Social movements often impose nontrivial costs on others against their wills. Civil disobedience is no exception. How can social movements in general, and civil disobedience in particular, be justifiable despite this apparent wrong-making feature? We examine an intuitively plausible account—it is fair that everyone should bear the burdens of tackling injustice. We extend this fairness-based argument for civil disobedience to defend some acts of uncivil disobedience. Focusing on uncivil environmental activism—such as ecotage (sabotage with the aim of protecting the environment)—we (...) argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats. Indeed, insofar as some acts of uncivil disobedience can more accurately target responsible people, they can better satisfy the demands of fairness compared to their civil counterparts. In some circumstances, our argument may require activists to engage in uncivil disobedienceeven whencivil disobedience is available. (shrink)

In the “Qiwulun” 齊物論 chapter of the Zhuangzi, the author recommends a better way of arguing for a conclusion in the debates that are recorded in the books Discourse on Pointing at Things and White Horse Discourse 1:To use an attribute to show that attributes are not attributes is not as good as using a non-attribute to show that attributes are not attributes. To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as (...) using a non-horse to show that a horse is not a horse. Heaven and earth are one attribute; the ten thousand things are one horse.2Later in the same chapter, Zhuangzi gives a lengthy, disparaging speech on discerning the real winner in.. (shrink)

This paper argues against the continued practice of Confucian familism, even in its moderate form, in East Asian hospitals. According to moderate familism, a physician acting in concert with the patient's family may withhold diagnostic information from the patient, and may give it to the patient's family members without her prior approval. There are two main approaches to defend moderate familism: one argues that it can uphold patient's autonomy and protect her best interests; the other appeals to cultural relativism by (...) construing the principle of ‘family autonomy’ to be incommensurable with that of individual autonomy. We respond to the first approach by explaining how the familist arguments either depend on some unreasonable assumptions or simply fail to articulate. The critique of the second approach is based on our recent survey showing that there is no dichotomy of relevant values between the East and the West: we believe that the result can effectively block the familist's reliance on certain traditional or cultural values to explain their resistance to the incorporation of pluralist values. Despite our disagreement with familism, we consider the Eastern emphasis on the family to be conducive to the communication between patient, family members and medical personnel, which is indispensible to the patient's well being and autonomy. We conclude that respect for patient autonomy is perfectly consistent with the involvement of the family in making medical decision as long as the family plays a merely consultant role. (shrink)

In this article, we present an account of ming 明 in the Zhuangzi's Neipian in light of the disagreements among the thinkers of the time. We suggest that ming is associated with the Daoist sage's vision: he sees through the debaters' attempts to win the debates. We propose that ming is primarily a meta-epistemological stance, that is, the sage understands the nature of the debates and does not enter the fray; therefore he does not share the thinkers' (...) anxieties. The sage takes his stance at the pivot of dao (daoshu 道樞) and, from there, responds to the different views limitlessly. (shrink)

My friends, what I intend to do here is not simply to present a thesis. Rather, I will follow the main subject of this seminar, namely "The Possibilities and Questions in the Teaching and Transmitting Chinese Philosophy," concentrating in this lecture on the core concepts of neo-Confucianism.

In this book, the author adopts the methodology of "discussing philosophy by studying history of philosophy". The chapters in the book discuss the essential content of The Study of Renxue Ontology, Ren's development in pre-Qin (before 206BC) and Han period (206BC-220), Ren theories in Song Dynasty (960-1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). It covers topics ranging from Confucius and Mencius' classic theories to Li Zehou's ontology of emotions as well as the development of Ren in the historical context and its (...) contemporary interpretations. The book develops the theory of Ren and Taoist style of classical Confucianism while critically incorporating modern Chinese philosophical ontology. The resulting philosophical construction incorporates classical Confucian Ren theory and classical Confucian Ren theory and the continuation of and responses to the arguments of modern Chinese philosophy, thus offering a comprehensive and innovative coverage of contemporary Chinese Confucianism. The book combines Chinese contemporary cultural heritage and creative development to promote contemporary Confucianism and harmony between China and the world. (shrink)

To counter the tendency of making Confucianism "localized" and thereby turning Confucianism research into research of local social history, the author criticizes this tendency and thinks it is unilateral to emphasize or stress the importance of a small unit's locality, but ignore the oneness of the distribution of Confucianism and the universality of Confucian thought. The thesis emphasizes that the main schools of Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties are all not local ones and cannot be reduced to (...) reflections of some local need and social structure. The author points out that we need to self-examine the following phenomena: aggrandizing the function of local social structure to culture and thought, coming down academic schools to reflections of local social benefits, opposing this kind of research to the research of thought itself, thus rejecting philosophical research and analysis of thought itself. (shrink)

電子テクノロジーが見逃してきた盲点を突き止める。 「蜘蛛の巣」を鍵言葉に、人類の想像力がいかに蜘蛛の巣状に連動し、それが従来の研究方法をいかに刷新するのか。また「蜘蛛の巣」というマトリックスに照らして現実を分析することがいかなる可能性を開くのか。電子 媒体を「蜘蛛の巣」Webとして捉えることで、そこに潜む危険とも裏腹の将来像を、特定の専門分野の枠組みを横断して探求する。.

Ben shu wei wo she chong dian tu shu hua xia wen ku ru xue shu xi zhong di yi ben. Gai shu yi jian ming de wen zi gou le le Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi san wei Ming mo da ru sheng huo de shi dai bei jing, hong ru de sheng ping jing li, ta men de xue shu zao yi (zhu yao zhi ta men zai ru xue fang mian de cheng jiu), cheng (...) yu jiao you yi ji san wei zai li shi shang de di wei he gong xian, ta men ren sheng de kan ke du lai ling ren bu sheng xi. (shrink)

Ben shu wei "Song Ming shi qi Chang Jiang zhong you de ru xue yan jiu" cong shu zhi yi: ben cong shu shi ren wen she hui ke xue chong dian yan jiu ji di-Wuhan da xue Zhongguo chuan tong wen hua yan jiu zhong xin tou biao, jing jiao yu bu zu zhi zhuan jia ping shen tong guo, zheng shi pi zhun de jiao yu bu ren wen she hui ke xue 2001 nian du zhong da (...) yan jiu xiang mu, xiang mu pi zhun hao shi 01JAZJD720008, ding yu 2004 nian qian hou wan cheng. ke ti zu zhu chi ren wei Guo Qiyong jiao shou, "Jiangxi zhi xue"shi Zhu Xi ti chu de yi ge gai nian, zhu yao zhi chu zi yu Jiangxi Jinxi Lu shi jia zu yi men de xue shuo, qi nei he shi Lu Jiuyuan de xin xue; di 2 quan ze shi you "Song Yuan xue an" suo zai zhi Xiangshan xiong Zhangfu, Suoshan de xue shuo; di 3 quan wei Xiangshan xiong di de di zi men de si xiang. Ben shu quan mian kao cha Jiangxi zhi xue zai Song dai Chang Jiang zhong you xing qi de xue mo yuan yuan, zhu yao xue shuo, yu Luo xue Min xue Zhejiang zhu xue zhe (Lü Zuqian, Yong Shangsi xian sheng deng) zhi jian de guan xi, yi ji qi dui Wang (Yangming) xue xing qi de nei zai guan lian xing, bing yan ji dui xian dai xin ru xue de tan tao. ben shu de xie zuo jiang zhu zhong si xiang kao gu de fang fa, zai quan mian yan jiu you guan dian ji de ji chu shang, dui you guan ren wu de chu sheng di, huo dong de di qu (ru jia zu suo zai cun luo, xue zhe shu xin wang lai, jiang xue, hui jiang, shu yuan deng) jin xing shi di de kao cha, guang fan di yun yong fang zhi, nian pu, shu yuan zhi, jia pu deng cai liao, ba si xiang jia huan yuan yu ju ti huan jing zhi zhong, zai ju ti she hui de li shi de jia zu de bei jing xia kao cha qi si xiang de nei han, jie shi qi jing shen suo zai, bing jin er yin shen chu qi yi yi yu jia zhi. (shrink)

美感教育的實施，不可避免必須面對「不同主體之間的美感」可能存在殊異性的問題，本書試圖立於互為主體性的基礎，論述一種「共鳴美感」的新視野，並描繪出臺灣美感教育的未來可能新願景。首先，筆者先透過美感教育相 關議題之探討，析論推動美感教育可能面臨的潛在難題與挑戰，其次，針對問題而論述出一種「共鳴美感經驗」之理念，以作為解決構想；最後，透過實際個案來闡述「共鳴美感」在課程教學中的可能樣貌，包含：以「共鳴」的 「共感性」作為「美育課程實踐」的核心；以「共鳴」的「協同性」作為「教學藝術體現」的策略；以「共鳴」的「他者性」作為形塑「自我主體認同」之途徑。.

Ben shu shou lu wen zhang si shi yu pian, shi zuo zhe dui dao jia yu dao jiao wen hua duo nian lai yan jiu cheng guo de zong he zhan xian.

The circulation and entanglements of human beings, data, and goods have not necessarily and by themselves generated a universalising consciousness. The "global" and the "universal", in other words, are not the same. The idea of a world-society remains highly contested. Our times are marked by the fragmentation of a double relativistic character: the inevitable critique of Western universalism on the one hand, and resurgent identitarian and neo-nationalistic claims to identity on the other. Sources of an argumentation for a strong universalism (...) brought forward by Western traditions such as Christianity, Marxism, and Liberalism have largely lost their legitimation. All the while, manifold and situated narratives of a common world that re-address the universal are under way of being produced and gain significance. This volume tracks the development and relevance of such cultural and social practices that posit forms of what we call minor universality. It asks: Where and how do contemporary practices open up concrete settings so as to create experiences, reflections and agencies of a shared humanity? With contributions by Isaac Bazié, Anil Bhatti, Jean-Luc Chappey, Elsie Cohen, Leyla Dakhli, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Nicole Fischer, Albert Gouaffo, Stefan Helgesson, Fatma Hotait, Tammy Lai-Ming Ho, Christopher M. Hutton, Ananya Jahanara Kabir, Mario Laarmann, Rukmini Bhaya Nair, Olivier Remaud, Gisèle Sapiro, Bénédicte Savoy, Maria-Anna Schiffers, Laurens Schlicht, Sergio Ugalde, Hélène Thierard, Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll. (shrink)

This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the (...) ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns. (shrink)

Ben shu xi tong jie shi le zhi jue lun si xiang zai zhong guo xian dai zhe xue fa zhan yan bian de gui ji, Fen xi le liang shu ming, Xiong shi li, Feng you lan, He lin, Mou zong san, Fang dong mei, Tang jun yi deng ren yun yong zhi jue fang fa lai jian gou ge zi zhe xue si xiang ti xi zhi de yu shi, Ji you zhuan ti yan jiu de shen (...) du, You jian gu le shi de guang du, Xian ming gou le chu zhi jue lun zai zhong guo xian dai zhe xue yan jiu zhong de du te lun kuo. (shrink)

Di 1 juan. Da kai yu zhou de ling yi shan men -- Di 2 juan. Guang yi yu xia yi sheng ming shuo -- Di 3 juan. Wo cong na li lai, you dao na li qu -- Di 4 juan. Jin ru yin xing wu zi shi jie.

Du Weiming xian sheng shi dang dai yan jiu he chuan bo ru jia wen hua de zhong yao si xiang jia. Ta 1940 nian chu sheng yu Kunming, xian hou qiu xue yu Taiwan dong hai da xue he Meiguo Hafo da xue, ren jiao yu Pulinsidun da xue, Bokeli Jiazhou da xue. Zi 1981 nian, Du Weiming xian sheng yi zhi zai Hafo da xue Dong Ya xi dan ren li shi ji zhe xue jiao shou,qi jian huo (...) xuan Meiguo ren wen she hui ke xue yuan yuan shi, hai ceng dan ren Hafo Yanjing xue she she zhang. Chang qi yi lai, Du Weiming xian sheng zhi li yu ru xue di 3 qi fa zhan, quan shi Zhongguo wen hua, fan si xian dai jing shen, chang dao wen ming dui hua, zai hai nei wai xiang you hen gao de xue shu sheng yu. Du xian sheng fei chang re xin Zhongguo you xiu chuan tong wen hua zai ben tu de chuan bo, duo ci hui guo can jia jiao yu he xue shu jiao liu huo dong. Ta yu Beijing da xue you zhe te shu de yuan fen,zao zai 1985 nian jiu lai Beijing da xue jiang shou ru jia zhe xue. Zui jin Du Weiming xian sheng yi zheng shi shou pin wei Beijing da xue gao deng ren wen yan jiu yuan yuan zhang. (shrink)

Ben shu yi Wang Yangming di zi Zou Dongkuo wei yan jiu dui xiang, zhuo zhong tan tao qi si xiang jie gou he nei han, bing jiang dui qi ge ti zhe xue si xiang de yan jiu na ru dao zheng ge Yangming xue fen hua, yan bian de li shi jin cheng zhong lai que ding qi ge ti de si xiang shi ding wei, jie yi kao cha qi ge ti de si xiang te se he (...) zheng ge Yangming xue zai zhong wan Ming de fa zhan te dian. (shrink)

Ben shu xi tong chan shu liao Zhongguo zhe xue de yuan qi, fa zhan he wei lai.quan shu gong fen cheng si ge da bu fen:yuan qi yu chu xing; er, ge ming hua de ding xing; san, xin shi dai de zhuan xiang;si, zou xiang quan qiu hua shi dai de Zhongguo zhe xue.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Zhuangzi:Personal Freedom and/or Incongruity of Names?Paul J. D'Ambrosio (bio)Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom (hereafter Origins) has sparked much scholarly debate. Already numerous presentations, various types of discussions, and reviews have appeared based on Origins. The present review focuses specifically on the Zhuangzi chapter. The entire project actually began, Jiang writes, fifteen years ago as a book on (...) the Zhuangzi. Through his research Jiang realized he needed to learn more about the objects of philosophical ridicule and critique in the Zhuangzi. Origins is the result of this decade-and-a-half study.Origins provides a somewhat novel framework for reading Warring States period philosophy. Summarizing the basic structure of his project Jiang writes: "I make the case that the philosophical dialectics between the partialist humaneness and imperialist justice formed the fundamental dynamics underlying the mainstream moral-political project during the classic period, with the musing on personal freedom as the outlier" (p. 35). As Karyn Lai puts it, Origins revolves around a "predictable set of inherited pre-Qin texts associated with key figures, traditionally called the "Masters" (zi 子) text" (Lai 2022, p. 181). Some models inherited by the "masters," such as yinyang 陰陽 thinking or ming 名 (names) and shi 實 (actualities), are nearly absent in Origins and would cast new light on the project as well [End Page 458] as the tradition. In this review I will first outline Jiang's reading of the Zhuangzi before considering how a richer appreciation of the Chinese tradition, especially its own methodological tools, frameworks, and concepts, could bolster the exciting contributions Origins stands to make. We will start with Jiang's big picture view of the Zhuangzi.In Origins the Zhuangzi is taken to be a completely unique text. It does not engage in the moral and political discourse the other "masters" texts are subsumed by, and instead of supporting either partialist humaneness or impartialist justice it "muses" on personal freedom. Jiang defines: "Personal freedom is understood as the appreciation and cultivation of personal space wherein one can be left alone and enjoy the company of like-minded friends without being entangled in the sociopolitical world" (p. 36). There are two significant points to note about Jiang's understanding of freedom. First, it is almost a word-for-character definition of how the "Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove" have been described by many. Research on these philosophical works could significantly enrich Jiang's reading, albeit from a different angle. Second, Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312) emphasis on, and philosophical explorations of, du 獨 (an interconnected type of "lone") would further fill out how freedom and relationality—which are both attributed to the Zhuangzi by Jiang—are connected.In addition to a "fierce advocacy for personal freedom" Jiang classifies the Zhuangzi as a "singular outlier" for ridiculing the "misguided character of [the contestations between humaneness and justice] and warn[ing] against their potential for inhumanity and injustice" (p. 49). Indeed, the Zhuangzi does demonstrate that these discussions can elicit "the very opposite of what was intended by the participants of the mainstream discourse" (p. 49). Its criticisms are even more penetrating when we appreciate its deeper point about "names being the guests of actualities" (Zhuangzi 1:4). From this perspective the Zhuangzi is not against systems of humaneness or justice as such. It rather points out that humaneness does not have a single referent, nor could that referent be reliably distinguished. The name "humane" does not guarantee humane action, or really anything in particular. The same is true for "justice." We will return to these points below.Jiang's chapter on the Zhuangzi begins by defending moral and political readings of the text. It is an outlier from the perspective of the "humanity-justice" framework, but this only means that the moral-political discourse Zhuangists were engaged in was different. The result was that already by the early Han and by the time of Sima Qian 司馬遷 (d. 86 b.c.e.) "Zhuangzi's teachings were … of little use to contemporary political discourse" (p. 288). Jiang should be delighted to know that the Wei-Jin period, which had inestimable... (shrink)

Although self-love is an important topic, it has not been viewed as appropriate for psychological research, especially in China. We conducted two studies to understand how Chinese people view self-love. In the first study, we surveyed 109 Chinese people about the dimensions of self-love using an open-ended questionnaire. In the second study, 18 participants were selected by means of intensity sampling and interviewed about the connotations and structure of Chinese self-love. The two studies revealed three important aspects of the Chinese (...) understanding of self-love: self-love has four dimensions: self, family, others, and society; it comprises five components: self-cherishing, self-acceptance, self-restraint, self-responsibility, and self-persistence; and the five components of self-love are linked together to form a stable personality structure. The reliability and validity of the two studies were strong. Finally, the results showed that Chinese self-love is dominated by Confucian culture, which provides guiding principles for how to be human. At the same time, it shows that there are differences in the understanding of self-love between Chinese and Western cultures, which provides an empirical basis for further research based on cross-cultural psychology and self-love psychology. (shrink)