That brings me to the crux of my disagreement with Hillis Miller. The central contention is not simply that I am sometimes, or always, wrong in my interpretation, but instead that I—like other traditional historians—can never be right in my interpretation. For Miller assents to Nietzsche's challenge of "the concept of 'rightness' in interpretation," and to Nietzsche's assertion that "the same text authorizes innumerable interpretations : there is no 'correct' interpretation."1 Nietzsche's views of interpretation, as Miller says, are relevant to (...) the recent deconstructive theorists, including Jacques Derrida and himself, who have "reinterpreted Nietzsche" or have written "directly or indirectly under his aegis." He goes on to quote a number of statements from Nietzsche's The Will to Power to the effect, as Miller puts it, "that reading is never the objective identifying of a sense but the importation of meaning into a text which had no meaning 'in itself.'" For example: "Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them." "In fact interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something."2 On the face of it, such sweeping deconstructive claims might suggest those of Lewis Carroll's linguistic philosopher, who asserted that meaning is imported into a text by the interpreter's will to power: "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things.""The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all." But of course I don't believe that such deconstructive claims are, in Humpty Dumpty fashion, simply dogmatic assertions. Instead, they are conclusions which are derived from particular linguistic premises. I want, in the time remaining, to present what I make out to be the elected linguistic premises, first of Jacques Derrida, then of Hillis Miller, in the confidence that if I misinterpret these theories, my errors will soon be challenged and corrected. Let me eliminate suspense by saying at the beginning that I don't think that their radically skeptical conclusions from these premises are wrong. On the contrary, I believe that their conclusions are right—in fact, they are infallibly right, and that's where the trouble lies. · 1. "Tradition and Difference," Diacritics 2 : 8, 12.· 2. Ibid. M. H. Abrams’s contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World is a famous dystopia, frequently called upon in public discussions about new biotechnology. It is less well known that 30 years later Huxley also wrote a utopian novel, called Island. This paper will discuss both novels focussing especially on the role of psychopharmacological substances. If we see fiction as a way of imagining what the world could look like, then what can we learn from Huxley’s novels about psychopharmacology and how does that relate to the (...) discussion in the ethical and philosophical literature on this subject? The paper argues that in the current ethical discussion the dystopian vision on psychopharmacology is dominant, but that a comparison between Brave New World and Island shows that a more utopian view is possible as well. This is illustrated by a discussion of the issue of psychopharmacology and authenticity. The second part of the paper draws some further conclusions for the ethical debate on psychopharmacology and human enhancement, by comparing the novels not only with each other, but also with our present reality. It is claimed that the debate should not get stuck in an opposition of dystopian and utopian views, but should address important issues that demand attention in our real world: those of evaluation and governance of enhancing psychopharmacological substances in democratic, pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Clinical and research practices designed by developed countries are often implemented in host nations of the Third World. In recent years, a number of papers have presented a diversity of arguments to justify these practices which include the defence of research with placebos even though best proven treatments exist; the distribution of drugs unapproved in their country of origin; withholding of existing therapy in order to observe the natural course of infection and disease; redefinition of equipoise to a more bland (...) version, and denial of post-trial benefits to research subjects. These practices have all been prohibited in developed, sponsoring countries, even though they invariably have pockets of poverty where conditions comparable to the Third World prevail. Furthermore, the latest update of the Declaration of Helsinki clearly decries double ethical standards in research protocols. Under these circumstances, it does not seem appropriate that First World scholars should propose and defend research and clinical practices with less stringent ethical standards than those mandatory in their own countries. Recent years have witnessed frequent reports of less stringent ethical standards being applied to both clinical and research medical practices, for the most part in the field of drug trials and drug marketing, initiated by developed countries in poorer nations. Still more unsettling, a number of articles have endorsed the policy of employing ethical norms in these host countries, which would be unacceptable to both the legislations and the moral standards of the sponsor nations. Also, these reformulations often contravene the Declaration of Helsinki or one of its updates. This paper is not so much concerned with the actual practices, which have been subjected to frequent scrutiny and publicly decried when gross misconduct occurred. Rather, my concern relates to the approval and support such practices have found in the literature on bioethics from authors who might be expected to use their energy and scholarship to explore and endorse the universalisability of ethics rather than to develop ad hoc arguments that would allow exceptions and variations from accepted moral standards. To this purpose, issue will be taken with arguments in three fields: medical and pharmaceutical practices, research strategies, and local application of research results. (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

This brief reply gives a few references and clarifies some points in order to emphasize that a number of Professor Seedhouse's assertions are debatable and that his criticism of slovenly scholarship and his unbridled ad hominem argumentation are out of place and easily refuted.

Peckham claims that my "behavior" in dealing with the quotations in Natural Supernaturalism is the same, in methodology and validity, as the interpretative behavior of Booth's waiter. But the great bulk of the utterances in my quotations—and no less, of the utterances constituting Peckham's own essay—do not consist of orders, requests, or commands. Instead, they consist of assertions, descriptions, judgments, exclamations, approbations, condemnations, and many other kinds of speech-acts, the meanings of which are not related to my interpretative behavior, even (...) in the indirect way in which the meaning of Booth's order is related to the future behavior of his waiter. M. H. Abrams, author of Natural Supernaturalism and The Mirror and the Lamp and Class of 1916 Professor of English at Cornell University, responds in this essay to Morse Peckham's "The Infinitude of Pluralism" . Morse Peckham, in his Critical Response, was commenting on issues raised by the forum on "The Limits of Pluralism" , to which M. H. Abrams contributed. Previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "The Deconstructive Angel". (shrink)

Informed consent has become one of the central problems in medical ehtics. At first sight, it would seem that no argument can be made against a person's right to be fully aware of the extent, course, and implications of his medical condition. It seems equally obvious that it is the patient's right to participate in, influence, or fully and solely assume the decisions of medical actions that should be undertaken or withheld with regard to his disease. Nevertheless, there are circumstances (...) in which these commonly held assumptions about a patient's rights may not apply. It is the purpose of this report to describe a case where informed consent was deliverately not sought, and to discuss the ethical issues involved. (shrink)

The term "interest" lacks a precise antonym. In English, we have "disinterested" and "uninteresting," but we want for a term that denotes robust opposition to interest. The same appears to hold true in every other language (as far as we know). Interest's missing antonym reflects not merely a widespread lexical oversight, but a misrecognition of interest's complete and exact meaning. More importantly, the idea that interest has no opposite expresses a certain refusal to acknowledge the power of the impulse to (...) extinguish interest, for the self and for others. Why then do we foreclose interest's possibility, degrade our (and others') capacities to experience interest, and destroy interest's objects? Why do we decline what interest proffers - which includes creative and subjective being, thinking, and relating - in favor of more primitive modes of survival, thoughtlessness, and nonbeing? Why do relationships - with ourselves, with others, with objects - toward which genuine interest draws us seem sometimes, if not often, unbearable? These questions are difficult. Their answers, even more so. Misinterest: Essays, Pensées, and Dreams attempts to approach them in an honest way, without making them fascinating, mysterious, boring, obscurantist, or fascinatingly mysteriously boringly obscurantist. Outwardly, Misinterest is concerned with dreams and forgetting and Eros and soaring dogs and groups and suicidal suburban teenagers and sex and jury duty and Nazis and fathers and hatred and holy parrots and fundamentalists and plagues and other things that may or may not be interesting. Ultimately, however, it seeks, like Jules Renard, "en restant exact" (in remaining true/real), to shed light on the establishment of misinterest, missingness, and mystery where and when they need not be, and, thus, on the psychic, familial, and political forces that compel us not to be when and where we ought. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Science of Interdisciplinary Research: A Polyocular Framework for Wicked Problems” by Hugo F. Alrøe & Egon Noe. Upshot: Alrøe and Noe are right in addressing Rittel and Webber’s notion of “wicked problems” as crucial for interdisciplinary research. However, I can see neither that they are providing a sufficiently clear understanding of “science” in their concept of a “second-order science of interdisciplinary research,” nor that their “polyocular framework” can contribute anything useful to addressing the (...) practical challenges posed by wicked problems. (shrink)

As out-of-hospital emergencies become more commonplace, so does the call for a “doctor in the house”. New York City paediatrician Mitchell Rubin has responded to numerous such crises over the past 25 years. He explores reactions on all sides of this peculiar physician–victim relationship, his growing concerns and fears, and possible reasons why many doctors hesitate to act. His thoughts and experiences instigate the discussion about the need for a universal system of Good Samaritan physician respondersWhile flying to Italy last (...) spring, the pilot’s voice came over the loudspeaker: “Is there a doctor on board”? How many times have I heard this request in the last 25 years? A passenger had fainted. As I began caring for her, the pilot asked me, “Should we take the plane down?”. Surprised to be given this responsibility, I took my best guess and answered “no”. After a stressful landing, while I gave oxygen to the prostrate woman, we were met by an ambulance on the tarmac. The woman was appreciative and gracious, the pilot scarcely offered thanks, and I began my vacation exhausted.Having been trained as a paediatrician, I have responded to nearly two dozen “Good Samaritan” scenarios, where a person was injured or became critically sick in a public setting. Perhaps I have had more than my fair share, but I wonder if this is an important and mounting phenomenon. With America growing older and more and more people with serious, chronic illnesses remaining active in the community, we should not be surprised to see increasing numbers of out-of-hospital emergencies. And, as this becomes more commonplace, I become less and less certain of the role I—and other physicians like me—should have.When I was young, cocky and fearless, the call to meet an emergency was exciting. Shortly after training, an …. (shrink)

L'auteur distingue entre la vérité constatante et la vérité vécue. Ces deux vérités sont qualitativement distinctes, et elles sont des ennemies archanées, dès qu'elles se trouvent en présence l'une de l'autre. De nos jours elles se combattent sous les noms de rationalisme et antirationalisme. Pourtant elles peuvent sans aucun compromis se transformer en une synthèse. Et cette synthèse se réalise lorsque la vérité constatante aboutit à sa suprême subtilité: l'observation introspective d'idées à tendance universelle (cette observation s'exprime en définitions exactes) (...) et l'introspection du mouvement de ces idées (qui s'exprime en logique exacte). Cette ultime introspection est la tâche de la philosophie. Le sens véritable de la philosophie est donc d'invoquer logiquement l'intuition postlogique. Cette intuition succède nécessairement à la pure logique philosophique et révèle aussi la valeur universelle des idées logiques par une rétrospection clarifiaǹte. (shrink)

In the first Critique Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction and illustrated it with theoretical propositions. As his main aim in that work was to justify synthetic a priori propositions, Kant was able to bring his central questions into relief and discuss the methodology of their solution by contrasting synthetic propositions, such as: “Every event has a cause” with analytic propositions, such as: “Every effect has a cause.” Consequently, few commentators have any difficulty in stating as propositions the propositions Kant is (...) justifying in the first Critique or in pointing out the difficulty of justifying such propositions. (shrink)

The Patient's Charter has been in effect for nearly five years. This article considers the purpose and value of the document through a comparison with the New Jersey Patient Bill of Rights. Patient rights statements have been posted in American hospitals for more than twenty years. However, the New Jersey document and the patient rights programme it established seven years ago, have proven to be economically effective, successful in their representation of patients and enforceable, due to the adoption of state (...) legislation and regulation to oversee the process. Several examples of how the programme works are included in the comparison, with a similar review of The Patient's Charter. In the comparison the author argues that for the programme to succeed as it has done in New Jersey, the government will need to develop legislative backing to ensure enforcement, and an efficient system for monitoring compliance. The programme will need to become credible in the eyes of the health service user. The author suggests this may be best achieved by developing an efficient, accessible and user-friendly means of redress, should the patient consider his or her rights have been violated. A "mish-mash" of quality assurance standards and levels of care which patients can "expect" from the health service providers only serves to distract the health service user from the government's failure to commit the resources that would empower the patients rights portion of The Patient's Charter. (shrink)

McNeilly presents an interesting if not altogether convincing analysis of Hobbes' Leviathan. He argues in introductory chapters that the different accounts of human nature given in The Elements of Law, De Corpore, and Leviathan reveal a development parallel to the development in the Hobbesian notion of science. More particularly, he claims that the theory of science presented in Leviathan is a conventionalist one, taking mathematics as its model. This is in contrast to the self-evidence theory of mathematics and the hypothetico-deductive (...) theory of physics found in De Corpore and it is like the conventionalism of Elements. Using the conventionalist model, Hobbes presents in Leviathan, a science of man which is a formal system of moral and political propositions definitionally true and not "purporting to state truths about human nature." The system of propositions remains true whatever the actual nature of human motivation. Applying his thesis to the various parts of the Leviathan, McNeilly finds Hobbes presenting there a generalized theory of the passions from which the egoism of the earlier works cannot be logically deduced, but is merely a "cautious empirical generalization added to the latter," and not necessary to it. He then shows that notions like power, glory, and felicity of the ethics, and the state of nature, natural law, and obligation of the politics, are reformulated in Leviathan as strictly formal concepts and are logically deduced from the theory of the passions. Material concepts, such as self-preservation, are seen to be expressions of Hobbes' private views and not essential to the system. McNeilly's analyses are lucid and perceptive throughout with the exception of his discussion of the nature of science. Here he imposes upon the writings of Hobbes the contemporary meanings and distinctions instead of working within the tradition of the seventeenth century where the distinctions have not yet been made. A good short English bibliography on Hobbes is appended.--M. M. H. (shrink)

Culture, livelihoods and political-economic status all influence people's perception of introduced and invasive species, shaping perspectives on what sort of management of them, if any, is warranted. Indigenous voices and values are under-represented in scholarly discourse about introduced and invasive species. This paper examines the relationship between the Xeni Gwet'in First Nation (one of six Tsilhqot'in communities) and wild or free-roaming horses in British Columbia, Canada. We outline how Xeni Gwet'in people value horses and experience management actions, contextualising the controversy (...) over wild horses amidst power imbalances in the expression of environmental values. We suggest that Indigenous voices are vital to include when evaluating impacts of controversial species and developing management strategies. (shrink)

This book is a development of ideas originally set out in the author’s well known articles "Basic Actions" and "What We can Do." The announced aim of the book is to isolate a class of actions that are basic in the sense that we do not do them by doing some other action. As Danto expresses it in the preface, he wants to "wash away the contextual features which convert movements into gestures and vest the disposition of limbs with high (...) spiritual significance." Danto compares doing this to eliminating the conceptual or interpretative component of perception so as to leave a purely sensory component. Indeed, the main strategy of this book is to exploit the analogies he sees between knowings and doings: as there are basic actions, so there are basic cognitions, things we know without having to know something else; and as there are things we know only by knowing other things which are evidence for them, so there are things we do only by doing other things which are adequate to cause them. There is also analogy in that descriptions of actions, like ascriptions of knowledge, are intensional—in Danto’s phrase, they have a complex logical structure arising from the fact that they are at once about the world and about somebody’s representation of the world. The things in the world which the descriptions of basic actions are about are physical movements subject to the causal order and identified by their place in this order, but the fact that descriptions of them as actions are intensional means that they also somehow transcend the causal order, and are free. So man, by acting, as by knowing, has a foot in both the physical and spiritual realms.—M.H. (shrink)

This book consists of a series of papers "read and discussed at the first Symposium of Exact Philosophy" at Montreal in 1971. "Exact philosophy," the editor says, means "mathematical philosophy, i.e., philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and mathematics." Judging from the contents, a more accurate statement would be that "exact philosophy" means formal semantics and modal logic. Two thirds of the papers are on these topics. The others include an essay on "Concepts of Randomness" by Peter (...) Kirschenmann; a characteristically difficult paper on "Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations" by Hector Castañeda; a somewhat inexact discursus on "Foundations as a Branch of Mathematics" by William Hatcher with a reply by Charles Castonguay; and a paper by Raimo Tuomela on "Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws", or, more exactly, on Ohmer’s discussion of that topic. The subject’s are highly specialized and their treatment is complex. In addition to those mentioned, other essays are "Matters of Relevance" by Hugues Leblanc, with an answer by Brian Chellas; "Translation and Reduction" by Lars Svenonius; "A Program for the Semantics of Science" by Mario Bunge; "S-P Interrogatives" by Nuel Belnap; "The Logic of Conditional Obligation" by Bas C. Van Frassen with commentary by Harry Beaty; and "The Intuitive Background of Normative Legal Discourse and Its Formalization" by Carlos E. Alchourron.—M.H. (shrink)

In their paper, “Helpful Lessons and Cautionary Tales: How Should COVID-19 Drug Development and Access Inform Approaches to Non-Pandemic Diseases?” Holly Fernandez Lynch and colleagues have present...

As its title implies, this collection of previously published popular essays and lectures by Hare attempts to bridge the gap between analytic ethics and moral and political issues. It succeeds in that endeavor only in so far as it, on the whole, provides some concrete illustrations for students of Hare’s theoretical positions; but the professional philosopher will seek in vain here for anything that is either new or incisive regarding the topics discussed. Worse still is the fact that a few (...) of the essays are so old and out of date that they are misleading to students as regards Hare’s views; for they reflect an obstinateness, and even superficiality, that typifies an earlier period of analytic philosophy but which is not evident in his major and later writings. Thus, for example, in the essay entitled "Nothing Matters," a critique of Camus’ nihilism, Hare argues that people become persuaded that "nothing matters" because of a misunderstanding of the function of the word "matters." Taking it to be the name of some process that things did, rather than seeing that it is used to express the speaker’s concern, they soon begin to wonder what this activity is called "mattering," and, failing to find anything corresponding to it, become easily convinced of the meaninglessness of life! (shrink)

Recent research argues that the use of information and communication technology has created a new channel through which transnational mothers can fulfill their maternal duties from afar. However, the literature pays little attention to the diversity of mothering practices via telecommunication. To fill this gap, our qualitative research on Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong elaborates on the complexity and diversity of transnational mothering via mobile communication by demonstrating three patterns for the performance of maternal duties: intensive, collaborative, and passive (...) mothering. We argue that transnational mothering via telecommunication is shaped by the intersection of mothers’ agency, children’s responses, and substitute caregivers’ role in child care. (shrink)

To localize wheat ESTs on chromosomes, 882 homoeologous group 6-specific ESTs were identified by physically mapping 7965 singletons from 37 cDNA libraries on 146 chromosome, arm, and sub-arm aneuploid and deletion stocks. The 882 ESTs were physically mapped to 25 regions flanked by 23 deletion breakpoints. Of the 5154 restriction fragments detected by 882 ESTs, 2043 were localized to group 6 chromosomes and 806 were mapped on other chromosome groups. The number of loci mapped was greatest on chromosome 6B and (...) least on 6D. The 264 ESTs that detected orthologous loci on all three homoeologs using one restriction enzyme were used to construct a consensus physical map. The physical distribution of ESTs was uneven on chromosomes with a tendency toward higher densities in the distal halves of chromosome arms. About 43% of the wheat group 6 ESTs identified rice homologs upon comparisons of genome sequences. Fifty-eight percent of these ESTs were present on rice chromosome 2 and the remaining were on other rice chromosomes. Even within the group 6 bins, rice chromosomal blocks identified by 1-6 wheat ESTs were homologous to up to 11 rice chromosomes. These rice-block contigs were used to resolve the order of wheat ESTs within each bin. (shrink)