Recent third person approaches to thought experiments and conceptual analysis through the method of surveys are motivated by and motivate skepticism about the traditional first person method. I argue that such surveys give no good ground for skepticism, that they have some utility, but that they do not represent a fundamentally new way of doing philosophy, that they are liable to considerable methodological difficulties, and that they cannot be substituted for the first person method, since the a priori knowledge which (...) is our object in conceptual analysis can be acquired only from the first person standpoint. (shrink)

It is natural to think that our ordinary practices in giving explanations for our actions, for what we do, commit us to claiming that content properties are causally relevant to physical events such as the movements of our limbs and bodies, and events which these in turn cause. If you want to know why my body ambulates across the street, or why my arm went up before I set out, we suppose I have given you an answer when I say (...) that I wanted to greet a friend on the other side of the street, and thought that my arm's going up would be interpreted by him as a signal to stop for a moment. This widely held view might be disputed, but I shall not argue for it in this paper. I want to start with the view that our beliefs and desires and other propositional attitudes are causally relevant, in virtue of their modes and particular contents, to our movements, in order to investigate the consequences for analyses of thought content. For this purpose, I argue, in sec. II, for three necessary conditions on causal relevance: (a) a nomic sufficiency condition, (b) a logical independence condition, and (c) a screening-off condition. In sec. III, I apply these conditions to relational and functional theories of thought content, arguing that these theories cannot accommodate the causal relevance of content properties to our behaviour. I argue further that, on two plausible assumptions, one about the dependence of the mental on the physical, and the other about the availability in principle of causal explanations of our movements in terms of our non-relational physical properties, content properties can be causally relevant only if they are nomically type-correlated, relative to certain circumstances, with non-relational physical properties of our bodies. In sec. IV, I respond to a number of objections that might be advanced against this conclusion. (shrink)

In cultural history the human body has been the object of a great variety of opposing valuations, ranging from "imago dei" to "the devil's tool". At present, the body is commonly regarded as a mere means to fulfill the wishes of its "owner". According to these wishes it can be technically improved in an unlimited way. Against this view the text argues for a conception of the human body as a valuable "common heritage". The "normal" human body as the result (...) of natural and cultural history is an essential condition of the modern social and legal order. The consequences of its technical alteration should be the subject of public debates and common decisions. (shrink)

The confounding effects of heterogeneity in biological psychiatry and psychiatric genetics have been widely discussed in the literature. We suggest an approach in which heterogeneity may be put to use in hypothesis testing, and may find application in evaluation of the Crespi & Badcock (C&B) imprinting hypothesis. Here we consider three potential sources of etiologic subtypes for analysis.

Der alle drei Jahre tagende Kongress der „Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie“ (DGPhil) ist der größte Kongress für Philosophie in Deutschland. Vom 11.-15. September fand er diesmal an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in München statt. Mit rund 1600 Teilnehmern und über 400 philosophischen Vorträgen fiel er, auch durch den Veranstaltungsort bedingt, wesentlich umfangreicher aus als der XXI. Kongress in Essen.

The notion of natural kinds has been widely criticized in philosophy of science but also appears indispensable for philosophical engagement with classificatory practices. Rather than addressing this tension through a new definition of “natural kind”, this article suggests materiality as a substitute for naturalness in philosophical debates about scientific classification. It is argued that a theory of material kinds provides an alternative and more inclusive entry point for analyzing classificatory practices, which is specified through an account of “restricted malleability” of (...) materiality and further analyzed as (1) gradual, (2)multi-dimensional, (3) scalable, (4) interactive, and (5) purpose sensitive. Such 1. (shrink)

Abstract“Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response” (ASMR) refers to a sensory‐emotional experience that was first explicitly identified and named within the past two decades in online discussion boards. Since then, there has been mounting psychological and neural evidence of a clustering of properties common to the phenomenon of ASMR, including convergence on the set of stimuli that trigger the experience, the properties of the experience itself, and its downstream effects. Moreover, psychological instruments have begun to be developed and employed in an attempt (...) to measure it. Based on this empirical work, we make the case that despite its nonscientific origins, ASMR is a good candidate for being a real kind in the cognitive sciences. The phenomenon appears to have a robust causal profile and may also have an adaptive evolutionary history. We also argue that a more thorough understanding of the distinctive type of phenomenal experience involved in an ASMR episode can shed light on the functions of consciousness, and ultimately undermine certain “cognitive” theories of consciousness. We conclude that ASMR should be the subject of more extensive scientific investigation, particularly since it may also have the potential for therapeutic applications. (shrink)

Immanuel Kants "Grundlegung" ist ohne Zweifel einer der bedeutendsten Texte der abendlandischen Moralphilosophie. Sie gilt mitunter allerdings auch als einer der "dunkelsten" Texte Kants - wenn nicht sogar der abendlandischen Philosophie uberhaupt. Der Kommentar macht deutlich, dass die vorgebliche Dunkelheit im Wesentlichen der Tatsache geschuldet ist, dass der Text seit langem im Schatten der falschen Annahme gelesen wird, Kant wolle eine Begrundung (oder Rechtfertigung) des Sittengesetzes liefern, um damit den moralischen Skeptizismus abzuwehren. Liest man ihn stattdessen unter der (auch historisch (...) angemesseneren) Perspektive, dass Kant mit dem kategorischen Imperativ 'nur' eine neue Formel fur das Prinzip der allgemein im Schwange gehenden Sittlichkeit 'angeben und rechtfertigen' will, um so den moralischen Eudaimonismus durch eine Moral der Autonomie zu ersetzen - dann zeigt sich, dass der Text nicht bloss ein philosophisches, sondern zugleich ein schriftstellerisches Meisterwerk ist. (shrink)

El Concilio Vaticano II ofrece una teología del diaconado, al aludir a la condición diaconal de toda la Iglesia y, más en concreto, del ministerio ordenado. Esta diakonía se expresa pues en clave de servicio, y no de poder. En este artículo se responde a la pregunta de cuál es la diferencia con un laico, quien puede desempeñar funciones muy parecidas. La condición sacramental del diaconado ha sido enseñada siempre por la Tradición y el Magisterio de la Iglesia, mientras que (...) la doctrina del “carácter diaconal” como representación in persona Christi Servi sería más bien un desarrollo del magisterio posconciliar. El Concilio ha afirmado que el diácono ha sido ordenado non ad sacerdotium sed ad ministerium, para expresar la colaboración con los obispos, con sus presbíteros y con todo el Pueblo de Dios. Sirve a la mesa de los pobres, a la Mesa de la Palabra y a la Mesa eucarística. Su misión consiste en crear las condiciones para que la comunidad local se convierta en Iglesia y pueda así contar con e. (shrink)

The context in which the author places the concept of substantial morality (Sittlichkeit) is the history of Athens from about 490 to 430 B.C. This facilitates the understanding of a (political) way of life that is quite foreign to us in modern times. This also makes the concept of modern post-traditional morality, which plays a central role in the discussion of Hegel today, easier to understand. The concept of morality as a political category of social interaction thus becomes more vivid. (...) As knowledge in historical and classical philological research has advanced, not every statement of Hegel's remains as meaningful and usable. A language of one's own, which does not just shimmy from Hegel quotation to Hegel quotation, facilitates understanding. (shrink)

Nei Princìpi della filosofia dell'avvenire (1843) Feuerbach ricostruisce la genealogia dell'idealismo, mostrando il legame tra teologia e forme filosofiche sostenuto già nelle Tesi provvisorie per una riforma della filosofia. Tuttavia non si ferma ad una lettura, pur geniale, della storia della filosofia, ma prospetta una nuova soluzione del problema ontologico che eviti il vuoto di soggetto in cui incorre la logica di Hegel: l'essere non è solo pensato ma esperito come altro rispetto al pensiero.Feuerbach propone una nozione positiva della sensibilità, (...) uno sguardo rinnovato che pone la causa del desiderio umano nel campo del visibile. Andare oltre Hegel non significa infatti recuperare il concetto romantico di sentimento, ma riconoscere la positività del reale.Nei Princìpi Feuerbach si interroga sugli effetti a lungo termine della verità. Il destinatario di questo manifesto filosofico non è l'uditorio universitario ma l'umanità futura. Qui l'universalità emerge come piano dell'intersoggettività. Solo dopo aver destituito l'Assoluto come soggetto, l'uomo incontra l'altro come simile: finito nella sua esistenza corporea, ma infinito nel genere in quanto umanità. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author uses the term ′ethics′ in a slightly wider sense, in a sense which includes an essential part of what is generally called ‘aesthetics’. The author says ′Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important’, or ‘Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living’. If one looks at all these phrases, a rough idea is obtained (...) as to what it is that ethics is concerned with. Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable can be no science. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which the author personally cannot help respecting deeply. (shrink)

Neste texto, refero-me principalmente à forma madura da Ciência da Lógica, isto é, ao seu primeiro livro da edição revista do ano 1832. O objetivo de meu trabalho reside em demonstrar que a ilustração do problema do início da filosofia por Hegel é indiretamente uma chave para o entendimento da ideia fundamental de sua concepção da lógica como método científico da filosofia. Para atingir esse objetivo exponho, em primeiro lugar, as principais ideias do programa de Hegel por uma revisão da (...) lógica, da metafísica e da filosofia completa, em contraste à lógica tradicional. Depois ofereço uma interpretação da declaração da dificuldade em encontrar um início lógico na filosofia, que reside em que resolver o problema de unir o método ao conteúdo, a forma ao princípio. Essa interpretação deve mostrar no qual sentido o início vale sem pressuposto. Esse entendimento nega a possibilidade de começar a filosofia com algo hipotética e problematicamente verdadeiro como é o procedimento comum na matemática. Por meio da análise daquele problema ilustrado especialmente pelo exemplo da crítica hegeliana à compreensão da natureza da relação entre o ser puro e a sua alteração necessária em Jacobi, tento encontrar um acesso para o entendimento do método lógico de Hegel, na medida em que o momento da negatividade enquanto princípio do modo de determinar e, com isso, do conteúdo, resultam necessariamente da indeterminidade do ser como a mais pensável abstração. Esse resultado surge pela necessidade, por qual o ser puro provoca a sua própria mudança para o devir um desenvolvimento que Jacobi desmente por princípio para ficar parado na abstração unilateral e falsa. Assim, a indeterminidade enquanto algo contrário é mesmo o determinado ou o negativo, isto é, o negativo puro, inteiramente abstrato, em outras palavras: O ser como resultado da perfeita abstração é negatividade abstrata, o nada. Mas essa negatividade é o princípio e o método da determinação e do conhecer na lógica e na filosofia como ciência. (shrink)

Der Reader versammelt programmatische Ansätze der kulturwissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der Evidenz aus dem Blickpunkt der Sprach-, Geschichts-, Kunst- und Literaturwissenschaft, Medientheorie, Anthropologie und Soziologie. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von Rüdiger Campe, Iris Daermann, Egon Flaig, Peter Geimer, Vinzenz Hediger, Caspar Hirschi, Ludwig Jäger, Albrecht Koschorke, Helmut Lethen, Jakob Moser, Inka Mülder-Bach, Jan-Dirk Müller, Karl Schlögel, Florian Sprenger, Jakob Tanner, Marcus Twellmann, Juliane Vogel und Claus Zittel.