Introduction. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Préface. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Idealization and the Defence of Economics: Notes Toward a History. Part I: General Observations on Idealization in Economics. Kevin D. HOOVER: Six Queries about Idealization in an Empirical Context. Bernard WALLISER: Three Generalization Processes for Economic Models. Steven COOK and David HENDRY: The Theory of Reduction in Econometrics. Maarten C.W. JANSSEN: Economic Models and Their Applications. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA: Idealization and Empirical Adequacy (...) in Economic Theory. Izabella NOWAKOWA and Leszek NOWAK: On Correspondence between Economic Theories. Uskali MÄKI: Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics. Part II: Case Studies of Idealization in Economics. Nancy CARTWRIGHT: Mill and Menger: Ideal Elements and Stable Tendencies. Wolfgang BALZER: Exchange Versus Influence: A Case of Idealization. Kees COOLS, Bert HAMMINGA, Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Truth Approximation by Concretization in Capital Structure Theory. Daniel M. HAUSMAN: Paul Samuelson as Dr. Frankenstein: When an Idealization Runs Amuck. Hugo A. KEUZENKAMP: What if an Idealization is Problematic? The Case of the Homogeneity Condition in Consumer Demand. Werner DIEDERICH: Nowak on Explanation and Idealization in Marx's 'Capital'. Gérard JORLAND: Idealization and Transformation. Jack BIRNER: Idealizations and Theory Development in Economics. Some History and Logic of the Logic Discovery. Discussions. Leszek NOWAK: The Idealizational Methodology and Economics. Replies to Diederich, Hoover, Janssen, Jorland and Mäki. (shrink)

In the traditional African view, knowledge is not acquired by labor but "given" by the ancestors. Second, it is immediately social: not "I" know, but "we" know. Thirdly, knowledge is not universal but local tribal : other tribes have different knowledge. Knowledge has it "biological variations" like all other things in nature. The ensuing logic is worked out in this article. Modern African society, changed as it is by the advent of western thought, should be understood in the awareness of (...) the conflicting nature of the two ideas of knowledge. (shrink)

This volume compares the western ideas of knowledge with the African. It aims at creating a mirror through which the western knowledge culture can look at itself through an unusual and interesting angle. The culture of Sub-Saharan Africa is the substance from which we, in this book, have tried to construe an epistemological mirror.

This paper exploits the language of structuralism, as it has recently been developed with stunning effectiveness in defining the relations between confirmation, empirical progress and truth approximation, to concisely clarify the fundamental problem of the classical Lakatos concept of scientific progress, and to compare its way of evaluation to the real problems of scientists facing the far from perfect theories they wish to improve and defend against competitors.I opt basically for the structuralist terminology adopted in Kuipers (2000), because that is (...) balanced with care to deal with a range of issues far wider than the one dealt with in this contribution. It should be added that this does not commit me to any position on any subject, because structuralism is not a (meta-) theory, it is a language, able to express anything that can be said in other concept systems created to describe knowledge and its dynamics. (shrink)

In the traditional African view, words and sentences are not viewed as being liable to objective reflective truth/falsehood-judgments. It is not a person-word-reality-view, but a person-word-person-view: the sender's words are units of orally produced energy that have the power to improve or degenerate the receiver's vitality. Words received can make you more powerful by increasing your confidence and your control over your environment. But they can equally well harm (parts of) you, by discouraging you in certain endeavors. From the traditional (...) African point of view, words are not logical, but physical phenomena: words are forces affecting power. (shrink)

The Pozna view is about the logical structure of theories, about what such theories claim and how rationally to judge and improve them. In the context of this volume it is relevant to explore what the Pozna view and the African ideas about knowledge have to say about one another.

This paper supplies a structuralist reconstruction of the Modigliani-Miller theory and shows that the economic literature following their results reports on research with an implicit strategy to come "closer-to-the-truth" in the modern technical sense in philosophy of science.

A presentation, lucid and concise, of Aquinas' chief philosophical views, set against the historical background out of which they developed and supplemented by an appraisal of their present-day significance. Fr. Copleston's writing is precise without being elaborately technical, simple without being superficial; he succeeds in saying something both to the general reader and to the philosophical specialist.--L. H. E.

The need today, according to Cohen, is not for more criticism of old theories of induction but for new theories to criticize. In his recent book, he presents a new theory of induction in which he attempts to develop Bacon's seminal ideas "in a way that is not vitiated by obsession with the mathematical calculus of probabilities." Consequently, "induction" in the title would seem to refer to Baconian Induction, i.e. induction by variation of circumstances as distinct from induction by enumeration. (...) The author offers his book as an analysis of the logical syntax of "support" for such induction. He prefers the metaphor of "support" to Carnap's metaphor of "confirmation" since the former is spatial and the latter is temporal and "... inductive support is timeless support for timeless propositions...." The first six chapters, the bulk of the book, are philosophical in character, while the last chapter contains a formalization of a system of inductive logic based on C. I. Lewis. In the philosophical sections, the author proposes that induction as used in various fields, e.g. by the scientist or lawyer, does not differ in method or logical syntax but in subject-matter. For this reason, he finds it necessary to present a logical system of induction as a conclusion to the book. Cohen invites criticism of his new theory of induction. The present reviewer feels that the author has misunderstood Aristotelian induction. Aristotelian induction means, primarily, being led from one truth to another and not the enumeration of instances. Rhetorical example has, for Aristotle, the nature of induction. Furthermore, the author himself seems to introduce time as a factor when he assesses inductive support in legal reasoning. This seems inconsistent with "timeless support for timeless propositions." Cohen's new theory is one that is worth a critical examination.--L. A. (shrink)

This text, serving as an introduction to Aristotelian, symbolic, inductive, and practical logic, presents the techniques of these approaches to logic, some of the philosophical problems of logic, and some of the attempts to solve philosophical problems by means of various logical techniques. It discusses the problem of universals and null classes; briefly introduces the theory of types; and presents Lukasiewicz's formalization of Aristotelian syllogistic logic as an example of a formal system. Classical logic and propositional logic are carefully and (...) fully presented. The text, however, is weak in its presentation of quantificational logic. After a correct, but brief and very inadequate introduction to quantificational logic, the readers are referred to Quine, Methods of Logic, or to Copi, Symbolic Logic, for a more adequate development. The chapter on inductive logic discusses the uses and dangers of generalizations and introduces the probability calculus; the chapter on informal logic discusses criteria of rationality and presents the usual informal fallacies. There are problems and exercises after many of the sections, and answers in the back of the book.—R. L. S. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

Comment fonctionne l’image sur le vase François ? Parmi les associations thématiques ou formelles que François Lissarague met en évidence sur ce cratère, on relèvera ici celles qui établissent un rapport entre l’épopée et l’histoire, notamment celle que vit Athènes depuis sa refondation par Solon.The Athens of Solon on the François Vase. How does the François Vase function? Among the thematic and formal associations, underlined by François Lissarague, this study emphasises those establishing a connection between the epic and history, notably (...) Athenian history since the Solonian “refoundation”. (shrink)

S'il est un point que les réflexions contemporaines sur le temps ont mis en relief et inscrit profondément dans notre conscience, c'est que l'avenir qu'on espère dépend directement du présent qu'on réalise. Telle est notre attitude en face du présent, telle elle sera inéluctablement en face de l'avenir; et donc l'avenir lui-même, puisque ce dernier n'est rien sinon un présent caché encore, au cœur d'un présent déjà actuel, et explicite. Il est en effet de l'essence même de notre condition humaine (...) d'avoir un présent structuré et comme stratifié. Certes on peut imaginer le présent comme un point sans épaisseur, comme la limite évanescente entre un segment de ligne qui marque le passé à jamais révolu, et l'avenir qui se meut vers nous pour basculer inexorablement vers le non-être en franchissant ce présent. Mais cette image, utile pour bien des tâches, ne correspond d'aucune manière à la réalité vivante de la conscience humaine et des activités qui lui sont propres. Nous sommes dans le présent ce que nous sommes et ce que, en un sens, nous croyons pouvoir dire que nous avons été. Une grande partie de ce que nous appelons le passé, notre passé personnel et sans doute notre passé spécifique, est présent, non seulement à titre de souvenir, pouvant être, ou non, évoqué, mais à titre de schéma dynamique modifiant notre être-au-monde, notre présente réaction au réel le plus réel, à la situation où nous avons à déployer notre activité. (shrink)

1. Falsafat al-rūḥ -- 2. Falsafat al-ʻaqūl -- 3. Raḥīq al-nafs -- 4. al-Qadāʼ wa-al-qadar.

Le philosophe Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) a-t-il vraiment existé? Que reste-t-il de lui? "Une élégance certaine de la pensée", affirme l'un de ses meilleurs interprètes, François L'Yvonnet. Le philosophe de La Société de consommation, des Stratégies fatales et des Cool Memories s'attachait à l'idée du fragment comme mode de pensée : car dans le détail, tout est parfait, c'est dans sa reproduction que tout se complique. François L'Yvonnet explore cinq fragments de la philosophie de Jean Baudrillard et de sa biographie pour (...) mieux saisir l'éclat et la jubilation d'une pensée toujours vivante et contemporaine. (shrink)

RésuméLa notion de «rationalité de l'Univers » a varié au cours du temps, le long dialogue de l'esprit et de la nature ayant toujours abouti à ce que Le Roy appelait « l'évolution de l'évidence et la plasticité de la raison ».L'échec de l'explication mécanique de l'Univers a conduit James Jeans à déclarer que le monde ressemble plutôt « à une grande pensée » qu'à une grande machine », car on ne peut en donner qu'une description mathématique. En réalité, la (...) physique moderne n'est ni plus ni moins mathématique que l'ancienne; elle est seulement plus générale. James Jeans confond les mathématiques pures et les mathématiques appliquées.Eddington prétend déduire les lois générales et les constantes physiques de la nature de considérations épistémologiques a priori. C'est un retour à Kant. Malheureusement les postulate dont il part comme évidents n'ont point paru tels au XVIIe siècle et n'ont été admis que sous la contrainte de l'expérience. Sa théorie ne prévoit ni les neutrons ni les mésons. Elle est vouée à l'échec.La possibilité de trouver un formalisme mathématique applicable à un domaine expérimental ne préjuge en rien la rationalité de l'Univers, car un mathématicien habile sera toujours capable de faire rentrer même un monde « erratique » dans un vêtement mathématique approprié. (shrink)

L'article explore la notion wébérienne de «domination rationnelle» comme outil pour analyser les rapports entre les efforts de gestion des populations indigènes par l'État colonial, et le développement d'une forme spécifique de rationalité scientifique, prenant pour objet ces populations: les savoirs anthropologiques. En s'appuyant sur le cas de l'Afrique coloniale française, on s'efforce de montrer comment les dimensions d'instrumentation (avec la production d'instruments d'identification et de compréhension) et de légitimation sont essentielles dans l'émergence de savoirs sur les sociétés et les (...) cultures indigènes, d'abord au sein des appareils administratifs, mais aussi dans les institutions savantes métropolitaines. L'appui au développement de la science de l'homme se fait dans le cadre de projets de « rationalisation » de la colonisation qui rapprochent des savants et des réformateurs liés à l 'École coloniale, voulant redéfinir la profession d'administrateur colonial comme «spécialiste des indigènes». (shrink)

Le but de ce texte est de mettre en évidence les équi­valences entre la façon dont le concept de conatus résout, dans l'Éthique, le problème de l'unité modale complexe. en rendant consis­tant le concept de chose singulière en tant que celle-ci doit être consi­dérée comme un légitime sujet d'attribution d'états, et la façon dont ce même concept dessine le rapport cognitif de l'esprit avec lui-même, rapport par lequel l'esprit se saisit comme sujet de ses états et qui ca­ractérise la notion (...) moderne de subjectivité. Ainsi, en éclairant cet as­pect du concept spinoziste de chose singulière. on comprendra aussi, de façon indirecte, l'une des conditions par lesquelles les choses peuvent, dans la doctrine spinoziste, devenir des objets ou des signes pour la connaissance humaine. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)