Perhaps the time has come in Ukraine, when “pedagogy, which puts a person at the center of everything, is now hopelessly outdated”. Perhaps it’s time to help schools enter the three-dimensional world where God rules all things and where He defines “me”, “you”, “us”, “them.” The President sent to us by God set the goal to make a change in the philosophy of the school in Ukraine. It turns out, V.A Yushchenko. has in his heart to set another goal for (...) Ukrainian education: to give our students the knowledge necessary for eternity. Will the realization of this goal become a big change, deep and thorough? It depends on us - practical teachers, methodologists, theorists, experimenters, academics and officials, all whom God has called to serve in the field of education, "to sow the rational, the good, the eternal.". (shrink)

Recent work in the ontology of music suggests that we will avoid confusion if we distinguish between two kinds of question that are typically posed in music ontology. Thus, a distinction has been made between fundamental ontology and higher-order ontology. The former addresses questions about the basic metaphysical options from which ontologists choose. For instance, are musical works types, indicated types, classes of particulars, or some other kind of entity? Higher-order ontology addresses the question of what lies ‘at the centre’ (...) of a specific form of music, such as rock or jazz—or perhaps classical music. The argument of this essay is, first, that a close examination of the best efforts in two of these territories shows that they have the effect of pressing the music in each sphere into implausible Procrustean beds. Second, it is argued that the general question that higher-order ontologies pose, that is, ‘What work-kind is it that lies at the centre of a given kind of music, F?’ is a question based on a mistaken but seductive assumption, namely that the concept of the work of F has actual application. In fact, these concepts—upon which higher-order ontology depends—are mere artefacts of philosophy. The question is also addressed why the assumption is so seductive. Finally, the question finally is posed about what, if anything, is implied from the foregoing about the traditional ontology of classical music. (shrink)

This paper continues a discussion concerning the distinction between disability and handicap initiated in this volume by Steven D. Edwards. Edwards argues that the reasons advanced by the WHO for this distinction in its International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH) are not valid. Edwards also criticizes my own quite different grounds for distinguishing between the two concepts. His general conclusion is that the distinction is superfluous. In this paper I claim that Edwards's reasoning is invalid. I present five (...) arguments for my case, viz., the arguments from: a) practical necessity, b) cost-effectiveness, c) clinical practice, d) the subject's vital goals, and e) the universal presence of some basic action. My own conclusion thus is that there is a need within health care for a distinction between disabilities and handicaps. I also indicate that there may be a need for further distinctions along the dimension of action-generation which is presented in the paper. (shrink)

Hanlester Network v. Shalala ) marks the first test of the application of the Medicare-Medicaid anti-kickback statute to physician self-referral joint ventures. The most recent development in this ongoing litigation was the April 6, 1995 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding the Hanlester Network vicariously liable for its marketing vice president's knowing and willful violation of the antikickback statute. The vice president had offered to pay physician-investors in order to induce their referrals of program-related business.The Hanlester Network (...) was a California general partnership comprised of corporations, clinical laboratories, and individual investors. In April 1987, it entered into a management agreement on behalf of the clinical laboratories with SmithKline BioScience Laboratories. (shrink)

The level of medical care to patients and the success of the implementation of the national project "Health" depend on the health status and doctor's professionalism. Modern healthcare reform is being implemented by optimizing costs, merging medical organizations, closing ineffective hospitals, expanding the use of high-tech care and informatization of the doctor's activities. All this makes it necessary to assess the health of doctors. Scientists have studied the quality of life and identified the professional burnout of doctors in children's clinics (...) in different age groups. Primary care pediatricians have a higher quality of life score when compared to the standard [1]. However, all groups have a high level of professional burnout. The pre-retirement group of doctors has more unfavorable profile. They are highly professional specialists but may experience emotional discomfort because the pension system has been reformed. This situation requires the introduction of preventive work with doctors of this age as a group with great potential and capable of professional longevity. (shrink)

There is no subject at the interface of law, psychiatry and medical ethics which is more controversial than psychosurgery. The divergent views of the treatment begin with its definition. The World Health Organisation1 and others2 define psychosurgery as the selective surgical removal or destruction of nerve pathways or normal brain tissue with a view to influencing behaviour. However, proponents of psychosurgery demur on the basis that the `modern' treatment is concerned predominantly with emotional illness, without any specific effect upon behaviour. (...) The alternative definition offered is `the surgical treatment of certain psychiatric illnesses by means of localised lesions placed in specific cerebral sites.3It is difficult entirely to accept this definition because, as examined below, scientific psychiatry is not yet in a position to directly treat psychiatric illness solely through surgical intervention. There is no reliable theoretical relationship between particular cerebral sites (which are normal and healthy) and an identifiable psychiatric illness or symptomatology. Given this state of psychiatric understanding, it is misleading to suggest fine distinctions between generalised alteration of behaviour or mood and treatment of an illness. Highly divergent practices and theories (relating to the multiplicity of conditions treated, surgical methods adopted and areas of the brain operated upon) further undermine exaggerated claims that psychosurgery can scientifically `treat' specific illness through precise surgical intervention. Nonetheless, contemporary psychosurgery does not contain quite the same `broadbrush' approach of its ancestors and it can lay some legitimate claim as an effective empirical treatment in narrowly limited circumstances. Major ethical problems still, however, arise and these will be discussed in this article. (shrink)

I. Singminji sigi p'yŏn -- II. Chŏnhwan'gi ŭi iron oe.

Let A₁,..., An, An+1 be a finite sequence of algebras of sets given on a set X, $\cup _{k=1}^{n}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$, with more than $\frac{4}{3}n$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging to An+1. It was shown in [4] and [5] that in this case $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. Let us consider, instead An+1, a finite sequence of algebras An+1,..., An+l. It turns out that if for each natural i ≤ l there exist no less than $\frac{4}{3}(n+l)-\frac{l}{24}$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging (...) to An+i, then $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. But if l ≥ 195 and if for each natural i ≤ l there exist no less than $\frac{4}{3}(n+l)-\frac{l}{15}$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging to An+i, then $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. After consideration of finite sequences of algebras, it is natural to consider countable sequences of algebras. We obtained two essentially important theorems on a countable sequence of almost σ-algebras (the concept of almost σ-algebra was introduced in [4]). (shrink)

It is well known that when resolution occurs in the stichic iambics and trochaics of tragedy word-end is not found between the two shorts so produced: w or, more accurately, that the first short of resolution must not be the last syllable of a polysyllabic word. Moreover, the syllables in resolution most often form part of the same word as the following short or anceps, e.g.: Ion 1143.

D. Blumbergi identifies three kinds of moral criticism: (i) of an individual for violating a moral practice in his society, (2) of a moral practice but not the individual who participates in it, and (3) of both an individual and the practice in accordance with which he acts ('practice-personal' criticism) (p. 348). According to Mr. Blumberg, successful derivation of a conclusive 'ought'-statement from statements about socially-created obligations would show how moral criticisms of type 1 are justified. Moral criticisms of type (...) 2 would still be allowed, but not those of type 3. -/- I discuss the following points made by Blumberg: (A) Criticism of type 1 is 'the most common kind of moral judgment' (p. 356); (B) Searle dispensed 'with the conclusive aspect of the conclusion, and with it the finality of the derivation, when it began to seem unrealizable' (p. 356); (C) 'It is impossible to derive conclusive "ought"-statements embodying our traditional moral outlook from statements about socially-created obligations, . . .' (p. 355); (D) 'Either we surrender the attempt to derive a conclusive "ought" -statement from statements about socially-created obligations, or else we must surrender our right to make practice-personal criticisms' (p. 357). -/- I argue that conclusiveness in judgments, both moral and non-moral, is always relative to the range of reasons weighed, the implications of action considered. Therefore 'ought' must always be taken to be context-bound just as moral principles are taken to be defeasible, elliptical. This interpretation of 'ought' and 'conclusive' as bound to a context, point of view or framework, is quite consistent with Searle's distinction between what is internal and external to an institution. (shrink)

The shape of hooks is of a taxonomic significance for cestoda. In order to characterize shape through numbers, a mathermatical model of drawings in two-dimensional space is proposed. This model is a synthetic one: first, it uses a large number of points on the edge of a hook-drawing as data; secondly, it enables to draw a specific hook by means of a computer after the parameters have been extracted from the data. The method does not use landmarks and therefore avoids (...) the difficulty of locating them. The ensuing discussion concerns description in common parlanceversus mathermatical language, the genesis of hooks and description in three-dimensional space. (shrink)

On the life and works of ancient Jaina philosophers.