Little is know about factors that influence the development of public self-consciousness. One potential factor is exposure to audiences: being repeatedly aware of one's object status could create a high disposition to focus on public self-aspects. To explore this hypothesis public self-consciousness was assessed in two groups of subjects: 62 professors and actors (high exposure to audiences) and 39 people without audience experience. Analysis show that significant differences exist for public self-consciousness in men only. Also, history of frequent exposure to (...) audience is significantly but weakly correlated with high public self-consciousness in men. This supports previous observations indicating that self-consciousness seems to develop differently for men and women. (shrink)

Characterizing feminist ethics and social and political philosophy as marked by a tendency to be non-idealizing serves to thematize the volume, while still ...

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...) appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition. (shrink)

Contemporary biomedical ethics and environmental ethics share a common ancestry in Aldo Leopold's and Van Rensselaer Potter's initial broad visions of a connected biosphere. Over the past five decades, the two fields have become strangers. Public health ethics, a new subfield of bioethics, emerged from the belly of contemporary biomedical ethics and has evolved over the past 25 years. It has moved from its traditional concern with the tension between individual autonomy and community health to a wider focus on social (...) justice and solidarity. Public health has a broad focus that includes individual, community, and environmental health. Public health ethics attends to these broad commitments reflected in the increasing concern with the connectedness of health of individuals to the health of populations, to the health of animals, to the health of the environment; it is well situated to reconnect all three “fields” of ethics to promote a healthier planet. (shrink)

Questions about the relevance and value of various liberal concepts are at the heart of important debates among feminist philosophers and social theorists. Although many feminists invoke concepts such as rights, equality, autonomy, and freedom in arguments for liberation, some attempt to avoid them, noting that they can also reinforce and perpetuate oppressive social structures. In Challenging Liberalism Schwartzman explores the reasons why concepts such as rights and equality can sometimes reinforce oppression. She argues that certain forms of abstraction and (...) individualism are central to liberal methodology and that these give rise to a number of problems. Drawing on the work of feminist moral, political, and legal theorists, she constructs an approach that employs these concepts, while viewing them from within a critique of social relations of power. (shrink)

Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...) mirror. Based on these analogies, we argue that the use of hypnosis is a reliable method to investigate the surface features of clinical delusions. But to what extent can hypnosis successfully recreate delusions? Can it also contribute to a better understanding of delusion formation? Although clinical delusions and hypnotically induced beliefs are different in etiology, some analogies can be identified in the underlying processes that characterise them, based on the two-factor theory of delusion formation. (shrink)

A consensus view appears to prevail among academics from diverse disciplines that biological races do not exist, at least in humans, and that race -concepts and race -objects are socially constructed. The consensus view has been challenged recently by Robin O. Andreasen's cladistic account of biological race. This paper argues that from a scientific viewpoint there are methodological, empirical, and conceptual problems with Andreasen's position, and that from a philosophical perspective Andreasen's adherence to rigid dichotomies between science and society, facts (...) and values, nature and culture, and the biological and the social needs to be relinquished. DNA forensics is just one field of research that reveals how race remains both idea and object for human population biologists, an indication that it is premature to accept the existence of a no- race consensus across the disciplines. DNA forensics research also demonstrates ways in which race is reified by scientists by the representation of what is cultural or social as natural or biological, and of what is dynamic, relative, and continuous as static, absolute, and discrete. The philosophical analysis of foundational concepts of human population biology such as population, race, and ethnic group is best served by foregoing traditional objectivist approaches for a critical stance that recognises the inextricability of the biological and the social. Introduction Consensus view: biological races do not exist Andreasen's defence of the biological reality of races as clades Biological permutations of race Conclusion. (shrink)

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers of the early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors, particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talented metaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that reality consists exclusively of minds and their ideas. Berkeley's system, while it strikes many as counter intuitive, is strong and flexible enough to counter most objections. His most studied works, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (...) Principles, for short) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous Dialogues), are beautifully written and dense with the sort of arguments that delight contemporary philosophers. He was also a wide ranging thinker with interests in religion (which were fundamental to his philosophical motivations), the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine. Although many of Berkeley's first readers greeted him with incomprehension, he influenced both Hume and Kant, and is much read (if little followed) in our own day. (shrink)

: Kant's 'argument from geometry' is usually interpreted to be a regressive transcendental argument in support of the claim that we have a pure intuition of space. In this paper I defend an alternative interpretation of this argument according to which it is rather a progressive synthetic argument meant to identify and establish the essential role of pure spatial intuition in geometric cognition. In the course of reinterpreting the 'argument from geometry' I reassess the arguments of the Aesthetic and illustrate (...) the origin of Kant's view of the role of pure intuition in geometry. (shrink)

The clinical years of medical student education are an ideal time for students to practise and refine ethical thinking and behaviour. We piloted a new clinical ethics teaching activity this year with undergraduate medical students within the Rural Clinical School at the University of New South Wales. We used a modified teaching ward round model, with students bringing deidentified cases of ethical interest for round-table discussion. We found that students were more engaged in the subject of clinical ethics after attending (...) the teaching sessions and particularly appreciated having structured time to listen to and learn from their peers. Despite this, we found no change in student involvement in managing or planning action in situations that they find ethically challenging. A key challenge for educators in clinical ethics is to address the barriers that prevent students taking action. (shrink)

The possibility of genetic enhancement to increase the likelihood of success in sport and life’s prospects raises questions for accounts of sport and theories of justice. These questions obviously include the fairness of such enhancement and its relationship to the goals of sport and demands of justice. Of equal interest, however, is the effect on our understanding of individual effort, merit, and desert of either discovering genetic contributions to components of such effort or recognizing the influence of social factors on (...) the development and exercise of individual effort. This paper analyzes arguments about genetic enhancement with the goal of raising questions about how sport and justice regard unchosen, undeserved inequalities and what is assumed to be their opposite—namely, the exercise and results of individual effort. It is suggested that contemplating enhancement of natural assets previously outside human control may reinforce recognition of responsibility to intervene with regard to social advantages so as to support individual effort and improve individuals’ life prospects. (shrink)

Abram Brummett and Christopher Ostertag offer critiques of my argument that clinical ethics consultants have expertise but are not “ethics experts”. My argument begins within our less-than-ideal world and asks what a justification of a clinical ethics consultation recommendation might look like under those conditions. It is a challenge to what could be called an “inflationary” position on ethics expertise that requires agreement on or rational proof of metaethical facts about the values at stake in clinical ethics consultation. Brummett and (...) Ostertag critique three distinct steps in the argument. Two of those I have a brief answer for, and an assessment of the third demonstrates that Brummett and Ostertag do not consider the premise upon which I based my account. Instead, they assert a counter-premise without argument, which at best results in a stalemate between our two accounts. However, the reasons supporting my premise still seem to me to be stronger, so I am in the end unconvinced by their critiques. (shrink)

Presenting state-of-the-art work on the conscious and unconscious processes involved in emotion, this integrative volume brings together leading psychologists, ...

“Chiaroscuro” is a art technique that makes use of light and shade to suggest depth and solidity on a flat surface. I argue that the standards regarding accountability in the second edition of the Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation , are chiaroscuro, because, despite the offered lists of competencies, it is very difficult to imagine how consultants might be held accountable to such standards. It is not clear to which of the many suggested standards a consultant should be held (...) accountable, and even if one stipulates that only the tabulated competencies are meant as standards, the vague wording makes it hard to know how a consultant might fail to meet the standards or perform excellently. In addition, because terms such as “ethics” and “ethical” are not defined in the document, we are left with no way to determine whether consultants have made appropriate recommendations. The document is useful as a point of discussion, but not yet ready to serve as a tool for holding practitioners accountable. (shrink)

Data reveal that the physical effects of trauma exposure increasingly surface in business, social, and other settings. Exposure to trauma at any point in life can cause employee health concerns, yet many firms do not acknowledge or address this. Herein, we combine trauma theory with human capital theory to explain how manifestations of trauma exposure— hyperarousal, intrusion, and constriction—impact employee health and performance. This article outlines how each manifestation affects human capital deployment, and thus employee performance. It further demonstrates how (...) these human capital deployment issues have individual- and unit-level performance implications. This article offers a theory linking health effects of trauma to performance outcomes at work. It suggests how managerial awareness of trauma manifestations is a necessary step toward workplaces becoming supportive or healing. Our model offers new explanations related to why some individuals behave as they do at work and connects trauma to employee behavior and value creation. (shrink)

: In liberal societies (where birth control is generally accepted and available), many people decide whether or not they wish to become parents. One key question in making this decision is, What kind of parent will I be? Parenting competence can be ranked from excellent to competent to poor. Cassidy argues that those who can foresee being poor parents, or even merely competent ones, should opt not to parent.

Drawing on a conception of people as ‘ecological subjects’, creatures situated in specific social relations, locations, and material environments, I want to emphasize the importance of place and place‐making for basing, demonstrating, and forging future solidarity. Solidarity, as I will define it here, involves reaching out through moral imagination and responsive action across social and/or geographic distance and asymmetry to assist other people who are vulnerable, and to advance justice. Contained in the practice of solidarity are two core ‘enacted commitments’, (...) first, to engaging our moral imaginations and recognizing others in need and, second, to responsive action. Recognizing the suffering of displacement and responding through place‐making should follow from even the most simplistic understanding of people as ‘implaced’. Recognition, furthermore, that places are created and sustained, transformed, or neglected in ways that foster or perpetuate inequities, including health inequities, generates responsibilities concerning place‐making. Place‐based interventions, on either count, should be principal and, indeed, prioritized ways of showing solidarity for the vulnerable and promoting justice. Where solidaristic relations do not prevail, place‐making can catalyze and nurture them, and over time advance justice. On the moral landscapes of bioethics, the terrain where care and health are or should be at the center of attention, an ethic of place and place‐making for those who have been displaced – patients, the elderly, urban populations, and asylum‐seekers, for instance – expresses and has rich potential for nurturing bonds of solidarity. (shrink)

A Future of the History of Science Is in the Institution. In this article, I warn against a tendency seen in the history of science towards very particular and isolating microhistories. The call for contextualization should be more than mere lip service and taken seriously. I suggest that a stronger focus on the history of institutions could be one particularly productive way to contextualize knowledge. There are at least five benefits that an analysis of institutions might bring for the history (...) of science: The history of scientific institutions offers the potential for (1) entangled histories that (2) include longer time periods and pay not only attention to (3) the dissemination of knowledge but also to (4) the field of law and the mechanisms of vocational bureaucracy. In this way, (5) questions of power and politics come into view. (shrink)

back in about 1984 or 1985, when I'd been in graduate school for a couple of years at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, I started hanging around with three chemists who shared a house. They were colleagues of my roommate, a chemistry grad student. One of them, no kidding, was named Lloyd A. Bumm, who would always introduce himself by saying, "My name is the best joke I know." Lloyd was a quirky, curious guy who often explored unusual places around (...) the City, unlike the typical chemistry grad student. For instance, he frequently would head into Chicago on Sunday mornings to go to this crazy street market he knew about. He invited me to go with him one weekend; he was looking for a power supply, whatever... (shrink)

This paper offers a new framework for thinking about the relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law. The standard way of framing this relationship is within the terms of the form/substance debate within the literature on the rule of law: Does the rule of law include only formal and procedural aspects or does it also encompass and support substantive rights such as private property rights and civil liberties? By focusing on the nature of common-law reasoning, (...) I wish to question the form/substance dichotomy that frames this debate and to show that the formal aspects of the rule of law are in fact principles widely adopted within the practice of common-law reasoning and as such play a large role in shaping the substantive content of common-law property rights. Understanding this has implications beyond the relationship between property law and the rule of law. (shrink)

This article examines the use of dialogues in two texts which functioned superficially as scientific handbooks for women: Aphra Behn's translation of Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle's Entretien sur la pluralité des Mondes and Elizabeth Carter's Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy Explained for the Use of Ladies (1739) translated from Francesco Algarotti's Il Newtoniasnismo Per le Dame (1737). Original texts exploit the female figure for the scientific cause, but at first glance, both of the original texts appeared generous to the ‘fair (...) sex’. However, neither text is as sympathetic as it initially appears. The confused gender messages emitted by these texts are further complicated by the fact that they were translated by women. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Taking On Your Natural Human Role by Killing Non‐Human Animals Discover Nature by Killing Non‐Human Animals The Paradox of Ethical Hunting Hunting and Environmentalism Notes.

Do bioethicists need yet another theoretical approach with which to frame their disagreements? Many pragmatists contend that pragmatism, unlike its liberal and utilitarian counterparts, is uniquely commendable in (a) beginning from our lived experiences and (b) locating those experiences amid our social relations. In place of an " principlism," pragmatism offers a practical "bedside-bioethic"; in lieu of "autonomy run amuk," pragmatism proposes an ethic rooted in our communal resources. To date, however, efforts to develop such a bioethic have been stymied (...) by pragmatists' own abstract theoretical commitments, commitments that prevent them, most directly, from beginning with the lived experiences and communal resources of those who hold theological commitments. This self-imposed methodological constraint, I argue, has needlessly thwarted pragmatism's most striking methodological promise: its potential to cultivate productive debates among secular and theologically-informed participants. (shrink)

I present and motivate a new solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. I suggest that we shift our focus from process-types that can be characterized independently of a subject’s epistemic concerns to process-types that play important roles in the life of the epistemic agent. Once we do so, a simple, promising solution suggests itself: the C-Typing Thesis. According to the C-Typing Thesis, how an epistemic agent forms her degree of confidence in a believed proposition determines the epistemically relevant type (...) of belief-forming process for that belief. First I motivate this view generally, arguing that it satisfies important desiderata for a solution to the generality problem. Then I show that it makes the intuitively correct predictions for a wide range of cases. I also show how it can solve Brian Weatherson’s temporal generality problem, and, relatedly, Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping problem for reliabilism. The C-Typing Thesis is plausible not only because it makes correct predictions, but also because it does so in a way that responds to a common charge against reliabilism: that reliability is disconnected from our lives as epistemic inquirers. The C-Typing Thesis shows how epistemic agency can play a significant role in an externalist account of justification and knowledge. (shrink)

In his writings on the gaze and the body in Being and Nothingness , Jean-Paul Sartre describes the ways in which bodies are exposed and vulnerable to the anonymous gaze of the other, and how they in the midst of their vulnerability depend entirely on being seen by the gaze for their meaning and their very being. Although it sometimes appears as quite depressingly restrictive, Sartre’s analysis of the gaze and his account of the body offer rich and important resources (...) for recognizing the force of objectifying categories and meanings in the constitution of identities. This article suggests that Sartre’s almost remorseless descriptions of how the body is molded by the gaze of the other provide a productive point of departure for understanding the becoming of singular identities, as they are lived on the margins and in the intersections of established categories which determine them in often oppressive ways. Being marked by difference, whether sexual, ethnic, racial, or other, is in many ways being trapped by the objectifying gaze of the other in such a way that the ability to return the gaze and claim a subject position is deeply circumscribed. The article gives an account of Sartre’s analysis of the phenomenon of the gaze as the force which objectifies me before the other and of his description of the body as it is subjectively experienced as objectified. This “third ontological dimension of the body” captures the tensions inherent in subjectivity and brings to light its perpetual exposure to its own unknown exterior as it is seen and constituted by the other. (shrink)

In this paper I explore some of the ramifications that thinking ecologically has on thinking about the human self, identity, and ethics. Inspired and informed by the work of the late Val Plumwood, I recommend new directions for Plumwood’s application of ecological continuity to human self-concept. I applaud Plumwood’s recognition of continuity as a key theoretical concept. Her work on revising selfhood in ways both 1) consistent with various insights of ecology, and 2) informed by oppression theory, is innovative and (...) a crucial theoretical move. Building on the work of Plumwood, I argue that an ecological self-concept should reflect dimensions of “open continuity” with the environment. Open continuity literally requires opening one’s self-concept in ways that require revising many presumptions of where one’s self leaves off and the other begins. The familiar notion of a clearly bound human self cannot serve as the hub of moral action and theory if it is to reflect key ecological insights. Attending to ecological selfhood reshapes human self-concept and the moral terrain. (shrink)

Karen Warren’s work has helped to transform the landscape of environmental philosophy, contributing theoretical grounding for Western ecofeminism and opening the range of theoretical perspectives one can adopt when doing Western environmental ethics. Although her work is laudable, there are substantive worries about how potential subjects of oppression are characterized in her later work. Warren’s work and relevant secondary literature can be used as a foil to illuminate inadequate justification for the failure to include all living entities as potential subjects (...) of the harm of oppression. The failure to provide conceptual room to include all entities that can rightfully be the potential subjects of oppression limits our understanding of oppression and the multiple ways in which it functions. Additionally, failure to attend to all potential subjects of oppression limits practical opportunities for anti-oppressive solidarity in political action. If oppression is correctly described as the harm of particular group members by others, and the class of living entities can be subjected to harm, then nonhuman living entities can potentially be subjects of oppression. The aim here is to provide conceptual support for the possibility that nonhuman life can be oppressed. (shrink)

This paper starts from an observation of our practices: when people are ascribed delusional beliefs or conspiracy beliefs, they tend to be excluded from shared epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. What might motivate this exclusion? One possibility is that delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are considered as evidence of irrationality and pathology, and thus endorsing them suggests that one’s epistemic agency is compromised, at least in some contexts. One common argument for the irrational and pathological nature (...) of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs lies in their being the outputs of faulty cognition. There are some areas of overlap in the cognitive antecedents of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs as identified in the empirical literature. For instance, some biases and thinking styles have been correlated either with the adoption of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs, or with the strength of conviction in such beliefs. The paper challenges the claim that, if delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are the outputs of biased cognition, then it is justified to exclude people endorsing delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs from epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. The relevant biases and thinking styles are widespread in the non-clinical population, do not need to be part of a dysfunctional cognitive process, and can be adaptive in some contexts. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...) emphasis on the notion of subscription badly fits with the motivations behind his theory of interpretation. (shrink)

How can we understand and move beyond a persistent tendency to think, write and organize about food and agriculture as if it were possible to separate a theorist’s views on gender and race from their views on farm animals? Considerable scholarship already addresses this question. This paper suggests that philosophy can contribute to the discussion by focusing a particular kind of attention on patterns of thinking. In particular, dichotomous thinking has traditionally provided grounds for separating production from consumption, and continues (...) to present an obstacle to efforts at connecting “farm issues” to “fork issues.” Three characteristics of dichotomous thinking present particular obstacles to scholarship that would deeply integrate food studies with agriculture studies. (1) Dichotomies tend to set up not just a contrast but an antagonism between their two poles, such that to be this means to be not that. (2) Dichotomous thinking tends to erase nuance, to eliminate anything between the two dichotomous options, and to purify or “clean up” the ambiguous case or extraneous material, by shoehorning it into one option or the other; and (3) Particular groups of dichotomies operate together, such that they mutually reinforce each other to create a way of understanding the world that is more plausible because of its cohesiveness. These snarls of mutuallysupportive dichotomies that are nevertheless purist and puritanical in their impact, present a real (i.e. ideological, theoretical, conceptual) challenge to creating scholarly and activist movements that integrate the best of agrarian thinking and the best of critical food studies scholarship attentive to race, class and gender oppression. Keywords Dichotomy Production Consumption Alternative agriculture Agrarianism Local food. (shrink)

"In her essay "Choosing the Margin," bell hooks draws attention to the way uncritical celebrations of difference and otherness often act as an alibi for progressive politics. The recent proliferation of discourses on alterity, particularly with the growth of Levinas studies, makes hooks's critique all the more relevant for ethical and political theory today. To what extent has this emphasis on alterity affected the dynamics of philosophical and political life? Does it fall into the trap that hooks identifies here as (...) a mask with which privileged subjects present themselves as critical thinkers, while failing to listen to the diverse voices of concrete others gathered under the rubric of "the Other"? It is one thing to affirm one's infinite responsibility for the Other, and quite another thing to make good on that responsibility in specific contexts, especially in a political landscape where some faces are more visible than others, and some voices more likely to be heard. Unless we can flesh out Levinas's ethical project with a political project of resisting oppression, his ethics risks a level of abstraction that covers over its own blind spots. And unless we can distinguish rigorously between otherness as a sign of political exclusion and otherness as a source of ethical command, we risk repeating the conflation of certain others with a position of weakness and victimhood, where "we" can feel responsible for "them" without having to listen to anyone but ourselves.". (shrink)

Lindquist et al. argue that emotional categories do not map onto distinct regions within the brain, but rather, arise from basic psychological processes, including conceptualization, executive attention, and core affect. Here, we use examples from cultural neuroscience to argue that psychological constructionism, not locationism, captures the essential role of emotion in the social and cultural brain.

By its very nature ethnography is an emergent methodology. To be ethical the ethnographer needs to manage research ethics in-situ. This need to manage ethical dilemmas as they arise often comes into conflict with increased ethical regulation and procedures from ethics review boards that require the researcher to foresee ethical quandaries before data collection commences. These regulations can constrain the emerging purpose of the study, evolving means of data collection and multifaceted ways of interacting with participants that are seen as (...) being the strengths of undertaking an ethnographic approach. 0The chapters in this volume problematise this tension and highlight the importance of managing ethics in-situ by reflecting on recently completed and current projects drawing out ethical dilemmas relating to data ownership, dissemination, representation, social justice and managing ethnographic studies in the midst of a global pandemic and Covid-19 lockdowns. 0Reflecting on these experiences of doing educational ethnography with children and young people, drawing on a diverse range of studies conducted in England, Scotland, South America, India, and the Basque Country, this volume argues that administrative and conceptual change is needed to ensure that ethics does not become a tick box exercise but that ethnographers commit fully to conscientiously managing ethics in-situ. (shrink)