This open access book investigates the role played by identity of proofs in proof-theoretic semantics. It develops a conception of proof-theoretic semantics as primarily concerned with the relationship between proofs (understood as abstract entities) and derivations (the linguistic representations of proofs). It demonstrates that identity of proof is a key both to clarify some —still not wholly understood— notions at the core of proof-theoretic semantics, such as harmony; and to broaden the range of the phenomena which can be analyzed using (...) the tools of this semantic paradigm, so as to include for instance paradoxes. The volume covers topics such as the philosophical significance of different criteria of identity of proofs, and adequacy conditions for an intensional account of the notion of harmony. The author also examines the Prawitz-Tennant analysis of paradoxes by investigating on the one hand the prospects of turning it into a theory of meaning for paradoxical languages, and on the other hand two distinct kinds of phenomena, first observed by Crabbe and Ekman, showing that the Tennant-Prawitz criterion for paradoxicality overgenerates. This volume is of interest to scholars in formal and philosophical logic. (shrink)

Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naïve and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the (...) graph conception. In addition, he presents a novel, minimalist account of the iterative conception which does not require the existence of a relation of metaphysical dependence between a set and its members. His book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The notions of common knowledge or common belief play an important role in several areas of computer science , in philosophy, game theory, artificial intelligence, psychology and many other fields which deal with the interaction within a group of “agents”, agreement or coordinated actions. In the following we will present several deductive systems for common knowledge above epistemic logics –such as K, T, S4 and S5 –with a fixed number of agents. We focus on structural and proof-theoretic properties of these (...) calculi. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty develops in his late thought an insightful account of reality. In opposition to the ontological primacy Husserl and Heidegger bestow to man, Merleau-Ponty’s late perspective is based on a dynamic ontology, namely on a philosophical understanding of the strict relation between nature and consciousness. With this respect, Merleau- Ponty approaches the problem of negativity, in order to explain the differences within reality without adopting an Hegelian account of dialectic and, on the (...) other hand, avoiding a merely empirical view of contingency. (shrink)

This paper focuses on whether static images can depict motion. It is natural to say that pictures depicting objects caught in the middle of a dynamic action—such as Henri Cartier-Bresson’s (1932) Behind the Gare St. Lazare—are pictures of movement, but, given that pictures themselves do not move, can we make sense of such an idea? Drawing on results from experimental psychology and cognitive sciences, I show that we can. Psychological studies on implicit motion and representational momentum indicate that motion is (...) really perceived in some static images: our visual system is built in order to detect motion, even where it is only implied, and to anticipate the probable outcomes of others’ actions—even when the ‘others’ are only the subject matters of pictures’. I argue that, consequently, a range of popular depiction theories—perceptualist theories of depiction—can accommodate depicted motion. (shrink)

Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book "Filozofija" , offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on (...) the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book "Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness" , is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance. We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming (...) from conventions are “tacit” in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTLinguistic evidence supports the claim that certain, weak rejections are less specific than assertions. On the basis of this evidence, it has been argued that rejected sentences cannot be premisses and conclusions in inferences. We give examples of inferences with weakly rejected sentences as premisses and conclusions. We then propose a logic of weak rejection which accounts for the relevant phenomena and is motivated by principles of coherence in dialogue. We give a semantics for which this logic is sound and (...) complete, show that it axiomatizes the modal logic KD45 and prove that it still derives classical logic on its asserted fragment. Finally, we defend previous logics of strong rejection as being about the linguistically preferred interpretations of weak rejections. (shrink)

Sleep strengthens memories by repeatedly reactivating associated neuron ensembles. Our studies show that although long-term memory for a medium number of word-pairs benefits from sleep, a large number does not. This suggests an upper limit to the amount of information that has access to sleep-dependent declarative memory consolidation, which is possibly linked to the availability of reactivation opportunities. Due to competing processes of global forgetting that are active during sleep, we hypothesized that even larger amounts of information would enhance the (...) proportion of information that is actively forgotten during sleep. In the present study, we aimed to induce such forgetting by challenging the sleeping brain with vast amounts of to be remembered information. For this, 78 participants learned a very large number of 640 word-pairs interspersed with periods of quiet awake rest over the course of an entire day and then either slept or stayed awake during the night. Recall was tested after another night of regular sleep. Results revealed comparable retention rates between the sleep and wake groups. Although this null-effect can be reconciled with the concept of limited capacities available for sleep-dependent consolidation, it contradicts our hypothesis that sleep would increase forgetting compared to the wake group. Additional exploratory analyses relying on equivalence testing and Bayesian statistics reveal that there is evidence against sleep having a detrimental effect on the retention of declarative memory at high information loads. We argue that forgetting occurs in both wake and sleep states through different mechanisms, i.e., through increased interference and through global synaptic downscaling, respectively. Both of these processes might scale similarly with information load. (shrink)

Math and reading are related, and math problems are often accompanied by problems in reading. In the present study, we used a dimensional approach and we aimed to assess the relationship of reading and math with the cognitive skills assumed to underlie the development of math. The sample included 97 children from 4th and 5th grades of a primary school. Children were administered measures of reading and math, non-verbal IQ, and various underlying cognitive abilities of math. We also included measures (...) of phonological awareness and working memory. Two approaches were undertaken to elucidate the relations of the cognitive skills with math and reading. In the first approach, we examined the unique contributions of math and reading ability, as well as their interaction, to each cognitive ability. In the second approach, the cognitive abilities were taken to predict math and reading. Results from the first set of analyses showed specific effects of math on number sense and number system knowledge, whereas counting was affected by both math and reading. No math-by-reading interactions were observed. In contrast, for phonological awareness, an interaction of math and reading was found. Lower performing children on both math and reading performed disproportionately lower. Results with respect to the second approach confirmed the specific relation of counting, number sense, and number system knowledge to math and the relation of counting to reading but added that each math-related marker contributed independently to math. Following this approach, no unique effects of phonological awareness on math and reading were found. In all, the results show that math is specifically related to counting, number sense, and number system knowledge. The results also highlight what each approach can contribute to an understanding of the relations of the various cognitive correlates with reading and math. (shrink)

This book explores the relationship between cultural psychology and aesthetics, by integrating the historical, theoretical and phenomenological perspectives. It offers a comprehensive discussion of the history of aesthetics and psychology from an international perspective, with contributions by leading researchers from Serbia, Austria, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Brazil. The first section of the book aims at summarizing the debate of where the song comes from. It discusses undeveloped topics, methodological hints, and epistemological questions in the different areas of contemporary psychological sciences. (...) The second section of the book presents concrete examples of case-studies and methodological issues to stimulate further explorations. The book aims to bring art back into psychology, to provide an understanding for the art of psychology. An Old Melody in a New Song will be of interest to advanced students and researchers in the fields of educational and developmental psychology, cultural psychology, history of ideas, aesthetics, and art-based research. (shrink)

The text examines the attempt by Jürgen Habermas to renew the tasks of critical theory. The systematic reconstruction of his writings reveals a system of typical functions: a) the rationalization of instrumental and strategic action in the material reproduction of social systems (social technology); b) the analysis of the pathologies in the symbolic reproduction of the world of life; c) the clarification of the cognitive, value and expressive models in the public sphere; d) the unveiling of false representations that dominate (...) the mainstream (critique of ideology); e) sketching out alternatives to the status quo, through the utopia of a non-reified communicative everyday practice. All these functions actualize the Enlightenment project to place the cultural tradition in the service of civil and social progress. This ambitious program, however, must recognize the limitations of critical theory, with respect to the need for consolation and hope of human existence. The dialogue between philosophy and religion, which marks the last decade of Habermas's reflection, should be understood in this light. (shrink)

In one of his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault observed that, prior to the eighteenth century, ‘population’ was a ‘present-absent’ object in the theories and practices of government. In this paper, I have attempted to reconstruct the genealogical history of proto-demographic thought as reflected in the works of three major Renaissance political theorists: Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Giovanni Botero. While all three thinkers address the question of how to cultivate a large and flourishing population, the primary obstacle (...) to the emergence of a modern conception of population lies in the inability to influence human reproduction directly, an area traditionally regarded as subject to divine will.Botero, however, introduced the possibility of an ‘incentive’ policy, promoting marriage and child-rearing, which foreshadowed the natalist policies later advocated by Mercantilists. The case of ‘population’ and its peculiar ‘presence-absence’ in Renaissance political theories, as interpreted through Foucault’s hypothesis, sheds light on the broader history of scientific objects —objects that are neither ‘discovered’ nor ‘invented’, but rather acquire their reality gradually over centuries through political and scholarly debate. (shrink)

Both sustainability and identity are said to be paradoxical issues in organizations. In this study we look at the paradoxes of corporate sustainability at the individual level by studying the identity work of those managers who hold sustainability-dedicated roles in organizations. Analysing 26 interviews with sustainability managers, we identify three main tensions affecting their identity construction process: the business versus values oriented, the organizational insider versus outsider and the short-term versus long-term focused identity work tensions. When dealing with these tensions, (...) some interviewees express a paradoxical perspective in attempting to accept and maintain the two poles of each of them simultaneously. It emerges in particular that metaphorical reasoning can be used by sustainability managers in varied ways to cope with the tensions of identity work. We read these findings in light of the existing literature on the relation between paradoxes and identity work, highlighting and discussing their implications for both research and practice. (shrink)

This article posits an interpretation of Thomas More’sUtopiathat focuses on the ways in which the nature of justice within a putatively ideal state is illuminated by references to international relations and the law of nations. Like Plato’sRepublic,Utopiauses differences of scale to provide a lens through which to examine the operation in one context of a unitary concept that is more visible elsewhere. Justice is constructed as a single concept; thus, in the same way that Plato uses the justice of thekallipolisto (...) provide insight into the justice of an individual, More uses the justice of the international community to provide a macroscopic perspective on justice as it exists within a sovereign state. Through discussions of trade, diplomacy, war and empire, Utopian understandings of international law and justice are revealed. The ideal organisation of the state is then characterised as one in which the resulting notions of justice, defined as the correct operation of laws that accord with natural law, are institutionalised. (shrink)

Through the interpretations of artwork provided by Hegel, Kant, and Heidegger, the artwork presents itself as complex and often irreducible. The reading offered by Harman, grounded in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), constructs a historically significant interpretation but does not exhaust the problematic nature of artwork represents. Through this article, I have attempted to demonstrate the functionality of the concept of loop applied to artwork, providing general connotations and linguistic tools for interpreting artwork as a loop.

Paul Feyerabend, one of the most original and nonconformist epistemologists of the 20th century, is known for describing science as an essentially anarchic enterprise characterized by different, sometimes contradictory, methods, approaches and ways of reasoning. But it was through his reflections on art and myth that he developed an even more radical view: there are different forms of human thought, each characterized by a different rationality and reality, and science is only one of them. And in intellectual history there is (...) only change, but not progress. (shrink)

Requiring only a background in elementary calculus and elementary mechanics, this book starts with the basics, introduces the most important developments in classical statistical mechanics over the last thirty years, and guides readers to ...

La posibilidad de entender al otro pasa de manera decisiva por la posibilidad de ser otro, de convertirse en otro. Pero ¿podemos nosotros, los animales humanos, entender lo que siente un murciélago, lo que siente una planta o, llevando el argumento al extremo, lo que siente un objeto? ¿Podemos nosotros, los seres humanos, empezar a entender los hiperobjetos a la luz de la imposibilidad de ser otro? Este artículo analiza la imposibilidad de la relación deleuziana del devenir- y la relación (...) con los hiperobjetos. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. (...) This demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core logical constants. (shrink)

Antinaturalistic Strategies in Beyond Good and Evil. Naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought ultimately appeal to two arguments. On the one hand, when tracing various human phenomena back to processes sufficiently explicable by the natural sciences, it would appear that Nietzsche was pursuing a de facto naturalization program. On the other hand, in BGE 230, the need for the naturalization of human beings as a whole is often interpreted as an argument de jure. After outlining some basic features of contemporary naturalism (...) and showing its incompatibility with Nietzsche’s philosophy, I argue in this paper that neither the de jure nor the de facto argument can be understood in a naturalistic sense. The task of “translating man back into nature” in BGE 230 is indeed turned against a point of view held by “old metaphysical bird-catchers.” An analysis of the manuscript and a comparison of it with the preface to HH I, in which this figure is used in the opposite sense, suggests rather that Nietzsche conceives of the renaturalization of the human in a deceptive way, that is, as one of those numerous “snares and nets for unwary birds” scattered throughout his works. Widening this view, a similar dynamic arises with respect to the de facto argument. In the concluding section, I highlight how, in On the Prejudices of Philosophers, certain naturalization operations are countered by as many arguments to the contrary. Such sudden shifts in perspective seem to indicate, at least in Beyond Good and Evil, a desire to subvert naturalism from within. (shrink)

In this article, I argue against negativism in critical theory. Negativism holds that critical theory should avoid appealing to explicit positive normative standards (“the good”) in its social critique. I distinguish between two types of negativism prevalent in critical theory. While dialectical negativism claims that we can approach the good in a negative way, radical negativism rejects such appeals entirely. I then review three motivations for negativism: that appealing to the good is epistemically precarious, normatively inadequate, and unimportant for the (...) project of critical theory. I contend that the arguments for negativism are largely unsuccessful. Some reliable knowledge of human goods is possible, appeals to the good need not be undemocratic or paternalistic, and positive normative standards are crucial for grounding critique and guiding transformation. I conclude that critical theory’s emancipatory aims are undermined by negativism, and that it should embrace appealing to the good in its social critique. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent desiderata set by him. But I show that (...) there are at least two synchronic rational constraints with distinctive and important, although only indirect, diachronic dimensions. Neither of them, however, supports the practical conservatism in the face of normative underdetermination that, according to Bratman, is part and parcel of the diachronic rationality of intention stability. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea of what I call (...) the ‘deep structure’ of intentions. Roughly, this is the idea that the conditional nature of our intentions is only partially made explicit in the expressions we use to communicate our intentions and in the explicit form of our thinking about and reasoning with them. Most conditions that qualify our intentions are part of a deep functional structure that can be evinced by observing the actual psychological functioning of intentions and by considering the rational requirements that they engage. I will argue that the deep structure of intentions is characteristically conditional. Genuinely unconditional intentions are only limiting instances of conditional intentions and their contribution to agency can only be understood in light of this fact. I will conclude by showing that the characteristic conditional structure of intentions is intimately related to distinctive features of human agency, especially to its unity over time. (shrink)

It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...) to ϕ gives rise to a defeasible exclusionary reason to ϕ. This reason is grounded on the default authority that is normally granted to one’s prior self as an “expert” deliberator. I argue that this kind of exclusionary reason is the only one that can account for the effectiveness of future-directed decisions at shaping our diachronic agency without violating our autonomy over time. (shrink)

"Habermas introduces the concept of “reconstructive science” with a double purpose: to place the “general theory of society” between philosophy and social science and reestablish the rift between the “great theorization” and the “empirical research”. The model of “rational reconstructions” represents the main thread of the surveys about the “structures” of the life-world (“culture”, “society” and “personality”) and their respective “functions” (cultural reproductions, social integrations and socialization). For this propose, the dialectics between “symbolic representation” of “the structures subordinated to all (...) worlds of life” (“internal relationships”) and the “material reproduction” of the social systems in their complex (“external relationships” between social systems and environment) has to be considered. This model finds an application, above all, in the “theory of the social evolution”, starting from the reconstruction of the necessary conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-cultural-life forms (the “hominization”) until an analysis of the development of “social formations”, which Habermas subdivides into primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. This paper is an attempt, primarily, to formalize the model of “reconstruction of the logic of development” of “social formations” summed up by Habermas through the differentiation between vital world and social systems (and, within them, through the “rationalization of the life-world” and the “growth in complexity of the social systems”). Secondly, it tries to offer some methodological clarifications about the “explanation of the dynamics” of “historical processes” and, in particular, about the “theoretical meaning” of the evolutional theory’s propositions. Even if the German sociologist considers that the “ex-post rational reconstructions” and “the models system/environment” cannot have a complete “historiographical application”, these certainly act as a general premise in the argumentative structure of the “historical explanation”.". (shrink)

Pictures are created objects that have the function of generating a perceptual experience. In this sense, they are “experiential artifacts” (Terrone forthcoming). The experience elicited by pictures – usually visual (but for non-visual pictorial experience see e.g. Lopes 1997) – is a composite perceptual experience, in which the “perception” of the depicted scene (which is not in front of us) is generated by and experienced along the perception of the marked surface (the object that is actually in front of us). (...) This experience is usually called a “pictorial experience”. A philosophical analysis of such an experience amounts to answering the following questions: How should we describe the phenomenology of pictorial experience? What is it like to experience pictures? How should the “perception” of the depicted scene be characterized? Is it really a form of perception? How does it relate to the perception of the marked surface? (shrink)

Wright claims that “the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference”. In this paper I follow Wright’s recommendation, but I consider a different epistemology of logic, namely anti-exceptionalism. Anti-exceptionalism’s main contention is that logic is not a priori, and that the choice between rival logics should be based on abductive criteria such as simplicity, adequacy to the data, strength, fruitfulness, and consistency. This paper’s goal is to lay down the foundations for (...) an application of the anti-exceptionalist methodology to abstraction principles. In Sect. 1 I outline my strategy. I show that anti-exceptionalism has a bearing on the so-called Bad Company problem (Sect. 2), and explore some versions of anti-exceptionalism about abstraction (Sect. 3). I then consider new criteria for choosing between rival abstraction principles, and, in particular, between consistent revisions of Frege’s Basic Law V (Sect. 4). I finally consider how the abstractionist can compare between competing criteria (Sect. 5), and argue that anti-exceptionalists should be pluralists about abstraction (Sect. 6). (shrink)

We examine the issue of entrepreneurial gender bias by focusing on the underlying mechanisms that impact the likelihood of receiving external venture-capital financing. We claim that gender bias negatively affects socially attributed dimensions (such as the stigma ascribed to entrepreneurs who have previously suffered a failure), while it has no effect on objective dimensions (such as the experience gained by entrepreneurs). Our results, based on 2088 US firms, show that female entrepreneurs are less likely to attract external funds if they (...) have previously encountered failure. This negative effect becomes less impactful when novel or serial successful entrepreneurs are considered. Consequently, novel or serial successful entrepreneurs are expected to suffer less from gender bias if compared to peers who experienced a failure during their entrepreneurial career. (shrink)

Developing a suggestion by Russell, Prawitz showed how the usual natural deduction inference rules for disjunction, conjunction and absurdity can be derived using those for implication and the second order quantifier in propositional intuitionistic second order logic NI\. It is however well known that the translation does not preserve the relations of identity among derivations induced by the permutative conversions and immediate expansions for the definable connectives, at least when the equational theory of NI\ is assumed to consist only of (...) \- and \-equations. On the basis of the categorial interpretation of NI\, we introduce a new class of equations expressing what in categorial terms is a naturality condition satisfied by the transformations interpreting NI\-derivations. We show that the Russell–Prawitz translation does preserve identity of proof with respect to the enriched system by highlighting the fact that naturality corresponds to a generalized permutation principle. Finally we sketch how these results could be used to investigate the properties of connectives definable in the framework of higher-level rules. (shrink)