I am interested in exploring the usefulness and limits of traditional categories of feminist theory, such as those laid out by Alison Jaggar (1977; 1983). I begin the analysis by critically comparing various treatments of liberal feminism. I focus throughout this investigation on uncovering ways that current frameworks privilege white authors and concerns, recreate the split between theory and activism, and obscure long histories of theoretical and practical coalition and alliance work.

Within the popular consciousness, Emma Goldman has become something of an icon, a symbol for rebellion and women’s rights. But there has been surprisingly little substantive analysis of her influence on social, political, and feminist theory. In _Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman,_ Weiss and Kensinger present essays that resist a simplistic understanding of Goldman and instead attempt to examine her thinking in its proper social, historical, and philosophical context. Only by considering the sources, influences, and specific significance of Goldman’s (...) ideas can her proper place in feminist theory be truly understood. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Martha A. Ackelsberg, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Lynne M. Adrian, Berenice A. Carroll, Voltairine de Cleyre, Janet E. Day, Candace Falk, Kathy E. Ferguson, Marsha Aileen Hewitt, Lori Jo Marso, Jonathan McKenzie, Alix Kates Shulman, Craig Stalbaum, Jason Wehling, and Alice Wexler. (shrink)

Consider an object or property a and the predicate F. Then a is vague if there are questions of the form: Is a F? that have no yes-or-no answers. In brief, vague properties and kinds have borderline instances and composite objects have borderline constituents. I'll use the expression "borderline cases" as a covering term for both. ;Having borderline cases is compatible with precision so long as every case is either borderline F, determinately F or determinately not F. Thus, in addition (...) to borderline cases, vagueness requires "fuzzy borders". A has fuzzy borders if there is no sharp line between a's borderline cases, a's determinate cases and a's determinate non-cases. To illustrate, loudness is vague because in a continuum of gradually increasing volume, there is no fact about where the last definite loud noise is and where the first borderline noise is. ;Actual borderline cases are not required for vagueness. Suppose actual noises are either ear-shatteringly loud or silent. Even so, loudness is vague since it could have borderline instances. Just so for objects. Suppose a table is cleanly bounded such that there is a sharp break between the table and its surroundings. Still, that table is vague since there are worlds at which it is indeterminate whether some wood molecule a is, or is not, part of that table. ;There are three views about which things can be vague. On the linguistic view, vagueness is solely a feature of expressions. On the nihilistic view, nothing is vague because vagueness is incoherent. Pitted against these views is the ontological conception of vagueness according to which borderline instances and constituents arise due to genuine indeterminacy in nature. ;My dissertation defends the ontological conception. I argue against the adequacy of the theory's rivals, disarm a damaging objection and demonstrate the causal superiority of vague events. Anyone familiar with the literature on vagueness will notice that only a subset of issues are discussed. What I offer is preliminary--I hope only to make the theory of ontological vagueness attractive enough to merit future work. (shrink)

Though emotion conveys memory benefits, it does not enhance memory equally for all aspects of an experience, nor for all types of emotional events. In this review, I outline the behavioral evidence for arousal's focal enhancements of memory and describe the neural processes that may support those focal enhancements. I also present behavioral evidence to suggest that these focal enhancements occur more often for negative experiences than for positive ones. This result appears to arise because of valence-dependent effects on the (...) neural processes recruited during episodic encoding and retrieval, with negative affect associated with increased engagement of sensory processes, and positive affect leading to enhanced recruitment of conceptual processes. (shrink)

In my original review (Kensinger, 2009), I proposed that to understand the effects of emotion on memory accuracy, we must look beyond effects of arousal and consider the contribution of valence. In discussing this proposal, the commentators raise a number of excellent points that hone in on the question of when valence does (and does not) account for emotion's effects on memory accuracy. Though future research will be required to resolve this issue more fully, in this brief response, I (...) address some of the concerns outlined by the commentators and suggest a few steps that may help to elucidate the dimensions that should be incorporated in models of emotional memory. (shrink)

Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma’s writings have had a worldwide impact on discourse about the philosophy of medicine, professionalism, bioethics, healthcare ethics, and patients’ rights. Given their works’ importance, it is surprising that commentators have ignored their admission of an unresolved and troubling dilemma and inconsistency in their theory. The purpose of this article is to identify and state what problems worried them and to consider possible solutions. It is argued that their dilemma stems from their concerns about how to (...) justify professional rules restricting colleagues from performing acts they view as direct, active, and formal killings, such as physician-assisted suicide, mercy killing, and abortion. It is further argued that their inconsistency is that they both assert and deny that professional colleagues should not use their moral or theological values to impose professional restrictions on other colleagues without adequate philosophical grounds. At risk are their arguments about the nature of an internal morality for medicine, a secular and multicultural basis for medical ethics, and a nonarbitrary way to determine what acts fall outside the ends of medicine. These are arguments they claim also apply to other healthcare professions. The article begins with a brief overview of their key positions to provide the context in which they make their admission. (shrink)

When making decisions for adults who lack decision-making capacity and have no discernable preferences, widespread support exists for using the Best Interests Standard. This policy appeals to adults and is compatible with many important recommendations for persons facing end-of-life choices.Common objections to the policy are discussed as well as different meanings of this Standard identified, such as using it to express goals or ideals and to make practical decisions incorporating what reasonable persons would want. For reasons of consistency, fairness, and (...) compassion, this standard should be used for all incapacitated persons. (shrink)

anonymous tissue samples obtained in hospitals and clinics without donor consent. This can be justified as a response to a public health emergency, but should not be seen as setting a precedent for waiving consent whenever samples are anonymous. The following recommendations grow out of this discussion: (1) Studies using anonymous tissue samples should not be automatically exempt from consent requirements, and consent should not be waived simply to avoid anticipated refusals, low participation rates or self selection bias. (2) The (...) consensus on informed consent favors fulfilling as many of the elements of informed consent as reasonably possible, so studies should be assessed individually to determine if any or all elements of informed consent should be modified or omitted. (3) There is a need for greater regulation of the research use of tissue samples. (4) Investigators seeking approval to waive consent or modify elements of informed consent should document the sort of new findings that they believe would effect their calculations about the benefits and burdens to subjects who are enrolled in the study, and institutional review boards should indicate whether they agree with the investigators' analysis. Keywords: AIDS, Consent, Ethics, HIV, Notification, Privacy, Research, Screening, Surveillance CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Classifying research proposals by risk of harm is fundamental to the approval process and the most pivotal risk category in most regulations is that of “minimal risk.” If studies have no more than a minimal risk, for example, a nearly worldwide consensus exists that review boards may sometimes: (1) expedite review, (2) waive or modify some or all elements of informed consent, or (3) enroll vulnerable subjects including healthy children, incapacitated persons and prisoners even if studies do not hold out (...) direct benefits to them. The moral and social purposes behind this threshold are discussed along with relevant views from the National Commission, NBAC, NHRPAC, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, The Nuremberg Code, and The WMA's Declaration of Helsinki. Representative policies from Australia, Canada, South Africa, the U.S., and CIOMS are reviewed revealing different understandings of this sorting threshold. Six of nine frequently cited interpretations of “minimal risk” are untenable. The “absolute” interpretation of the “routine examination” standard is defended as best. (shrink)

A new analysis of the Best Interests Standard is given and applied to the controversy about testing children for untreatable, severe late-onset genetic diseases, such as Huntington's disease or Alzheimer's disease. A professional consensus recommends against such predictive testing, because it is not in children's best interest. Critics disagree. The Best Interests Standard can be a powerful way to resolve such disputes. This paper begins by analyzing its meaning into three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions showing it: is an "umbrella" (...) standard, used differently in different contexts, has objective and subjective features, is more than people's intuitions about how to rank potential benefits and risks in deciding for others but also includes evidence, established rights, duties and thresholds of acceptable care, and can have different professional, medical, moral and legal uses, as in this dispute. Using this standard, support is given for the professional consensus based on concerns about discrimination, analogies to adult choices, consistency with clinical judgments for adults, and desires to preserve of an open future for children. Support is also given for parents' legal authority to decide what genetic tests to do. (shrink)

Many pediatric research regulations, including those of the United States, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science, and South Africa, offer similar rules for review board approval of higher hazard studies holding out no therapeutic or direct benefit to children with disorders or conditions. Authorization requires gaining parental permissions and the children’s assent, if that is possible, and showing that these studies are intended to gain vitally important and generalizable information about children’s conditions; it also requires limiting the risks (...) of harm to no more than a “minor increase over minimal risk” and showing the study is commensurable with the children’s experiences. For convenience, these investigations will be called “no benefit, higher hazard” studies.Despite the existence of these policies for decades, studies show that review boards’ judgments vary about what “no benefit, higher hazard” studies should be approved. (shrink)

"Applied" is a technical term describing a variety of new philosophical enterprises. The author examines and rejects the view that these fields are derivative. Whatever principles, judgments, or background theories that are employed to solve problems in these areas are either changed by how they are used, or at least the possibility exists of their being changed. Hence we ought to stop calling these endeavors "applied", or agree that the meaning of "apply" will have to include the possibility that what (...) is applied may be changed. The socalled applied fields of philosophy, therefore, are not derivative. The strongest cases to the contrary are the foundationalist views that what we apply is epistemically privileged. Different foundationalist views take different principles, judgments, or background theories to be epistemically privileged. Strong and weak versions of each of these foundationalist views are considered but none establish these fields as derivative. Keywords: applied ethics, background theories, casuistry, epistemic privilige, foundationalism, principles, reflective equilibrium CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The view that identity can be vague holds that there are statements of identity which are neither true nor false. The view that composition can be vague holds that unities can have borderline constituents — that is, elements that are neither parts nor non-parts of some larger unity. The case for vague identity is typically made by way of an argument for the vagueness of composition. In this paper, however, I argue that the thesis that composition can be vague is (...) actually incompatible with the thesis of vague identity. The argument for the incompatibility of these two views arises out of a demonstration of the way in which constituency facts are grounded in the other facts about how a larger unity is configured. Thus, I show that composites that are allegedly vaguely identical are actually different configurations. Hence, the alliance of vague composition with vague identity is taken to be all that is needed in order to show that compositional vagueness is indefensible. (shrink)

Clinicians sometimes disagree about how much to honor surrogates’ deeply held cultural values or traditions when they differ from those of the host country. Such a controversy arose when parents requested a cultural accommodation to let their infant die by withdrawing life saving care. While both the parents and clinicians claimed to be using the Best Interests Standard to decide what to do, they were at an impasse. This standard is analyzed into three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and used (...) to resolve the question of how much to accommodate cultural preferences and how to treat this infant. The extreme versions of absolutism and relativism are rejected. Properly understood, the Best Interests Standard can serve as a powerful tool in settling disputes about how to make good decisions for those who cannot decide for themselves. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 32-34, January 2012.

Twitter, an online application, allows users to post microblog statements in real time. Have psychologists in leadership positions adopted Twitter? What ethical standards are navigated in doing so? Little research has examined the adoption rate of Twitter within a sample of psychologists. This article outlines a series of case vignettes depicting ethical dilemmas encountered by psychologists who adopt Twitter. Data reviewing Twitter adoption by professional psychologists who served as president within psychology advocacy organizations reveal higher adoption rates from student group (...) leaders than professional organization advocacy presidents. Implications for ethical standards and professional development are discussed. (shrink)

A dispute exists about whether bioethics should become a new discipline with its own methods, competency standards, duties, honored texts, and core curriculum. Unique expertise is a necessary condition for disciplines. Using the current literature, different views about the sort of expertise that might be unique to bioethicists are critically examined to determine if there is an expertise that might meet this requirement. Candidates include analyses of expertise based in "philosophical ethics," "casuistry," "atheoretical or situation ethics," "conventionalist relativism," "institutional guidance," (...) "regulatory guidance and compliance," "political advocacy," "functionalism," and "principlism." None succeed in identifying a unique area of expertise for successful bioethicists that could serve as a basis for making it a new discipline. Rather expertise in bioethics is rooted in many professions, disciplines and fields and best understood as a second-order discipline. (shrink)

Case methods of reasoning are persuasive, but we need to address problems of bias in order to use them to reach morally justifiable conclusions. A bias is an unwarranted inclination or a special perspective that disposes us to mistaken or one-sided judgments. The potential for bias arises at each stage of a case method of reasoning including in describing, framing, selecting and comparing of cases and paradigms. A problem of bias occurs because to identify the relevant features for such purposes, (...) we must use general views about what is relevant; but some of our general views are biased, both in the sense of being unwarranted inclinations and in the sense that they are one of many viable perspectives. This reliance upon general views to determine relevancy creates additional difficulties for defenders who maintain that case methods of moral reasoning are not only useful, but more basic, reliable or prior to other forms of moral reasoning. If we cannot identify the case's relevant features and issues independently of our general views or biases, we need further explanation about why a case method or casuistry should be viewed as prior to or more basic or reliable than other forms of moral reasoning. Problems of bias also arise for other methods of reasoning. In medical science, case reviews are regarded as an unreliable way to form generalizations, and methods such as clinical trials are used to address bias. (shrink)

Our cultural disagreements can often be anticipated, negotiated and resolved using shared methods of moral reasoning. This claim is incompatible with any extreme version of communitarianism or strong ethical relativism, which hold that one's culture is the final arbiter of good, bad, right and wrong, or that the rights of the community should trump individual rights within that community. This view is discussed and found to be implausible using the example of common grounds for responding to different cultural views about (...) being truthful in medical practice. Its implausibility stems from difficulties individuating cultures, and accounting for intercultural goals, values and methods. Given our increasingly diverse populations, problems arise as clinicians from one culture try to care respectfully and compassionately for people from other groups. Yet working from shared values and goals, we can use some bridging methods such as discussing grim news in the third person. Claims that something is a cultural belief or attitude, moreover, cannot always be taken at face value. Various meanings of ‘multiculturalism’ are distinguished. (shrink)

Introduction -- Healing justice and whole self-care -- Oppression, trauma, and healing justice -- Stress and the self-care revolution -- The whole self -- A skillful path of healing justice -- Holistic self-care practices and skills -- Connecting to the body -- Befriending the mind-heart -- Rediscovering spirit -- In the fabric of community -- Cultivating connections between person and planet -- Where the rubber meets the road -- The healing justice organization -- Healing justice on the frontlines -- Widening (...) the circle and coming home -- Notes -- Index. (shrink)

Two incompatible policies exist for guiding medical decisions for extremely premature, sick, or terminally ill infants, the Best Interests Standard and the newer, 20-year old "Baby Doe" Rules. The background, including why there were two sets of Baby Doe Rules, and their differences with the Best Interests Standard, are illustrated. Two defenses of the Baby Doe Rules are considered and rejected. The first, held by Reagan, Koop, and others, is a "right-to-life" defense. The second, held by some leaders of the (...) American Academy of Pediatrics, is that the Baby Doe Rules are benign and misunderstood. The Baby Doe Rules should be rejected since they can thwart compassionate and individualized decision-making, undercut duties to minimize unnecessary suffering, and single out one group for treatment adults would not want for themselves. In these ways, they are inferior to the older Best Interests Standard. A "negative" analysis of the Best Interests Standard is articulated and defended for decision-making for all incompetent individuals. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether randomized clinical trial (RCT) methods are necessarily morally problematic. If they are intrinsically problematic, then there may be a dilemma such that tragic choices might have to be made between this socially very useful method for making medical progress on the one hand, and patients' rights and welfare, or physicans' duties on the other. It is argued that the dilemma may be avoided if RCTs can sometimes be viewed as an honorable (...) and cooperative venture between investigators and subjects. Another dilemma may take shape, however, if too few people are willing to cooperate to maintain the structural integrity of many important RCTs. Given their importance, does this method justify easing some of the consent requirements? It is argued that RCT methods are not so ideal that special consideration should be given to them regarding consent requirements. To examine the compatibility of current consent requirements and frequently used RCT schemas, seven RCT designs are discussed. It is found that some, but not all, RCTs, are intrinsically problematic but that sufficient reason has not been found to hold all RCT schemas as intrinsically morally troubling. Keywords: randomized clinical trials, informed consent, randomization CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

(2004). What is the Role of the Precautionary Principle in the Philosophy of Medicine and Bioethics? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 255-258.

In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether it is possible for investigators or research entities to have a special relationship with subjects, thereby creating a duty of care that could, if breached, give rise to an action in negligence. The research under review, the Lead Abatement and Repair & Maintenance Study, was conducted from 1993 to 1996 by investigators at the Kennedy Krieger Institute, an affiliate of Johns Hopkins University.After briefly discussing the case at (...) the center of this ruling, I consider how ambiguities within the federal research regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 46 contribute to disagreements among reasonable and informed people of good will about what studies should be approved. I argue that Grimes may be understood as placing restrictions on how these regulations may be interpreted and used. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A complex problem exists about how to promote the best interests of children as a group through research while protecting the rights and welfare of individual research subjects. The Nuremberg Code forbids studies without consent, eliminating most children as subjects, and the Declaration of Helsinki disallows non-therapeutic research on non-consenting subjects. Both codes are unreasonably restrictive. Another approach is represented by the Council for the International Organizations of Medical Science, the U.S. Federal Research Guidelines, and many other national policies. (...) They allow research ethics committees or institutional review boards to authorize studies with acceptable balances of likely benefits and harms, but neither clarify how to balance them nor explain the meaning of pivotal concepts, like “minimal risk.” Paths to the improvement of balancing or consequentialist approaches include improving standardizing of risk assessment, rejecting crude utilitarianism, identifying and justifying normative or moral judg-ments, and acknowledging extra-regulatory thresholds and deontological or non-negotiable duties to children. (shrink)

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) promotes social justice by protecting disabled persons from discrimination and prejudice. It seeks equality of opportunity for them and protects their well being by giving them fair access to goods, services and benefits. These rights are circumscribed in the ADA, however, by constraints of cost, efficiency, utility, and certain social mores. The ADA offers little direction about how to set priorities when these values come into conflict, or about whether equality of opportunity favors equivalent (...) or preferential treatment for disadvantaged people. Until these ambiguities and potential value conflicts are resolved, a central moral and social problem remains unresolved: How can we demonstrate commitment to the rights and welfare of those with severe disabilities while placing fair limits upon their claims? Five special concerns are discussed: (1) eligibility and the allocation of health care; (2) the meaning of ‘qualified but disabled’ in employing people with mental disabilities; (3) equal opportunity and problems of envy and malingering; (4) ADA accommodation and public protection through testing and licensure; and (5) ADA protection and problems of backlash. Rather than simply wait to see what courts and administrative agencies decide, we should evaluate the moral conflicts, articulate criteria, and help make some difficult choices on morally defensible grounds. Keywords: disabled, health benefit plans, health care rationing, health care reform, health priorities, health services accessibility, Oregon, Rawls, selection bias, social justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)