This book/CD package guides readers and listeners on a journey through Franz Schubert's Winterreise song cycle, in which the composer set the poetry of Wilhelm Muller to music. The complete text of the 24 poems is presented in both German and English, with 116 b&w photographs of winter scenes on the facing pages. An introductory essay by Susan Youens offers a critical examination of the song cycle. The music CD features a new recording of Winterreise, performed by baritone Paul (...) Rowe and pianist Martha Fischer. Oversize: 10.25x10.25". Annotation 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

This paper investigates why some companies give to charity and others do not. The study uncovers a strong relationship between the personal attitudes of the charitable decision maker and the firm's giving behavior. This relationship indicates that the human element of personal attitudes may interact and play a very important role in a firm's decision to become involved with philanthropic activities. The study also shows that firms who have a history of giving to charity cite altruistic motives for their behavior. (...) On the other hand, firms that do not give to charity tend to use business reasons to explain their non-involvement. (shrink)

The primary objective was to review pediatric ethics consultations at a large academic health center over a nine year period, assessing demographics, ethical issues, and consultant intervention. The secondary objective was to describe the evolution of PECs at our institution. This was a retrospective review of Consultation Summary Sheets compiled for PECs at our Academic Health Center between January 2008 and April 2017. There were 165 PECs reviewed during the study period. Most consult requests came from the inpatient setting, with (...) the Pediatric and Neonatal Intensive Care Units being the highest utilizers. Consultation utilization increased over the study period. The most common patient age was less than one year. Physicians were most likely to request consultation. Patient Best Interest, Withholding/Withdrawing of Life Sustaining Therapy, and Provider Moral Distress were ethical issues most commonly identified by the consultants. Making recommendations was the most common consultant intervention. The ethics consultation process evolved over time from informal provider discussions, to a hospital infant care review committee, to a pediatric only consultation service, to a combined adult/pediatric consultation service, with variable levels of salary support for consultants. Ethics consultation requests are growing at our institution. Similarities in identified ethical issues exist between our findings and existing literature, however meaningful comparisons remains elusive secondary to variability in approaches to investigation and reporting. A combined paid/volunteer/trainee ethics consultation service model appears sustainable and real time ethics consultation is feasible using this approach. (shrink)

There is a consensus among interpreters that Kant denies non-human animals possess discursive abilities but that he ascribes to them conscious representations in some more primitive sense. I argue this latter interpretive claim is not justified by the textual evidence. There is in Kant’s early published writings and unpublished remarks extensive evidence that he denies animals possess conscious representations. I examine this material in detail. I explain the competing view of Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), at which some of Kant’s early (...) remarks are directed. I then explain Kant’s denial of animal consciousness with reference to his early views on the relation between faculty psychology, the capacity for judgment, and consciousness. Corroborating evidence for Kant’s denial of animal consciousness occurs in remarks in the student lecture notes that span thirty years. I explain why the strongest textual evidence to which interpreters have typically appealed is inadequate for ascribing to Kant a commitment to animal consciousness. This paper helps clarify the interpretive challenges for those who wish to claim the Critical Kant ascribes consciousness to animals. (shrink)

This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral (...) theory and moral intuition, and therefore does not require that individual moral intuitions be directly responsive to rational reflection. The psychological problem is whether human psychology actually implements the processes required for reflective equilibrium. The psychological problem is far more difficult, and requires appealing to a dual-process view of moral judgement that regards moral intuitions and moral theories as belonging to different mental systems. (shrink)

Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue that this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant’s various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how (...) might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated. (shrink)

We provide a justification for political liberalism’s Reciprocity Principle, which states that political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we will (...) argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 1, Page 72-103, Winter 2019.

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in a restricted scenario (Olsson and Schubert 2007, Synthese 157:297–308). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario where it is any (...) finite number of witnesses that give equivalent reports. It is shown that only the so-called Shogenji measure is reliability conducive in this scenario. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence. (shrink)

Some claim Kant’s commitment to the explanatory priority of judgments over concepts is one of his most important contributions to the philosophy of mind. There is, however, extensive disagreement over the nature and extent of this commitment. Existing interpretations ignore a substantial body of textual evidence and offer no account of the origins of Kant’s view. This paper corrects for these deficiencies. I explain, first, the relevant accounts of concept possession Kant encountered in the writings of his predecessors; and, second, (...) how within this context he first expressed a commitment to the view that conceptual content is explanatorily dependent on acts of judgment. I then argue that Kant endorsed a second form of discursive primacy, namely, the view that every use of a concept in conscious thought about an object has the form of a judgment. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus among interpreters that in his Critical writings Kant ascribes unconscious representations to the mind. The nature and extent of this ascription over the course of Kant’s philosophical development is however not well understood. I argue that from his earliest published writings Kant consistently ascribes unconscious representations to the mind; that some of these representations are unconscious in the strong sense that they are not available to introspection; and that Kant extends his commitment to unconscious representations (...) by ascribing to the mind unconscious acts of judging and reasoning. (shrink)

Philosophers after Leibniz used a technical idiom to classify and explain the nature of mental content. Substantive philosophical claims were formulated in terms of this vocabulary, including claims about the nature of mental representations, concepts, unconscious mental content, and consciousness. Despite its importance, the origin and development of this vocabulary is insufficiently well understood. More specifically, interpreters have failed to recognize the existence of two distinct and influential versions of the post-Leibnizian idiom. These competing formulations used the same technical terms (...) and taxonomic relations but assigned different connotations to those terms and employed different criteria for their application. This paper explains the two most influential versions of the post-Leibnizian idiom. (shrink)

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for (...) deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

There is a certain kind of tension in recent accounts of the role of reasons in virtue ethics between two plausible claims that pull in different directions. First, that virtues are the central normative notion in virtue ethics; and second, that virtue is a kind of responsiveness to reasons: that reasons explain both what it is to act from virtue, and what the virtues are. I argue that this is a serious tension and necessitates a different account of the relationship (...) between virtues and reasons; one that explains the distinctive normative contribution of virtue, central to virtue ethics, and that also captures the ways in which virtues structure practical reason itself and provide normative reasons for thinking, feeling, and acting. I develop a view, which I call virtues as reasons structure, that achieves these aims by drawing a theoretical and practical distinction between reasons from virtue and reasons for virtue. On this view, character traits explain what reasons a person has. A generous person, for example, is one who characteristically takes certain facts to be reasons for action; these are reasons from the virtue. Reasons for the virtues have a different role in theoretical and practical reflection in grounding claims with respect to which character traits to develop. I conclude by arguing that this view does not lead to a problematic kind of relativism and suggest further lines of inquiry. (shrink)

We agree with Cesario's premise but reject his conclusion: Although experimental studies of racial stereotyping, weapons perception, and shoot decisions typically exclude real-world contextual factors and thus have limited relevance to race disparities, these excluded factors comprise systemic, institutional, and individual-level biases that are more likely to amplify racial disparities than negate them.

A new variety of empirical skeptical moral arguments have been put forward in recent years, drawing on data from neuroscience, social and behavioral psychology, and economics, which strongly suggest that emotions play a central causal role in moral judgment, and that reasoning has at most a limited supplementary causal role in small portion of moral judgments. It follows from these empirical finding, it is argued, that moral judgments and morality more generally cannot be grounded in reason in the right sort (...) of way to be rational. I argue that there are at least three distinct ways of understanding what it means to claim that moral reasoning is necessary to moral judgment. First, that moral reasoning is directly causally necessary to every moral judgment; second that moral reasoning is causally necessary to the ordinary development of the capacity for moral judgment, but is not directly causally implicated in every particular instance of moral judgment; and third that moral reasoning is necessary to a well-ordered capacity for moral judgment. I argue that the empirical data does support the claim that reasoning is not necessary to moral judgment in at least the first sense, perhaps in the second, but not in third, and that this is sufficient to provide for the rationality of moral judgments and morality more generally. (shrink)

16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always (...) a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl. (shrink)

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...) moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (asmeasured) of a set of testimonies implies a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that the Shogenji measure of coherence is reliability conducive in restricted scenarios (e.g., Olsson and Schubert, Synthese, 157:297–308, 2007). In this article, I investigate whether the Shogenji measure, or any other coherence measure, is reliability conducive in general. An impossibility theorem (...) is proved to the effect that this is not the case. I conclude that coherence is not reliability conducive. (shrink)

It is routinely observed in NLP that sentences seem to “evoke” situations (where I use this term comprehensively to cover events, episodes, eventualities, processes, etc.). Much like discourse entities evoked by explicit noun phrases, these evoked situations can be referred to anaphorically, as for instance in (1) and (3) below, and can be modified in various ways, for instance by supplying their duration and location, as in (2) and (4).

According to a traditional view, one lies if and only if one asserts what one believes is false and with the intent to deceive one’s audience. Recently, many theorists have challenged the requirement of intent to deceive. The principal reason offered appeals to so-called bald-faced lies wherein one asserts what one believes is false without intent to deceive. I argue that, assuming a reasonable model of assertion, two of the most prominent examples of bald-faced lies fail to be genuinely assertoric. (...) As such, they fail as counter-examples to the view that intent to deceive is a necessary condition on lying. (shrink)

This paper examines some French feminist uses of Lacanian psychoanalysis. I focus on two Lacanian influenced accounts of psychological oppression, the first by Luce Irigaray and the second by Julia Kristeva, and I argue that these accounts fail to meet criteria for an adequate political psychology.

Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Karsten Schubert liefert die erste systematische Rekonstruktion der sozialphilosophischen Debatte um Freiheit bei Foucault und eine neue Lösung für das Freiheitsproblem: Freiheit als die Fähigkeit zur reflexiven Kritik der eigenen Subjektivierung – kurz: Freiheit als Kritik – ist das Resultat von freiheitlicher Subjektivierung in politischen Institutionen. Der Band zeigt so die Konsequenzen von Foucaults Freiheitsdenken für die Demokratietheorie und die allgemeine sozialphilosophische Freiheitsdiskussion auf.

What role does moral reasoning play in moral judgment? More specifically, what causal role does moral reasoning have in the production of moral judgments? Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to answer this question by drawing on empirical data. However, these attempts fall short because there has been no sustained attention to the question of what moral reasoning is. This paper addresses this problem, by providing a general account of moral reasoning in terms of a capacity, and suggests how (...) this account of moral reasoning can provide a way forward in current debates. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben is a philosopher well known for his brilliance and erudition, as well as for the difficulty and diversity of his seventeen books. The interest which his _Homo Sacer_ sparked in America is likely to continue to grow for a great many years to come. _Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction_ presents the complexity and continuity of Agamben's philosophy—and does so for two separate and distinct audiences. It attempts to provide readers possessing little or no familiarity with Agamben's writings with (...) points of entry for exploring them. For those already well acquainted with Agamben's thought, it offers a critical analysis of the achievements that have marked it. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) among testimonies implies a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in scenarios of equivalent testimonies (Olsson and Schubert 2007; Schubert, to appear). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario (...) where the testimonies do not have to be equivalent. It is shown that four measures are reliability conducive in the present scenario, all of which are ordinally equivalent to the Shogenji measure. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence. (shrink)

In the 1950s and 1960s, prominent institutional economists in the United States offered what became the orthodox theory on the obstacles to commercializing scientific knowledge. According to this theory, scientific knowledge has inherent qualities that make it a public good. Since the 1970s, however, neoliberalism has emphasized the need to convert public goods to private goods to enhance economic growth, and this theory has had global impacts on policies governing the generation and diffusion of scientific research and innovation. We critique (...) the foundational conceptualizations of scientific knowledge as either public or private by examining Germany’s treatment of scientific outputs as club goods. We then compare the relative impacts on social welfare of distinct United States and German approaches to food and agricultural research and innovation. We conclude with reflections on how these findings might contribute to a democratic debate on how best to manage scientific knowledge to enhance social welfare. (shrink)

Annie Besant has rarely been identified as a philosopher. Her work as an ethicist has been obscured by the reaction of critics to her abandonment of Anglican Christianity for serial eng...

As efforts to commercialize university research outputs continue, critics charge that universities and university scientists are failing to live up to their public-interest purpose. In this paper, I discuss the distinctions between public-interest and private-interest research institutions and how commercialization of university science may be undermining the public interest. I then use Jürgen Habermas’s concept of communicative action as the foundation for efforts to establish public spaces for ethical deliberation among scientists and university administrators. Such ethical deliberation is necessary to (...) facilitate discussion on whether public-interest science should be the research university’s primary purpose and what institutional rules and resources are needed to honor that purpose. (shrink)

Seemingly, in an attempt to appease both the micro-physicists and the classical theists, Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy have each developed accounts of God which allow for Him to act, in an otherwise causally closed natural world, through various micro-processes at the subatomic level. I argue that not only do each of these views skew the accounts of both micro-physics and theism just enough to preclude the appeasement of either group but that both accounts can aptly be classified as, what (...) I term, epistemic deism. I go on to argue that epistemic deism is a weak brand of deism that ultimately provides us with little to no answers to any of serious questions discussed within the philosophy or religion. (shrink)