덜그럭 덜그럭 소란한 우리네 마음 살림살이를 깨끗하게 청소해주는 산중 큰스님을 만나다 “쩔쩔 맬 것 없이, 집착할 것도 없이, 한세상 훨훨 살아라!” ‘집안 살림’이 아무리 풍족해도 ‘마음 살림’ 부족하면 다 헛인생이다. 진짜 잘사는 사람은 쩔쩔 맬 일도 없이, 집착할 것도 없이 트인 마음으로 훨훨 살아가는 사람이 아닐까? 그런 길로 안내하는 스물일곱 산중 선승들을 만났다.“우리는 누구인가”, “어떻게 살아야 하는가”, “마음과 몸이 힘들고 어려울 때는 어떻게 해야 할까”. 저자는 오래전부터 팍팍한 세상에 필요한 ‘마음 살림살이’를 탁발하러 선승들을 찾아다녔다. 때로는 시대와 역사와 사회에 대한 촌철의 (...) 말씀을 청했고, 때로는 노스님의 살아온 이야기를 듣고 일상을 엿보기도 했다. 모든 스님들이 무더운 여름날 한줄기 시원한 소나기였다. 이 책에는 ‘염화실의 향기’라는 이름으로 경향신문에 연재한 글을 보완해 다시 쓴 것과 이후 만난 큰스님까지 모두 스물일곱 분의 이야기를 담았다. 그사이 이 세상을 떠나가신 큰스님들은 2부에 따로 모셨다. 스님들 몸은 산중에 있어서도 그 말씀은 속세를 떠나지 않았다. 어지럽고 어려운 이 세상을 향한 한 말씀 한 말씀은 송곳처럼 정곡을 찌르며 우리네 눈과 귀, 마음을 환하게 밝혀준다. 깨끗하게 비질 된 큰스님들의 ‘마음 마당’을 거닐다보면, 누구나 잃었던 마음의 본래 밝음을 되찾고, 저마다 ‘마음을 살리는 화두’ 하나씩 가슴에 품게 된다. (shrink)

For two thousand years the Mencius was revered as one of the foundational texts of the Confucian canon, which formed the basis of traditional Chinese education. Today it commands considerable attention in current debates on "Asian values" raging in classrooms and boardrooms in both East Asia and the West. This volume, which represents the work of fifteen respected scholars of early Chinese thought and culture, is an especially timely effort to bring the Mencius under fresh scrutiny. Making use of recently (...) excavated manuscripts, the contributors approach the Mencius from novel perspectives, challenge established interpretations, and confront anew issues that continue to attract and divide students of this classic text. The famous Mencian doctrine of the "goodness" of human nature forms one main focus. Questions of context and interpretation bring into sharp relief key hermeneutical issues that surround the text. Does the Mencius present a coherent and systematically developed ethical teaching? Or should it be read as a composite work, comprising different layers of material that reflect different emphases and conflicting doctrines? Traversing contested territories and exploring new avenues of understanding, the essays presented here do not aim at settling debates; on the contrary, they afford ample opportunities for further discussion on the background, interpretation, and continued relevance of this classic of Confucian philosophy. Contributors: Roger T. Ames, Irene Bloom, A. Taeko Brooks, E. Bruce Brooks, Alan K. L. Chan, Kim-Chong Chong, Antonio S. Cua, Robert Eno, Jiuan Heng, Donald J. Munro, Ning Chen, David Nivison, Kwong-Loi Shun, Sor-Hoon Tan. (shrink)

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik. (shrink)

1. Tʻaegŭk igisŏl nonʼgu -- 2. Simsŏngjŏng sŏl nonʼgu -- 3. Tʻoegye, Kobong wangboksŏ yŏkhae -- 4. Tʻoegye, Kobong wangboksŏ nonʼgu I -- 5. Tʻoegye, Kobong wangboksŏ nonʼgu II -- 6. Yulgok, Ugye wangboksŏ nonʼgu.

1. An Tŏng-mun ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏse pangsik -- 2. An Tŏng-mun ŭi Samsan Sŏwŏn wisang chŏngnip kwa kŭ ŭimi -- 3. Ha Ik-pŏm ŭi sam kwa munhak -- 4. Pak Ch'i-bok ŭi Nammyŏnghak kyesŭng yangsang -- 5. Kang Pyŏng-ju ŭi hangmun kwa munhak -- 6. Chŏng Chae-gyu ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa 'Taehak' haesŏk -- 7. Kim Chin-ho ŭi haksŏl e taehayŏ -- 8. Kwak Chong-sŏk ŭi Myŏngdŏksŏl nonjaeng -- 9. Kim Hwang ŭi Kyŏnghak Sipto e taehayŏ.

[1]. Pyŏngwa Yi Hyŏng-sang, Hosan Pak Mun-ho yŏnʼgu -- 2. Cho Ik yŏnʼgu -- 3. Kwak Chong-sŏk yŏnʼgu.

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

This volume brings together flux essays by an eminent scholar on the origins, development, and import of Kant's philosophy, chiefly in its metaphysical aspects. Four of these were separately published between 1924 and 1926, but until now have been difficult to obtain, despite great demand. Their appearance here will be welcomed. The thesis emerging from these studies is that the critical philosophy originates in metaphysical probings concerning the nature and presuppositions of being, and issues in doctrines which, despite psychological, epistemological, (...) and ethical presentation, are intended to have definite ontological import. --L. K. B. (shrink)

It is a mystery how we just know to be in any context of our lives. It happens without our thinking. By this same token we never have to work out how to speak an English sentence that we utter. We just know to talk and do. This paper is an exploration of this mystery.

In December of last year, a few clowns appeared on the grand and spectacular stage of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These clowns were the reincarnated ghosts from the Capital Red Guard West City, East City, and Haidian Districts Pickets. They viciously attacked Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, engaged in slander on the Central Cultural Revolution Group, called dear Comrade Jiang Qing names, and sabotaged the organizations under the proletarian dictatorship. They provoked violence, created chaos, searched and confiscated the possessions of (...) revolutionary organizations, and spread reactionary declarations. The crimes they committed are simply too numerous to mention. These clowns were none other than the "Capital Red Guards United Action Committee.". (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the well-intended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by (...) pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psycho-physiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. (shrink)

The study examines the relationship between the strength of an organizationÕs ethical climate and ethical problems involving human resource management. Data were collected through a survey of 1078 human resource managers. The results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the strength of an organization'ss ethical climate and the seriousness of ethical violations and a statistically significant positive relationship between an organization'ss ethical climate and success in responding to ethical issues. Thus, interventions that strengthen an organization'ss ethical climate may help (...) manage ethical behavior within organizations. (shrink)

A thoughtful inventor-businessman's statement of the simple truth about the world: All is energy, with causal order everywhere, and with such forces dominating as to justify optimistic trust in the necessary course of events.--L. K. B.

In Mengzi 6A4, Gaozi states that “yì 義 (propriety, rightness) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi says of yì that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly (...) is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jiz’s defense of his statement, Meng Jizi cites a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yì may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yì is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yì. (shrink)

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

A comparative methodological examination of neo-positivism and analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and existentialism. These are interpreted as springing from the cultural and existential crisis of our time, each responding to a genuine element of this crisis, and thus tending toward integration into a unified method by which modern thought can extricate itself from the crisis--a recognition of the logical analysis of language, tempered by phenomenology and an historical orientation, as the methodological basis of modern philosophy. Speculative metaphysics and cosmology are much (...) too lightly dismissed.--L. K. B. (shrink)

A rewritten version, following the same plan and theme, of the author's earlier work of the same title. New chapters are added on Unamuno's ideas of fiction and of reality. The bibliographical appendix, with brief comments, is brought up-to-date. The unifying stress is on the "incessant fluctuation" between opposites, such as reason and the irrational, as the source of Unamuno's originality. Sympathetically expository rather than critical, this brief sketch deliberately sacrifices precision and analysis for the sake of "interiorizacion"--probably the most (...) profitable introductory approach to such a thinker.--L. K. B. (shrink)

A clear and well-written defense of the Christian theistic world-view, marked by a constructive and well-balanced philosophical orientation, with only slight hints, through most of the book, of the underlying religious fundamentalism. The stress on the fundamental importance of commitment is balanced by a recognition of its constitutive role in reasoning, and by an insistence on the need for the integration of the intellectual, the practical, and the religious. The author takes as his main field of evidence man's "power of (...) moral and rational self-transcendence," and builds upon an epistemological scheme involving a triad of methods of knowing--by acquaintance, by inference, and by moral self-acceptance. The book concludes with a frankly dogmatic summary of the author's evangelical convictions. --L. K. B. (shrink)

A critique of modern empiricism, pressed ploddingly but capably from a renovated pragmatist standpoint. In Part I the author argues that a rigid distinction between the analytic and synthetic is presupposed by empiricism and yet leads to a conventionalism out of touch with experience. Part II attacks various attempts to base knowledge on of perceptual experience. The constructive position developed in Part III stresses the concept of experience as a plurality of contextual happenings, always involving formal and nonformal elements; the (...) formal structure is held to rest on conventions which should remain flexible, varying according to purposes. Though often clumsy, cluttered, and over-abstract, the discussion is informed and perceptive.--L. K. B. (shrink)

A comparative study of Zumel's and other scholastic theories concerning the influence of the understanding or reason upon the will.--L. K. B.

A collection of six unrelated articles by as many authors. First come three scholarly studies, dealing with causality in Aristotle, St. Augustine's metaphysics of created being, and St. Thomas as a commentator on Aristotle. The fourth is an exposition of Hegel's views on scepticism. Next comes a reconstruction, within the scholastic spirit, of "classical formal logic." The concluding and most interesting article is a bibliographical survey of recent works in the history of ancient philosophies. --L. K. B.