Standard theories of liability say that X is liable to Y only if Y was harmed, only if X caused Y harm, and (usually) only if X was at fault. This article offers a series of criticisms of each of these claims, and use them to construct an alternative theory of liability in which the nature of X's having imposed a risk of harm on Y is central to the question of when X is liable to Y, and (...) for how much. The article ends with some conjectures on ignorance as an excusing condition. (shrink)

This article discusses the problematic aspects relating to the employee dismissal based on application of the disciplinary liability. It contains analysis of two grounds for termination of the employment contract without any previous notice: 1) imposing several disciplinary sanctions upon the employee in the course of twelve months, and 2) the employee has only one breach of labour discipline but a gross one. The article is based on legal acts and judgements of Judicial Assemblies of the Civil Division of (...) the Supreme Court of Lithuania and resolutions of the Senate of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in order to provide the legislative execution practice as well as reveal the problems in this field of labour law. (shrink)

The author investigates the necessity of fault as the prerequisite of contractual civil liability. The author makes the conclusion that Lithuanian law, following most of the countries belonging to the civil law tradition and contrary to the common law systems, as well as Vienna convention, UNIDROIT principles, PECL and DCFR, begins with the theory that fault is a requirement for contractual liability. Strict liability in Lithuanian law is the exception of this general rule. Nevertheless, the author argues (...) that the general rule is subject to important exceptions, and the practical importance of these exceptions is as great as the cases falling within the general rule. In case of no agreement of the parties or any provision of law regarding fault as the necessary prerequisite for contractual liability, in Lithuania, similar to France, the distinction between the obligations to produce a given result and the obligations to use reasonable care is essential: according to Article 6.200(4) of the Lithuanian Civil Code (hereinafter – the CC), a party in breach of an obligation to use best efforts is liable for fault. (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of criminal liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities, analyses the emergence and development of this norm in criminal law and the ways of its optimal explanation. Special attention is paid to the problem of identification of illegality of activities, based on specific tax and economic regulation. The study concludes that criminal liability must be limited to a violation of fundamental requirements for the legality of business, and does not include particular abuses (...) occurring in legal business. The author also deals with the criteria of delimitation of criminal and administrative liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities. Under Article 202(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, application of criminal liability is limited by two alternative conditions: either a person illegally undertakes activity in entrepreneurial way or on a large scale. According to the paper, the above-mentioned regulation lacks clarity and leads to the risk of unfounded prosecutions. The author gives practical examples, where on the basis of inexplicable criterion of an entrepreneurial way, criminal charges are filed in respect of petty economic activities. Such practice is incompatible with the purposes and principles of criminal law. The paper proposes to delete the criterion of an entrepreneurial way from the definition, leaving the possibility of criminal liability only in case of large scale illegal economic activity. The article also substantiates the conclusion that prohibited business activities provided for in Article 202(2) of the Criminal Code actually defies logical explanation and should be removed from the regulation. At the end of the article, the author offers a sample of optimal legal wording of unlawful engagement in economic activities in criminal law. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, (...) however, is that many unjust combatants contribute very little to the war in which they participate—often no more than the typical civilian. Thus either the typical civilian is morally liable to be killed, or many unjust combatants are not morally liable to be killed. That is, the liability based account seems to force us to choose between a version of pacifism, and total war. Seth Lazar has called this “The Responsibility Dilemma”. But I will argue that we can salvage a liability-based account of war—one which rejects MEC—by grounding the moral liability of unjust combatants not only in their individual contributions but also in their complicit participation in that war. On this view, all enlistees, regardless of the degree to which they contribute to an unjust war, are complicitously liable to be killed if it is necessary to avert an unjust threat posed by their side. This collectivized liability based account I develop avoids the Responsibility Dilemma unlike individualized liability-based accounts of the sort developed by McMahan. (shrink)

Legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania establish several types of material liability of workers engaged in labour (professional) relations: material liability applied pursuant to the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LC) and material liability applied pursuant to the Law on Public Service of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LPC). In the present article, theoretical and practical aspects of material liability of Lithuanian public servants for (...) material damage caused are analysed. The authors of the article study the conditions for the application of the material liability and identify the main circumstances that must be determined in applying this type of legal compulsion. Furthermore, the authors investigate the relation between the material and disciplinary liabilities, study the limits of the application of labour law norms (that regulate material liability of employees) and civil law norms (regulating personal civil liability) in professional legal relations, identify the means and procedure for solving disputes arising in the application of the material liability. Practical mistakes in the application of the material liability of public servants and violations are analysed on the basis of a rather sparse case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania related to the material liability. (shrink)

There is a well-established social practice whereby we hold one another responsible for the things that we say. Speakers are held liable for the truth of the contents they express and they can be sanctioned and/or held to be unreliable or devious if it turns out what they say is false. In this paper chapter we argue that a better understanding of this fundamental socio-linguistic practice – of ascribing what we will term (following Borg (2019)) ‘linguistic liability’ – helps (...) to shed light on a core debate in semantics and pragmatics, concerning how and where to draw the line between different kinds of content. We suggest that attributions of linguistic liability form a heterogenous (rather than a homogenous) class and seek to show that different kinds of liability judgements are useful because they track divergent kinds of content – specifically the kinds that have come to prominence in recent theorising theorizing about the semantics/pragmatics divide. (shrink)

Beginning with the seminal work by Williams and Nagel, moral philosophers have used auto accident hypotheticals to illustrate the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck is present in the hypotheticals because two equally careless drivers are assessed differently because only one of them caused an accident. This Article considers whether these philosophical discussions might contribute to the public policy debate over compensation for auto accidents. Using liability and insurance practices in the United States as an illustrative example, the Article (...) explains that auto liability insurance substantially mitigates moral luck and argues that, as a result, the moral luck literature is unlikely to make a significant contribution to this public policy debate. The debate would benefit more from philosophical analysis of victims’ luck, which is not as substantially mitigated by liability insurance. (shrink)

According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no "moral equality of combatants." That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war - but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the (...) rights of innocent people ("collateral damage"), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance. (shrink)

Collective Liability in Islam: The ʿĀqila and Blood-Money Payments. By Nurit Tsafrir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xviii + 167. $99.99.

Should there be civil liability when a person who could easily and without risk rescue another fails to do so? It is argued that the failure to act does not cause the harm that follows, and that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction provides no basis for liability. In spite of this, it is maintained that there can sometimes be a duty to rescue, and even a right to be rescued, even in the absence of a voluntary undertaking or an explicit (...) assumption of responsibility.There are convincing arguments for some sort of legal recognition of a duty to rescue, but these arguments do not support tort liability. Nor is a case for tort liability made with the argument that a growth of tort law in this direction would be compatible with the values most centrally involved in the division between torts and contracts. Furthermore, there is a case against tort liability — namely, that the purpose of tort liability is to compensate, that there are certain sorts of situations in which compensation is apposite, and that failure to rescue does not fit into these categories. Criminal liability is the appropriate way for the law to recognize a duty to rescue. (shrink)

Many climate ethicists maintain that climate policy costs should be borne by those who historically emitted the most greenhouse gases. Some theorists have recently argued, however, that actors only became liable for emitting once the emissions breached legitimate legal regulation governing emissions. This paper challenges this view. Focusing on the climate responsibility of states, it argues that even if we assume that legitimate legal regulation is needed to remove excusable ignorance of entitlements to emit or is constitutive of such entitlements, (...) it does not follow that states should be exonerated from responsibility for all pre-legal emitting. This is because the pre-legal emissions may have violated moral duties not to behave recklessly and to promote the emergence of the relevant regulation. The paper closes by noting how grounding liability for emitting in such duties complicates the link between past emissions and liability. (shrink)

In most cases, liability in tort law is all-or-nothing—a defendant is either fully liable or not at all liable for a claimant's loss. By contrast, this paper defends a causal theory of partial liability. I argue that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's loss only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the loss. I ground this principle in a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice (...) and use it to critically evaluate different mechanisms for “limiting” liability for consequences of wrongdoing and for “apportioning” liability between multiple wrongdoers. (shrink)

This paper offers an economic analysis of one aspect of the possible liability for incorrect information traded on information markets: expert liability for incorrect asset valuation. The article does not address the questions of whether and under what circumstances an expert should bear contractual liability for an incorrect valuation. Rather, it assumes such contractual liability towards the person who has solicited the opinion and focuses instead on analyzing the circumstances under which the expert’s liability should (...) be extended to third parties as well. (shrink)

Workplace exposure to SARS-CoV-2 has sickened workers and, subsequently, their family members. Family members might be able to recover from the employer in a negligence action using “take-home” liability theory.

The responsible corporate officer doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not (...) to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine. (shrink)

Due to its specificity, the legal institute of preliminary agreement poses a number of questions. This pre-contractual agreement is not yet a contract. Therefore, the form and scope of legal protection will not be the same as that guaranteed to contracting parties. However, the European legal systems would claim that the relationships between the parties during pre-contractual negotiations have to be regulated and protected by the law. The first part of this article deals with the legal nature of pre-contractual (...) class='Hi'>liability: tort, contractual or sui generis. The question of determining the type of applicable civil liability for breach of a preliminary agreement still remains a matter under debate in the Lithuanian legal doctrine as well as in legal practice. Taking into account the specific interest that may be infringed and the fact that the aggrieved party cannot recover the expectations it had in profit of the sought contract, including the remedy of the right of performance, there is nosufficient reason to apply contractual legal regime for breach of the preliminary agreement either. Hence, the special nature of the pre-contractual phase merits special treatment. In the Lithuanian legal system, liability for breach of a preliminary agreement should therefore be qualified as a separate sui generis kind of liability. In fact, the biggest problem is the scope of damages recoverable under the preliminary agreement. As far as the tendencies of a legal doctrine and jurisprudence of Lithuania and other countries are concerned, the aggrieved party should be compensated not only the direct expenses incurred during the negotiations, but also the value of lost opportunity, which must be based on real, proven, unavoidable income or expenses. It is not possible to claim the profit which would have resulted had the main contract been concluded (the so-called expectation damages). Recent tendencies show that the Lithuanian courts are prone to make no distinction between the concept of the lost opportunity to conclude a transaction with a third party (as reliance damages) and lost profits as expectation damages. The reason for such an interpretation is the fact that the value of lost opportunity can be determined by applying the principle of price difference provided in Article 6.258(5) of the Lithuanian Civil Code, which is used for contractual liability. This principle should be applied in accordance with the Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and in the context of the nature of the preliminary agreement. Therefore, the aggrieved party may claim compensation for damages in the amount of difference between the price of the contract that has not been concluded with a third party and the price of the replacement contract. Such an interpretation reflects the compensatory function of the recovery of the value of the lost opportunity. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the possible legal implications of the production, marketing and use of expert systems. The relevance of a legally useful definition of expert systems, comprising systems designed for use both by laymen and professionals, is related to the distinctions inherent in the legal doctrine underlying provision of goods and provision of services. The liability of the sellers and users of, and contributors to, expert systems are examined in terms of professional malpractice as well as product (...) liability. A recurring theme indicates that legislators may be inclined to restrict possibilities of liability suits in order to avoid disincentives to the creation of expert systems. (shrink)

The courts have experienced difficulty in justifying the imposition of liability to third parties for negligent misstatements. The justifications ordinarily invoked relate to notions of assumption of responsibility and detrimental reliance. These can be seen, in turn, to rest upon a normative framework of give and take (or «mutuality») between statement makers and third party recipients. This article challenges the cogency of that normative framework and offers an alternative based upon the remedial nature of tort, which has traditionally focused (...) upon the particular interactions by which wrongdoers have caused harm to others. The most important indicators of liability to third parties relate, in turn, to normatively significant features of the causal sequence between acting and the infliction of harm. These indicators, it is submitted, are (i) actual knowledge of the likelihood of harm if care is not taken and (ii) the tightness of the causal connection. (shrink)

Accomplice liability makes people guilty of crimes they knowingly helped or encouraged others to commit, even if they did not commit the crime themselves. But this method of criminalizing aiders and abettors is fraught with problems. In this chapter, I argue that accomplice liability in the criminal law should be replaced with a system in which agents are criminalized on the basis of their individual contributions to causings of harm—the larger the contribution, the more severe the crime—regardless of (...) whether those contributions were made “through” the actions of another person. Not only would this avoid the issues associated with making the guilt of accomplices parasitic on the guilt of the principal, it would also fill gaps in the law concerning other cases to which accomplice liability does not apply. (shrink)

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

The modern Lithuanian legal doctrine recognises that criminal liability is a last resort (ultima ratio) protecting the society from various law violations. This idea has got deep roots in criminology and is obviously based on the position of rational approach towards the state criminal policy. However, it is not clear whether it is of obligatory legal status to the legislature and the courts. This article attempts to present the idea of a last resort as a concept based on the (...) constitutional principles of the rule of law, justice, proportionality and rationality in the legislation and case law. The author concludes that the main precursors of the ultima ratio principle are the German legal doctrine of protection of legal goods (Rechtsgüterschutz) and Harm principle respected in the common law tradition, as well as the need for protection of human rights in the democratic world. These concepts raise the duty of the legislator to justify the act of criminalisation by legitimate purpose and to comply with certain constitutional limits of application of criminal law. The idea of criminal liability as a last resort is recognised both in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (obiter dictum) and in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania reasoning particular decisions in criminal cases, especially delimiting criminal and other types of legal liability. The author concludes that the fact of discrepancy of criminal law to ultima ratio test can be one of the arguments in support of its objection to the Constitution and even the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. At the same time, the author of the article has found that many norms of the Criminal Code are in conflict with the idea of a last resort. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of Athenian laws regulating commercial activities is the absence of any concept akin to the modern legal notion of the partnership or corporation. Despite the presence in Athenian society of numerous koinoniai, groups of individuals cooperating for some purpose, be it commercial or otherwise, Athenian law concerned itself solely with individual persons and did not recognize the separate legal existence of collective entities. And just as Athenian law did not recognize the legal existence of (...) partnerships or corporations, it also did not possess the notion of corporate liability. This meant that if someone entered into an agreement with a group of individuals and one of those individuals violated the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff proceeded only against the individual who acted contrary to the agreement, not against the group as a whole. If the plaintiff won his suit, he only had a right to receive compensation from the defendant's private property; he did not have a claim on all the funds held in common by the group. (shrink)

This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such (...) requirement can be circumvented. (shrink)

This article presents the conception of negligent account management, analyses the rules of the criminal act that govern criminal liability for negligent account management, by focussing on the form of guilt and the problem of its content. The plenary session’s conclusion that the two offences – failure to administer bookkeeping and failure to protect the bookkeeping documents – can be committed both intentionally and negligently is disputed in this article. The adoption of the new Criminal Code in 2000, setting (...) the form of guilt and its content in criminal cases for negligent account management, posed no significant problems – the court practice and legal literature followed the attitude that this crime could be committed only negligently. According to Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code 2000, a person is punished for negligent commission of a crime or a misdemeanour only in individual cases stipulated in the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The problem was that no “individual case” was foreseen in Article 223 of the Criminal Code that imposed liability for negligent bookkeeping. This created preconditions for deviating from pre-existing case-law under which this crime could be qualified as negligent. Only in 2009 the Criminal Division of the Lithuanian Supreme Court concluded in its plenary session that Article 223 of the Criminal Code provided liability for criminal record-keeping and accounting only if committed negligently as a form of guilt, and other activities pursuant to this Article might be committed intentionally and recklessly. The plenary session identified a loophole of criminal law and created preconditions for the formation of uniform court practice. Only the legislator can remove the loophole of criminal law identified by the Supreme Court of Lithuania. The author states that all of the acts named in Article 223 of the Criminal Code can be committed negligently and suggests applying the rule contained in Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code to Article 223 of the Criminal Code. All of these findings are based on historical, grammatical and logical interpretation of the “neglect” concept and the analysis of Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code. (shrink)

The responsibility account of permissible killing in war states that only those responsible for unjustified threats may be intentionally killed in war. In recent papers, Jeff McMahan and Bradley Strawser have defended the responsibility account against an objection that it leads either toward pacifism, according to which force is nearly always unjustified, or towards total war in which combatants need not even respect noncombatant immunity, depending on how much responsibility is required for liability to be killed. This chapter rebuts (...) their counterarguments with the challenge that defensive forces are unable to discern to what extent individuals are responsible for the threats they pose, and hence whether they are liable to defensive force. (shrink)

The American tort system regularly conducts a sort of lottery in which plaintiffs try to name as many defendants in a tort action as they can in order to collect a large judgment from at least one of them. This procedure is encouraged under strict joint and several liability, which permits plaintiffs to recover greater damages from defendants - usually businesses - with less moral culpability for the tort than poorer defendants, who bear greater culpability. In a case involving (...) the Disney Corporation and a negligent amusement park rider, for instance, Disney was forced to pay 86% of the court award to the plaintiff, even though the jury found the company to be only 1% liable for the injury. The legal principle of joint and several liability violates morality in several different ways. Even though the principle appears to be better in the short run for plaintiffs, I will show that it fails not only to satisfy utilitarianism, but compensatory justice as well. Hence, the legal principle of joint and several liability should be eliminated in favor of a better, fairer law, which I will briefly sketch at the end. (shrink)

McMahan argues that justification defeats liability to defensive attack (which would undermine the thesis of the "moral equality of combatants"). In response, I argue, first, that McMahan’s attempt to burden the contrary claim with counter-intuitive implications fails; second, that McMahan’s own position implies that the innocent civilians do not have a right of self-defense against justified attackers, which neither coheres with his description of the case (the justified bombers infringe the rights of the civilians) nor with his views about (...) rights forfeiture, is unsupported by independent argument, and, in any case, extremely implausible and counter-intuitive; and third, that his interpretation of the insulin case confuses the normative relations between an agent’s justification and non-liability on the one hand and permissible or impermissible interference with the agent’s act on the other. Similar confusions, fourth, affect his discussion of liability to compensation. (shrink)

Criminal liability of legal entities was legitimized in the Republic of Lithuania eight years ago, and in the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 8 June 2009, a conclusive confirmation on its accordance with the Constitution was made. It should be noted that the extension of the concept of criminal offense subject has received considerable attention of Lithuanian scientists. It was obvious that this penal law novel would cause many problems and, surely, it has become a reason of many (...) doubts in the judicial practice. However, despite the fact that a fairly broad scientific analysis of the topic under consideration has been made, none of the Lithuanian authors has ever addressed the issue regarding the sources of the criminal liability of legal entities. (shrink)

This collection of contemporary essays by a group of well-known philosophers and legal theorists covers various topics in the philosophy of law, focusing on issues concerning liability in contract, tort and criminal law. The book is divided into four sections. The first provides a conceptual overview of the issues at stake in a philosophical discussion of liability and responsibility. The second, third and fourth sections present, in turn, more detailed explorations of the roles of notions of liability (...) and responsibility in contracts, torts and punishment. The collection not only presents some of the most challenging work in legal philosophy, but it also demonstrates the interdisciplinary character of the field of philosophy of law, with contributors taking into account recent developments in economics, political science and rational choice theory. This thought-provoking volume will help to shed light on the underexplored ground that lies between law and morals. (shrink)

Several states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, have recently engaged in the high-profile supporting of foreign rebel fighters, providing them with training, weapons, and financial resources. Justifications for providing this assistance usually invoke, at least in part, our obligations to prevent harm to the citizens of oppressive and violent regimes. Providing such assistance is often presented as a morally safe ‘middle ground’ between doing nothing and putting one’s own troops at risk. Yet this assistance typically enables (...) rebels to cause unjust harms, since armed uprisings almost invariably cause harm to innocent people. I argue that enabling these unjust harms can render the provision of assistance unjustified. When a state could prevent at least as much harm by using its resources in other ways, such as preventing disease, without thereby causing comparable unjust harm and without incurring a (significantly greater) supererogatory cost, the state acts unjustifiably if it nonetheless funds the rebellion. When assistors unjustifiably enable unjust harms, they are morally liable to bear costs for the sake of people who suffer those harms. This is true even if the rebels act justifiably in directly inflicting those harms. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Jeff McMahan's "Just Cause for War". It defends a more permissive, and more traditional view of just war liability against McMahan's claims.

It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar (...) arguments support the use of criminal liability for regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance. But this analysis fails to appreciate the crime-control costs of strict liability. By explicitly providing for punishment in the absence of moral blameworthiness, the law undermines its moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes subversion and resistance instead of the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime control. More importantly, the system’s lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. Given the serious limitations inherent in the real-world application of general deterrence and preventive detention programs, the most effective crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law’s reputation for being just, which means avoiding the use of strict liability. (shrink)

The paper considers the proper method for theorizing about criminal jurisdiction. It challenges a received understanding of how to substantiate the right to punish, and articulates an alternative account of how that theoretical task is properly conducted. The received view says that a special relationship is the ground of a tribunal’s authority to prosecute and, hence, that a normative theory of that authority is faced with identifying a distinctive relation. The alternative account locates prosecutorial standing on an institution’s capacity to (...) address the basic reasons generating criminal liability. This reframes the normative issues at stake, and has the result that various, perhaps quite heterogeneous, considerations can substantiate penal authority. It also eliminates the existence of a special relation as a necessary condition for legitimate criminal accountability. The argument proceeds by offering an analysis and account of universal jurisdiction. Not only does the alternative elegantly perform where the received view struggles, it can accommodate much of what motivates the pursuit of relational ties in existing efforts to vindicate jurisdictional conclusions. (shrink)

This article analyses the legal basics of the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law and the conditions for liability. It is emphasized that the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law has three different grounds—one direct legal background (Article 4 of the Treaty of the European Union) and two indirect basics—principles of direct effect and that of effectiveness of European Union law. The author subsequently examines the (...) content of each condition for liability established in the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union —the intention of the rule of European Union law infringed to confer rights on private parties, the sufficiently seriousness of the breach and the direct causal link between the breach and the damage. It is stated that in order to prove that a Member State is liable for the breach of European Union law, one more condition for liability should be established—a private party must prove that he has incurred particular damage. It is also highlighted that the second condition for the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law —sufficiently seriousness of the breach—restricts the right of a private party to obtain compensation. (shrink)

The article deals with the question whether a state might be held liable for the infringement of the European Convention on Human Rights if its national court of last instance fails to implement the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union under the conditions laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed in the case-law of the Court. Relying on well-established (...) practice that an arbitrary decision not to refer a question for a preliminary ruling theoretically could infringe the right to a fair trial, the author analyses the practical application of the “arbitrariness rule” and discusses whether the European Court of Human Rights has established any specific criteria that national courts are required to bring into play in order to substantiate the decision not to refer. (shrink)

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

Who is responsible when an AI machine causes something to go wrong? Or is there a gap in the ascription of responsibility? Answers range from claiming there is a unique responsibility gap, several different responsibility gaps, or no gap at all. In a nutshell, the problem is as follows: on the one hand, it seems fitting to hold someone responsible for a wrong caused by an AI machine; on the other hand, there seems to be no fitting bearer of responsibility (...) for this wrong. In this article, we focus on a particular (aspect of the) AI responsibility gap: it seems fitting that someone should bear the legal consequences in scenarios involving AI machines with design defects; however, there seems to be no such fitting bearer. We approach this problem from the legal perspective, and suggest vicarious liability of AI manufacturers as a solution to this problem. Our proposal comes in two variants: the first one has a narrower range of application, but can be easily integrated in current legal frameworks; the second one requires a revision of current legal frameworks, but has a wider range of application. The latter variant employs a broadened account of vicarious liability. We emphasise strengths of the two variants and finally highlight how vicarious liability offers important insights for addressing a moral AI responsibility gap. (shrink)

When states perpetrate injustices, do their individual citizens develop liabilities to repair such wrongdoings? Most existing accounts of citizens’ liabilities for state-perpetrated injustices, whilst applicable across certain democratic contexts, struggle to provide robust accounts of the grounds and nature of liabilities for citizens in non-democratic contexts. This problematically leaves a lacuna when it comes to the responsibilities and appropriate responses of citizens in these states. This article advances a distinctive two-pronged authorisation-based account applicable to non-democracies. Objective authorisers are individuals who (...) derive presumptive benefits, are comparably better-off under, and can reliably influence the decision-making processes over the injustice perpetrated by the state. Subjective authorisers are citizens who autonomously endorse their state as credible interpreters and upholders of their aims in relation to the injustices in question. Both objective and subjective authorisers of the state in relation to particular injustices perpetrated, are liable to compensate, actively oppose, and commemorate the victims of state-perpetrated injustices. This account will be shown to be empirically applicable to a large number of minimally decent non-democratic states, where the political elite enjoy moderate popular support over their incorporation and reflection of citizen interests and preferences in their governance, despite the absence of formal democratic electoral mechanisms. This authorisation-based view differs from existing accounts oriented around complicity and participatory intentions, in better accounting for non-participants who are nevertheless intuitively liable for the actions of their authorised state, as well as circumventing structural shortcomings affecting complicity-centric accounts. (shrink)

Developments in contract law over the past century have led to the proliferation of interpretive theories according to which contract law is no longer a sui generisi legal branch. It is widely accepted that if there is a sui generis contractual obligation, it must somehow be based on the wills of the parties. But a new orthodoxy in contract theory claims that the role of the will of the parties in contract law has been progressively shrinking due to judicial doctrines (...) within the law of contract and also to general statutory provisions. It is no longer apparent that there is any interesting sense in which contractual liability is based on the will of the parties. Hence, so it is claimed, contract law has lost its sui generis nature. The article challenges this new orthodoxy. But rather than reverting to the old orthodoxy—the will theory of contracts (or its contemporary rendition, contract as promise)—it argues that we should resist being forced to choose between them. The article argues that the purpose of contractual liability is to support the practice of voluntary obligations. This view preserves an important connection between contractual liability and voluntary undertakings and meets the objections that beset the will theory. (shrink)

Political contestability is an important issue in the ethical analysis of corporate political activity (hereafter CPA). Though previous studies have proposed analytical frameworks for creating contestable political systems, these studies conceive firm-level factors such as size and wealth as the main (and perhaps, only) determinants of contestability. This relegates the influences of informal managerial-level attributes such as tribalism, especially in ethnically diverse contexts where politics and tribe are inseparable. In this article, I explore the linkages between managers’ tribal identity and (...) political contestability among firms in Ghana. I found that contestability is affected by _tribal consonance_ (similarity) and _tribal dissonance_ (difference) between corporate executives and policymakers. I also found that dissonance creates _liability of tribe_, which causes contestability problems in all four stages of the CPA process—i.e., _political planning_, _political access, political voice_, and _political influence_. Overall, this article extends the micro–macro link of political connections from performance to the ethics of political competition and contestability. It offers important contributions to the literature, advances insightful implications for practice, and outlines useful future research directions. (shrink)

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (UN-SDGs) offer a comprehensive framework for global sustainable development, embraced by both UN member states and multinational enterprises (MNEs). The SDGs take a holistic approach and emphasize the need to align public- and private-sector actions. However, understanding the effectiveness of the SDG framework in coordinating stakeholder actions remains a challenge. This study explores how MNEs engage with the SDGs as a function of their home countries’ SDG profiles. Leveraging institutional theory, we test competing mechanisms (...) by analyzing sustainability reports from 150 MNEs across 23 countries. Our results suggest that MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs aligns most closely with a “liability of origin” explanation, with firms showing greater SDG engagement when their home countries have lower progress on the SDGs. However, at the individual SDG level, the engagement patterns are more nuanced. Our findings have important implications for both theory and practice, providing insights into the complex dynamics that shape MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs and offering guidance for policymakers and businesses seeking to enhance their contributions to sustainable development. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of compensation for the value of lost opportunity at the pre-contractual stage. It has been determined that such measure of recovery depends on the nature of pre-contractual liability. However, although the Supreme Court of Lithuania recognizes the possibility for the aggrieved party of pre-contractual negotiations to recover the value of lost opportunity, the motivation of the Supreme Court’s decisions is too incoherent. Moreover, Lithuanian courts have not yet adopted any methods of awarding and calculation (...) of the damages. The conclusion of the analysis is that in cases of breach of the general obligation of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations, the Supreme Court of Lithuania allows the recovery of lost opportunity, i.e. awards delictual damages. The same motivation applies even in certain cases where there is a possibility of broadening the scope of pre-contractual liability by applying contractual damages. (shrink)

Adil Ahmad Haque argues that civilians who contribute to unjust lethal threats in war, but who do not directly participate in the war, are not liable to defensive killing. His argument rests on two central claims: first, that the extent of a person’s liability to defensive harm in virtue of contributing to an unjust threat is limited to the cost that she is initially required to bear in order to avoid contributing, and, second, that civilians need not bear lethal (...) costs in order to avoid indirectly contributing to unjust lethal threats. I argue that Haque’s defence of each claim fails. (shrink)

Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong argue that both an instrumental account of liability to defensive harm, according to which an aggressor can only be liable to defensive harms that are necessary to avert the threat he poses, and a purely noninstrumental account which completely jettisons the necessity condition, lead to very counterintuitive implications. To remedy this situation, they offer a “pluralist” account and base it on a distinction between “agency rights” and a “humanitarian right.” I argue, first, that (...) this distinction is spurious; second, that the conclusions they draw from this distinction do not cohere with its premises; third, that even if one granted the distinction, Firth’s and Quong’s implicit premise that you can forfeit your agency rights but not your “humanitarian right” is unwarranted; fourth, that their attempt to mitigate the counterintuitive implications of their own account in the Rape case relies on mistaken ad-hoc assumptions; fifth, that even if they were successful in somewhat mitigating said counterintuitive implications, they would still not be able to entirely avoid them; and sixth, that even in the unlikely case that none of these previous five critical points are correct, Firth and Quong still fail to establish that aggressors can be liable to unnecessary defensive harm since they fail to establish that unnecessary harm can ever be defensive in the first place. (shrink)