Technology used in online marketing has advanced to a state where collection, enhancement and aggregation of information are instantaneous. This proliferation of customer information focused technology brings with it a host of issues surrounding customer privacy. This article makes two key contributions to the debate concerning digital privacy. First, we use theories of justice to help understand the way consumers conceive of, and react to, privacy concerns. Specifically, it is argued that an important component of consumers' privacy concerns relates to (...) fairness judgments, which in turn comprise of the two primary components of distributive and procedural justice. Second, we make a number of prescriptions, aimed at both firms and regulators, based on the notion that consumers respond to perceived privacy violations in much the same way they would respond to an unfair exchange. (shrink)

Leibniz's earliest philosophy and its importance for his mature philosophy have not been examined in detail, particularly in the level of detail that one can achieve by placing Leibniz's philosophy in the context of the sources for two of the most basic concerns of his philosophical career: his metaphysics of individuals and the principle oftheir individuation. In this book I provide for the first time a detailed examination of these two Leibnizian themes and trace its implications for how we should (...) interpret other major Leibnizian themes and for how we should read Leibniz and other philosophers of the sixteenth and later centuries as 'modem' philosophers. Leibniz began his philosophical career more than 300 years ago, a fact that shapes fundamentally my attempt in the pages that follow to come to terms now with the texts that he left us. Leibniz's did not do philosophy in a way wholly congenial to twentieth century philosophical methodologies, especially those that have enjoyed some prominence in recent Anglo-American philosophy. Moreover, as we shall see, Leibniz is not a modem philosopher, when 'modem' is understood to mean making a sharp break with medieval philosophy. Indeed, I shall argue, scholars should discard such terms as 'modem' from historical philosophical scholarship, so that old texts can be allowed to remain old - to stand on their own in and from times now long past. (shrink)

A commentary on “The Ethics of Anonymous Gamete Donation: Is There a Right to Know One's Genetic Origins?” by Inmaculada de Melo‐Martín, in the March‐April 2014 issue.

(2001). The History of Medical Ethics Is Crucial for a Critical Perspective in the Continuing Development of Ethics Consultation. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 55-57.

This study investigated the mechanisms behind episodic autobiographical memory development in school-age children. Thirty children performed a novel EAM test. We computed one index of episodicity via autonoetic consciousness and two indices of retrieval spontaneity for a recent period and a more remote one . Executive functions, and episodic and personal semantic memory were assessed. Results showed that recent autobiographical memories were mainly episodic, unlike remote ones. An age-related increase in the indices of episodicity and specific spontaneity for recent AMs (...) was mainly mediated by an age-related increase in the efficiency of the three cognitive abilities. Remote AMs varied only slightly with age , reflecting improvements in semantic abilities. Thus, EAM development in school-age children is essentially bound up with the increasing efficiency of cognitive abilities. Results are discussed in the light of models of childhood amnesia. (shrink)

In 2013, there were an estimated 50,000 individuals involved in downloading and sharing indecent images of children in the United Kingdom. This poses challenges for limited police resources. We argue that police officers can make most effective use of limited resources by prioritizing those offenders who pose the greatest risk of contact offending, by nature of demonstrable pedophilia, hebephilia or dual offending status and thus, those at highest risk must be dealt with first. What is currently lacking is a clear (...) idea of the potential scale of the problem in socio-economic terms and why, therefore, it is so important that evidence-based approaches to offender detection and investigation continue to be a top priority for funders and policy makers. A systematic literature review was undertaken to address two related questions. First, what is the scale of the problem in the UK, in terms of the number of pedophilic and hebephilic individuals who pose a risk of contact offending against a child? Second, what is the potential socio-economic burden generated by the national IIOC suspect pool if left unattended to by targeted police action? Applying population estimates of pedophilia and hebephilia to the male population, we estimate there are between 2,365–5,991 males with paedophila and 12,218–30,952 males with hebephilia who are likely contact offenders. Applying average prevalence and incidence based costing methods to a conservative estimate of one victim per offender, the combined socio-economic burden from these persons could amount to £236-£597 million increasing to £2.9-£7.3 billion. Applying the same costs to CEOP estimate of 50,000 IIOC offenders we estimate that between 6,000 and 27,500 dual offenders could have already committed past contact offenses, contributing an economic burden of between £97–£445 million increasing to £1.2–£5.4 billion. Future contact offenses could contribute a further burden of £16–£18.6 million increasing to £198–£227 million. Drawing upon these findings, we argue for the benefits of a research-informed prioritization approach to target IIOC offenders. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics in the Twenty-First Century: Why We Should Pay Attention to Eighteenth-Century Medical EthicsLaurence B. McCullough (bio)Those of us who work in the field of bioethics tend to think that, because the word “bioethics” is new, so too the field is new in all respects, but we are not the first to do bioethics. John Gregory (1724–1773) did bioethics just as we do it, at least two centuries before (...) we thought to do it (Gregory 1772). He deployed philosophical methods as sophisticated as our own. Indeed, Gregory took up the very best moral philosophy available to thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, David Hume’s moral philosophy and its core concept of sympathy. Gregory also responded in a conceptually powerful and clinically applicable way to the problems of his time, just as we do. I want here to outline Gregory’s accomplishment and to identify some aspects of its importance for bioethics in the twenty-first century.Gregory’s “Problem List”Gregory wrote his medical ethics as a response to the then current state of medicine in Britain. We now follow Gregory in our writing of bioethics and clinical ethics in response to the problems of our time. A great deal that we now take for granted did not then exist. 1There was not, as there is now, any uniform pathway into medicine. Nor did there exist universal licensure. The Royal Colleges did attempt to assert, but failed to achieve, monopoly control of medical practice. The concepts of health and disease were themselves contested and therefore competed for their success in the market place. There was a marked oversupply of practitioners who competed fiercely—very fiercely indeed—in the medical market place for their concepts of health and disease, their treatments, and therefore their livelihoods. Patients had their own concepts of health and disease, engaged in “self-physicking” or self-care, and often traded physician’s prescriptions.Medicine exhibited little scientific discipline in its accounts of disease and in determining the efficacy of treatments, a fact that Gregory (1743) laments as a [End Page 329] medical student. There was no marked improvement when he began to give his medical ethics lectures nearly a quarter of a century later. Treatments failed as often, perhaps more often, than they succeeded in benefiting patients. The sick usually sought out the help of a physician after trying self-physicking.Physicians, Gregory taught, could not hope to control human biology, though they could aim to manage its processes well. When nature underresponds to disease the physician should assist her processes; when nature overresponds, the physician should tamp down nature’s responses, to lessen their “violence”—in both cases always attentive to the limits of medicine’s capacities in treating disease.Physicians attended the well-to-do sick at home, and the sick person summoned and dismissed physicians, surgeons, or apothecaries at will. A physician therefore might find himself—no women had yet been admitted to the ranks of university-trained physicians—summoned before, after, or simultaneously with a competitor, with his concepts and diagnosis and treatment put to the acid test. In this setting, there existed only a patient-physician relationship, not a physician-patient relationship.Physicians left off the care of dying patients, a practice that was made a matter of duty by Friederich Hoffmann (1749). One would suffer punishing economic consequences if one had a high mortality rate. Better, then, to label the patient incurable, withdraw, and turn matters over to clergy. Gregory attacks this practice as intellectual fraud and calls for the physician to continue to attend the dying. Indeed, he says, “It is as much the business of a physician to alleviate pain, and to smooth the avenues of death, when unavoidable, as to cure diseases” (Gregory 1772, p. 35). He does not explicitly address what we now call physician-assisted suicide; neither does he condemn it, and he is quick to condemn some things—e.g., sexual abuse of female patients or “sporting” with patients in the Royal Infirmary by using experiments as the first line of treatment.The Royal Infirmary was established to care for the deserving, working poor, who received free care... (shrink)

Clinical ethics, like bioethics more generally, until recently has tended to focus on the present and future, with little attention to the history of moral thought about health care that preceded bioethics. As a consequence, clinical ethics and bioethics lack maturity as fields of the humanities. The papers in this year's clinical ethics issue of the Journal put contemporary clinical ethics in critical dialogue with the past, making the former accountable to the latter. The six papers in this issue of (...) the Journal are briefly described, with an emphasis on how they contribute to the maturation of clinical ethics as a field of the humanities. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 10, Page 34-35, October 2011.

The five papers in the 2008 “Clinical Ethics” number of the journal address the conceptual and empirical foundations of clinical ethics. Three articles take up the concept of professionalism in medicine, exploring its possibilities and implications. The fourth article provides a distinctive, phenomenological account of the “placebo effect,” a vexing topic of surprising durability in the clinical setting. The final article, a systematic review of the qualitative literature on bedside rationing of resources, creates an empirical foundation for philosophical analysis and (...) argument of a distinctive kind. (shrink)

Désignant des femmes qui ont des droits et exercent des pouvoirs, le mot domina est fréquemment utilisé par Jérôme dans son traité Contre Jovinien et dans ses correspondances féminines. Les acceptions de ce terme, qui vont de l'épouse à la vierge chrétienne, en passant par la maîtresse des esclaves et la supérieure du monastère, donnent une image très claire du contexte socio-culturel qui les vit naître. Le point commun entre ces différentes occurrences est manifestement l'idéal cher à Jérôme, à savoir (...) le mode de vie inspiré des Pères du désert. Elles font voir à quel point la conversion monastique, qui faisait vivre les femmes de haut rang en compagnie de leurs esclaves, pouvait scandaliser l'aristocratie romaine.The word domina, which designates women who have rights and exercise power, is frequently used by Jerome in his treatise Against Jovinian and in his correspondence with women. The accepted uses of this term, which extend from wife to Christian virgin, including the mistress of slaves and the superior of the monastery, give a very clear image of the socio-cultural context from which they arose. The common point between these different occurrences is manifestly the ideal for Jerome, that is to say, the way of life inspired by the Fathers of the desert. We can see to what point monastic conversion, which had highly placed women live in the company of their slaves, could scandalise the Roman aristocracy. (shrink)

The human mind is capable of entertaining an astounding range of thoughts. These thoughts are composed of concepts or ideas, which are the building blocks of thoughts. This book is about where all of these concepts come from and the psychological structures that ultimately account for their acquisition. We argue that the debate over the origins of concepts, known as the rationalism-empiricism debate, has been widely misunderstood—not just by its critics but also by researchers who have been active participants in (...) the debate. Part I fundamentally rethinks the foundations of the debate. Part II defends a rationalist view of the origins of concepts according to which many concepts across many conceptual domains are either innate or acquired via rationalist learning mechanisms. Our case is built around seven distinct arguments, which together form a large-scale inference to the best explanation argument for our account. Part III then defends this account against the most important empiricist objections and alternatives. Finally, Part IV argues against an extreme but highly influential rationalist view—Jerry Fodor’s infamous view that it is impossible to learn new concepts and his related radical concept nativism, which holds that essentially all lexical concepts are innate. Throughout the book, our discussion blends philosophical and theoretical reflection with consideration of a broad range of empirical work drawn from many different disciplines studying the mind, providing a thorough update to the rationalism-empiricism debate in philosophy and cognitive science and a major new rationalist account of the origins of concepts. [An open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence]. (shrink)

Né à Cordoue en 1126, mort en 1198, Ibn Rusd (Averroès), juge, médecin et philosophe andalou, a laissé une œuvre considérable : outre des traités polémiques (contre Galien, contre al-Gazâli) et de nombreux essais, il a consacré à Platon, et surtout à Aristote, des commentaires appelés à exercer une influence particulièrement grande dans les domaines de la logique, de la métaphysique, de la noétique. Rédigé dans les dernières années de sa vie, le Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique marque le couronnement (...) de l'œuvre philosophique d'Averroès. Ce volume présente la première traduction française annotée du texte arabe de Bêta et du commentaire qu'Averroès y consacre. Souvent considéré comme une introduction générale à toute la métaphysique aristotélicienne, le livre Bêta expose une série d'apories que rencontre le philosophe et qu'il doit tâcher de résoudre. La traduction est précédée d'une introduction qui tente de montrer dans quelle perspective Averroès envisage la " problématique " de la métaphysique. Quels sont les principes, les limites, l'objet ou les enjeux de la métaphysique? Voilà les questions, aussi vastes que capitales, auxquelles Averroès tente ici d'apporter une réponse. (shrink)

In this article, the focus is on developing a governance concept built on integrating the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility standard with an “employee social responsibility” concept developed by the authors. To this end. The authors propose to compliment the voluntary, organizationally adaptable, ISO 26000 SR standard for the organization/firm with a seamlessly integrated—and equally adaptable—ESR concept for the individual/employee of that organization/firm. An SR/ESR governance concept emerges, with an emphasis on implementing a SR-based business enterprise code of conduct and ESR-related (...) functional-level codes of conduct, the latter firmly ensconced in an organization's ethical climate. The conclusion section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of our proposed SR/ESR governance concept. (shrink)

Si la coupe 2243 de Munich est souvent mentionnée dans les études d'iconographie ou dans des ouvrages plus généraux, les soixante-deux inscriptions qu'elle porte ont été quelque peu négligées. Un examen attentif permet toutefois d'avancer une lecture, pour des cas jugés désespérés, et de regarder d'un autre œil les suites de caractères dépourvues de sens. On s'est donc proposé d'analyser ici en détail toutes ces inscriptions, d'abord une à une, en s'attachant à leur valeur linguistique, puis plus globalement, en les (...) replaçant dans le contexte des scènes figurées. On peut dès lors appréhender les diverses fonctions que, signifiantes, semi-signifiantes ou non signifiantes, elles assument dans l'image. (shrink)

: Medical ethics often is treated as applied ethics, that is, the application of moral philosophy to ethical issues in medicine. In an earlier paper, we examined instances of moral philosophy's influence on medical ethics. We found the applied ethics model inadequate and sketched an alternative model. On this model, practitioners seeking to change morality "appropriate" concepts and theory fragments from moral philosophy to valorize and justify their innovations. Goldilocks-like, five commentators tasted our offerings. Some found them too cold, since (...) they had already abandoned applied ethics; others too hot, since they still find the applied ethics model to their taste. We reply that the appropriation model offers an empirically testable account of the historical relationship between moral philosophy and medical ethics that explains why practitioners appropriate concepts and fragments from moral philosophy. In contrast, the now fashionable common morality theory neither explains moral change nor why practitioners turn to moral philosophy. (shrink)