Neuroethics has developed rapidly, driven in large part by developments in neuroscience. This article reviews neuroethics from the standpoint of its growing real-world relevance. It opens up with an analysis of the history of neuroscience that suggests the reason for the emergence of neuroethics now, in the early twenty-first century. It proceeds to survey current applications of neuroscience to diverse real-world problems. Published research in the field of neuromarketing is more focused on academic issues, such as the nature of the (...) brain activity underlying consumer behavior and the accuracy of brain-behavior predictions, than it is on the real-world utility of neuromarketing for improving business. Finally, this article concludes with a discussion of the ethical issues raised by these developments, and outlines three general challenges for society in the age of neuroscience. (shrink)

David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart. I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the intensional) (...) natural language, and show that none of them provide compelling evidence that a counterpart semantics is needed. (shrink)

As a historical figure, Lamarck proves a rather difficult subject. His writings give us few explicit leads to his intellectual debts; nor do they present his theories as the outcome of any sustained course of observations or experimental research; and, what is equally frustrating, it is hard to see how his personal development as a scientific theorist was affected by the dramatic political and social upheavals of the period, in which he took an active and lively interest. And so, with (...) his importance for later writers much clearer than his relationship to those of his own and earlier ages, historians have repeatedly interpreted his works as prophetic of doctrines developed more fully by subsequent generations. No less surprisingly, this facile tactic has provoked a reaction; we have been offered Lamarck as a Stoic, a romantic, harking back to Heraclitus. (shrink)

This paper is a study of the theory of judgement and truth found in the works of F. H. Bradley. Although Bradley's thought underwent some changes during the forty years he wrote on these topics there seems to be only one change, viz. his abandonment of the so-called 'floating ideas' which is of any significance.

The second of these lines seems to be the result of an interpolation designed to spell out the implicit sense of the first. In 241–6 Ion has expressed amazement that Creusa should be weeping at the sight of Apollo's sanctuary, a sight which brings other visitors joy. She prefaces her explanation of this with an assurance which in its transmitted form is elegantly translated by Grégoire: ‘Il n'est point discourtois de ta part, étranger, de marquer ta surprise au sujet de (...) mes pleurs.’ But there are reasons for doubting I the authenticity of line 248: Line 247 is self-sufficient, as is shown by IA 1402: τ μν σόν, νενι, γενναίως χει. This also gives the closest parallel for the use of τ σόν in reference to the attitude which a previous speaker's words have just expressed. Other instances of τ σόν, tout court, are helpfully grouped in Allen and Italie's Concordance to Euripides, s.v. σός. τ σόν…[adverbial phrase] χει occurs also in Hek. 1195 and Med. 312; cf. HF 165, Hel. 893, Pho. 995 with τομόν. These make it unlikely that τ χόν in our passage is to be taken adverbially, as perhaps Grégoire intended with ‘de ta part’, rather than as subject of χει. Tro. 82 might be adduced for the alternative , but there is no reason for Creusa to be saying emphatically ‘as far as you are concerned’. (shrink)

What can the actions of stockbreeders, as they select the best individuals for breeding, teach us about how new species of wild animals and plants come into being? Charles Darwin raised this question in his famous, even notorious, Origin of Species (1859). Darwin's answer - his argument by analogy from artificial to natural selection - is the subject of our book. We aim to clarify what kind of argument it is, how it works, and why Darwin gave it such prominence. (...) As we explain more fully in our Introduction, we believe that the argument becomes much more intelligible when set, contextually, in a story stretching from classical Greek mathematics to modern evolutionary genetics: a long story, and a broad one too, encompassing everything from Darwin's earliest notebook theorising on the births and deaths of species, to agrarian capitalism as a distinctive form of economic life, to shifting Western reflections on art-nature relations. (shrink)

Johannes Kinker (1764–1845) who tried to promote Kantian philosophy in different ways, was also interested in the phenomenon of language. His general language theory is presented in Inleiding eener Wijsgeerige Algemeene Theorie der Talen, published in 1817. An impression of that theory is given in this paper. Some important questions arise, viz. whether Kinker was influenced by others; whether his theory was an original one and what the place of the theory is in the linguistic situation of the eighteenth and (...) the beginning of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

In this book of essays, Burrell selects five religious thinkers principally to provide an example of doing hermeneutics. His chapters on Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Kierkegaard, and Jung, therefore, not only tell us what they thought about certain religious topics, but propose their procedures as distinct models for religious understanding. To bring out their distinctive contributions to the hermeneutical problem, he has carefully chosen the titles for each essay. Augustine shows us an example of religious understanding as a personal quest while (...) Anselm formulates the quest for such understanding. The systematic reflections of Aquinas constitute an articulation of transcendence. The experiencing of the transcendent is expressed in Kierkegaard’s language of spirit and also in Jung’s language for soul. These are telling titles and well worth mentioning even in a very brief review. (shrink)

Watts Miller’s book on Durkheim joins a growing number of recent reassessments of Durkheim’s significance as a radical thinker rather than the naïvely positivistic sociologist he is sometimes taken for. The newer interpretations suggest that he can be read as a late-modern or even a postmodern thinker who imaginatively combined social science with a political and ethical vision. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim should be read as making a key contribution to liberal socialist ethics, to a “communitarian defence of individualism” (...) within a significant continuation of the “enlightenment project.” The perspective followed is to separate Durkheim from Comte and the Comtean tradition, and to read Durkheim on ethics as engaged principally in a debate with Kant. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim is concerned with the “rational deliberation of ends,” and “not only to identify, clarify and rework ideals, but also to adjudicate on them”. Watts Miller proposes to look again at the fundamental problem of any engaged social science—how to argue both for individual autonomy of thought and action and for a science which adjudicates and legislates social values. In Watts Miller’s view, it is Durkheim who brings this off. (shrink)

Marsilius of Inghen’s Commentary on the Sentences evinces the history of Scholasticism between Ockham and Luther. The part edited here discusses the Trinity revealing new evidence on the debates among Realists and Nominalists at the Universities of Paris and Heidelberg.

In his treatment of the One and the Many in the Science of Logic, is Hegel talking about atoms? He is and is not. He discusses critically the atoms and the void of the ancients as part of his own presentation of a being-for-self One from which the Many purportedly derive. The void of the ancients is seen by Hegel as the ground of movement, but not in the representational sense as affording "room," in which case it would be a (...) presupposition, not a ground. The void is properly conceived as the ground of movement not sensuously or pictorially, says Hegel, but "only as the negative relation of the One to its negative, to the One, i.e., to its own self, which nevertheless is posited as a determinate being." With such an ontological One that in its own being is immanently related to its other, Bloch seeks to show, thinking is freed once and for all from traditional atomism’s pregiven particulate corpuscles fortuitously combining and separating in a pregiven space and time. Hegel’s One is at the same time a plurality of ones, ideal atoms immanently related in their being and requiring no extraneous "forces" to set them in motion or in process with one another. Modern theoretical physics, which concedes the inadequacy of sensuous and intuitive thinking, would do well to note Hegel’s criticisms of historical atomisms and to re-examine the possibilities in Hegel’s Atomistik for new ways of conceiving physical reality. (shrink)

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

' I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. [] Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.' Australian Journal of Philosophy, 71:3 (1993).