Leibniz denies Spinoza’s claim that all possible things actually exist. He also denies necessitarianism, Spinoza’s claim that all truths are necessary truths. Both denials seem plausible. What is surprising, however, is Leibniz’s view that the first claim entails the second, i.e., that the existence of all possible things implies necessitarianism. Why think this? Couldn’t it be that, as a matter of contingent fact, all possible things actually exist? There seems to be no incoherency in claiming both that all possible things (...) actually exist and that fewer things could have existed. In this paper, I explain why Leibniz thought that such a position is indeed inconsistent. My thesis is that the Principle of Sufficient Reason plays a decisive role in his reasoning. Leibniz claims that the non-existence of a thing requires a sufficient reason. He also holds that if all possible things can coexist, such a reason cannot be given. Together these claims rule out a scenario in which all possible things actually exist, but only contingently so. (shrink)

The “Model for Reaching Ethical Judgments in the context of Modern Technologies — the Case of Genetic Technology”, which is presented here, has arisen from the project “Ethical Criteria bearing upon Decisions taken in the field of Biotechnology”. This project has been pursued since 1991 in the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Technikforschung (ZIT) of the Technical University of Darmstadt, with the purpose of examining decision-making in selected activities involving the production of transgenic plants that have a useful application. The model is (...) the basis of an outline for interviews to investigate how far decisions concerning the development of such plants with genetic techniques take ethical criteria into account. It was necessary to design this new model because other models for reaching judgments of this kind were not conceptually suited for concrete application. This model represents a problem related approach and combines methodological with substantive typology. In this it differs from comparable models for reaching ethical judgments. (shrink)

As a practicing clinical nurse, a phenomenon I experienced at times was the sudden acute sense that something was going wrong with a person in care at the sub‐critical unit in the hospital where I worked. In fact, many hospital nurses have their story of “something's not right” in relation to a person they were caring for/with, in that the day started with them on a coherent path to healing and then suddenly the nurse feels something is going very wrong, (...) and yet there is nothing observable that would justify such a feeling. This feeling would be called “intuition” by many nurses, a concept most notably theorized in nursing by Patricia Benner in her extensive program of scholarship. Benner defines intuition as “understanding without rationale.” Benner opposes embodied intuition and rational abstract reasoning and creates criteria for the use of each by nursing depending on whether the clinical situation is familiar or novel. The philosophical idea is that the new must be reasoned with a different mode of thought than the familiar. Charles Sanders Peirce was a philosopher of reasoning. He defined logic as the theory of reasoning, which by the end of his career he was declaring was only another name for semiotic. Peirce argued that all reasoning/semiosis is done through signs, or more accurately sign‐activity. Semiotic is the philosophical schema providing the concepts and methods by which semiosis ‐ reasoning ‐ happens. Importantly, semiotic does not oppose different modes of thought, and conceptualizes reasoning as a process that functions in familiar as well as novel situations. In this paper I describe Peirce's philosophy of semiotic. I then provide an example relevant to nursing by conducting a semiosis of the nursing scenario above to show how nursing “works chance,” or novelty, in a way that doesn't need to resort to rational abstract reasoning and yet is different than Benner's notion of intuition. (shrink)

My purpose in this short response to Clinton's interesting article On Bender's orientation to models: Towards a philosophical debate on covering laws, theory, emergence and mechanisms in nursing science, which is published in this issue, is not to provide any counterargument to Clinton's interpretation of my own argument; readers are welcome to interrogate both articles at their leisure and make their own conclusions. What I will do instead is provide a brief critical assessment of my own (il)logic re bringing (...) in the notion of mechanism as conceived by Machamer, Darden and Craver into an argument for models versus theories as a carrier of nursing knowledge. (shrink)

Cognitive science thrives on the diversity of its (sub‐)disciplines, and topiCS is the ideal journal for bringing the diversity to bear. In this welcome address as its incoming Executive Editor, I outline my view of the journal and my vision for how to sustain its inviting and integrative power.

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles —the principle that no two numerically distinct things are perfectly similar—features prominently in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Despite its centrality to his philosophical system, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what modal status Leibniz ascribes to the PII. On many occasions Leibniz appears to endorse the necessity of the PII. There are a number of passages,however, where Leibniz seems to imply that numerically distinct indiscernibles are possible, which suggests that he subscribes to a merely contingent (...) version of the PII. In this paper I attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency. I argue that Leibniz consistently takes the PII to be necessary and that this view of his shines through even in his correspondence with Clarke. I also show that competing interpretations, on which Leibniz’s PII is contingent, misread a number of crucial passages from this correspondence. (shrink)

The history of Physical Science appears to exhibit, periodically, a race between the acmulation of data and the ability of its codification to find a natural place for much of the empirical findings. If the codifying scheme is a mathematical theory, capable of interpolation and extrapolation, according to the rules of the particular branch of mathematics employed, the ablest handlers of the theory are frequently confronted with a situation in which mathematical computation alone does not suffice. In such a situation (...) the introduction of symbols, whose interpretation is not direct and simple is resorted to. This symbol is usually involved in a mathematical relation by a species of reasoning, which may be somewhat unfamiliar and remote from customary habits of thought. It is generally accepted as physically valid, if the mathematical formulation which involves it can produce results which account for the mass of data uncovered by experimenters. As an example of such a procedure we may mention the case of the Schrödinger Ψ-symbol, a symbol which was involved in Schrödinger's famous matter wave equation. The successes which such a theory enjoyed, particularly, in its initial stages, in formally relating the relative positions and intensities of spectral lines, with the atomistic concepts of gross matter which were inferred from the data of macroscopic measurement, such as the atomic mass, the electronic charge, Planck quantum of action, etc.,—these successes, gave a certain physical dignity to the Ψ-function itself. This dignity was further enhanced by the disclosure, by Schrödinger, of four functions of the Ψ-symbol which held the same place in the “continuity equation” as the classical charge density and the three components of current density. The successes accompanying this discovery for spectroscopic problems, in particular, are well known to Physicists. (shrink)

This book explores different accounts of powers and abilities in early modern philosophy. It analyzes powers and abilities as a package, hopefully enabling us to better understand them both and to see similarities as well as dissimilarities. While some prominent early modern accounts of power have been studied in detail, this volume covers lesser-known thinkers and several early modern women philosophers. The volume also investigates early modern accounts of powers and abilities in a more systematic fashion than has been previously (...) done. By broadening its scope in these ways, the volume uncovers trends and tendencies in early modern thinking about powers and abilities that are easy to miss. The chapters explore how twenty-two early modern thinkers approached the following questions: What kind of entities are powers and abilities? Are they reducible to something categorical or not? What is the relation between powers and abilities? Is there a fundamental metaphysical difference between them or not? How do we know what powers objects have and what abilities agents have? Are human abilities in any way special? How do they relate to the abilities non-human animals have? And how do they relate to the powers of inanimate objects? Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in the history of early modern philosophy, in metaphysics, and in the history of science. (shrink)

Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances. Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can (...) the having of reflective acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of necessary and eternal truths? The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is, according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self- consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences. This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and rationality are connected with each other. (shrink)

Most research on aggression and delinquency concentrates on risk factors. There has been less attention for protective factors and mechanisms, in particular with regard to biosocial influences. Based on theories of autonomous arousal and stress reactance the present study addresses the influence of adrenocortical activity as a risk and/or protective factor in the development of antisocial behavior in children. We also investigated relations to anxiousness and family stressors. In a prospective longitudinal study of 150 German boys, the first measurement took (...) place at preschool age and contained an assessment of cortisol after waking up and 30 min later. Aggressiveness and anxiousness of the children were assessed by the kindergarten teachers with the Social Behavior Questionnaire. After 6 years, the children's behavior was rated by the teachers in middle school. Variable-oriented data analyses revealed a significant correlation between the total amount of cortisol after waking up and 30 min later and anxiousness both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, but not with aggressiveness. A family stress index correlated positively with aggressiveness but neither with cortisol nor with anxiousness. There were significant correlations between aggressiveness and anxiousness at kindergarten age and the respective behavior problems 6 years later. In a linear regression analysis on aggression only family stress had a significant effect but anxiousness not. Moderator analyses on aggressiveness with anxiousness and AUCG or on AUCG with anxiousness and aggressiveness did not show any significant interactions. Longitudinally, only aggression significantly predicted aggression 6 years later in a linear regression. In addition to variable-oriented analyses, we also applied a person-oriented approach to investigate specific patterns of behavior. Children who were high in both aggressiveness and anxiousness had the highest cortisol level and those with low anxiousness and high aggressiveness the lowest. The groups with different patterns of externalizing and internalizing problems at preschool age showed significant differences in aggression 6 years later. Our results underline the need for complex pattern analyses on cortisol, aggression, and anxiousness in children and for a differentiated consideration of emotional reactive aggression and unemotional instrumental aggression. (shrink)

Leibniz defends two apparently inconsistent doctrines. On the one hand, he holds that substances are independent entities and that God can, at least in principle, create any possible substance whatsoever no matter what else he creates. On the other hand, Leibniz insists that some possible substances are incompossible with one another and thus cannot coexist. I first discuss three attempts of dealing with this tension in Leibniz’s work that have recently been made in the literature: the logical approach, the lawful (...) approach, and McDonough’s tiling approach. I conclude that none of them solves the problem satisfactorily. I then argue that a modified version of the lawful approach, which also takes into account some of the insights of the two other options, is the most promising strategy. I believe that it is crucial to realize that it is, at least in principle, in God’s power to co-create incompossible substances. I do not take this to imply, however, that such substances can coexist. Since coexistence requires being in the same world, and because not all collections of possible substances are worlds in Leibniz’s sense, I argue that co-creation does not entail coexistence. Thus in order to get clear on Leibniz’s conception of compossibility, I suggest that we must better understand what a possible world is for Leibniz. What does it mean, then, for a collection of possible substances to form a world? I argue, first, that all complete concepts of the relevant possible substances need to have the same laws inscribed in them this is in line with some versions of the lawful approach). In addition, I argue that every complete concept in the relevant collection must also involve the concept of every other substance in the collection. Moreover, I maintain that these two requirements are not reducible to each other and that they are individually necessary and only jointly sufficient for a collection of substances to form a world. Only substances whose complete concepts fulfill both conditions can coexist and thus be compossible. (shrink)

Tomasello argues in the target article that, in generalizing the concrete obligations originating from interdependent collaboration to one's entire cultural group, humans become “ultra-cooperators.” But are all human populations cooperative in similar ways? Based on cross-cultural studies and my own fieldwork in Polynesia, I argue that cooperation varies along several dimensions, and that the underlying sense of obligation is culturally modulated.

In their recent paper on “Challenges in mathematical cognition”, Alcock and colleagues (Alcock et al. [2016]. Challenges in mathematical cognition: A collaboratively-derived research agenda. Journal of Numerical Cognition, 2, 20-41) defined a research agenda through 26 specific research questions. An important dimension of mathematical cognition almost completely absent from their discussion is the cultural constitution of mathematical cognition. Spanning work from a broad range of disciplines – including anthropology, archaeology, cognitive science, history of science, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology – we (...) argue that for any research agenda on mathematical cognition the cultural dimension is indispensable, and we propose a set of exemplary research questions related to it. (shrink)

Bender, Robert The USA constitution does not have a clause requiring any separation of church and state and until 1948 there were no Supreme Court rulings to ensure that this was seen as a basic constitutional principle. Then in 1945 Vashti McCollum, a 33-year-old part-time squaredancing teacher from Champaign, Illinois, initiated a legal action that changed all that.

On Berkeley’s immaterialist ontology, there are only two kinds of created entities: finite spirits and ideas. Ideas are passive, and so there is no genuine idea-idea causation. Finite spirits, by contrast, are truly causally active on Berkeley’s view, in that they can produce ideas through their volitional activity. Some commentators have argued that this account of causation is inconsistent. On their view, the unequal treatment of spirits and ideas is unfounded, for all that can be observed in either case are (...) mere patterns of regularity; Berkeley should therefore adopt a full-blown occasionalism and follow Malebranche in holding that God is the only true cause. Other commentators have argued that Berkeley denies the tenet that causes necessitate their effects – that is, the idea that causation involves necessary connection – and that in this way he can avoid inconsistency. This paper argues that Berkeley can subscribe to the thesis that finite spirits are truly causally active without falling into inconsistency, even if it is granted that Berkeleyan causes necessitate their effects. His differing treatment of spirits and of ideas is well founded, since ideas are transparent in a way our notions of spirits are not. (shrink)

In this blog entry, which addresses a broader audience, I wonder what exactly historians of philosophy do and how their work relates to non-historical work in philosophy. In particular, I raise the question why systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are relatively close to each other. After all, they often publish in the same journals and work at the same departments. This is surprising, given that asking what X is seems to be rather different from asking what some person a (...) few hundred (or thousand) years ago thought what X is. I argue that systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are so close because their work proceeds in a similar way. To be sure, they have very different starting points. Historians of philosophy may start, for instance, with a number of texts from one and the same author which appear to be in conflict. Systematic philosophers, in contrast, may start with a set of intuitions which seem to contradict one other. The way historians of philosophy and systematic philosophers operate upon those different starting points, however, is very similar. This explains at least in part, I maintain, why they are a lot closer than is the case in many other disciplines. (shrink)

We have synthesized a 582,970-base pair Mycoplasma genitalium genome. This synthetic genome, named M. genitalium JCVI-1.0, contains all the genes of wild-type M. genitalium G37 except MG408, which was disrupted by an antibiotic marker to block pathogenicity and to allow for selection. To identify the genome as synthetic, we inserted "watermarks" at intergenic sites known to tolerate transposon insertions. Overlapping "cassettes" of 5 to 7 kilobases (kb), assembled from chemically synthesized oligonucleotides, were joined by in vitro recombination to produce intermediate (...) assemblies of approximately 24 kb, 72 kb ("1/8 genome"), and 144 kb ("1/4 genome"), which were all cloned as bacterial artificial chromosomes in Escherichia coli. Most of these intermediate clones were sequenced, and clones of all four 1/4 genomes with the correct sequence were identified. The complete synthetic genome was assembled by transformation-associated recombination cloning in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, then isolated and sequenced. A clone with the correct sequence was identified. The methods described here will be generally useful for constructing large DNA molecules from chemically synthesized pieces and also from combinations of natural and synthetic DNA segments. 10.1126/science.1151721. (shrink)

This German paper investigates what kinds of abilities Leibniz ascribes to non-human animals and how they differ from the abilities he ascribes to humans. The paper attempts to clarify how the notions of perception, apperception, reflection, and conscientia are related for Leibniz. More specifically, the paper develops a new reading of section four of the Principles of Nature and Grace, which is a much-discussed passage in Leibniz scholarship. It argues for two claims: (i) Leibniz distinguishes between a reflective and a (...) non-reflective kind of apperception. (ii) Leibnizian conscientia is not to be confused with (phenomenal) consciousness, because it includes a reflective element, from which it follows that non-human animals do not have conscientia according to Leibniz. (shrink)