The main aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of Lacan's uses of the structural paradigm. The investigation will emphasize the function of this use in terms of relations between psychoanalysis and history of sciences. Freud, in order to establish the epistemological identity for psychoanalyses was impelled to choose between Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften. By assuming the natural sciences model Freud has created what one can call a certain epistemological discomfort: model and object seems not to fit each (...) other. The influence of Koyre's work is here remarkable. Lacan's uses of structural paradigm may be seemed as a strategy to create a new space for psychoanalysis in science. Only a structuralist science could formulate a conception of the subject that is nor naturalistic, nor psychological. This is showed particularly in what concerns the category of cause. (shrink)

With studies like Discourse Networks 1800/1900 and Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Friedrich A. Kittler contributed significantly to transforming the history of media into a vital field of inquiry. This essay undertakes to more precisely characterize Kittler’s historiographical approach. When we look back on his early contributions to studies of the relationship between literature, madness and truth – among others, his doctoral dissertation on the Swiss poet and writer Conrad Ferdinand Meyer – what strikes us is the significance that Jacques Lacan’s (...) structuralist psychoanalysis had in shaping the orientation of Kittler’s later studies. His intensive engagement with Lacan galvanized Kittler’s concern with the question of sex and/or gender in the evolution of the humanities as well as his concern with the media history of the university. At the same time, Kittler’s reliance on Lacan led him to a kind of history that is interested above all in the internal logic of discourse. As we see, for instance, in Kittler’s anecdotic treatment of 19th-century physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, this historiography does not involve any original research in archives and/or museums. Rather, it builds upon existing historical accounts and focuses its analyses on the issue of symbolic structures. Instead of investigating the history of the material culture of science and technology, what is thereby ultimately reinforced is a philosophical idealism in which knowledge and paranoia become superimposed in and by means of an ‘original syntax’ (Lacan). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 83-85 [Access article in PDF] Lacan, Science, and Determinism Douglas McConnell Grant Gillett Keywords Lacan, the unconscious, free will Van Staden And Hinshelwood's commen-taries raise a number of issues, but there are two particular themes common to both that we pick up in this response.The first theme concerns the reconcilability of Lacanian theory to the disciplines of analytic philosophy and "Anglo-American positivist psychiatry." (...) This is closely related to the relationship between the unconscious and the empirical sciences discussed in the editorial (McConnell and Pickering 2005). The second theme concerns the relevance of Lacanian theory to our understanding of free will and the structure of the mind. Lacan, Analytic Philosophy, and Scientific Psychiatry First, psychoanalysis or psychotherapy generally should not try to reunite with neuroscience because of the fundamental difference in their approaches to the patient, which is likely to mean that even if a theoretical rapprochement can be found, a working relationship is unlikely.Although there are many facets of Lacan's theory that were not addressed in our paper and even if many of those are totally irreconcilable to analytic philosophy, we believe that we have addressed the most ontologically fundamental issues and that these can genuinely contribute to and challenge analytic philosophy of mind.As Hinshelwood points out, psychiatry does operate with a philosophical basis, critical (or sometimes relatively uncritical) scientific realism (even though it may not be acknowledged), and it as such it can legitimately be contributed to or challenged by the philosophical aspects of Lacanian theory outlined in our paper.In fact, the theoretical basis is evinced in van Staden's commentary when he remarks on the relation between Lacanian theory and psychiatry: "... the unconscious is not only structured like a language but actually reflects and is produced by linguistic interaction between the subject and others. This is a difficult claim to verify, no doubt, but it prompts further related questions... whether the conscious mind is structured like a language" (van Staden 2005, 78). And one must ask whether this is the kind of claim that can be verified or whether it is a hermeneutic claim (in somewhat the way suggested by Jaspers), serving more as a framing belief to allow people to make sense of what has influenced them in their life histories and is currently played out in their relationships with others. We would lean toward this interpretation of the unconscious, explicitly distancing ourselves from any overreaching, quasi-scientific realism about unconscious contents and mental structures, but clinging to the thought that dealing with such contents is an essential part of the therapeutic encounter. [End Page 83]Looked at in this way, both the Lacanian unconscious and conscious mental life bear the imprint of language due to the subject's immersion and participation in the symbolic realm. This may seem a "difficult claim to verify," but because verification is linked to the scientific framework of inquiry rather than the hybrid that is clinical knowledge, we would better regard it as being difficult to establish as an axiom of therapy. The linguistic structure of the conscious and unconscious mind is, on this account, a conceptual implication of the role of the symbolic register in thought and not a thesis that requires verification (a Wittgensteinian thesis espoused by a number of contemporary philosophers, including Dummett and Davidson).As it happens, cognitive science has found linguistic structure to be important in operations of the cognitive unconscious (arguably different from the dynamic unconscious due to the former's dependence on scientific experiment and the latter's connections to life history rather than mere psychological or cognitive traits [see Gillett and McConnell 2005]). Given that language and problem solving are so closely intertwined, it would suggest that cognitive science was overlooking something important rather than damaging Lacanian theory if linguistic structure did not appear on cognitive science's "radar." So, how does language logically (in the sense defended by Husserl and Frege, that is, to do with the sense or content of thoughts not merely the processes underpinning one's contingently evolving stream... (shrink)

This text explores a set of key concepts in Marxist theory as developed and read by Lacan, demonstrating links and connections between Marxist thought and Lacanian practice. The book examines the complexity of these encounters through the structure of a comprehensive vocabulary which covers diverse areas, from capitalism and communism to history, ideology, politics, work, and family. Offering new perspectives on these concepts in psychoanalysis, as well as in the fields of political and critical theory, the book brings together (...) contributions from a range of international experts to demonstrate the dynamic relationship between Marx and Lacan, as well as illuminating 'untranslatable points' which may offer productive tension between the two. The entries trace the trajectory of Lacan's appropriation of Marx's concepts and analyses how they were questioned, criticized and reworked by Lacan, accounting for the wide reach of two thinkers and worlds in constant homology. Each entry also discusses psychoanalytic debates relating to the concept and seeks to refine the clinical scope of Marx's work, demonstrating its impact on the social and individual dimensions of Lacanian clinical practice. With a practical and structured approach, The Marx Through Lacan Vocabulary will appeal to psychoanalysts and researchers in a range of fields, including political science, cultural studies, and philosophy. (shrink)

The interactions between literature and science and between literature and psychoanalysis have been among the most thriving areas for interdisciplinary study in recent years. Work in these 'open fields' has taught us to recognize the interdependence of different cultures of knowledge and experience, revealing the multiple ways in which science, literature, and psychoanalysis have been mutually enabling and defining, as well as corrective and contestatory of each other. Inspired by Gillian Beer's path-breaking work on literature and science, this volume presents (...) fourteen new essays by leading American and British writers. They focus on the evolutionary sciences in the nineteeth-century; the early years of psychoanalysis, from Freud to Ella Freeman Sharpe; and the modern development of the physical sciences. Drawing on recent debates within the history of science, psychoanalytic literary criticism, intellectual history, and gender studies, the volume makes a major contribution to our understanding of the formation of knowledge. Among its recurrent themes are: curiosity and epistemology; 'growth', 'maturity', and 'coming of age' as structuring metaphors ; taxonomy; sleep and dreaming and elusive knowledge; the physiology of truth; and the gender politics of scientific theory and practice. The essays also reflect Beer's extensive influence as a literary critic, with close readings of works by Charlotte Brontë, Alfred Lord Tennyson, George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, Henry James, Oscar Wilde, H. G. Wells, Edith Ayrton Zangwill, Charlotte Haldane, Virginia Woolf, George Orwell, and Karin Boye. (shrink)

Alexandre Koyre was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyre is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science-that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyre has to say about his historical studies (and most of what others have said about them), (...) we find him embracing and championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyre's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyre's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyre's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the 'transscientifiques' (philosophy, metaphysics, religion) have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than 'Platonist', as has been the custom, 'Hegelian' makes a better fit. (shrink)

Philosophy After Lacan: Politics, Science and Art brings together reflections on contemporary philosophy inspired by and in dialogue with Lacanian theory. Rather than focus on the thinkers who came before Lacan, the editors maintain attention on innovations in contemporary philosophy that owe their emergence to complimentary, critical, direct, or tangential engagement with Lacan. This collection makes one of the first concerted efforts to expand discussions between psychoanalysis and more recent philosophical thinkers while gathering chapters by some of the leading philosophical (...) voices of the present moment. With contributors from around the world, this book has international appeal and is unique in its emphasis on contemporary philosophies inspired or influenced by Lacan. Philosophy After Lacan will not only appeal to psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, but also to students and professors of philosophy, critical theory, psychology, politics, history, and literature. (shrink)

The use of psychoanalytic ideas to explore social and political questions is not new. Freud began this work himself and social research has consistently drawn on his ideas. This makes perfect sense. Social and political theory must find ways to conceptualise the relation between human subjects and our social environment; and the distinctive and intense observation of individual psychical structuring afforded within clinical psychoanalysis has given rise to rich theoretical and methodological resources for doing just this. However, psychoanalytic concepts do (...) not remain the same when they are rearticulated in the context of research. This book traces the reiteration and transformation of concepts in the psychoanalytic theory of Freud, Klein and Lacan, the social theory of Butler, Derrida, Foucault, Laclau and Zizek, and case studies of empirical research ranging from the classic Tavistock Institute studies to contemporary work in politics, gender studies, cultural studies and education. Each chapter explores one cluster of concepts: Melancholia, loss and subjectivity Overdetermination and free association Resistance, reflexivity and the compulsion to repeat Repression, disavowal and foreclosure Psychic defenses and social defenses Arguing against the reification of psychoanalytic concepts, Claudia Lapping suggests the need for a reflexive understanding of the play of attachments and substitutions as concepts are reframed in the contrasting activities of psychoanalysis and research. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre;'s great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre;'s thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre; was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes (...) Études (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

Love, hate, slavery, torture, addiction and death - as this book shows, only psychoanalysis can speak well of such matters. Psychoanalysis was the most important intellectual development of the 20th century, which left no practice from psychiatry to philosophy to politics untouched. Yet it was also in many ways an untouchable project, caught between science and poetry, medicine and hermeneutics. This unsettled, unsettling status has recently induced the philosopher Alain Badiou to characterise psychoanalysis as an 'antiphilosophy', that is, as a (...) practice that issues the strongest possible challenges to thought. Justin Clemens takes up the challenge of this denomination here, by re-examining a series of crucial psychoanalytic themes: addiction, fanaticism, love, slavery and torture. Drawing from the work of Freud, Lacan, Badiou, Agamben and others, Psychoanalysis is an Antiphilosophy offers a radical reconstruction of the operations and import of key psychoanalytic concepts and a renewed sense of the indispensable powers of psychoanalysis for today. (shrink)

The relationship existing between science and psychoanalysis has long been tense, critical, even hostile. Andre Haynal addresses this relationship by examining three questions: how is psychoanalytic "knowledge" established? what methodology and epistemology underlie psychoanalytic theory? and what are the historical circumstances that have shaped psychoanalysis? Haynal is familiar with the full spectrum of analytic thought and begins with a systematic discussion of analytic theory. The second part of the book covers a series of historical topics and includes discussions of Freud (...) and his relations with his followers. A chapter on Freud and his "favorite disciple," Sandor Ferenczi, is an engrossing account of the complex intellectual and personal connection the two men shared. (shrink)

Die Hauptrichtung der französischen Soziologie ist heute noch die Durkheimsche Schule, die C. Bouglé in seinem Buch „Bilan de la Sociologie française contemporaine“ in den Vordergrund stellt. Diese Schule hat weniger im Sinne einer Einzelwissenschaft gewirkt als durch den Einfluss, den sie auf fast alle sozialen Wissenschaften ausgeübt hat. Deswegen sind die verschiedenen Kapitel des Bougléschen Buches den besonderen Disziplinen : Psychologie, Ethnographie, Geschichte, Jura, Nationalökonomie gewidmet, um die Wechselwirkung zwischen ihnen und der Soziologie, die Verbreitung der soziologischen Methode, des (...) soziologischen Gesichtspunkts zu würdigen. Anschliessend an Bouglé versucht Koyré diese Würdigung zusammenzufassen und kritisch zu beleuchten. Trotz ihrer verschiedenen theoretischen Einstellung kommen diese Disziplinen praktisch zu einer fruchtbaren Zusammenarbeit. Schliesslich macht Koyré zwei wichtige Bemerkungen : 1. über die Tendenz der soziologischen Moral, für welche die soziale Kohärenz der höchste Wert wäre, und 2. über die Wiederentdeckung einer besonderen Schicht der Wirklichkeit durch Dürkheim, nämlich die Kollektivvorstellung, die wie der „objektive Geist“ jedem Individuum innerlich und zugleich äusserlich und für alle verpflichtend ist.The dominant tendency in French sociology is still represented by the school of Durkheim, which receives prominent treatment by C. Bouglé in his book,,, Bilan de la Sociologie française contemporaine“. This school has penetrated nearly all the different social sciences and its influence has not been confined to the boundaries of a separate discipline. The different chapters of Bouglé's book, therefore, deal with psychology, anthropology, history, law, and political economy, in order to analyze the interaction between these separate disciplines and the sociological method.The author attempts to develop further the viewpoint advanced by Bouglé and to throw critical light upon it. He makes his observations along two main lines of thought, namely : first, that the focal conception which represents the supreme value for any sociology and its scientific unity is the conception of social coherence ; and second, that there is a particular area of reality rediscovered by Durkheim, namely the collective idea which, like the „objective mind“, represents for each and every individual a bond internal as well as external. (shrink)

Alexandre Koyré was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyré is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science—that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyré has to say about his historical studies , we find him embracing and (...) championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyré's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyré's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyré's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the ‘transscientifiques’ have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than ‘Platonist’, as has been the custom, ‘Hegelian’ makes a better fit. (shrink)

Este ensaio examina o relacionamento possível entre o pensamento de Martin Heidegger enquanto emerge no Zollikon Seminaire na sua troca de idéias com Medard Boss e a perspectiva da psicanálise como aparece através do prisma da releitura de Freud oferecido por Jacques Lacan. Heidegger entende Freud como vítima de uma compreensão positivista da ciência que procura explicar o comportamento humano patológico por um complexo de causas discerníveis conscientemente. Quando determinados fenômenos não podem ser explicados desta maneira, Freud postula um jogo (...) de causas psíquicas que não são conscientes, cuja soma ele chama o "inconsciente". Desde que todos os fenômenos humanos são, para Heidegger, discerníveis via uma profunda fenomenologia do ser humano como o ser-no-mundo, a construção hipotética de Freud é desnecessária e, a longo prazo, perniciosa. Mas Lacan propõe uma nova maneira de compreender o inconsciente descoberto por Freud, a saber, que não deve ser entendido como um sistema físico de forças hidráulicas, mas como um processo que seja estruturado como um idioma. A pergunta levantada neste ensaio é se Heidegger seria ou não igualmente hostil à hipótese de Freud, apresentada a ele dentro da forma de Lacan, como algo "estruturado como um idioma". O ensaio sugere que a resposta poderia ser "provavelmente não". Baseado num exemplo clínico altamente simplificado, este ensaio esforça-se para mostrar a compatibilidade entre determinados conceitos básicos de Heidegger e diversos, de Lacan, em especial as noções da verdade e da liberdade.This paper examines the possible relationship between the thought of Martin Heidegger as it emerges in the Zollikon Seminaire through his exchange with Medard Boss and the perspective of psychoanalysis as it appears through the prism of Jacques Lacan's rereading of Freud. Heidegger takes Freud to be victim of a positivist conception of science that seeks to explain pathological human behaviour by a complex of consciously discernible causes. When certain phenomena cannot be explained in this way, Freud postulates a set of psychic causes that are not conscious, the sum total of which he calls the "unconscious." Since all human phenomena are, for Heidegger, discernible through a thorough-going phenomenology of human being as being-in-the-world, Freud's hypothetical construct is unnecessary and, in the long run, pernicious. But Lacan proposes a new way to understand the unconscious that Freud discovered, namely, that it is not to be thought of as analogous to a physical system of hydraulic forces but rather to a process that is structured like a language. The question raised in the paper is whether or not Heidegger would have been equally hostile to Freud's hypothesis, if it had been presented to him in Lacanian fashion as something "structured like a language". The paper suggests that the answer could be "probably not". On the basis of a highly simplified clinical example, it endeavors to show the compatibility between certain basic Heideggerean concepts and several of those essential to Lacan, especially the notions of truth and freedom. (shrink)

In so curious, lively, and passionate an epoch as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, the life and work of few other persons generated as much admiration, as many repercussions and so much influence as did his. At the same time, few others caused as much animosity and hostility. And yet, there are few others about whose work and thought we are less informed. Who was this infamous vagabond? Was he a profound scientist, whose struggles against Aristotelian physics and classical medicine supposedly (...) laid the foundations of modern experimental medicine? Was he a precursor to nineteenth century rational science? Was he an erudite physician, or an ignorant charlatan? A peddler of superstition and quackery, an astrologist, a magician, a gold maker? Was he one of the greatest minds of the Renaissance, or simply a latecomer to Middle Age mysticism, a ‘gothic’? Was he a pantheistic cabalist, an adept of a vague Neo-Platonism and natural magic? Or was he ‘the physician’, ever watchful over suffering humanity; a man who found and formulated a new conception of life, the universe, of God and humanity? Was he, with a deeply Christian mind, one who attempted his own ‘reformation’ in the solitude of the Swiss mountains, who preached an evangelical, sophisticated form of mysticism, without clergy, dogma, and rites? Or was Paracelsus ultimately a Christian who, in spite of his frequently heterodox, even heretical opinions, remained faithful to his Church, preferring Catholicism to the new Protestant churches? (shrink)

_Oedipus Lex_ offers an original and evocative reading of legal history and institutional practice in the light of psychoanalysis and aesthetics. It explores the unconscious of law through a wealth of historical and contemporary examples. Peter Goodrich provides an anatomy of law's melancholy and boredom, of addiction to law, of legal repressions, and the aesthetics of jurisprudence. He retraces the genealogy of law and invokes the failures and exclusions—the poets, women, and outsiders—that legal science has left in its wake. (...) Goodrich analyzes the role and power of the image of law and details the history of law's plural jurisdictions and traditions of resistance to law. He explores mechanisms of repression and representation as constituents of modern subjectivity, using long-abandoned medieval texts and early appearances of feminism as resources for the understanding and renewal of legal scholarship. Not simply deconstruction but also reconstruction, this work is keenly attuned to the discontinuties, silences, and gaps in the cultural tradition called law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 1-7 [Access article in PDF] Clinical Practice, Science, and the Unconscious Douglas McConnell Neil Pickering Keywords psychotherapy, cognitive science, neuroscience, computational view of mind. This volume of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology is devoted to questions about the unconscious mind. The philosophical complexities and difficulties associated with the unconscious are many and, despite widespread confusion and disagreement as to the nature of the unconscious (...) mind, it is used as a concept informing psychotherapy. It is therefore not surprising that papers in a special edition on the unconscious might be weighted heavily toward uncovering a justifiable conceptual niche for the unconscious and elaborating on some of the main conceptual connections. Although this makes for a slightly more philosophical edition of PPP than usual, those perhaps less interested in philosophy and more interested in actual psychiatric practice can incorporate the concepts and insights developed in these papers into their practice as they see fit.The three main articles take three quite distinct approaches to the unconscious. Schechtman (2005) addresses the need for a theory of personal identity to incorporate the unconscious and presents one that does so by developing some central Lockian intuitions. Church (2005) investigates whether the kinds of things happening in the unconscious can be explained by cognitive operations not normally associated with consciousness, specifically, spatial structuring of experience. McConnell and Gillett (2005) clarify some of Lacan's ontology of the mind where the language encountered and used by the subject provides the structure for their unconscious.The aim of this introduction is to ask and try to answer a question that logically precedes those raised in the articles in the light of the therapeutic use of the unconscious. When dealing with psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic concepts in an Anglo-American context, the struggle that psychoanalysis has had and continues to have in a psychiatric domain ruled by science is never far from the spotlight. Indeed Hinshelwood (2005) also picks up the importance of this conflict when replying to McConnell and Gillett. It seems to be historically true that the unconscious has fallen out of favor in scientific and psychiatric circles (it is no surprise that psychiatric training is largely based in "hard," that is, biological and biochemical science) particularly over the last 50 years or so. But is the scientific skepticism to be found about the use of the unconscious well-founded? And how does the continued utilization [End Page 1] of the unconscious by the therapist fit into current practice given this skepticism? Psychotherapy and the Unconscious In psychotherapy, the therapist and the client together construct a story that explains why the client is having some form of difficulty in his or her life. The stated aim is to enable the client to overcome this difficulty by gaining an understanding of what has generated it. Doing so may be a first step to dealing with that conflict. For example, an office worker who is scared of the boss and whose life at work is a misery as result may come to think that the boss is a reminder of some threatening figure from childhood and that the reaction is a regression to infantile behavior. Knowing this, the fear of the boss can be revisited—perhaps reconfigured, perhaps overcome—and life may improve. In the process of therapy, the relation of the figure from childhood to the boss is made conscious. But it was still operative before it was made explicit, even though the client did not realize it and some would say that the client's unconscious had somehow buried the memory from childhood or hidden from the client the relation of this memory of a threatening figure to the boss.A description of the content of the unconscious is, then, an intentional description involving the client's thought life, one made to help an individual understand otherwise unintelligible (to that individual) feelings, beliefs, desires, actions, and so on. Subjects' intentions are their normatively structured mental representations of, and attitudes toward, the world (e.g., "He is my boss"; "I am afraid of him"). An intentional unconscious description then takes an intentional form... (shrink)

This paper investigates the historiographical utility of psychoanalysis, focussing in particular on retrospective explanations of demonic possession and exorcism. It is argued that while 'full-blown' psychoanalytic explanations-those that impose Oedipus complexes, anal eroticism or other sophisticated theoretical structures on the historical actors-may be vulnerable to the charge of anachronism, a weaker form of retrospective psychoanalysis can be defended as a legitimate historical lens. The paper concludes, however, by urging historians to look at psychoanalysis as well as trying to look through (...) it. Full-blown psychoanalysis is a bad historical lens but it may, in some cases, be an excellent explanatory template: a thorough understanding of how psychoanalytic therapy functions in the modern world is, for example, a good theoretical preparation for historians seeking to understand the sixteenth-century's demonological universe. (shrink)

A charismatic and controversial figure, Lacan is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century and his work has revolutionized a range of fields. The volume aims to introduce Lacan's vast opus to the field of international politics in a coherent and approachable manner. The volume is split into three distinct sections: Psychoanalysis and Politics: this section will frame the discussion by providing general background of Lacan's engagement with politics and the political Lacan and the Political: each chapter (...) will focus on different key ideas and concepts in Lacan's thought including ethics, justice, discourse, object a, symptom, jouissance Political Encounters: seeks to represent different ways of engaging with Lacanian thought and ways of adopting it to explain and comment on global political phenomena Bringing together internationally recognised scholars in the field, this volume will be an invaluable resource to students and scholars in areas including critical theory, international relations, political theory and political philosophy. (shrink)

This article is a discussion of Sigmund Freud’s note on ‘The Perversions in General’ from the 1905 edition of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. To summarise its argument, the article proposes that what Freud calls ‘perversion’ is itself to be properly understood as a form of sexual generalisation. It goes on to contend that Freudian perversion thus has larger implications for our understanding of the new sciences of sexual generalisation (sexology, psychoanalysis, structuralism, genealogy) that are beginning to (...) emerge from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. If perverse sexuality is arguably the defining libidinal object of Krafft-Ebing’s sexual taxonomy, for example, the article argues that perversion is already in itself a form of perverse sexual taxonomy. In conclusion, the article argues that Freud’s perversion is consequently a form of structural ‘dis-content’ that cannot be contained within the modern sciences of sex which extend from Krafft-Ebing’s sexology to Foucault’s history of sexuality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:French Philosophical Thought: Present Trends of French Philosophical Thought *Alexandre Koyré*This is a rather large subject, so you will not be astonished that I shall not treat it in its entirety. French philosophy during the years of war and occupation was pretty active. Though there were some heavy losses: the death of Brunschvicg, posthumous book [...], Héritage de mots, héritage d’idées, 1 a book written when Brunschvicg was (...) in hiding, and a book as “clear and serene as that of Condorcet,” has appeared after the liberation of France; the death of Halbwachs, of Politzer, of Cavaillès, of Lautman shot by the Nazis, of others less well known...; there was the ban on publications by Jewish authors, yet, in spite of this, there has been a surprising number of interesting and even important publications, both during and after the war.It seems that for the elder generation of French philosophers—and that applies not only to philosophers, but to scholars in general—for the generation of men too old to take an active part in the underground move-ment—work, as if nothing happened, has been in the same time a means of escape and a means of resistance. They felt themselves asserting a spiritual tradition that could not be destroyed, and should not be destroyed, and should not be endangered by such contingent “accidents” as Vichy government or even the Gestapo.Thus there have been a new translation of Plato by Robin, books on Plato, on Aristotle, on the medieval (Gilson) and modern philosophy etc., books on philosophy of science, books on sociology, psychology, logic (Méray, Serrus), 2 philosophy of religion, translations of philosophy classics. At the first glance the bibliography of this period (Lavelle, Le Senne, Bachelard, Gilson, etc.) you could have the impression wander in a familiar landscape: yet this would be a completely false impression, because as a matter of fact, this familiar landscape has been completely upturned by the upsurge of existentialism and the revival of Catholic philosophy [End Page 531] (Fessard, 3 De Lubac, Blondel, Nedoncelle, G. Marcel). Under this double impact everything—even the “climate” of philosophy—has changed. Philosophy has become a socially phenomenon.Neither Catholicism nor existentialism are, of course, specifically French intellectual movements. Catholicism is universal ex definitione, and as for existentialism, though French existentialism possesses some specific fea-tures that distinguish it from and even oppose it to the German one, fea-tures that can probably be explained by different national traditions—Descartes, Pascal—it, too, is no more French than it is German. Existen-tialism as such is European by-phenomenon, a definite phase of Western philosophical thought (and European thought, European civilization, at least until the recent—perhaps successful—attempts to destroy it, has been a unity). It originates more than a hundred years ago with Maine de Biran and Kierkegaard, and only has been rediscovered by the twentieth century now. Two thinkers that have been nearly completely neglected by the 19th century—but the 19th century, at least the second part of it, has been a dark age for philosophy—and after the rediscovery or simply the discovery of Kierkegaard in the 20th, it spreads, in Kierkegaard’s wake, from country to country with the usual speed or delay with which ideas travel today. Thus existential philosophy has been, first, developed in Germany in the ‘20s and ‘30s by Heidegger and Jaspers, then—Kierkegaard having been translated into French during the long armistice between the World Wars—in France, some 15 years later. 4 I have heard, by the way, that Kierkegaard has been, or is in the process of being translated into English. So, it is possible that in some 15 or 20 years you will have an existentialism in this country.But to return to France, the rise or upsurge of existentialism has been extraordinarily rapid. It was simultaneous with Husserl’s phenomenolo-gy becoming known in France (Husserl’s last work, Meditations Car-tesiennes, being the text of the lectures he gave in the Sorbonne in 1929, which is now available only in the French translation): from Husserl to... (shrink)

This paper employs the revised conception of Leibniz emerging from recent research to reassess critically the 'radical spiritual revolution' which, according to Alexandre Koyre's landmark book, From the closed world to the infinite universe (1957) was precipitated in the seventeenth century by the revolutions in physics, astronomy, and cosmology. While conceding that the cosmological revolution necessitated a reassessment of the place of value-concepts within cosmology, it argues that this reassessment did not entail a spiritual revolution of the kind assumed by (...) Koyre, in which 'value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim' were shed from the conception of the structure of the universe altogether. On the contrary, thanks to his pioneering intuition of the distinction between physical and metaphysical levels of explanation, Leibniz saw with great clarity that a scientific explanation of the universe which rejected the 'closed world' typical of Aristotelian cosmology did not necessarily require the abandonment of key metaphysical doctrines underlying the Aristotelian conception of the universe. Indeed the canon of value-concepts mentioned by Koyre-meaning, aim, perfection and harmony-reads like a list of the most important concepts underlying the Leibnizian conception of the metaphysical structure of the universe. Moreover, Leibniz's universe, far from being a universe without God-because, as Clarke insinuated, it does not need intervention from God-is a universe which in its deepest ontological fabric is interwoven with the presence of God. (shrink)

In this ambitious work, Fred Weinstein confronts the obstacles that have increasingly frustrated our attempts to explain social and historical reality. Traditionally, we have relied on history and social theory to describe the ways people understand the world they live in. But the ordering explanations we have always used--derived from the classical social theories originally forged by Marx, Tocqueville, Weber, Durkheim, Freud--have collapsed. In the wake of this collapse or "fall," the rival claims of fiction, psychoanalysis, sociology, anthropology, and (...) history have created the dilemma of radical relativism, the prospect of multiple interpretations of any complex historical event. The basic strategy of social theory and the social sciences--the search for underlying unities--proves so inherently contradictory and has provided so little in the way of reliable knowledge of social and historical relationships that to many critics it seems no longer worth pursuing. Weinstein enters the debate by rejecting any search for underlying structural unities, dynamic or social, through which historians have attempted to find continuity with the past. He looks instead to ideological processes, to the construction of successive and changing versions of reality that mediate between the power of fantasy on the one side and the power of the social world on the other. He argues further that the need to use ideological constructs in this way accounts for the heterogeneous and changing content of social movements and for the persistent need people have always had for authoritative leaders, even in democratized societies. He suggests that people have historically been able to take a step away from leaders only by substituting the possession of objects such as property or money. This book is a breakthrough in poststructuralist theory that is sure to stimulate considerable discussion, especially about the shape of the social sciences and the future of historical interpretation. (shrink)

This paper employs the revised conception of Leibniz emerging from recent research to reassess critically the ‘radical spiritual revolution’ which, according to Alexandre Koyré’s landmark book, From the closed world to the infinite universe was precipitated in the seventeenth century by the revolutions in physics, astronomy, and cosmology. While conceding that the cosmological revolution necessitated a reassessment of the place of value-concepts within cosmology, it argues that this reassessment did not entail a spiritual revolution of the kind assumed by (...) Koyré, in which ‘value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim’ were shed from the conception of the structure of the universe altogether. On the contrary, thanks to his pioneering intuition of the distinction between physical and metaphysical levels of explanation, Leibniz saw with great clarity that a scientific explanation of the universe which rejected the ‘closed world’ typical of Aristotelian cosmology did not necessarily require the abandonment of key metaphysical doctrines underlying the Aristotelian conception of the universe. Indeed the canon of value-concepts mentioned by Koyré—meaning, aim, perfection and harmony—reads like a list of the most important concepts underlying the Leibnizian conception of the metaphysical structure of the universe. Moreover, Leibniz’s universe, far from being a universe without God—because, as Clarke insinuated, it does not need intervention from God—is a universe which in its deepest ontological fabric is interwoven with the presence of God.Author Keywords: Leibniz; Koyré; Clarke; Universe; Cosmology; Harmony. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sharon O'Dair FREELOADING OFF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES In Profession 89, published by the MLA, Martin Mueller complains that the fashion for interdisciplinary work in literary studies is mostly an intradepartmental affair. In English departments interdisciplinary work results not in cross-fertilization between disciplines but in the establishment ofsubdisciplines within English. To support his assertions, Mueller focuses on the efforts of new historicists, most of which, he claims, would not pass (...) muster in history departments orjournals.1 But literary critics who import from sociology or psychology can be arraigned on the same charge; seldom do they engage sociologists or psychologists in the way envisioned by Mueller, that is, intensely. Ifthey did, the subdisciplines would not be defined as narrowly as they are; Marxism would not dominate our sociology of literature and psychoanalysis would not dominate our psychology of literature. If they did, critics would better understand the norms of science and thus be less likely to appropriate terms and theories for use outside the specialized arenas for which they were designed. And, to anticipate my conclusion, critics might then be less likely to further what psychologist Liam Hudson calls his discipline's "psychic engineering." My concern with how literary critics use social science results from grappling with the problem myself. Like most critics, I used to be rather uncritical in my borrowings from social science, figuring that ifit works, it works, and being, no doubt, somewhat off-put by the notion of "science." But as I read sociology and psychology on the problem of the self/subject, I became troubled by the way science structures discourse on the problem ofthe selfor subject and its relationship to surrounding environments. What do these discourses include and leave out? What are their boundaries? What is the status of the images of men and Philosophy and Literature, © 1991, 15: 260-267 Sharon O'Dair261 women offered by them? These are questions thatought tobe addressed by literary critics, but seldom are. To be more specific: although literary critics borrow heavily from the social sciences, most notably, of course, from those derived from the work of Marx and Freud, we do not often acknowledge the limits of the scientific discourses from which we borrow. Sociological "man" (the alienated role-player)—like psychological "man" (one pushed by drives and molded by stimuli) or economic "man" (the rational optimizer)— is an abstract and artificial description, a construct, useful as a tool in scientific analysis. As such, homo sociologicus or homo psychologicus maintains heuristic strength, but neither is intended to capture the whole of a human being or to account for the entirety of determining and enabling influences on him or her. Neither is a philosophy of human nature, and certainly neither was offered by social scientists to account for the creations of Kafka or Shakespeare. Ralf Dahrendorf has observed that "man in his entirety not only is safely removed from the attack ofany single discipline, but may possibly remain forever a nebulous shape in the background of scientific endeavor."2 Generalizing that point, Kenneth Burke explains that "insofar as any science has a nomenclature especially adapted to its particular field of study, the extension of its special terms to provide a definition in general would necessarily oversociologize, overbiologize, overpsychologize, or overphysicize, etc., its subject."3 So, in general, the social sciences, like the physical sciences from which they draw methodological inspiration, aim not to describe reality but to construct categories that allow each social science to capture a certain part, and only a certain part, ofreality in analysis. To get on with thejob, the sociologist controls for the fact of individuality—what is personal or unique in human beings—just as to get on with thejob, the psychologist controls for the fact ofsociety—what is social in human beings. Each discipline simplifies its notion of a person to proceed as science. As an object of study in much social science of this century and the last, a person is necessarily quite different from a person one meets on the streets, in a city or town. To the sociologist, then, if I may focus my argument, the person is nothing but his or her social roles. Erving Goffman, therefore... (shrink)

Exploring how a Freudian-Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis intersects with social and cultural theory, Lacan, Jouissance and the Social Sciences demonstrates the significance of subjectivity as a concept for the study of leadership, social psychology, culture, and political theory. Raul Moncayo examines Lacan's notion of surplus jouissance in relation to four types of socio-economic value: Productive Value, Exchange Value, Surplus Value and Profit. Also drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, Moncayo contends that surplus production cannot be reduced to alienated labor, (...) but rather includes various levels of jouissance-value. In this way, the jouissance that drives capitalization and organization can be theorized as constructive rather than destructive, and encompass satisfaction and prosperity rather than individual suffering. This volume will be of great interest to psychoanalysts both in practice and in training, and to academics and scholars of psychoanalytic studies, Lacanian studies, and the social sciences. (shrink)

Poststructuralism and After provides a comprehensive, innovative and lucid account of contemporary poststructuralist theory, which probes its limits, explores rival theoretical approaches, and elaborates new concepts and logics. The book distils and articulates the basic philosophical assumptions and theoretical concepts of poststructuralism, but by building upon the work of Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger, Lacan, Laclau, Levi-Strauss, Marx, Saussure and & ek it also provides a distinctive version of the poststructuralist project.The philosophy and theory of poststructuralism is presented through a critical engagement (...) with the central problems of social and political theory. Such problems include the structure/agency dilemma; the problem of social order; the ongoing debates between positivists, interpretivists and realists about the role and character of social science; the relationship between the economy, the state and society; the complexities of identity/difference; and the role of power, domination and ideology. Empirical illustrations and case studies of selected social phenomena further illuminate the theoretical arguments displayed in this book. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Barrow and Newton E. W. STRONG As E. A. Buxrr HAS ADDUCED,Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) in his philosophy of space, time, and mathematical method strongly influenced the thinking of Newton: The recent publication of an early paper written by Newton (his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum)2 affords evidence not known to Burtt of Newton's indebtedness in philosophy to Barrow, his teacher. Prior to its publication in 1962, this paper was (...) utilized by Alexandre Koyrd in his essay, "Newton and Descartes," 3 a study based on the third Horblit Lecture in the History of Science which he gave at Harvard University, March 8, 1961. Koyr8 maintains that there is a radical opposition in Newton's Principia not only to Descartes' purely scientific theories but also to the Cartesian philosophy. Yet, as he remarks, "we do not find in the Principia an open criticism of the philosophy of Descartes.... " He attributes this fact principally "to the very structure of the Principia: it is essentially a book on rational mechanics, which provides principles for physics and astronomy. In such a book there is a normal place for the discussion of Cartesian optics, but not of the conception of the relations of mind and body, and other such things." Koyrd asserts, nonetheless, that the criticism is not absent. It lurks in Newton's carefully worded definitions of fundamental concepts--those of space, time, motion, and matter--and becomes more apparent in the Optice of 1706 and in the second odition of the Principia. In support of this argument, he makes much of young Newton's unfini.~hed paper. He holds that this essay is of exceptional value "as it enables us to get some insight into the formation of Newton's thought, and to recognize that preoccupation with philosophic problems was not an external additatmentum but an integral dement of his thinking." 4 As concerns "young Newton's conception of space in its being and in its relation to God and time," Koyrd remarks that we learn from this essay The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (New York, 1927), p. 144. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1962), Introduction, pp. 75-88; Latin text, pp. 90-121; English translation, pp. 121156. " Newtonian Studies (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 53-114. " Newtonian Studies, pp. 82-83. In his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum, Newton is indeed engrossed with philosophic problems. With regard, however, to the announced purpose of his paper, namely, "to treat of the science of gravity and solid bodies in fluids by two methods," does Newton represent kis metaphysical "explanation of the nature of body" as an element of his science essential to its completeness7 He does not do so. At the end of his explanation he remarks: "I have already digressed enough; let us return to the main theme." He proceeds to set forth fifteen more definitions and then turns to the demonstration of two "Propositions on Non-Elastic Fluids." [155] 156 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "that space is necessary, eternal, immutz~ble, and unmovable, that though we can imagine that there is nothing in space we cannot think space is not.., and that if there is no space, God would be nowhere. We learn also that all points of space are simultaneous and that, therefore, the divine omnipresence does not introduce composition in God.... " What we here learn from Newton about space in confutation of Descartes is to be found in Barrow's tenth mathematical lecture, "'Of Space, and Impenetrability." 5 In this lecture, Barrow opposes both Descartes and Hobbes. He objects, as does Newton, to the position taken by Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae, namely, "it is necessary.forMatter to be infinitely extended." He proceeds, as does Newton, to show how "very much Cartesius's great Subtility has failed him in this Case" to conclude that there is space empty of matter and distinct from magnitude from which an infinity of matter cannot be deduced. The correspondence of arguments tendered by Barrow and Newton indicates that the tenth lecture constituted a source from which Newton gleaned principal objections to Descartes' Principia Philosophiae. Although Koyr~ makes reference to Burtt's... (shrink)

Psychoanalytic structuralism in the Cahiers pour l'analyse -- Bachelard, Lacan and the impurity of formalization -- Science, suture and the signifier -- Discourse and ideology in post-rationalism: Althusser, Badiou, Lacan, Milner -- Canguilhem, Deleuze and the problem of life.

The subversion of tradition of ethics carried out by Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason is, according to Lacan, the intelligibility background on which it is possible a science of the subject as developed by Freud. This would be shown up in a particularly effective way if comparing Kant’s moral theory with Sade’s antimoral one. It is not difficult to show the formal-structural identity of the state of affairs established by inconditionality of law in both theoretical systems, and thus (...) expose the possibility of that anti-moral as a kind of Kantian variation. Moreover, Lacan holds, it is necessary to recognize in Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom the truth of Critique of Practical Reason. Our study proposes an examination of this well-known Lacanian thesis. On the one hand, we seek to establish the exact content of this thesis and the diagnosis of the relationship that it involves between Kant and Freud (between Enlightenment and psychoanalysis). On the other hand, we seek to confront that diagnosis with the reconstruction of the specific terms of the practical subject question in Kant’s philosophy. The ultimate aim is at least to raise a question about the place of the concept of “Reason” in psychoanalysis, that is, about the margin that the truth of the subject discovered by this theory leaves for making the difference (at least de iure) between the weight of reason and the illusions of moral masochism, and about the very conditions of psychoanalysis as a theory. (shrink)

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing, this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré, one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for (...) his interest in philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field, and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike. (shrink)

We characterize science in terms of nihilism: the nihilism of science is something faced not in what science i mplies, but as the very essence of science as such. The nihilism of science is the birth of the truth of Nietzsche's announcement "God is dead" from within science as it must now face its repressed subjective core. But in truth, as the Psychoanalytic tradition has determined, it is subjectivity itself that is a bottomless searching-the subject is itself born from nothing. (...) In this way it becomes clear that the nihilism of science is in fact the birth of a nothingness as the essence of science insofar as it embraces the nothingness of its own subjectivity. Therefore, we show that the proper determination of the crisis of science is not made via phenomenology, as Husserl attempted in the early 20th century, but can only be made properly in a philosophical-psychoanalytic register. This nihilism is encoded within science in its very modality of thought , as Heidegger well understood: science thinks by means of "representation", and it is this "representational thinking" which prevents the expression of the repressed core of subjectivity. Therefore, by overcoming representation, it is seen that science will no longer be in despair to determine itself as a self, but come to see that this self, grounded in nothingness, in fact becomes its greatest and final expression, that is, as a self rooted not in an unending yearning for the transcendent certainty of a ground, but in a productive desire -self as will-to-create, will-to-power . This transition from the self as rooted in Desire qua lack to a self as determined by an infinitely productive desire is shown to be, in fact, the transition from Lacan to Deleuze. Once this transition is accomplished, it becomes clear that the anti-representational mode of thinking, accompanied by the productive self as will-to-power, determines science not from a transcendent metaphysic , but as an aesthetically determined modality of pure creativity-i.e., as an art . We then conclude by speculating on the proper form of art that this new science should take. We see that anti-representational thinking, rooted in the self as infinite creativity , is determined not by concepts, but by play or performances . Perhaps, then, we should consider music as determining the proper artistic form of this new kind of science? In this way we finally come to see the possibility for the first time of music as a new kind of science. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

This article discusses an important moment in the career of Alexandre Koyré, and the history of philosophy in France. It looks at the 1951 election of a successor to Étienne Gilson at the Collège de France, for which Koyré was one of the possible candidates, alongside Henri Gouhier and Martial Gueroult. Koyré came close, but Gueroult was elected to the chair. In time, Gueroult was succeeded first by Jean Hyppolite and then, in 1970, by Michel Foucault. (...) Using archival documents to discuss the process in detail, this article shows the weakness of Koyré’s proposers, and the strength of Gouhier’s application. Finally, drawing on Koyré’s outline of his proposed teaching programme, it discusses how success might have shaped his future career, using this as an indication of his position within and beyond a French tradition in the philosophy and history of the sciences. (shrink)

Carey argues that the aspects of categorization that are diagnostic of deep conceptual structure and, by extension, narrow conceptual content, must be distinguished from those aspects that are incidental to categorization tasks. For natural kind concepts, discriminating between these two types of processes is complicated by the role of explanatory stance and the causal history of features in determining category structure.

In this original work of psychoanalytic theory, John Muller explores the formative power of signs and their impact on the mind, the body and subjectivity, giving special attention to work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Muller explores how Lacan's way of understanding experience through three dimensions--the real, the imaginary and the symbolic--can be useful both for thinking about cultural phenomena and for understanding the complexities involved in treating psychotic patients. Muller develops Lacan's (...) perspective gradually, presenting it as distinctive approaches to data from a variety of sources, such as cognitive, social and developmental psychology, literature, history, art, and psychoanalytic treatment. The book's first four chapters present Muller's reading of selected data from child development research, psychology and linguistics, approximating a semiotic model of "normal" development. The following three chapters examine in a Lacanian framework the structural basis of psychotic stages as indicative of massive semiotic failure in development. The final chapters on human narcissism suggest reasons that "normal" development may be impossible. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity - like other forms of creativity - is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies - where target and source domain are close - we argue that distant analogies where target (...) and source domain differ widely are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen. (shrink)

ArgumentSociologists and historians have long favored externalist over internalist accounts of practices in the clinical disciplines. This has been particularly true in the case of the so-called new patient or borderline personality, which a range of commentators have located in culturally resonant narratives of decline. I argue here that these narratives, while pleasing, do not hold up as history; most problematic is their assumption that the appearance of the borderline portends the emergence of altogether novel forms of modal personhood. (...) Internalist accounts of the category's consolidation are equally problematic in asserting a coherence and a stable referent that repeatedly proves elusive. In the end, I suggest that a complex account of disciplinary practice that attends to knowledge production in the clinical encounter supports the conclusion that the new patient was new to psychoanalysis. Whether or not he was altogether new cannot be established, undermining the critics' certitude and prophecies of decline. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Jean-Paul Sartre had a contentious theoretical relationship with psychoanalysis. Nowhere is this more evident than in his criticisms of the concept of the unconscious. For him, the unconscious represents a hidden psychological depth that is anathema to the notion of human freedom. In this paper, I argue that Lacan’s conception of the unconscious-structured-like-a-language overcomes many of Sartre’s most damning objections. I demonstrate that Lacan shares with Sartre a concern to rid the psyche of hidden depths. Both thinkers (...) therefore reject the depth psychological conception of the unconscious and arrive at strikingly similar positions on the nature of the unconscious. In this way, I show that the conceptual analogues that Sartre develops in order to avoid the psychoanalytic unconscious lead him to a position on the unconscious with which Lacan could be in agreement. This indicates that Sartre’s philosophical position is not as at odds with Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis as is typically thought. (shrink)

The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–81) left a legacy of thought that increasingly commands the attention of American scholars and critics. His provocative essays and wide-ranging seminars and lectures attempted, with remarkable success, to bridge the supposedly unbridgeable gap between the humanities and modern science. For some time his influence has shadowed the theoretical work being done in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, women’s studies, and literature. In Lacan and the Human Sciences eight eminent scholars examine how ideas entered these fields, how well (...) they were understood and adapted, and what fruit they have produced. The editor, Alexandre Leupin, whose introduction reveals the underpinnings of Lacan’s thought, views the book as a blueprint for overcoming the present impasses of scientific and humanistic discourses and their imaginary contradictions. The essays demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The relevance of his work to epistemology is considered by Jean-Claude Milner, François Regnault, and Ellie Ragland-Sullivan; to anthropology, by Jean-Joseph Goux; to feminist studies, by Jane Gallop; and to literature, by Dennis Porter and Denis Hollier. The result is a book that points to a new and more pertinent way of dealing, on one hand, with the problems of epistemology and, on the other, with the question of literary theory in the humanities. (shrink)

A number of authors recently have pointed out what they think are enlightening similarities between psychoanalysis and history. In stressing such similarities they are usually trying to justify their own particular characterization of psychoanalysis. I show wherein I think these characterizations go wrong and at the same time try my own hand at clarifying the nature of psychoanalytic propositions.

The paper discusses the relation between psychoanalysis and science from the perspective of formalization and contingency. It departs from the role of biology in Freud, pointing out the insufficiency of his scientific preferences to account for the specific epistemological status of the unconscious and sexuality. Lacan’s notable reference to mathematical formalization then appears as a critical response to Freudian scientism. The paper in particular underlines the relation between formalization and contingency, which for Lacan was the central issue not only of (...) psychoanalysis but also of modern science. This problem is addressed in reference to the polemic between the philosopher Émile Boutroux, who advocated the idea of the contingency of natural laws, and the mathematician Henri Poincaré, who decisively rejected Boutroux’s “speculations”. The paper then concludes with a brief outline of the main features of Lacan’s use of formalization, focusing especially on the “mathematization of the non-all” in which Lacan saw the point of encounter between scientific thinking and the real. (shrink)