Summary of Transformative Experience by L.A. Paul and replies to symposiasts. Discussion of undefined values, preference change, authenticity, experiential value, collective minds, mind control.

Philosophical Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 163, l. 24 for ‘Pocreon’ read “Creon’ and p. 165, l.4 for “Nereus” read “Nessus”, l. 16 for “Corrolate” read “Correlate” and l. 27 for “ Trachinae ” read “ Trachiniae ”. Proffessor Mackinnon should also have been described as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Corpus Christi College.

Nous examinons ici un type très caractéristique d'installation artisanale, fréquente dans les habitats ou les bâtiments isolés de l'époque minoenne. Elle est composée, dans sa forme la plus simple et la plus courante, d'un récipient tronconique avec bec verseur placé sur une plate-forme artificielle ou un banc et, en immédiate relation avec lui, d'un grand vase situé à un niveau inférieur, servant à recueillir un liquide. On a donné des interprétations variées de ces installations : servaient-elles à séparer deux liquides (...) (huile et eau), au cours de la production de l'huile? à écraser les raisins pendant la fabrication du vin? à laver les vêtements? Après avoir dressé un catalogue, aussi complet que possible, des installations minoennes de ce type connues à ce jour, on tente de comprendre leur fonctionnement, à l'aide de données comparatives et de parallèles iconographiques diachroniques. Enfin, on examine le rôle de ces installations dans le cadre socio-économique plus large de l'époque minoenne. (shrink)

Taubes, Badiou, Agamben, Žižek, Reinhard, and Santner have found in the Apostle Paul's emphasis on neighbor-love a positive paradigm for politics. By thoroughly reexamining Pauline eschatology, L. L. Welborn suggests that neighbor-love depends upon an orientation toward the messianic event, which Paul describes as the "now time" and which he imagines as "awakening." Welborn compares the Pauline dialectic of awakening to attempts by Hellenistic philosophers to rouse their contemporaries from moral lethargy and to the Marxist idea of class consciousness, emphasizing (...) the apostle's radical spirit and moral relevance. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

Comment fonctionne l’image sur le vase François ? Parmi les associations thématiques ou formelles que François Lissarague met en évidence sur ce cratère, on relèvera ici celles qui établissent un rapport entre l’épopée et l’histoire, notamment celle que vit Athènes depuis sa refondation par Solon.The Athens of Solon on the François Vase. How does the François Vase function? Among the thematic and formal associations, underlined by François Lissarague, this study emphasises those establishing a connection between the epic and history, notably (...) Athenian history since the Solonian “refoundation”. (shrink)

A vigorous, critical examination of Descartes' conception of knowledge and method contained in the early unfinished Regulae. Bold, brief, and accurate, Joachim's lectures are model for the analytical explication of philosophical texts. Joachim ends by constructing a theory of concrete unities as a more satisfactory basis of explanation than the Cartesian method of reduction of complexes to simples.--C. L.

Mrs. Warnock opens her discussion with a warning against the attempt to define existentialism, or to treat it as a single, unified position. With this warning in mind, she then proceeds to trace some of the general features of existentialist "ethics" through the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. Mrs. Warnock sees the common aim of these thinkers as the attempt to "free people from illusion." She particularly stresses 1) the breakdown of the distinction between thinking and feeling, and the (...) resultant blurring of the line between an ethics and the rest of each thinker's philosophy; and 2) the breakdown of the distinction between feeling and acting—in Sartre's words "we try to change the world." Throughout the volume the import of the role of freedom, choice, and anguish are emphasized.—C. L. H. (shrink)

An epistemological discussion of the cognitive claims of religious, especially Christian, faith. Assuming that God exists, how can He be known? Faith is an act of interpreting the world, having much in common with sensory and moral interpretation. The assertions it gives rise to are meaningful, even within an empiricist criterion. God reveals himself only indirectly in order to preserve man's freedom and responsibility.--C. L.

Arguing that religion is both false and harmful, Russell asserts the prerogative of the scientific intelligence over dogma, faith and custom. The editor has written and appended an account of how Russell was excluded from teaching at the City College of New York.--C. L.

Paperback reprint of a classic study first published forty years ago. Allen examines the practical dimensions of Paul's missionary activity and urges the contemporary relevance of these same methods.--L. S. F.

This book is essential for those interested in Russell, or in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Only two of the fifteen selections are readily available elsewhere: "On Denoting" and "Mr Strawson on Referring." Amazingly, three substantial selections have never been published previously: "On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations," "The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premisses of Mathematics," and "Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic?". Three other papers have appeared previously only in French : one of these is a better (...) introduction to the theory of types than the classic "Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types." Finally, of the five remaining papers, which are not easily available, three are commentaries on Meinong, one is a note on the axiom of infinity, and the most substantial piece is a discussion of three notions of sets—in effect, Zermelo-Frankel, New Foundations, and Russell’s own "no-classes" theory, which required a theory of types applied to propositional functions. What is striking throughout these essays—all but one from the first decade of the century-is Russell’s persistent sympathy with some sort of realism in foundation theory, and his perception that the theory of definite descriptions, the "no-classes" proposals, and the theory of types, were very closely interrelated. Also included are three bibliographies. The chronological bibliography includes several still unpublished mss in the McMaster University Russell Archives.—J.L. (shrink)

Four papers that first appeared elsewhere, though within the last few years. Probably the best source for Chomsky’s recent technical work and a good source for his recent views about linguistic theory and about language and cognition generally. The introduction and the first two essays, "Questions of Form and Interpretation" and "On the Nature of Language," speak to the more general questions and the linguistics will not overburden the philosophical reader. From the middle sixties to the early seventies, many linguists (...) proposed ever more abstract and idiosyncratic syntactical analyses, often invoking vague and overly powerful "rules" without much concern for how they could fit within a learnable system of rules. What motivated these linguists was a desire to give some account within a rich grammar for nearly any sort of semantic, logical, or cognitive feature that comes up in our use of language. Much of Chomsky’s recent work has been concerned with a principled reduction in the power of grammatical rules; since this reduces the sorts of rules and grammars that may be proposed, it makes grammatical analyses more testable. The reduction is "principled" in that what one is after are the universal constraints of human language that derive from the child’s language acquisition capacities. In "Conditions on Transformations" and "Conditions on Rules of Grammar" Chomsky proposes various limitations on the power of transformational rules within the context of a similarly-restricted base. The logico-semantic role in the strict explication of linguistic competence is restricted to "logical form," which is read off a surface level of syntax into something like the familiar structures of predicate logic. The trace theory of movement rules is a powerful and relatively simple way of accounting for features of pronominalization and anaphor, reference and logical form, without sacrificing testability or system; it also permits the expression of some elegant generalizations and lends itself to the exploitation of the universal—particular grammar distinction. Trace theory also permits logical form to be read off from surface structure alone. And the logical form so read off appears to be the familiar variable-employing one and not the sort suggested by Montague.—J.L. (shrink)

This Festschrift for Professor Baron's sixtieth birthday displays an astonishing variety of interests on the part of his former students, from the sociological study of the American conservative Rabbinate to the correspondence of Tobias ben Moses and the New York cloakmakers' strike of 1910. Essays of philosophic interest are Bokser's "Morality and Religion in the Theology of Maimonides," Hahn's "Wellhausen's Interpretation of Israel's Religious History," Blau's "Tradition and Innovation," and Ben-Horin's "Toward the Dawn of History". The volume includes an extensive (...) bibliography of Baron's writings. --L. S. F. (shrink)

A literary re-appraisal of the style of the Argentine writer, Sarmiento. --L. K. B.

This badly written book has many marks of quackery--it is jargonic, repetitious, sometimes weird. But there are a few traces of a kernel of significant critique of philosophical method from a viewpoint combining elements of extreme operationalism and psychoanalysis. Philosophy is viewed as an activity which could have considerable therapeutic value--i.e., lead to growth in "awareness," released creativity, and increased emotional and intellectual maturity--if it is conducted under the guidance of the author's precepts.--L. K. B.

The autobiography of a medium and investigator of extra-sensory phenomena.--L. F.

Arguing that religion and science can not be in essential conflict, Harris sets himself the task of resolving their apparent disagreements by considering such problems as the language of theology, the relation of nature and God, and the nature of evil.--L. S. F.

This scholarly and perceptive account makes Hindu beliefs and practices intelligible by showing how the contradictions which have puzzled Westerners are rooted in human diversity. The author's thesis is that Hinduism is best understood neither as a philosophy nor as a religion but as a way of life. It is a process and a becoming, a continual progress toward moksa. It is each man's quest for the realization of his individual potentialities, never achieved because man's potential is infinite and because (...) it is his nature to become rather than to be. His aim is fourfold: to grasp Satcitänanda which is both Reality and himself; to become spiritualized, that is, to come to consider the human body, physical life, and rational faculties solely as instruments of the quest; to integrate all activities, thoughts, and feelings by understanding them as ways of being human, and hence as aspects of the quest; and finally to become free both from finitude and for fulfillment. There are four märgas or paths to these goals: thought, action, devotion, and discipline. There is no conflict among, or within, the märgas as, for example, between the yoga of ascetic contemplation and the Tantric yoga of erotic ecstasy. All are merely different paths to the same goal, suitable for different men or the same man at different times. There is an extensive bibliography.--L. G. (shrink)

This book continues the Muirhead Library of Philosophy series. It is a sequel to Trethowan’s own Absolute Value, to which frequent reference is made by the author. Together with that work, it comprises the lectures the author delivered in the Department of Religion of Brown University in 1969. It is chiefly a work of theological reflection: Trethowan is seeking new conceptual models for the Christian experience of God. In this vein, he devotes the bulk of the book to explorations of (...) the nature of faith and of the At-onement effected in the experience of God by the Christian mystics. An interesting treatment of the mystical experience of the Absolute concludes the book. This is not to suggest that Trethowan’s work will not be of interest to a general philosophical audience as well. The author begins his investigations with a discussion of contemporary positions which are opposed to metaphysical and theistic claims; within this context, Trethowan’s suggests some useful criticisms of Flew’s position. Searching for an experience of the Absolute that can serve to ground theistic claims, Trethowan examines the formulations of Coreth and Marcel; in the author’s estimate each yields an important emphasis, although some criticism must be directed to their respective accounts. The author’s own solution surfaces in the course of his treatment of faith. Its inspiration is largely Blondel’s "logic of action" : man’s experience of his own range of action leads him to an "option" in favor of the Absolute, an option which includes assent to the Christian experience of the Absolute. Trethowan also indicates a theory of signs, in which signs mediate but also are dynamically directed toward an experienced Absolute. The author’s treatment of Blondel has the advantage of providing the reader with lengthy citations from Blondel in translation.—W. L. P. (shrink)

S'il est un point que les réflexions contemporaines sur le temps ont mis en relief et inscrit profondément dans notre conscience, c'est que l'avenir qu'on espère dépend directement du présent qu'on réalise. Telle est notre attitude en face du présent, telle elle sera inéluctablement en face de l'avenir; et donc l'avenir lui-même, puisque ce dernier n'est rien sinon un présent caché encore, au cœur d'un présent déjà actuel, et explicite. Il est en effet de l'essence même de notre condition humaine (...) d'avoir un présent structuré et comme stratifié. Certes on peut imaginer le présent comme un point sans épaisseur, comme la limite évanescente entre un segment de ligne qui marque le passé à jamais révolu, et l'avenir qui se meut vers nous pour basculer inexorablement vers le non-être en franchissant ce présent. Mais cette image, utile pour bien des tâches, ne correspond d'aucune manière à la réalité vivante de la conscience humaine et des activités qui lui sont propres. Nous sommes dans le présent ce que nous sommes et ce que, en un sens, nous croyons pouvoir dire que nous avons été. Une grande partie de ce que nous appelons le passé, notre passé personnel et sans doute notre passé spécifique, est présent, non seulement à titre de souvenir, pouvant être, ou non, évoqué, mais à titre de schéma dynamique modifiant notre être-au-monde, notre présente réaction au réel le plus réel, à la situation où nous avons à déployer notre activité. (shrink)

1. Falsafat al-rūḥ -- 2. Falsafat al-ʻaqūl -- 3. Raḥīq al-nafs -- 4. al-Qadāʼ wa-al-qadar.

Le philosophe Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) a-t-il vraiment existé? Que reste-t-il de lui? "Une élégance certaine de la pensée", affirme l'un de ses meilleurs interprètes, François L'Yvonnet. Le philosophe de La Société de consommation, des Stratégies fatales et des Cool Memories s'attachait à l'idée du fragment comme mode de pensée : car dans le détail, tout est parfait, c'est dans sa reproduction que tout se complique. François L'Yvonnet explore cinq fragments de la philosophie de Jean Baudrillard et de sa biographie pour (...) mieux saisir l'éclat et la jubilation d'une pensée toujours vivante et contemporaine. (shrink)

RésuméLa notion de «rationalité de l'Univers » a varié au cours du temps, le long dialogue de l'esprit et de la nature ayant toujours abouti à ce que Le Roy appelait « l'évolution de l'évidence et la plasticité de la raison ».L'échec de l'explication mécanique de l'Univers a conduit James Jeans à déclarer que le monde ressemble plutôt « à une grande pensée » qu'à une grande machine », car on ne peut en donner qu'une description mathématique. En réalité, la (...) physique moderne n'est ni plus ni moins mathématique que l'ancienne; elle est seulement plus générale. James Jeans confond les mathématiques pures et les mathématiques appliquées.Eddington prétend déduire les lois générales et les constantes physiques de la nature de considérations épistémologiques a priori. C'est un retour à Kant. Malheureusement les postulate dont il part comme évidents n'ont point paru tels au XVIIe siècle et n'ont été admis que sous la contrainte de l'expérience. Sa théorie ne prévoit ni les neutrons ni les mésons. Elle est vouée à l'échec.La possibilité de trouver un formalisme mathématique applicable à un domaine expérimental ne préjuge en rien la rationalité de l'Univers, car un mathématicien habile sera toujours capable de faire rentrer même un monde « erratique » dans un vêtement mathématique approprié. (shrink)

L'article explore la notion wébérienne de «domination rationnelle» comme outil pour analyser les rapports entre les efforts de gestion des populations indigènes par l'État colonial, et le développement d'une forme spécifique de rationalité scientifique, prenant pour objet ces populations: les savoirs anthropologiques. En s'appuyant sur le cas de l'Afrique coloniale française, on s'efforce de montrer comment les dimensions d'instrumentation (avec la production d'instruments d'identification et de compréhension) et de légitimation sont essentielles dans l'émergence de savoirs sur les sociétés et les (...) cultures indigènes, d'abord au sein des appareils administratifs, mais aussi dans les institutions savantes métropolitaines. L'appui au développement de la science de l'homme se fait dans le cadre de projets de « rationalisation » de la colonisation qui rapprochent des savants et des réformateurs liés à l 'École coloniale, voulant redéfinir la profession d'administrateur colonial comme «spécialiste des indigènes». (shrink)

Le but de ce texte est de mettre en évidence les équi­valences entre la façon dont le concept de conatus résout, dans l'Éthique, le problème de l'unité modale complexe. en rendant consis­tant le concept de chose singulière en tant que celle-ci doit être consi­dérée comme un légitime sujet d'attribution d'états, et la façon dont ce même concept dessine le rapport cognitif de l'esprit avec lui-même, rapport par lequel l'esprit se saisit comme sujet de ses états et qui ca­ractérise la notion (...) moderne de subjectivité. Ainsi, en éclairant cet as­pect du concept spinoziste de chose singulière. on comprendra aussi, de façon indirecte, l'une des conditions par lesquelles les choses peuvent, dans la doctrine spinoziste, devenir des objets ou des signes pour la connaissance humaine. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)