The increasing adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the workplace raises concerns about its impact on professionals’ sense of identity and their willingness to use this technology. This study investigates the relationship between AI-induced professional identity threat (PIT) and AI use intention in the workplace. We explore how factors like AI identity, records and information management culture, explainable AI (XAI) as a collaborator, professional experience, and temporal distance, can influence these relationships. Data was collected through an online survey distributed via (...) Google Forms and administered to a sample of 413 records and information management (RIM) professionals within Eastern and Southern Africa. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was conducted using IBM-SPSS-AMOS to analyse the hypothesized relationships. The findings reveal that while RIM culture does not significantly affect PIT or AI use intention, XAI and a strong AI identity are crucial in reducing PIT and enhancing AI adoption. Temporal distance was found to exacerbate PIT, especially among expert practitioners and reduce AI use intention among novice practitioners. These insights contribute to a deeper understanding of how to mitigate the negative impacts of AI on professional identity and promote its successful adoption within organizations. (shrink)

Gosh, we lead busy lives. Most of the people I know no longer have the time, even occasionally, to stop and think. And yet, this is not because we accomplish or do so much. In fact, in comparison with other historical and some contemporary societies, we do not. Think, for instance, about the masses of itinerant agricultural laborers who participated in the Gang System in early industrial England after 1834…. This form of labor organization was an answer to the demand (...) for irregular work-force which arose with the development of large-scale commercial agriculture. Bands of workers of all ages and both sexes, under the direction of an overseer moved from farm to farm as their services were required. They worked long hours for a little pay, and most of them depended entirely on what they earned doing so. Life before the industrial revolution was not better, and even affluence and higher status rarely translated into leisure. At the end of the 18th century it was still common for gentlewomen, mistresses of large dairy farms, to take an active part in production, not only as a manager, but as the most skilled, and therefore most involved manual worker. Conditions across the Atlantic differed, but not dramatically. American factories were no playgrounds either, not then and not much later, as anyone who watched Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times and/or read Dreiser’s American Tragedy, would well recognize. The hours, by our standards, were exceedingly long, the discipline oppressively harsh, the work copious and painstaking enough to keep one thoroughly exhausted by the end of the day and thus out of mischief on Sundays. Only…it did not. Somehow, these overworked people did not feel busy. (shrink)

Accounts that attribute nationalism to capitalism or industrialization face the problem of nationalism in late?stage capitalist, or as some might say, post?industrial, societies. While increasing social significance has been attributed to economic growth throughout human history, reasons for this are far from self?evident. By looking at arguments made by Marx, List, and Smith, a new understanding of the relationship between nationalism and economics emerges?one that explains the attribution of social importance to economic development by revealing it as a function of (...) nationalism. (shrink)

Some of the most celebrated theories of nationalism exemplify the self‐confirming, evidence‐averse, deterministic, and ideological aspects of social science as we know it. What has gone wrong? The social sciences have modeled themselves on physics, failing to grasp the essential difference between the contingent, historical development of cultural particularity and the universal, law‐like regularities of inanimate matter. The physicist's tools for conducting the method Popper called “conjecture and refutation” are largely inappropriate when dealing with imaginative and therefore unpredictable human beings. (...) Obsessive quantification and the assumption of universal “social” laws, in particular, need to be de‐emphasized in favor of a Weberian willingness to make conjectures about the causes of unique events, and to test those hypotheses by comparing them to apparently similar cases. (shrink)

Abstract Nationalism is an essentially secular form of consciousness, one that, indeed, sacralizes the secular. This renders the temptation to treat it as a religion problematic. The framework of individual and collective identities in modern societies, nationalism both obscures the importance of the transcendental concerns that lie at the core of great religions and undermines their authority. Though instrumental in the development of nationalism, religion now exists on its sufferance and serves mainly as a tool for the promotion of nationalist (...) ends, not vice versa. (shrink)

Abstract In ?The Worth of Nations? I proposed that nationalism was a major factor in the emergence of the modem, growth?oriented economy. In response to criticisms, I demonstrate here the nationalistic inspiration of seventeenth?century English?or British?economic tracts. Urging a reconsideration of earlier approaches (such as that of W.W. Rostow) to the problem of why?rather than how?the modern economy emerged, I agree with Max Weber's challenge to the naturalness of our proclivity for constant economic expansion, while departing from his explanation for (...) it. (shrink)

A little over one hundred years after his birth, and not quite twenty-five years since his death, interest in the French political philosopher and sociologist Raymond Aron continues to grow. Aron is now widely recognized as one of the most significant intellectual figures of the postwar period, whose wide-ranging reflections played a key part in preserving liberal democracy in Europe and abroad. His sober analyses of modern society, his trenchant critique of ideological politics and every form of totalitarianism, and his (...) philosophical reflections on politics and history have given powerful support to democratic liberalism throughout the western world. Aron's work combines passion and observation, disinterested reflection and love of liberty in a way that is an imitable model for humane and balanced political reflection. In this stimulating collection of essays, inspired by the centennial of Aron's birth, a distinguished group of North American and European scholars—including Pierre Manent, Stanley Hoffmann, Irving Louis Horowitz, Liah Greenfeld, Claude Lefort, and Aurelian Craiutu—examine four key aspects of Aron's thought and work: his educative legacy; his reflections on other philosophers and intellectuals; his distinctive approach to international relations; and the unique character of his own political reflection. The result is a masterful engagement with Aron's intellectual legacy and a thoughtful coming to terms with the political and intellectual substance of the twentieth century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 116-127 [Access article in PDF] Authority, Solidarity, and the Political Economy of Identity: The Case of the United States David A. Hollinger Theorists of nationalism tend to circle around the United States like boy scouts who have spotted a clump of poison oak. The nationalism of the United States has figured small in the robust and wide-ranging discourse about nationalism that has involved sociologists, historians, political (...) scientists, philosophers, and literary scholars during the past two decades. Although there are significant exceptions to this pattern of avoidance--David Miller and Liah Greenfeld are convenient examples--several prominent cases illustrate the pattern. The United States is mentioned in only a single footnote in Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism. The United States is given short shrift in three of the most important collections of the 1990s: Homi Bhabha's Nation and Narration, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith's Nationalism, and Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny's Becoming National. Montserrat Guibernau mentions the United States only twice, and in passing, in her Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. The United States gets less attention than Canada and the Ukraine in John A. Hall's rich, state-of-the-art collection of 1998, The State of the Nation. Ronald Beiner's Theorizing Nationalism has much more to tell us about Quebec than about the United States, which is alluded to even in passing by only half the contributors to this valuable anthology of 1999. That "nationalism is unknown" in the United States is claimed by Elie Kedouri, even in the fourth edition of his classic text Nationalism [143]. But the most interesting case of all is that of nationalism's most creative and influential theorist, Benedict Anderson.Anderson provides only episodic treatment of the United States while discussing "creole nationalism" in his influential book Imagined Communities. To be sure, Anderson's demonstration of the similarities between a large number of similarly situated, comparably developing national projects among creole populations in the New World is no cause for complaint. It is a signal contribution, and still insufficiently absorbed by a persistently Europe-centered discourse about nationalism. Anderson's recent book, The Spectre of Comparisons, also deals episodically with the United States, which Anderson now tells us explicitly has proved "too sui generis for ready-to-hand" [336] comparisons with other national projects in the Western Hemisphere. Most of Spectre of Comparisons is about Southeast Asia, just as the preponderance of Imagined Communities is about Latin America. Fair enough. [End Page 116]My point is not to find fault with Anderson for being an Area Studies specialist in so many areas of the world outside the United States. Nor do I have any significant quarrel with what little Anderson does say about the United States. What is worth remarking upon is simply that even the least Eurocentric of our era's leading theorists of nationalism in general has emerged not from the study of the United States, but from the study of Southeast Asia and Latin America. This is less a comment about Anderson than about the class of theorists of which he is a member. The scholars whose careers focus on the United States are "area studies specialists" of a kind, but few of them have intervened tellingly in the cross-disciplinary discussion of nationalism. One who did was the historian David Potter, whose still-powerful article "Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa" was published nearly forty years ago but is rarely cited today.The poison oak effect among theorists of nationalism would not be worthy of notice were it not for one fact that might be expected to attract rather than repel these theorists: the United States is the most successful nationalist project in all of modern history. What makes it "successful" is its longevity, its absorption of a variety of peoples, and its sheer power. Two-and-one-quarter centuries after its founding and 135 years after its Civil War, it is by far the most powerful nation-state... (shrink)

Abstract Reversing the arguments of Anderson, Gellner, and Hobs?bawm, Liah Greenfeld contends that it is nationalism that produces economic development. Specifically, she claims that nationalism inspired three seminal economic thinkers: Marx, List, and Smith. However, Greenfeld's ideological preferences lead her to a problematic conception of individualism as nationalism, as well as to flawed treatments of Smith, List, and Marx. Nationalism is better understood as an attempt to address the deepening conflict between the imperative of community and the secular trends (...) of the marketplace, which challenge national sovereignty and democracy. (shrink)