This chapter explains how case studies can be used successfully in distance education to provide an authentic, interactive way to teach ethical behavior through critical analysis and decision-making while addressing ethical standards and theories. The creation and choice of case studies are key for optimum learning, and can reflect both the instructor’s and students’ knowledge base. The process for using this approach is explained, and examples are provided. As a result of such practice, students support each other as they come (...) to a deeper, co-constructed understanding of ethical behavior, and they make more links between coursework and professional lives. The instructor reviews the students’ work to determine the degree of understanding and internalization of ethical concepts/applications, and to identify areas that need further instruction. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that farmers manage a complex farm system. In this article we seek answers to the following questions. How do farmers perceive and understand their farm system? Are they sufficiently aware of their farm system that they are able to represent it in the form of a map? The research reported describes how causal mapping was applied to sheep/beef farmers in New Zealand and shows that farmers can create maps of their farm systems in ways that allow (...) expression of both individual maps and the formation of group maps which represent the general character of farm systems. A group map was made for all the farmers studied and for subgroups using conventional, integrated, and organic management systems. The results are discussed in terms of the depth of meaning associated with individual elements of the map, map complexity and the limitations of causal mapping. Causal mapping has the potential to contribute to our knowledge of how farmers see their farm systems, and this can benefit farmers and other stakeholders concerned with the management of farms and their economic and environmental performance. (shrink)

In order to implement environmental policies for sustainable and resilient land use we need to better understand how people relate to their agricultural land and how this affects their practices. In this paper I use an inductive, qualitative analysis of data gathered from interviews with kiwifruit orchardists and observations of their orchards to demonstrate how their interpretation of their relationship with their orchards affects their management practices. I suggest that these orchardists experience their orchards as having agency in four different (...) ways—as wild, challenging, needy, and passive—and that these different perspectives result in practices which produce orchards that impact differently on sensory faculties—sight, touch, hearing, taste, and smell. This finding implies that land use policies that seek to change sensory aspects of the land which are in conflict with producers’, farmers’, or growers’ sense of relationship with the land—and how the land “should be”—are unlikely to succeed. That these orchardists produce fruit which is compliant with two comprehensive audit systems—one of which is organic—and also serve an international market, indicates that the constraints of such systems still allow orchardists to exercise autonomy, express their identity, and make sense of their orchard activities in different ways, indicating a potentially resilient and sustainable production system. (shrink)

Migrant farmworkers dominate the horticultural workforce in many parts of the Minority (developed) World. The ‘manual’ work that they do—picking and packing fruits and vegetables, and pruning vines and trees—is widely designated unskilled. In policy, media, academic, activist and everyday discourses, hired farm work is framed as something anybody can do. We interrogate this notion with empirical evidence from the Sunraysia horticultural region of Australia. The region’s grape and almond farms depend heavily on migrant workers. By-and-large, the farmers and farmworkers (...) we spoke to pushed back against the unskilled tag. They asserted that farmworkers acquire knowledge and skills over time and that experienced farmworkers are valuable—their value being brought into sharp relief against accounts of inexperienced farmworkers’ errors. Our interviewees provided rich insights into farmworkers’ engagements with crops and the intricacies of picking and pruning well. Far from being bereft of knowledge and skills, they recognised that experienced farmworkers bring benefits. They improve productivity, product quality and ultimately profits. This is especially so when open communication channels exist across the farm hierarchy, when experienced farmworkers’ insights are taken seriously by their employers. Our research is informed by organisational studies literature and scholarship on craft/making. Like factory floor workers and artisans, experienced farmworkers bring accumulated knowledge and skills to their work, gained through repeat performance. They reflect on and adjust their activities in dialogue with their materials and the environment. Experienced farmworkers demonstrate care, dexterity and judgement. They are not unskilled, and they are more than labouring bodies. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch's famous case of M and D illustrates the moral importance of learning to see others in a more favourable light through renewed attention. Yet if we do not read this case in the wider context of Murdoch's work, we are liable to overlook the attitudes and transformations involved in coming to change one's mind as M does. Stanley Cavell offers one such reading and denies that the case represents a change in M's sense of herself or the possibilities (...) for her world of the kind exemplified by Nora in Ibsen's A Doll's House. In this essay, I challenge Cavell's reading, suggesting that the case, while it may not be an exemplar of the perfectionist outlook as described by Cavell, can and should be interpreted in perfectionist terms. To see this, I reflect on Murdoch's views on the endless perfectibility of language, the importance of humility, and the role of love and attention in moral learning. I conclude that Murdoch's work uniquely sheds light on how we might cultivate a perfectionist outlook in ourselves and others, and describes the distinctive role that some novels can play in moral education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Another Look at Flage's Hume Lesley Friedman In recent articles, Daniel Flage (1985a, 1985b) offers an interpretation of Humean memory-ideas as relative ideas: ideas of memory are analogous to definite descriptionsinsofar as they single outexactly one entity.1 Consequently, Flage argues that Hume has provided an adequate distinction between ideas generated by memory and ideas generated by imagination. It is my contention that Flage's reading is neither consonant with (...) Hume's remarks in the Treatise nor successful in reducing the number ofdifficulties with Hume's theory ofmemory. I shall argue that (1) it is not clear that all memory-ideas are complex (an assumption necessary for Flage's interpretation); (2) Flage construes all memory as episodic, but he overlooks semantic memory; and (3) there isa distinction between mis-remembering and imagining which Flage's account cannot accommodate. It is worth noting that Flage contends that he is giving an interpretation ofHume's account ofmemory; he is not simply attempting to find out the truth ofthe matter. That is, Flage's position is that there is good reason to think that Hume construed memory-ideas as relative ideas. Accordingly, Flage must provide evidence, preferably textual, for the claim that Hume held such a view. My position is thatit is unlikely that Hume held such a view, and even if he did, it is inadequate for grounding an external distinction between memory-ideas and imagination-ideas. In short, claiming that Hume was interested in a decisive distinction between ideas ofmemory and ideas ofimagination is to involve Hume in problems with which he was not concerned. Not only are Flage's remarks in conflict with Hume's, but ifwe readhim as Flage suggests, Hume's theory ofmemory becomes considerably more riddled with problems than it is if we do not so read him. Flage and Hume In section 1 of Treatise 1.1, Hume draws his celebrated distinction between ideas and impressions. In the second section he considers impressions in some detail and he does the same for ideas in section three. Following every impression, Hume claims, there is a corresponding idea, either produced by the faculty of memory or the faculty of imagination. He takes it as no less than obvious that memory-ideas are more "lively and strong" than imagination-ideas: Volume XDi Number 1 177 LESLEY FRIEDMAN Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are emplo/d by the latter.2 That memory-ideas are more lively than their counterparts in imagination Hume construes as asensible difference between the two. Accordingly, I shall refer to this difference as the internal difference. Thereis,however,another difference betweenthesekinds ofideas, namely, that memory-ideas preserve the order and form of their corresponding simple ideas, while imagination-ideas need not: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of the memoryis not to preserve the simpleideas, but their order and position.... The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the Uberty ofthe imagination to transpose andchange its ideas. (T 9-10) I shall refer to the above as the external difference between memory-ideas andimagination-ideas.3 During his discussion ofcausation, Hume elaborates on the above differences. The external difference, he claims, "is not sufficient to... make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the pastimpressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether theirarrangementbe exactlysimilar" (T85). He concludes that the difference between memory and imagination is simply that memory-ideas are more forceful and vivacious than imagination-ideas. In short, since the external difference is non-phenomenal, it is inadequate for distinguishing, in practice, between ideas that are the product ofmemory and ideas that are the product of the imagination. Before concluding his discussion of the above differences Hume voices anote ofscepticismconcerningthe internal difference. He argues that theinternal... (shrink)

Honeybees show lateral asymmetry in both learning about odours associated with reward and recalling memory of these associations. We have extended this research to show that bees exhibit lateral biases in their initial response to odours: viz., turning towards the source of an odour presented on their right side and turning away from it when presented on their left side. The odours we presented were the main component of the alarm pheromone, iso-amyl acetate (IAA), and four floral scents. The significant (...) bias to turn towards IAA odour on the right and away from it on the left is, we argue, a lateralization of the fight-flight response elicited by this pheromone. It contrasts to an absence of any asymmetry in the turning response to an odour of the flowers on which the bees had been feeding prior to testing: to this odour they turned towards when it was presented on either the left or right side. Lemon and orange odours were responded to differently on the left and right sides (towards on the right, away on the left) but no asymmetry was found in responses to rose odour. Our results show that side biases are present even in the initial, orienting response of bees to certain odours. (shrink)

This book explores Iris Murdoch as a philosopher who, through her distinctive methodology, exploits the advantages of having a mind on the borders of literature and politics in her early career writings (pre-The Sovereignty of Good). By focusing on a single decade of Murdoch’s early career, Jamieson tracks connections between her views on the state of literature and politics in postwar Britain and her approach to the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Furthermore, this close study reveals that, far from (...) a stylistic quirk, Murdoch’s use of metaphors, analogies, and other literary devices is internal to her methodology. Finally, rather than asking what Murdoch’s views are, this work will ask “what is Murdoch trying to achieve with her writings and public lectures, and how does she go about this?” By answering the latter question, we will have a new strategy for interpreting her writings more generally. The book contributes to the growing body of scholarship focusing on Iris Murdoch’s philosophical writings, and on women in the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines the nature of happiness, which he defines as a specially good kind of life. He considers the nature of practical reasoning, friendship, and the role and importance of the moral virtues in the best life. This new edition features a revised translation and valuable new introduction and notes.

This paper takes as its starting point the special provision made for grant maintained schools through the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act and suggests that the compromise it represented may be considered as an example of New Labour's Third Way in politics. The latter is discussed in terms of general and educational policies with specific regard to the characteristics of self-governing schools.

This essay discusses how the organisation of mental material within the cognitive system can influence consciousness and awareness, and presents a theory of dissociation based on the premise that awareness is relative, contingent on the activated representation of the ongoing event being linked to the activated self-representation. It allows four possible variations of integration: non-integrated experience—perceptions about an object/event are either not perceived or they remain at the sensory level: traditional dissociative states, amnesia, depersonalisation etc; variably integrated experience—activation of information (...) of a specific valence about an object blocks activation of information of contrasting valence: splitting; alternatively integrated experience—experience is integrated into a specific, limited active self-representation: fugue and multiple identity states; dis-integrated experience–the ongoing experience of innate drives and needs is no longer consistently activated in the core self-representation: repression and isolation. (shrink)

Indirect routes by which gonadal hormones influence sexual differentiation are considered. In rats, differentiation may depend on the way in which the mother responds to the hormonal condition of her pups, and this has implications for the interpretation of the data for humans. Interaction between gonadal hormones and light experience in chicks is compared with the mammalian systems covered in Fitch & Denenberg's review.

Elaine J. Lawless. Handmaidens of the Lord: Pentecostal Women Preachers and Traditional Religion. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988. ISBN 0812212657. Paper, $18.95. ISBN 0812281004. Hardcover, $41.95. Pp. xx+272.

Microfinance began with the noble aim of alleviating poverty through the extension of small loans to poor borrowers, and has grown to now serve approximately 200,000,000 people-the majority of whom are female. Yet despite claims to the contrary, the practice has not been proven to have succeeded in either enriching or empowering its borrowers. In a thorough-going ethical assessment of the industry, Can Microfinance Work? examines the central microfinance model and whether or not it is effective, the extent to which (...) the practice creates the conditions for exploitation and coercion to occur, and whether the distribution of the benefits and burdens of microfinance is likely to be an ethical one. Author Lesley Sherratt argues for the establishment of a duty of care in microfinance in recognition of the vulnerability of the client base. She also examines the ethical dilemmas inherent in working in the informal sector, as well as microcredit's macro impact on economies. From there, Sherratt draws some wider lessons microfinance can offer anti-poverty developments in general.Challengingly, the book considers how microfinance might be reformed to ensure it is practiced both more ethically and effectively, and in doing so, argues that only a part of the industry may survive in its current form. The bulk could instead bifurcate in to one of two camps, either scaling down to become predominantly savings rather than credit vehicles, probably subsidized; or scaling up to provide credit to small and medium enterprise lending operations. For the rest, it is argued that establishing a non-exploitative interest rate, ending the practice of group liability, and fully specifying a duty of care -- with, if necessary, regulation developed to enforce these -- are microfinance's urgent ethical priorities. (shrink)

As an anthropologist, I have long been interested in highly experimental science, with my work engaging the moral underpinnings of xenoscience and, more recently, lab animal research. The possibility of employing animals as human “matches” sparks enthusiastic responses among researchers who imagine various creatures as lucrative “donor species” or “source animals” whose organs might replace the failing parts of humans and render obsolete any future need for brain‐dead donors. When we attend to how xenoscientists imagine the promissory qualities of various (...) species, we encounter a specialized logic of how and why one type of animal is valued over another.Well‐established bioethical principles might assist us in framing our position in reference, say, to the limits of human suffering, or how to weigh the worth assigned to human versus animal lives, or how we conceive “the quality of life.” But sadly, subjective experience can creep in to shape and cloud those very stances we regard as bioethically principled. Rather than pursue such a well‐worn path, I suggest an alternative framework that privileges attentiveness to everyday thought and action over codified bioethics. This framework—described as “everyday” or “ordinary ethics” in anthropology—involves assuming a critical, self‐reflexive stance in reference to quotidian ways of seeing and knowing. Like John Berger, who famously asked, “Why Look at Animals?,” I ask, when we look at the lab‐based baboon, chimp, or pig, what do we see? How do we think of, or presume to know, the animal in question? How do we think about human‐animal relations in science? (shrink)

Among political philosophers - and indeed public officials - it is generally believed that some sort of general principle of distributional equality can provide solid moral foundations for universal access to health care. In fact, this belief is so widely received that even among those who are very critical of egalitarianism, few have expressed doubts about the prospects for an egalitarian defense of universal access to health care. The purpose of this paper is to put pressure on this received view.

Beautifully packaged reissue of the vividly lyrical biography of Nietzsche that John Banville called 'a major intellectual event' In 1888, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche moved to Turin. This would be the year in which he wrote three of his greatest works: Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, and Ecce Homo; it would also be his last year of writing. He suffered a debilitating nervous breakdown in the first days of the following year. In this probing, elegant biography of that pivotal year, (...) Lesley Chamberlain undoes popular clichés and misconceptions about Nietzsche by offering a deeply complex approach to his character and work. Focusing as much on Nietzsche's daily habits, anxieties and insecurities as on the development of his philosophy, Nietzsche in Turin offers a uniquely lively portrait of the great thinker, and of the furiously productive days that preceded his decline. (shrink)

This guest column marks the tenth anniversary of the death of Jacques Derrida. The journal in which it appears, Common Knowledge, was not especially receptive to deconstruction during Derrida's lifetime, but Lesley Chamberlain in retrospect sees reasons to reconsider his role in intellectual history now. The delicacy of Derrida's mission, she argues, has been misunderstood. He is best placed in the company not of the “deconstructionists” who thought to follow in his footsteps but, rather, in the company of the (...) moralistic and theologically minded German philosophers and thinkers who inspired him, from Kant and Hegel to Heidegger and Walter Benjamin. A personal fear of being pinned down, coupled with his tragic Jewish witness to a philosophical quest for certainty gone astray, led the “Sad Rider,” one of many possible Derridas, to want to “erase” as much as he wanted to write — despite which, he was not spared being turned into an industry. (shrink)

It has been 140 years since a full biography of William of Auvergne (1180?-1249), which may come as a surprise, given that William was an important gateway of Greek and Arabic thought and philosophy to western Europe in the thirteenth century, and one of the earliest writers in the medieval Latin west on demonology. Lesley Smith's aims in this book are two-fold: first, to take a closer look at William, the human being, how he saw the world and his (...) place in it; and to uncover William's interactions with his Parisian congregation through the nearly 600 sermons he left after his death. Smith has mined these writings, unremarked in previous scholarship, to give us a different perspective on the schoolmaster, bishop of Paris, and strict theologian we have come to know: a preacher who spoke and ministered not just to the powerful and elite, but also to commoners, to the poor, and to the less fortunate. Through a study of the sermons, Smith creates a broader landscape of William's thought and life, highlighting his attention to the importance--and limits--of language, and his attempts to find a way to address the concerns of the larger populace. In his preaching, we get a sense of the balance William achieved, in the way he communicated religious teachings, in his understanding of the concerns of ordinary Parisians, and in his awareness of the ebb and flow of daily life in a medieval city. The book will interest scholars of intellectual history and philosophy, religion, and literary studies more broadly for Smith's innovative method of excavating the sermons in pursuit of William the person, and his humanity. An altogether "new" William for the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 81-96 [Access article in PDF] Pragmatism:The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley Lesley Friedman 1. Introduction THOUGH WELL KNOWN AS A SCIENTIST, logician, and metaphysician, Charles Sanders Peirce is perhaps best remembered as the founder of Pragmatism. Surprisingly, Peirce attributes this way of thinking—often taken as a uniquely American contribution—to Bishop George Berkeley. According to Pierce, Berkeley should be regarded as (...) the author of that method of modern pragmatism (RFB, 96): 1 Pragmaticism is... a method of thinking.... Of those who have used this way of thinking Berkeley is the clearest example.... (CP, 8.206, c.1905) Berkeley on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism into philosophy than any other one man.... (1903 letter to William James)In a metaphysical Club, I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it 'Pragmatism.' (CP, 6.482, 1908) [End Page 81]While it is acknowledged that Peirce believed Berkeley to be "a very distinguished master of the pragmatist mode of thinking," just why Peirce makes this claim is not altogether clear. In significant ways Berkeley blundered metaphysically, according to Peirce (MS, 322, c.1907). 2 He overlooked the reality of possibility (and thus realism about generals), misunderstood the nature of existence and the ordinary notion of matter, and had an inadequate view of perception. 3 In his early work, Peirce goes so far as to criticize what looks to be Berkeley's attempt at the pragmatic method: "A better rule [than Berkeley's] for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfil the same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished" (CP, 8.33, 1871). Moreover, while Peirce cites the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision as using the "medium of pragmatism," others have criticized Berkeley in this very work for drawing conclusions without any experimentation. 4 Since it is precisely the pivotal role of experience and experiment that distinguish the method of pragmatism, it is puzzling that Berkeley is chosen as worthy of the title that Peirce bestows on him. My hope in this paper is to shed some light on this question. I beginwith an explication of Peirce's pragmatism and then move on to offer an account ofhow Berkeley uses this method, though never formulates it. Next, I discuss the positions Peirce understood to be consequences of the view, including critical common-sensism, fallibilism, and scholastic realism. I suggest that, although he erred on several corollary positions, Berkeley foresaw the aims, purpose, and essential points of the methodological, though not the "metaphysical side" of pragmatism. 5 2. Peircean Pragmatism Pragmatism 6 is not a metaphysical doctrine: it does not aim to ascertain the truth of things; it does not attempt to throw any "positive light on any problem" (CP, 5.464, 1907). Rather, it offers a means of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate [End Page 82] hypotheses, so that verbal disputes—those that so often arise simply because the disputants do not understand meanings in the same way—can be resolved. It is thus "only a method of thinking"(CP, 8.206, c.1905, emphasis added).... pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and furthermore, this is all that the [logical] maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do.... (CP, 5.195, 1903) Seeking to lay "the dust of pseudoproblems," pragmatism allows "us to discern what pertinent facts the phenomena may present. But this is a good half of the task of philosophy" (CP, 8.186, 1903). It is worth pausing to mention that philosophy, as Peirce understands it, does not stand apart from science in the way it does today, but rather is the second of the three sciences of discovery, all of which... (shrink)

Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct (...) view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I Equality of Resources II Justice in Health Care III Why Universal Access Requires In‐kind Transfers IV Conclusion Acknowledgement.

This chapter contains sections titled: Plato Aristotle.

In this article, we aimed to evaluate the utility of critical posthumanism for nurses interested in planetary health—a growing area of study that requires a decentering of the human, and environmental justice considerations. We used Chinn and colleagues' method to describe and critically reflect on critical posthumanism, extending the theory analysis method to include a wide range of academic and video sources. We found that critical posthumanism is like a double‐edged sword: It provides a lens through which to transcend human‐centric (...) approaches to healthcare but is marred by its lack of clarity and inaccessibility. We argue critical posthumanism can be adapted to enhance its potential at the intersection of nursing and planetary health. An analysis of critical posthumanism is followed by a discussion framed by five ways of knowing in nursing, highlighting real‐world examples of how critical posthumanism can aid nurses in dealing with planetary health concerns. By exploring the intersections of critical posthumanism with nursing knowledge, we demonstrate how critical posthumanism can enable nurses to comprehend and tackle environmental issues intricately linked to human health. (shrink)

Manuscripts and early printed copies of Nicholas of Lyra's influential biblical commentary, the Postilla litteralis et moralis in totam bibliam, were made to include a series of around forty illustrations, mostly in the biblical books of Exodus and Ezekiel, to accompany the sections on the Tabernacle of Moses, Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem, and Ezekiel's re-visioning of the Temple. Although they are not present in all copies of the work, it is known that they were planned by Nicholas himself, since he (...) refers to them in the text. This chapter considers possible sources for Nicholas's drawings and diagrams, including Richard of St Victor, and the Jewish commentators, Rashi and Maimonides. It argues that, far from being mere decoration, the illustrations are meant as an integral part of Nicholas's literal exegesis of the scriptural text. (shrink)

In this book Lesley Jacobs challenges the view, now prevalent in North America and Western Europe, that the primary function of a nation's social policy should be to provide support only for the poorest people instead of social services accessible to all its citizens. In an interesting and distinctive argument he develops and defends the idea that access to basic rights such as education, health care, adequate housing, and income support can provide a solid moral foundation for redistributive state (...) welfare programmes, maintaining that any nation which purports to take rights to basic liberties seriously must also be fully committed to the principles of the welfare state. Dr Jacob's thesis addresses a pressing political and philosophical problem at the heart of the policies and structure of the modern state. His justification of the redistribution of resources will be of particular interest to political philosophers, lawyers, and social policy analysts. (shrink)

The k-provability for an axiomatic system A is to determine, given an integer k 1 and a formula in the language of A, whether or not there is a proof of in A containing at most k lines. In this paper we develop a unification-theoretic method for investigating the k-provability problem for Parikh systems, which are first-order axiomatic systems that contain a finite number of axiom schemata and a finite number of rules of inference. We show that the k-provability problem (...) for a Parikh system reduces to a unification problem that is essentially the unification problem for second-order terms. By solving various subproblems of this unification problem , we solve the k- probability problem for a variety of Parikh systems, including several formulations of Peano arithmetic. Our method for investigating the k-provability problem employs algorithms that compute and characterize unifiers. We give some examples of how these algorithms can be used to solve complexity problems other than the k-provability problem. (shrink)

Lesley Wright; Physical Education and Moral Development, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 93–102, https://doi.org/10.1.

Lesley Wright; The Concept of Development and its Legitimacy in the Philosophy of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006.

Who were the true forerunners of the seventeenth-century theorists of innate ideas? Credit should go, not to Plato, despite the common label Platonist, but to the Stoics—or so this challenging new study claims. Plato’s celebrated doctrine of knowledge as recollection differed from these others’ theories not merely in its extravagant postulate of a prenatal knowing state but in many hitherto unrecognized ways, Scott argues. Among those who shared the belief that all men are endowed at birth with considerable epistemological resources, (...) Plato alone is a pessimist both about how few of us make any use of these—only those who make philosophical progress—and about the difficulty of unearthing these resources. Contrary to a prevalent view, Scott holds that Plato invokes recollection to explain not “ordinary learning,” the acquisition or application of everyday concepts such as equality or beauty, but “higher learning”—the province of the philosopher. (shrink)