Quantum electrodynamics is the theory of electrons and other elementary charged particles, interacting through the exchange of light quanta. Albert Einstein introduced the light quantum in 1905, but for about three decades physicists applied quantum ideas mainly in theories of the structure and behavior of matter, not to electromagnetic radiation itself, which was always treated semi-classically. This began to change after 1923 with the discovery of the Compton effect and its kinematic description by Arthur Compton and Peter Debye, based on (...) the light quantum. In this paper we review the study of high-energy radiation that led to Compton's discovery. We discuss the analysis of the intensity distribution of Compton-scattered radiation that together with the ''new'' quantum theory beginning in 1925, resulted in the development, especially by Pascual Jordan and Paul Dirac, of a quantum theory of electromagnetic radiation in interaction with matter. (shrink)

I consider and reject four possible arguments directed against the preservation of natural aesthetic conditions. (1) Beauty is not out there in nature, but is “in the eye ofthe beholder.” I argue that since ingredients ofnature cause aesthetic experiences, we cannot justifiably disregard and exploit nature. Preservation of aesthetic conditions is compatible with both objective and nonobjective theories of aesthetic value. (2) Frequent aesthetic disagreements bring about irresolvable disputes concerning which segments of nature to preserve. I claim that these disputes (...) are not irresolvable. Not all disputes about nature’s aesthetic values are purely aesthetic disputes: ecological balance, community identity, historic continuity, and economics are relevant; aesthetic experts can help; and such disputes can be put to a vote. (3) Natural beauty is not important compared to nonaesthetic values of nature. I show that this is questionable. Current awareness of environmental problems includes a rapidly growing concern for natural aesthetics. Moreover, even if majority preference is for nonaesthetic uses of nature, this does not settle the question of whether we ought to preserve nature’s attractive features. (4) From neither a utilitarian nor a deontological viewpoint do we have an obligation to preserve natural aesthetic conditions for future generations. I argue that even if we do not have a strict obligation, it does not follow that it makes no moral difference whether we preserve. Not yet existing people may have no rights against us, but this does not mean that we do no wrong in polluting and destroying aesthetic conditions of the natural world in which future people will live. (shrink)

The distance in conceptual space between the philosophical pragmatism of William James and the narrative theologies of Hans Frei and Stanley Hauerwas would appear at first glance to be significant. Hauerwas himself has measured that distance in public, when his extended critique of James supplied a good portion of the agenda for his Gifford Lectures, delivered in 2001 at St. Andrews and subsequently published as With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural Theology. In this book, Jacob (...) Goodson dramatically closes the distance, appealing consistently to James's pragmatism as a resource not only for understanding the thought of contemporary narrative theologians but also for productively... (shrink)

The question addressed here is whether evidence concerning defendants' past criminal records should be introduced at their trials because such evidence reveals their character and thus reveals whether they are the kinds of persons likely to have committed the crimes with which they are currently charged. I strongly caution against the introduction of such evidence for a number of reasons. First, the link between defendants' past criminal records and claims about their standing dispositions to think and act is tenuous, at (...) best. Second, noncharacter, or trace, evidence should have primacy in determining the guilt or innocence of defendants. Third, character evidence will vary in its freshness and specificity. Other things being equal, only relatively fresh and specific character evidence has probative value. Moreover, such evidence will have greater probative value in criminal cases where the issue before the court is whether a crime has been committed than in cases where the issue is whether it was the defendant who committed the crime. Finally, we might be more sanguine about the introduction of fresh and specific character evidence under conditions likely to work against its misuse or misinterpretation. However, the relevant conditions may not often be satisfied in the real world of criminal trials and defendants. (shrink)

This paper argues that forgiveness is not best understood in terms of waiving a requirement of justice, and, specifically, that forgiveness is distinct from mercy. I question some reasons philosophers have given for distinguishing forgiveness and mercy, but argue that the difference between the two notions can be clearly shown by considering the standard grounds for which they are granted. I argue that while mercy involves leniency in the infliction of punishment that is due in accordance with justice, forgiveness primarily (...) concerns the victim's feelings and attitudes towards the wrongdoer as a person. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 (1) 2008 pp. 1-9. (shrink)

Max Stirner (1806-1856) est l'auteur de L'Unique et sa propriété, paru en 1844. Il occupe une place singulière dans l'histoire de la pensée philosophique en ce qu'il pousse celle-ci dans ses derniers retranchements et oppose à tous les systèmes politiques et sociaux la réalité de l'individu unique. Chantre de l'égoïsme mais prônant l'association, il s'en prend radicalement à toutes les doctrines fondées sur le sacrifice ou l'oubli de soi. Les deux textes qui composent le présent volume visent à dégager la (...) pensée de Stirner des contresens et légendes qu'a entrai nés une lecture biaisée de son oeuvre. Le Philosophe qui s'en va tout seul en propose une interprétation destinée à rendre Stirner accessible au lecteur d'aujourd'hui. Celui-ci y trouvera les grandes étapes de la vie de Stirner ainsi que la genèse et l'évolution de sa philosophie. Il assistera à la vigoureuse attaque menée par Stirner contre les idéaux – religieux, politiques ou moraux, qui asservissent l'individu concret. Or loin d'être apocalyptique, L'Unique fonde de manière dynamique un nouveau type d'individu et de relations sociales, qui s'oppose à tous les totalitarismes. De ce fait et par la postérité qu'il a eue (de Nietzsche et des anarchistes aux situationnistes), Stirner reste un des philosophes les plus actuels. Stirner a choqué nombre de lecteurs, à commencer par Karl Marx qui écrivit avec Engels L'Idéologie allemande pour le combattre: c'est cet éreintage "matérialiste" que dissèque Daniel Joubert dans Marx versus Stirner. Il éclaire l'antagonisme entre ces deux émules de Hegel, qui traça pour longtemps une fracture dans les rangs de la révolte et de la critique du monde marchand. Ces considérations, souvent malicieuses, ébauchent en outre la perspective d'un dépassement de l'opposition entre "l'Unique" stirnérien et "l'être générique" marxien. (shrink)

Preliminary Material /Louis M. Epstein --Polygamy /Louis M. Epstein --Concubinage /Louis M. Epstein --Levirate Marriage /Louis M. Epstein --Intermarriage /Louis M. Epstein --Incest /Louis M. Epstein --Other Marriage Prohibitions /Louis M. Epstein --Abbreviations /Louis M. Epstein --Register of Foreign Terms /Louis M. Epstein --Bibliography /Louis M. Epstein --Index of Subjects and Names /Louis M. Epstein.

Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) was one of the prominent figures of Khorasan Shafiʻīsm and a jurist among the Aṣḥāb al-Wujūh. He received education in Irāq from important scholars in the fields of theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and hadīth. After returning to Nishabur, he taught at a madrasa built in his name. He trained students such as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38), Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (d. 450/1058), Abu al-Qāsim al-Isqāf al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 452/1060), Abu al-Rabīʿ Ilākī (...) (d. 465/1073), and Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), who later influenced the course of Shāfiʿīsm. He authored works as an important hadith scholar and Ashʿarī theologian. Although most of these works have not survived to the present day, we learn about his views through excerpts from them. He held views, reflected in the prin-ciples of jurisprudence, that led to criticism for being influenced by the Muʿtazila. Despite being a theologian, his adoption of the jurists' method in jurisprudence further emphasizes the importance of his views. The aim of this study is to reveal Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī's thoughts on the principles of jurisprudence, specifically in the areas of hadīth, consensus (ijmā), indepen-dent reasoning (ijtihād), and imitation (taqlīd), and to identify their reflecti-ons on the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence. Since there is no specific study on Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s thoughts on jurisprudence in our country, we beli-eve that this research will contribute to future studies on his legal scholarship. (shrink)

Kitāb al-ʻibar. Muqaddimah by Ibn Khaldūn, 1332-1406; criticism and interpretation.