This book presents an English translation of a classic Russian text on duality theory for Heyting algebras. Written by Georgian mathematician Leo Esakia, the text proved popular among Russian-speaking logicians. This translation helps make the ideas accessible to a wider audience and pays tribute to an influential mind in mathematical logic. The book discusses the theory of Heyting algebras and closure algebras, as well as the corresponding intuitionistic and modal logics. The author introduces the key notion of a hybrid that (...) “crossbreeds” topology and order, resulting in the structures now known as Esakia spaces. The main theorems include a duality between the categories of closure algebras and of hybrids, and a duality between the categories of Heyting algebras and of so-called strict hybrids. Esakia’s book was originally published in 1985. It was the first of a planned two-volume monograph on Heyting algebras. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the publishing house closed and the project died with it. Fortunately, this important work now lives on in this accessible translation. The Appendix of the book discusses the planned contents of the lost second volume. (shrink)

This essay is basically exegetical in nature, and its purpose is fourfold. First, I argue against the prevailing view that the dao 道 of the Daodejing 道德經 is metaphysically either a non-being or something transcending all senses by showing that it is a nonempty transforming unsummed totality.1 Dao is still metaphysical, but only as something that defies our ability to experience it as a totality or as any of its aspectual totalities.Second, I argue that in the Daodejing Laozi 老子 adopts (...) the condition of naming that a sign becomes a name only if it can be used to describe what it signifies.2 Because none of the aspectual totalities of dao can be described, the naming condition is contravened, and thus dao and its... (shrink)

While it is no doubt a good pedagogical principle to stress the most convincing proof in the first learning of a philosophic thesis, yet a man with any pretence to philosophic effeciency should certainly have at his beck and call several proofs to do service in various situations. Mr. Brown indicates a few subsidiary proofs in connection with the subject of materialsm, a consideration of grave import in the philosophical world today.

Our regular contributor on the business ethics scene in Poland reports on recent encouraging developments and sees them as contributing to the ‘moral revolution’ in addition to the political and economic ones which a leading Polish academic judges his country needs today. The author is Professor of Management at DePaul University Department of Management, 1 East Jackson Blvd, Chicago IL 60604, and Visiting Fulbright Professor of Management at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan.

In this article, I examine some traditional Indian conceptions of unconscious mental activity. There are concepts in the Indian philosophical tradition, notably saskāras and vāsanās, which can be taken to refer to unconscious mental states and dispositions. My discussion, which is essentially philosophical by nature, is loosely based on the English philosopher C.D. Broad's distinctions concerning the unconscious. Saskāras, which are interpreted realistically in Indian tradition, may manifest themselves as what I (and Broad) call relatively unconscious states. Evidence for this (...) interpretation can be found in discussions concerning the nature of dream state and the supernatural powers of yogis in Indian tradition. It is interesting to try to view the retributive system of karma as an absolutely unconscious system, but this is not a plausible interpretation of the Indian view of karma. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Tractatus classifies names into constant names and variable names. A variable name, via the application of the existential quantifier against the background of picturing, picks out and denotes an unspecified object from the range of objects of the form shown by the relevant variable. A constant name labels an object picked out from a scope of the existential quantifier. I also refute two types of attempts to argue that the Tractarian relation between a (...) name and its meaning is not realist, and to explain why it is more reasonable to hold that it is. (shrink)

Horst Seidl of the University of Nijmegen has written an unusual book. It consists of a series of critical reviews of publications by other scholars concerning Aristotle's logic, epistemology and metaphysics. The author's approach is not merely historical and critical: a philosopher must reach definite, objective truth. He reminds the reader that this is a difficult enterprise: too often Aristotle's works have been interpreted from the viewpoint of particular theories. Seidl's study is a defense of Aristotle's doctrines and methods such (...) as the use of syllogisms, the theory of the possible, etc. Somewhat surprisingly Seidl asserts that deductive arguments cannot be used in metaphysics. (shrink)

In this voluminous and detailed study of the views of leading philosophers from Descartes to Schelling on the problem of God, Clayton argues that when one studies the history of philosophical theology in the modern period and the different attempts at a solution, it is possible to find a basis for a well-founded choice. Clayton begins his investigation with the authors of this period, borrows their starting points and critical positions, such as Kant’s view that the idea of God cannot (...) be derived from finite experiences, and disengages himself from a way of thinking which considers it possible to reach certitude about the existence of God. (shrink)

The aim of the translator is to make his readers experience the freshness and novelty of the Greek text which, he believes, was not written for specialists, but for generally educated people... who are willing to think hard. Sachs sets out on a difficult task because the Metaphysics abound in plainly contradictory statements. According to Sachs, the main obstacle to the understanding of the Metaphysics is the fact that it has come to us via the Latin translations and versions influenced (...) by them. For this reason he avoids the use of certain traditional terms such as substance, actuality, sensation, principle, induction, and so forth, replacing them by terms such as thinghood, being-at-work, perception, source, and example. (shrink)

Kutschera's book is an attempt at a positive answer to the question whether religious faith is still justifiable. To this effect the author examines problems of the science of religion, philosophical theology, and religious beliefs. He asserts that Aquinas's natural theology is a thing of the past, for the Aristotelian philosophy used by Thomas has no validity ; recent debate has shown that the proofs of the existence of God are not conclusive. Unfortunately, Kutschera presents no solid evidence; the short (...) passages purporting to show that the Five Ways are invalid are superficial. Kutschera reminds the reader that the impossibility of a rational foundation of the existence of God does not imply that God does not exist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Question of Style in Philosophy and the ArtsJeffrey R. Di LeoThe Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts, edited by Caroline van Eck, James McAllister and Renée van de Vall; xi & 245 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $49.95.The question, “Should philosophers concern themselves with questions of style?” motivates this rich collection of twelve essays on the interrelatedness of content and its formal representation in (...) both philosophical writing and the arts. Alongside issues such as aestheticized forms of philosophizing and the relationship between method and style, there are articles on Heinrich von Kleist’s Marionettentheater, the graphic works of William Hogarth, Alexis de Tocqueville’s use of metaphor and paradox, the use of ellipses in Johannes Kepler’s astronomical theories, and eclecticism in eighteenth-century English architecture.Style has been an explicit concern for historians and theorists of the arts long before it came to the fore in philosophy. The editors think philosophers can learn a lot not only about the concept of style but also about philosophical style by looking into the practices of musicians, architects, and painters and by thinking about how styles are formed, transformed, and understood in the arts. By comparing the arts and philosophy, we can move toward something lacking in contemporary discussions, namely stylistic categories specific to philosophy. Richard Wollheim’s essay, for example, offers many categories appropriate to painting that could be relevant to philosophical writing.A provocative point traced here is that until the end of the eighteenth century, “style” had little to do with the meaning of a work of art—the term merely denoted an artwork’s place in the hierarchy of art. Before 1800, there was hardly a question of choice among styles: contributions to a practice were regarded not as belonging to one style or another, but as falling within or being alien to a practice. Only in the early nineteenth century did style become a key element in the meaning of a work, when it took the place previously occupied by nature, antiquity, or absolute standards of reason. With the traditional bearers of meaning gone, one could no longer look to content for meaning, and artists turned to style to create meaningful art—style being that aspect of writing, painting, or building traditionally associated with ornament, that could be varied without changing the content. Gradually, the “variable” element in art became the prime bearer of meaning.The claim here is that an analogous transition from stylistic monism to pluralism occurred in philosophy about a century after it did in art. This shift away from the monistic geometrical and mathematical standards of philosophical reasoning established in the late sixteenth century was brought about by philosophers such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Lambert Weising suggests that, with Wittgenstein, there is a substitution of style for truth—a point which seems equally true of others, notably Nietzsche. A consequence of this new [End Page 187] pluralism is a loosening of what can be called philosophical reasoning, and an increasing receptiveness to and acceptance of a diversity of philosophical styles. Questions of style do tend to arise in connections with philosophers of the literary sort—Plato or Kierkegaard. Now philosophers have much less difficulty regarding as philosophical a work such as Pascal’s Pensées, which has traditionally been treated more as literature than as philosophy.One of the challenges of this collection is to refute the view of those who deny that the content of their philosophical writing depends at all on style. This would give support to a thesis defended by Martha Nussbaum in this journal in 1983: “No stylistic choice can be presumed to be neutral—not even the choice to write in a flat or neutral style” (p. 146). Beryl Lang, who has addressed this question in other books and articles, argues that style is relevant to all philosophical writing, even that professed to be “style-less.” Lang correctly shows that philosophers’ general disregard for expressiveness, and their belief that the proper philosophical method will lead all who follow it to the same results, has itself become a feature of philosophical writing. So “style-less” writing is a philosophical... (shrink)