing pretend harmful actions or to performing metabolically-matched non-harmful actions. This suggests that the aversion to harmful actions extends beyond empathic concern for victim harm. Together, these studies demonstrate a link between the body and moral decision making processes. (shrink)

Judgment and Agency contains Sosa’s latest effort to explain how higher epistemic value of the sort missing from an unwitting clairvoyant’s beliefs might be a special case of performance normativity, with its superior value following from truisms about performance value. This paper argues that the new effort rests on mistaken assumptions about performance normativity. Once these mistaken assumptions are exposed, it becomes clear that higher epistemic value cannot be a mere special case of performance normativity, and its superiority cannot be (...) guaranteed just by truisms about performance value. Sections 1 and 2 set the stage, clarifying the thesis and the relevant features of Sosa’s strategy, and explaining why the strategy requires the mistaken assumptions. Section 3 presents a dilemma for the new account of higher epistemic value. Section 4 deepens the case for one of the horns. Section 5 takes stock and draws some broader morals. (shrink)

Recent writers claim that responsibilist virtue epistemology courts skepticism, owing to the fact that most of us lack the virtues it deems necessary for justified belief and knowledge. A powerful version of this objection is the challenge from situationist social psychology pressed by Alfano (2012, 2013) and Olin and Doris (2014). This paper develops a new version of responsibilism that is immune from this objection, and shows that this view has many advantages over other forms of virtue epistemology. My responsibilism (...) dispenses with the ubiquitous but (I argue) mistaken idea that responsibilist virtue properties must be understood in terms of character traits. My view parallels an often overlooked form of virtue ethics suggested by Thomson (1997) that some situationists (e.g., Harman (2001)) have praised. That form shares with other forms the thought that virtue properties are normatively fundamental, but it adds that act-attaching ones are prior to person-attaching ones, and require no backing by character traits. Far from being an ad hoc retreat position, I argue that this view is independently attractive. (shrink)

Categorization and memory for specific items are fundamental processes that allow us to apply knowledge to novel stimuli. This study directly compares categorization and memory using delay match to category (DMC) and delay match to sample (DMS) tasks. In DMC participants view and categorize a stimulus, maintain the category across a delay, and at the probe phase view another stimulus and indicate whether it is in the same category or not. In DMS, a standard item working memory task, participants encode (...) and maintain a specific individual item, and at probe decide if the stimulus is an exact match or not. Constrained Principal Components Analysis was used to identify and compare activity within neural networks associated with these tasks, and we relate these networks to those that have been identified with resting state-fMRI. We found that two frontoparietal networks of particular interest. The first network included regions associated with the dorsal attention network and frontoparietal salience network; this network showed patterns of activity consistent with a role in rapid orienting to and processing of complex stimuli. The second uniquely involved regions of the frontoparietal central executive network; this network responded more slowly following each stimulus and showed a pattern of activity consistent with a general role in role in decision-making across tasks. Additional components were identified that were associated with visual, somatomotor and default mode networks. (shrink)

The question of the moral status of human nature is today being posed above all under the influence of medical and biotechnological aspects. These facilitate not only an increasing number of, but also increasingly far-reaching interventions and manipulations in humans, so that the perspective of a gradual "technologization" of his physical constitution can no longer be regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that this disturbing development can only be halted when an inherent value is (once again) ascribed to (...) human nature. After a short description of this situation (I), the following paper first examines the difficulties that arise as regards an adequately precise descriptive definition of human nature (II) and, in a second step, the problems posed by the necessity to define the normative status of human nature (III). It hereby comes to the conclusion that a precise definition of "human nature" is not possible for fundamental reasons, and that only a weak normativity can be warranted. (shrink)

I give a semantics for a logic with two pairs of doxastic modals and an indicative conditional connective that all nest without restriction. Sentences are evaluated as accepted, rejected, or neither. Certainty is the necessity-like modality of acceptance. Inferences may proceed from premises that are certain, or merely accepted, or a mix of both. This semantic setup yields some striking results. Notably, the existence of inferences that preserve certainty but not acceptance very directly implies both failure of modus ponens for (...) the indicative conditional in the logic of acceptance and failure of the deduction theorem for the material conditional in the logic of certainty. The latter failure dissolves, in the logic of certainty, the much - discussed tension between modus ponens and the law of import-export. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the ‘It's OK to be White’ Senate motion made by Australian far-right politician Pauline Hanson in 2018. Deliberately innocuous, the ‘It's OK to be white’ slogan was designed by online white supremacist groups with the intention of ‘triggering liberals’ and provoking outrage. Drawing on critical discourse analysis, I demonstrate that Hanson's ‘It's OK to be white’ motion was an act of calculated ambivalence, which served to address multiple audiences simultaneously. I argue that the motion provided Hanson (...) with a novel way to discuss so-called ‘anti-white’ or ‘reverse’ racism which succeeded in generating the desired controversy and media attention. I further argue that the success of the motion exposed the Australian media's illiteracy on contemporary alt-right/white supremacist tactics and discourses. I also critically examine the implications of the motion and Hanson's promotion of white victimhood narratives. Despite its innocuous framing, the ‘It's OK to be white’ motion represented the successful co-optation of a racist white supremacist political project, the implications of which should not be understated. This research furthers our understanding of the strategies and tactics employed by the far-right, as well as the interrelationship between the populist radical right and online white supremacist groups. (shrink)

Sound definitions of its basic concepts are fundamental to every scientific discipline. In some instances, like in the case of the ecosystem concept, the question arises if we can define such concepts at all. And if we can define them, how should we choose from the multiple definitions available? And what are the preconditions for a scientifically sound and useful definition? On the basis of the ecosystem concept, this paper illustrates a major, often neglected distinction in the definition of ecological (...) concepts, namely that between defining criteria and additional descriptive statements connected to those definitions. As is demonstrated by examples from the literature, mixing up these categories leads to false inferences about the properties of physical objects (e.g. a particular forest) subsumed by the concept (e.g. the ecosystem). As a further consequence, this inference becomes problematic in terms of theory development and/or the application of ecological concepts for management decisions. (shrink)

Die naive Idee des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts beruht auf der irrtümlichen Annahme, daß es absolute Tatsachen und Grundsätze gibt, auf denen aufbauend die Wissenschaft ein ständig verbessertes Bild der Wirklichkeit liefert und sich mehr und mehr einer absoluten Wahrheit nähert. Im Gegensatz dazu wird gezeigt, daß wissenschaftliche Tatsachen und Grundsätze nur innerhalb der Interpretationsschemata von "Systemmengen" vermittelt werden können, von denen die jeweiligen "historischen Situationen" bestimmt werden. Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften wird durch Unstimmigkeiten innerhalb solcher Systemmengen und durch den darin begründeten (...) Wandel hervorgerufen. Dabei liegt ein historischer Relativismus bloßer Fatalität oder Willkür nicht vor, weil nicht nur Kriterien für die Wahrheit von Aussagen innerhalb von Systemen logisch, sondern weil auch die Systeme selbst samt ihren Veränderungen, und zwar situationslogisch begründet werden können. Ist nun Wissenschaftsgeschichte "Systemgeschichte", so kommen nur zwei Bewegungsformen in Frage, in denen Fortschritte erzielt werden können: Nämlich erstens "Systemexplikation" und zweitens "Systemmutation". Entsprechend ist ein Fortschritt I von einem Fortschritt II zu unterscheiden. Beide werden mit Hilfe des Begriffs "Harmonisierung einer Systemmenge" genauer definiert. (shrink)

Despite decades of research, we still lack a clear explanation for the emergence and persistence of inequality. Here we propose and evaluate a marginal utility of inequality hypothesis that nominates circumscription and environmental heterogeneity as independent, necessary conditions for the emergence of intragroup material inequality. After coupling the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample with newly generated data from remote sensing, we test predictions derived from this hypothesis using a multivariate generalized additive model that accounts for spatial and historical dependence as well as (...) subsistence mode. Our analyses show that the probability a society will be stratified increases significantly as a function of proxies of environmental heterogeneity and environmental circumscription. This supports the hypothesis that increasing environmental heterogeneity and circumscription drives the emergence and persistence of inequality among documented societies across the globe. We demonstrate how environmental heterogeneity and circumscription produce situations that limit individuals’ options so that some may find it in their best interest to give up some autonomy for material gain, while others may find it in their best interest to give up some material resources for another individual’s time or deference. These results support the marginal utility of inequality framework and enable future explorations of the ecological conditions that facilitate the emergence of intragroup inequality through time and across the globe. (shrink)

Die spekulative Frage, wie das Denken sich und somit ein Selbst denken kann, ist die prinzipientheoretische Grundfrage der Philosophie. In ihr ist auch die transzendentale Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt enthalten. Wie sie darin enthalten ist und inwiefern die transzendentale Fragestellung auf die spekulative verweist und ihrer bedarf, wird im Anschluß an Kant zu zeigen sein, denn die spekulative Frage ist nicht die Ausgangsfrage Kantens. Kant geht aus von der Antinomie von empiristischem Skeptizismus und (...) ontologischem Dogmatismus und spielt sie an der Differenz von Ding und Denken durch, die dieser Antinomie zugrundeliegt. Die Ontologie wird darum von ihm belehrt, daß sie das Gedankending nicht mit dem Gegenstand der Erfahrung und das Denken nicht mit dem Erkennen verwechseln dürfe. Der Empirismus wird hingegen belehrt, daß die Gegen-stände der Erfahrung und ihre Zusammensetzungen kein Gegebenes, sondern ein vom Denken mit Bezug auf das Anschauungsmaterial Gemachtes sind. Die Differenz von Ding und Denken bleibt solcherart in Kants transzendentaler Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt aufbewahrt. Sie macht sich in Kants Antworten auf diese Frage aber auch geltend und bleibt als bloße Differenz von Verstandesspontaneität und rezeptiver Sinnlichkeit der blinde Fleck, um den seine Argumentationen kreisen. Die ersten vier Kapitel des vorliegenden Buches folgen diesem Kreisgang der Kantischen Beweisführung. Das Beweisziel: die transzendentallogische Entdeckung der Formen des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt, versuchen die Kapitel 5 und 6 einzulösen, indem - im Gegensatz zur ‚exoterischen‘ Lehre Kantens und zur nach-idealistischen Standardinterpretation des Kritizismus - die Vereinbarung von transzendentalem Idealismus und empirischem Realismus nicht in einem Apriori gesucht wird, das schlechterdings mit dem ‚Verstande‘ zu identifizieren wäre, sondern das gegenstandskonstitutive Verstandesapriori vielmehr aus ursprünglichen - die Differenz von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit allererst ermöglichenden - Weisen der Synthesis entwickelt wird. Diese genetische Grundlegung des Apriori ist anhand der Prinzipien der klassischen Logik und einer Analyse des Seinssinnes der Kopula “ist” als transzendentallogische Differenzierung der Urteilssynthesis durchzuführen und mit Bezug auf die Gegebenheitsweisen Raum und Zeit durch eine korrespondierende transzendental-phänomenologische Analyse zu vervollständigen. Da das genetische Apriori aber nicht unmittelbar, sondern nur vermittels der reflexiv-synthetischen Bewußtseinsstruktur auf die Kantischen Gegenstandskategorien bezogen werden kann, bleibt in Fortführung des Nachweises der Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Kategorientafel die spekulative Frage zu beantworten, wie Synthesis (Vermittlung) und damit das Denken selbst zu denken ist. Dieser Aufgabe und den damit untrennbar verbundenen Problemen der Verhältnisbestimmung von transzendentaler und formaler Logik, sowie von regulativer und konstitutiver Apriorität, sind die letzten vier Kapitel gewidmet, wobei in diesem Problemzusammenhang der Begriff der Transzendentalphilosophie in Auseinandersetzung mit einigen ihrer vor- und nach-kantischen Positionen noch näher zu klären sein wird. Wollte man das Ergebnis dieser Klärung vorweg zusammenfassen, dann ließe sich in Abwandlung eines oft zitierten Kantischen Satzes sagen, daß die transzendentale Logik seit Platon keinen Schritt rückwärts und mit Kant erst einen Schritt vorwärts hat tun dürfen und folglich schon von den ältesten Zeiten her nahezu vollendet sei. Vordergründig betrachtet, relativiert dieses Resultat den historischen Anspruch, den Kant an seine ‚Revolution der Denkungsart‘ geknüpft hat, es bekräftigt dafür jedoch um so mehr den systematischen Anspruch, den die Transzendentalphilosophie als Prinzipientheorie erheben und auch einlösen muß. (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure Hannah Arendt’s discussion of public happiness, contextualising it within her thoughts on politics, democracy and revolution. It draws on Arendt’s discussion of how the expression “pursuit of happiness” has historically shifted from a public understanding of happiness into an increasingly privatised one. The article engages with Arendt’s account of public happiness in order to reanimate her radical democratic critique of how representative politics reduces the scope of political action and participation; and how (...) the notion of happiness in a neoliberal era can only be interpreted in economistic and subjectivist terms. Furthermore, the article turns to examine how recent works in contemporary political thought, namely, those by Adriana Cavarero and Judith Butler, extend and transform the stakes of Arendt’s account of public happiness. On one hand, Cavarero’s notion of surging democracy is considered as an account of radical politics that keeps alive the Arendtian concern with public happiness by contextualising it within contemporary political struggles and social movements. On the other hand, Butler problematises Arendt’s discussion of politics for its neglect of precarity; however, this article argues that Butler’s work on assembly extends Arendt’s by highlighting possibilities of resistance, radical democracy and even public happiness amid experiences of loss and grief. Although prima facie it might appear that happiness and precarity are opposed to each other, this article points towards contemporary political practices, such as those of Ni Una Menos, that are critically reanimating public happiness through the intertwining of affective registers that range from joy to grief. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Interpretationen von Nietzsches Werk im Ganzen oder von spezifischen Themen und Aspekten aus unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen Perspektiven ver ffentlicht, vor allem aus philosophischer, literatur- und kommunikationswissenschaftlicher, soziologischer und historischer Sicht. Die Publikationen repr sentieren den aktuellen Stand. Jeder Band ist peer-reviewed.

RÉSUMÉLe «clair» et le «distinct» comptent parmi les concepts les plus importants de la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance. Il n'est pas étonnant dès lors qu'il se soit trouvé quelques divergences quant à la façon dont ces concepts doivent être compris. Mais jusqu'à tout récemment, les chercheurs ne se sont guère attardés sur ces divergences, alors pourtant que certaines d'entre elles sont fort remarquables. Ainsi certaines interprétations de la théorie soutiennent que le fait de contraindre la volonté est la marque (...) des idées claires et distinctes, tandis que cela est rejeté par d'autres. Certaines encore soutiennent que le clair et le distinct sont susceptibles de degrés, tandis que d'autres ne sont pas d'accord. Mon objectif dans cet article est d'esquisser une théorie générale capable de rendre compte, dans ces cas comme dans un certain nombre d'autres, de cette variété d'interprétations du clair et du distinct qui est enracinée dans le corpus cartésien même. J'appelle cette théorie «générale» dans la mesure où les diverses interprétations évoquées sont par rapport à elle comme des espèces par rapport à un genre. Ma reconstruction de la théorie générale trouve son appui textuel dans l'ensemble du corpus cartésien. Le gros de mes efforts, cependant, consiste à retracer la théorie dans un texte qui fut l'un des premiers écrits de Descartes : les Régies pour la direction de l'esprit. (shrink)

Building upon a recent call to renew actor-network theory (ANT) for educational research, this article reconsiders relations between technology and educational theory. Taking cues from actor-network theorists, this discussion considers the technologically-mediated networks in which learning actors are situated, acted upon, and acting, and traces the novel positions of creative capacity and participation that emerging media may enable. Whereas traditional theories of educational technology tend to focus on the harmonization of new technologies with extant curricular goals and educational practices, an (...) educational theory of technology looks to novel forms of technologically-mediated learning experience—from production pedagogies to role play in the virtual—to make visible the surprising relations, techniques, and opportunities that emerging media, and their attendant social contexts, may offer educational research. (shrink)

If we were to look caref ully at recent commentary on Descartes's theories of ideas and Sensation, we would find that a large number of commentators hold that he believes the following:.Ideas are representational,Sensations are ideas,Sensations are not representational.This is an inconsistent triad: any two of the above claims can be true together, but they cannot all be true together. The inconsistent triad can be avoided if we reject one of the claims. Some have argued that Descartes did not hold.1 (...) Some have argued that he did not hold. I believe that Descartes held and, and will argue that he did not hold.Generally, any account of Cartesian Sensation at the very least must account for sensations in terms of the ontology. The account must say whether they are modes or not, and if modes, modes of what — mind, body, both, the union, and so on. Moreover, how sensations are cast in terms of the ontology must agree with how they are cast in terms of the epistemology. (shrink)