Using the theoretical approach he introduced in his acclaimed Religious Reason, and drawing on contemporary rationalist ethical theory as well as a variety of religious traditions and issues, Ronald M. Green here provides a simple, effective model for understanding the complexity of religious life. He shows clearly and convincingly that the basic processes of religious reasoning are the same everywhere and that they give rise, in perfectly understandable ways, to the rich diversity of religious expression worldwide. This is a major (...) resource for courses in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This book is a specialized monograph on interpolation and definability, a notion central in pure logic and with significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic is applied, especially computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science and natural language. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematics, computer science and philosophy, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism, J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in (...) Philosophical Logic, H. Rott's Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, P. T. Johnstone's Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium: Volumes 1 and 2, and David J. Pym and Eike Ritter's Reductive Logic and Proof Search: Proof theory, semantics and control. (shrink)

In his report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev noted that "our philosophical and economic front, indeed the social sciences in general, find themselves in a state … somewhat removed from the demands of life."1 He further pointed out that "the times demand that the social sciences address the concrete needs of practical activity on a broad front, that social scientists respond keenly and deftly to the changes taking place in life, that they not lose sight of (...) new phenomena and draw conclusions capable of truly guiding practical activity". (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Time has not worn out the urgency and the novelty of these essays on existentialism published first in 1950 and again in 1959. The nothingness on which Paci writes so poignantly here is being as dealt with in the various historico-philosophical positions of transcendence. This suggestion of Paci is Heideggerian in character: being and nothingness are after all identified. But since Paci has in mind the inevitable destruction of human finitude by philosophical conceptions of transcendence, his words of caution apply (...) to Heidegger's intentions as well. Heidegger in fact destroyed metaphysics, i.e., the possibility of enclosing transcendence within any philosophical system. Yet by making this destruction systematic he opened up a new transcendence which encompasses existence as speech oriented in the philosophical mode. For Paci all of these philosophical positions end up identifying being and nothingness precisely because none of their images of transcendence can be properly superimposed upon the freedom and the finitude of man; thus, they become irrelevant, they lead nowhere. Three philosophical directions in Paci's background lead him away from this irrelevancy: the Augustinian emphasis on the existentiell that leads through Kierkegaard to Jaspers; the immanentistic [[sic]] sense of human development that flows parallel in Marx and Croce; the constitutive role of experience and expression in the late Husserl. Concerning the latter, Paci sees some important connections between constitution and myth in the two central chapters of his work, one of which is about existentialism and neo-Kantianism and the other about myth and existence.--A. M. (shrink)

This particular volume differs from other members of the series, in that it is historically as well as dialectically oriented, and is also less encyclopedic than the others. The first part develops six different theories of happiness and the second presents different controversies about happiness. In the first chapter, the author proposes Aristotle's eudemonism [[sic]] as the most complete and most influential of all theories of happiness, and he uses it as a matrix for most of the discussions in the (...) second part. Chapters following this initial exposition of Aristotle treat Plato's "mixed" eudemonism [[sic]], Stoic suppression of desire, concepts of transcendent happiness in Plotinus, Augustine and Aquinas, Kant's valorization of duty and Hegel's critique thereof, and Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism. Moral issues discussed in the second part include: self-realization, happiness vs. performance of duty, fulfillment vs. prudence, and eudemonism [[sic]] vs. hedonism. The last thirty pages focus on contemporary pursuits of the good life, centered around the issue of self-actualization. This section is predominantly psychological, and treats very briefly some theories of Kurt Goldstein, G. W. Allport, Robert W. White, A. H. Maslow, Marie Jahoda, Carl Rogers, and Fromm. Although the author take sides, he does stimulate reflection about the good life through expositions which avoid more difficult philosophical problems but which definitely evoke practical individual and social overtones.--C. M. R. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

A mimeographed book on the philosophy of "Being" from Thales to Aristotle. The author states that the book has evolved out of his lectures in an introductory course on metaphysics. Almost half the pages are devoted to Platonism. The whole treatment is somewhat repetitious and is more pedagogic than scholarly, making relatively free use of terminology.--M. G.

This book's purpose is the exposition of the inability of natural science to disprove the existence of God. Clark argues that the acceptance of a mechanistic world view based on Newtonian science makes, unjustifiably, a philosophy of science in which science forgets the many idealizations built into its laws' mathematical formulations. The philosophy of science Mr. Clark espouses is Percy Bridgman's operationalism, i.e., the reduction of the meaning of a concept to the operations used to measure it. The separation of (...) the physical world from what the scientist says about it leads Clark to deny that science is cognitive. It is, rather, a way of increasing nature's utility. As such, it may not be used to support any ethical position whatever.—J. M. B. (shrink)

The body of this book consists of facing English and Latin versions of Scotus' treatise prepared by Father Wolter from study of existing manuscripts. Textual variants are marked in frequent notes, but, perhaps because he doubts that one correct or personally written version ever existed, inconsistencies in the argument or apparent errors in the text are unremarked by the editor. Included as a 30 page appendix is Wolter's translation of Scotus' commentary on Peter Lombard's work, Two Questions from Lectures on (...) Book I of the Sentences. Wolter considers this to be an early version, of which the Treatise is the definitive argument. Scotus' demonstration intends to overcome two classical problems afflicting other proofs of the existence of God: the conclusion that the universe is eternal, and that either God's omnipotence or man's moral freedom is limited by His necessary inclusion in the causal order of the world. These metaphysical difficulties are avoided through Scotus' skilled use of modal logic. The book should be of great interest to students of logic and analytic philosophy on account of the display of technique in the logic of contingency and necessity, as well as to medievalists, for reasons of its substance. Wolter performs a real service in making available this workmanlike edition of a powerful and ingenious original.—M. B. M. (shrink)

This volume is the reprint of perhaps the best study of Goethe's philosophy. Its importance lies in its method. Instead of trying only to collect material pertaining to traditional, philosophical problems, it makes a deep-reaching attempt to grasp and to extricate the metaphysical foundations and basic themes of Goethe's Weltanschauung. There is a thoroughgoing analysis of his "morphological" method and excellent, long passages on his magnificent studies of the life and the structure of plants. The culmination of the whole work (...) is its third part: on the symbol considered what it truly is, not a merely esthetical [[sic]], but an essentially metaphysical notion. The book is not easy to read and it does presuppose a certain familiarity with Goethe's whole oeuvre. Those interested in the history of German idealism will certainly appreciate the parallels with Kant, but unfortunately Weinhandl omits the important parallels with Schelling.—M. J. V. (shrink)

In his struggle to vindicate the religious enterprise from the charge that it is unfalsifiable and meaningless, McKinnon reduces both science and religion to distorted caricatures, ignores the centrality of the problems of evil, anguish, absurdity, and the egocentric predicament for religion, and asserts that religion and science are fundamentally one and the same. He builds his thesis on a distinction between "assertional," "self-instructional," and "ontological-linguistic" intentionality of utterances. By equivocating about whether these usages are logically independent, McKinnon holds that, (...) as "self-instructional," utterances are outside the positivist's arena. He presses the noteworthy point--that utterances sometimes are intended to report an existential stance--in such a way as to divert attention from the vast differences between religious and scientific methods and subject matter. Not content with leaving religious utterances restricted to mere reporting, McKinnon builds a case for bypassing positivistic attack under the other two usages by trading on a supposed incommensurability between particulars and universals. E.g., he holds that "God is love" must be indeterminate and unfalsifiable since both nouns are universals and since God is incomprehensible. And so it goes, a battle between straw men on a shifting field of honor for a prize of dubious worth. Notwithstanding, this is a thought provoking treatment of a difficult topic.--M. D. P. (shrink)

Freedom and unity are the values James most wanted to protect and to extend. Roth agrees with this choice, and recommends James to his readers as the moral philosopher who can best show us how. James is presented as combining a principled morality with the responsiveness to particular cases characteristic of existentialism and situational ethics, and his ethics is found to yield what John Wild would call a "primary existential norm": Act so as to maximize freedom and unity. While the (...) philosophical foundations of James' theory are generally secondary to Roth's advocacy of it, the author shows how the norm is based on the following Jamesian concepts: human consciousness is selective and efficacious; the universe is unfinished; value is rooted in consciousness and choice; and the goal of ethics is to achieve unity or harmony among personal and communal choices. Roth mentions problems for James--for example, pointing out that the principle of satisfying as many value demands as possible while frustrating a few as necessary does not handle qualitative differences in demands, and showing how James' later work emends this principle. He also touches on the tough problem, developed by others following James, of "unity" as an ideal in a system in which both meaning and value are rooted in feeling, and feelings are "owned" by individual selves. The book is simply written and should present no difficulty for the reader with little background in philosophy.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The great value of this book does not lie in any new discovery but in its being the most comprehensive monograph to date on the major ideas of Jacobi's thinking as well as on the relationship of the "philosopher of faith" to the leading German thinkers of his time. The first chapters are devoted to a subtle analysis—focussing mainly on his novels—of the moral aspirations underlying his philosophical oeuvre. The next major theme is the well-known polemics with M. Mendelssohn on (...) Lessing's alleged Spinozism—and this is a good pretext for Prof. Verra to display his vast learning by passing in review the views of Herder, Gœthe, and Hegel on Spinoza and continuously referring to the highly important book of Heydenreich. The last three chapters deal with Jacobi's "mature" thought centered around the problem of an intuitive knowledge of reality and his violent polemics against philosophical demonstration as such, which leads necessarily—according to him—to Spinozistic pantheism, i.e., atheism. It is in these chapters that Jacobi's criticism of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling is treated. The footnotes are at the end of the chapters, and they should be read separately. They are sheer delight for anyone a little at home in this period of German intellectual history. There is also a forty page appendix: the bibliography of Jacobi's letters of which not less than 1291 are known to Prof. Verra.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the second volume of the author's ambitious attempt at outlining the history of the dogma of original sin from its beginning to our days. The reader of the first volume witnessed a concerted attack against the dogma and especially against its Augustinian formulation. The second volume deals with perhaps the most obscure period of this dogma's development: the one between the fifth and the eleventh centuries. In the West—thanks to Augustine's undisputed authority—the dogma became accepted as an integral (...) part of Christian theology, even though those theologians of the Dark Ages tried to "humanize" its original, savage formulation. The Christian East, however, would never have accepted it, and took a rather ambiguous position towards the meaning of the "curse of Adam." This is, briefly, the author's thesis, and to prove it he marshals an impressive array of quotes and references, fruits of a wide and often really impressive scholarship. Yet, the whole book is written in the same spirit of crusading, shallow rationalism as was the preceding volume. The speculative issues are not really treated and the whole work lacks that synthetical approach which is so indispensable for an enterprise of such magnitude.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)