This paper examines the status of Corporate Ethical Policies (CEP) in large companies in Argentina, Brazil and Spain, with a special emphasis on Corporate Ethics Statements (CES), documents that define the firms’ philosophy, values and norms of conduct. It is based on a survey of the 500 largest companies in these nations. The findings reveal many similarities between these countries. Among other things, it emerges that most companies give consideration to ethics in business and have adopted some kind of formal (...) or informal ethical policies. Regardless of whether or not they have a CES, companies agree that ethical conduct must be taken into account when selecting, appraising and promoting personnel as an important ethical policy. There is a growing tendency to draw up formal corporate ethics documents. These documents are perceived, first and foremost, as supporting the development of corporate culture. Most respondents believe that primary responsibility for ethical issues in the company rests with the CEO. Finally, the findings indicate that most companies that devote more resources to communicating and implementing CESs have two or more formal ethics documents. The main differences between the countries included in the study concern the emphasis given to specific aspects, such as avoiding misconduct or taking ethical criteria into account when selecting personnel. The emphasis is greatest in countries where corruption seems most prevalent. (shrink)

Power is one of the key ideas in management, and so is the concept of authority. However, most studies on power are rather instrumental, dealing with the place of power in management, and how to achieve it. Less attention has been paid to the essential concepts of power and authority themselves in management thought and how they have evolved. To clarify these concepts, and to better understand the notions of power and authority in management and their proper use in organisations, (...) this paper goes back to one of the pioneers in management thought: Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933). She had an original vision of power, holding that genuine power is not ‘power-over’, but ‘power-with’. At the same time, she defended an authority based on function and responsibility. We explain what her account implies for management in theory and practice. (shrink)

Management cybernetics has been in development since the 1960s, although its implementation has been relatively modest. Two of the best-known proposals are Beer’s Viable System Model and Steinbruner’s Cybernetic Theory of Decision. Both are homeostatic systems, inspired by living organisms. Professor Juan A. Pérez López (1934–1996) argued that homeostatic systems are not fully appropriated for human beings, and proposed instead the “Freely Adaptive System” (FAS) model to explain the dynamics of an organization formed by two dynamic human systems. This model, (...) although it is within the management cybernetic paradigm, and does not propose any anthropological philosophy, is consistent with several features of the Aristotelian anthropological tradition, including epistemology, practical reason, and virtues. The FAS model can help as a compass for decision making by considering three basic criteria—effectiveness, internal efficiency and consistency—when two persons—an active agent and a reactive agent—interact repeatedly. The model sheds light on the interdependence of ethics and efficiency in successive interactions. (shrink)

In light of the recent crisis and its aftershocks, it becomes crucial to reflect on the relationship between finance and accounting and on how to integrate ethics and efficiency, as well as on how to motivate and empower practitioners in the world of finance to commit to justice, fairness and enhanced understanding, and to improving their personal integrity. This article, written as an editorial introduction to a special issue includes works related to control measurement and ethical behavior, misbehaviors in finances (...) and accounting, professionalism in accounting, ethical investing and corporate reporting. We conclude by suggesting further research for a better integration of technical aspects of accounting and finances into business activity—human activity actually—and an for understanding of ethics not limited to rules, but as a mutual and interdependent system of values, virtues and principles. (shrink)

Differences in perceptions and knowledge of crop diseases constitute a major obstacle in farmer–researcher cooperation, which is necessary for sustainable disease management. Farmers’ perceptions and management of crop diseases in the northern Ethiopian Regional State of Tigrai were investigated in order to harness their knowledge in the participatory development of integrated disease management (IDM) strategies. Knowledge of disease etiology and epidemiology, cultivar resistance, and reasons for the cultivation of susceptible cultivars were investigated in a total of 12 tabias (towns) in (...) ten weredas (districts). Perception of diseases involved both scientific and spiritual conceptual frameworks. Of the more than 30 crop diseases recorded on the major crops in the region, only rusts and powdery mildews (locally called humodia) and a few root rots were considered by farmers to be important. Farmers’ awareness of other diseases was extremely low; some highly damaging but less conspicuous diseases, such as faba bean chocolate spot and chickpea ascochyta blight (also called humodia), were not regarded by farmers as disease but as problems caused primarily by excessive soil moisture. Considering that some of these “unrecognized” diseases can cause complete yield loss and genetic erosion in epiphytotic years, there is an urgent need for bringing together farmers’ and scientists’ knowledge to complement each other. Even when farmers had access to disease-resistant or disease-tolerant cultivars, they grew susceptible local varieties because of multiple criteria including earliness, good yield in years with low humodia severity, suitability for home consumption, market demand/quality, and low soil fertility and land management requirements. Farmer innovation and knowledge were evident in their use of diverse disease control measures, but these were a mixture of the “useful and the useless.” Our findings stress the necessity for extension workers and researchers to understand and improve farmers’ knowledge of crop diseases, and farmers’ ability to observe and experiment, through the Farmer Field School or a similar experiential learning approach. These insights about farmers’ knowledge of crop diseases provide a basis for further collaborative maintenance of crop genetic diversity, development of germplasm, and IPM-related research in Africa. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) (...) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made... (shrink)

In his "Purposive Intending" T.L.M. Pink (1991) instructively criticized a popular view about intentions and advanced an alternative position of his own. I challenged a pair of theses to which Pink's position committed him (Mele 1992a). Pink now agrees that both theses are false. His mistake, he says, was to express his view in terms of reasons; his position is now to be framed in terms of "justifications" (1993).

T. L. M. Pink, in his (1991) "Purposive Intending", raises an important question about intentions, instructively criticizes a familiar response, and advances an interesting answer of his own. Pink's question is this (p. 343): "What psychological attitudes rationalize and explain intentions to act?" The burden of this note is to show that his answer is problematic.

A book review of Robert M. Gordon's The Structure of Emotions.

Investigates the connection between motivation and reasons for action. It begins with a sketch of Donald Davidson's influential version of the view that reasons for action are states of mind. It then undermines some criticisms of a broadly Davidsonian view of action explanation, including objections by Rosalind Hursthouse and T. M. Scanlon. Finally, it builds a theoretical bridge between work on its central topic by two groups of theorists: those guided primarily by a concern with the evaluation of actions or (...) their agents, and those primarily guided instead by an interest in the explanation of intentional actions. Motivational and normative notions of reasons for action are distinguished. (shrink)

Une éthique de la bio-médecine s'élabore depuis plus de vingt ans dans des institutions hospitalières, professionnelles ou politiques. Elle vise à protéger les droits de la personne face aux progrès de la techno-science. Elle est pluridisciplinaire et mêle aux chercheurs des penseurs de diverses familles d'esprit. Une aide à la décision est proposée aux praticiens par plusieurs méthodes : les « conférences de consensus » entre experts, les « protocoles » de soins, les « arbres décisionnels » qui connectent toutes (...) les hypothèses possibles et leurs issues prévisibles, l'évaluation médico-économique des coûts et de l'utilité des soins. L'éthique clinique qui commence à être intégrée aux études médicales s'intéresse aux décisions prises, ou à prendre, au chevet du malade. Des méthodes d'analyse de ces cas ont été mises au point, pour tenir compte, notamment, de la situation singulière, physique, mentale, sociale du patient et des modalités de l'expression de sa volonté. Ces analyses et prospectives font appel, entre autres spécialistes, au concours d’«- éthiciens », représentants des diverses « valeurs » spirituelles reconnues dans la société, qui sont souvent interrogés sur le fondement des décisions éthiques, et c'est alors que la théologie a son mot à dire.A biomedical ethics bas been developing for over twenty years in hospitals, professional groups and political committies. It’s goal is to protect an individual’s rights in face of techno-scientific progress. It is pluri-disciplinary and mixes groups of different intellectual tendencies with those wbo do research. Help in making decisions is given to practitioners by many metbods : “consensus conferences”between experts, treatment “protoco1s”, “decision trees” that connect all possible hypotheses and their foreseeable results, medico economical evaluation of the costs and utility of the treatments. Clinical ethics, which is beginning to be integrated into medical studies, concerns decisions already made or to be made by the bedside of the patient. Analytical methods of these cases bave been perfected to take into account the patient's special physical, mental, and social conditions, as well as his metbods of expressing his will. These analyses and their trends call upon representatives of diverse spiritual “values” recognized in society, among other specialists, at the gatherings of “ethicians“ wbo are often questioned about the basis of ethical decisions. This is wben theology has something to say. (shrink)

Free-will incompatibilism has become a motte-and-bailey doctrine (Shackel 2014), and is currently being maintained by standard motte-and-bailey strategies. In this paper, I explain why incompatibilism has a motte-and-bailey structure and why philosophers who do not aim to dismantle it are complicit in both the maintenance of this problematic doctrine and the normalization of a host of bad practices engaged in by those who actively exploit it. To solidify the diagnosis, I provide a paradigmatic motte-and-baileying case that has been ongoing for (...) over a decade. Specifically, I discuss how motte-and-baileying has generated widespread confusion surrounding the logical structure and conclusion of manipulation arguments. Even more specifically, I look at Mele's so-called "Zygote Argument for incompatibilism". I point out that Mele currently conflates under two distinct arguments with different logical forms and substantively different conclusions under that heading, and explain how this has needlessly impeded progress in the free-will debate. The original variant of the Zygote Argument was invalid because it aimed to establish that determinism precludes (destroys, undermines, is antagonistic to) free will, but its supported a far weaker non-explanatory conclusion. In direct response to this invalidity objection, Mele took his critic's suggestion to change the conclusion of his argument to the thesis that free will and determinism are perhaps spuriously associated -- but he also covertly changed his preferred definition of 'incompatibilism' to pick out the non-explanatory conclusion of the new variant of the Zygote Argument which allowed him to continue speaking AS IF his argument was still an argument for incompatibilism according to his original definition of 'incompatibilism'. It is not simply that Mele made these changes or that he failed to mention in print that he made them (despite having over a decade to do so), but that he has actively attempted to discredit his critics by insisting--contrary to fact--that those who do not use his negative definition of 'incompatibilism' are using the term in a nonstandard and nontraditional way that he has "never had any use for" and there is some kind of connection (which he does describe) between the invalidity objection to his original argument that the definition of 'incompatibilism' one prefers. Oddly, Mele has mentioned only one "invalidity objection" in print, but this objection is direct at the revised Zygote Argument--even though no one had ever pressed an invalidity objection to his new argument (the form of which is patently valid). As a direct result of Mele's evasive behaviors (covertly redefining jargon to cover changes to the form/conclusion of his argument), many people--including Mele's own former graduate students--have published articles in which they fail to recognize that Mele changed his argument and redefined terms, thereby perpetuating the false narrative that the new Zygote Argument has the same "incompatibilist" conclusion as the original (which, notably, had the same conclusion as its predecessor, Pereboom's Four-Case Argument). Moreover, Mele has not even ONCE corrected those who "misdescribe" his revised argument as concluding that determinism is antagonstic to (precludes, undermines, rules out, etc.) free will. For example, Mele never corrects those who mistakenly claim that the revised Zygote Argument has the same "incompatibilist" conclusion as Pereboom's, nor has Mele ever mentioned that he now defines the term 'incompatibilism' differently than Pereboom--since Pereboom since uses this term to refer to the explanatory conclusion of the original Zygote Argument, which had the same explanatory conclusion of his Four-Case Argument. To further throttle his critics, Mele has obliquely suggested that the invalidity objection to his original Zygote Argument works only if one accepts his critic's idiosyncratic definition of 'incompatibilism' -- a patently false charge (since the term 'incompatibilism' doesn't even appear in his arguments) and one that has needlessly confused his audience. Indeed, other philosophers have now made this false and quite indefensible accusation explicitly in print, thereby helping Mele and others to continue motte-and-baileying with impunity. I close by preemptively responding to strategies commonly used by motte-and-bailey apologists to suppress legitimate criticisms of their equivocation and well-poisoning strategies (e.g. "Philosophers are allowed to define their technical terms however they like" and "the motte/bailey divide is a distinction without a difference") which have hitherto kept their philosophical audience from participating in a legitimate discussion about why tracking the distinction between the the "motte" thesis (a negative, arguably spurious association claim) and the "bailey" thesis (a positive explanatory claim) is not trivial, but is instead one that is absolutely essential to making progress in the free-will debate. Of course, a single critic cannot (almost by definition) undermine a motte-and-bailey doctrine once it has been established. As such, even if every diagnosis in this essay is accurate, it will not change the discourse. The motte-and-baileying will continue, and the debate will remain in needless deadlock, until a critical threshold of OBSERVERS learn about the motte/bailey distinction and ask apologists for motte-and-bailey incompatibilism to stop their motte-and-baileying. -/- Manuscript available upon request, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42@. (shrink)

Traditional compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. Humean-law compatibilism (a.k.a. weak-law compatibilism), is the view that free will is compatible with determinism, where determinism is defined in terms of a broadly Humean view of the laws of nature. A growing number of philosophers hold that Humean-law compatibilists are targeted by and have special resources to resist arguments for traditional incompatibilism, including the Consequence Argument (cf. Beebee and Mele 2002, Perry 2004, Hetherington 2006, Berofsky 2012, (...) Mele 2013). In this paper, I argue that Humean-law compatibilism is not a proper target of the Consequence Argument and that Humean-law compatibilists have no unique resources to show that the Consequence Argument is unsound. Moreover, I attribute the rise of the paradoxical notion of Humean determinism, upon which Humean compatibilism is based, to Peter van Inwagen’s failed attempt to capture the traditional metaphysical doctrine of determinism (as he himself characterizes it) in the impoverished language of symbolic logic. -/- For the most recent version of this manuscript, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

In this essay, I explain why Gabriel De Marco's attempts to "solve" the invalidity problem for the Zygote Argument were non-starters. The first solution he describes was originally developed by Mickelson (2012/2015) and already adopted by Mele (2013), but De Marco presents it as his own (using an idiosyncratic labelling system). De Marco's second response fails because it is grounded in a patently invalid argument. Most importantly, De Marco (like Mele before him) fails to even mention that Mickelson (...) wasn't interested in the Zygote Argument per se, nor did she have the quixotic aim of providing "correct" definitions of anachronistic jargon like 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' (for reasons explained in Mickelson's 2015 critique of Vihvelin's three-fold classification). Mickelson's invalidity objection served to highlight several novel and dialectically significant lessons, such as: it is surprisingly difficult to close the "explanatory gap" between incompossibilism and the standard causal luck explanation for incompossibilism without relying upon invalid arguments or question-begging assumptions. Indeed, there appears to be no argument in the free-will literature which does so -- i.e. there appears to be NO logically viable, non-question-begging argument for incompatibilism in the free-will literature as a whole! Philosophers like De Marco don't want to "fuss" over such fundamental philosophical errors or investigate the new avenues of research that have opened up by exposing them; he suggests that no one else should fuss over such things either. This paper was written for fussier philosophers. [] *My thanks to the referees and editors at Philosophia for publishing this corrective when Phil Studies would not. []. (shrink)

A suspicion about libertarian free will is that freedom is undermined, rather than supported, by the positing of indeterminism within processes of volition. In response, this paper presents a way in which moments of indeterminism can enhance freedom, by showing how such moments can genuinely belong to the agent. The key idea is that of putting the imagination to work in the service of free agency. The suggestion is that indeterministic processes of imaginative generativity can both belong to an agent, (...) and provide a ground for claims of freedom. In contrast to Robert Kane’s libertarian proposal of locating critical self-forming actions in special moments of rational choice, freedom-friendly indeterministic moments of self-shaping are instead posited within processes of imaginative generativity in which our future possibilities are imagined. This incompatibilist alternative to traditional libertarianism is briefly compared to Mele’s modest libertarianism, and defended against a selection of likely criticisms. (shrink)

The old problem about mental causation arises out of dualism: if minds are not physical, how can they interact causally with bodies? The new problem about mental causation arises, ironically, out of materialism: if everything that happens, including intentional action, has a wholly physical cause, what room is left for distinctively mental causes? This is the problem to which the essays in Heil and Mele’s extremely useful volume are devoted. Although mental causation enthusiasts will recognize most of the arguments (...) and positions put forward in these papers, the collection is invaluable as a kind of canon, since the contributors include many of the most important parties to the debate, and collectively present nearly the full range of opinion on this topic. (shrink)

Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith have presented a puzzle about omnipotence which they call “the new paradox of the stone.” They have also proposed a solution to this puzzle. I briefly present their puzzle and their proposed solution and argue that their proposed solution is unsatisfactory. I further argue that if their suggested solution to the original paradox of the stone succeeds, a similar solution also solves the new paradox of the stone.

One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of (...) self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended. (shrink)

Das Volksmärchen L’Arbre du Bœuf vom Typ ATU 511 [Ein-, Zwei-, Dreiäuglein] ist nach P. Delarue und M.-L. Tenèze das einzige französische Märchen, welches dem Subtyp AT 511 A [Kleiner Roter Ochse] angehört. L’Arbre du Bœuf ist darüber hinaus aufgrund einiger Motive besonders interessant, weil sie vermutlich aus archaischen Glaubensvorstellungen stammen: So ist die mystische „Reise zur Sonne“ ein bestimmendes Thema, welches seinen Ursprung im indoeuropäischen Mythos findet. Der Weltbaum als Axis Mundi und die Seelenbrücke sind Verbindungen zwischen dem Dies- (...) und Jenseits, die der Märchenheld ebenso wie der Schamane bei seiner ekstatischen Reise in die lichte Himmelswelt benutzt. Magische Tier- und Helferwesen treten im Zaubermärchen auf und sind integrale Bestandteile schamanistischer Glaubenswelten. Wenn im Märchen auf oder aus dem geopferten Ochsen als heiliges Tier der Weltbaum sprießt, so findet dieses Sujet Entsprechungen in urtümlichen Kosmogonien. Damit ideell verwandt ist vielleicht das Motiv vom „Tierhorn als Weltbaum“, welches sich in archaischen kosmologischen Vorstellungen findet und sich von da her womöglich ebenso in die Märchenwelten eingemischt hat. Le conte populaire L’Arbre du Bœuf du type ATU 511 [Un Œil, Deux Yeux, Trois Yeux] d’après P. Delarue et M.-L. Tenèze est le seul conte de fées français appartenant au sous-type AT 511 A [Petit Bœuf Rouge]. En outre, L’Arbre du Bœuf est particulièrement intéressant en raison de certains motifs probablement issus de croyances archaïques : Le « voyage mystique au soleil » est un thème déterminant qui tire son origine du mythe indo-européen. L’Arbre du Monde en tant qu’Axis Mundi et le pont d’autre monde sont des liens entre l’ici et l’au-delà, que le héros de conte et le chaman utilisent dans leur voyage extatique dans le ciel lumineux. Les animaux magiques et les êtres auxiliaires apparaissent dans le conte de fées et font partie intégrante du monde de croyances chamaniques. Tout comme dans le conte de fées, l’Arbre du Monde pousse sur ou bien du bœuf sacrifié et sacré, ce motif trouve des correspondances dans les anciennes cosmogonies. Le motif de la « corne animale en tant qu’Arbre du Monde » est peut-être associé à ce concept mythique. Il se trouve dans les conceptions cosmologiques archaïques et s’est mêlé de là au monde des contes de fées. The folk tale L’Arbre du Bœuf of the type ATU 511 [One Eye, Two Eyes, Three Eyes] is according to P. Delarue and M.-L. Tenèze the only French fairy tale that belongs to the subtype AT 511 A [Little Red Ox]. In addition, L’Arbre du Bœuf is particularly interesting due to some of the motifs that probably stem from archaic beliefs: The mystical “journey to the sun” is a determining theme, which finds its origin in the Indo-European myth. The World Tree as Axis Mundi and the Soul Bridge are connections between this world and the hereafter which are harnessed by the fairy tale hero as well as the shaman in his ecstatic journey into the bright world of heaven. Magical animals and helping entities appear in the fairy tale and are fundamental parts of shamanistic beliefs. The World Tree as it sprouts on or out of the sacrificed and sacred ox finds its equivalent in ancient cosmogonies. Perhaps ideally related to this is the motif of the “animal horn as the World Tree”, which is present in archaic cosmological conceptions and has possibly interfered with the fairytale worlds as well. (shrink)

Dans cet essai bref et étincelant, Jean-Claude Guillebaud s’insurge contre la désespérance qui habite nos sociétés. Il nous convainc que, décidément, l’avenir a besoin de nous. Ce texte de combat est l’un des plus personnels qu’il ait écrit. "J’aimerais trouver les mots pour dire à quel point m’afflige la désespérance contemporaine. Elle est un gaz toxique que nous respirons chaque jour, sans réfléchir. Or, la réalité n’est jamais aussi sombre. Ombres et lumières y sont toujours mêlées. L’espérance n’implique donc ni (...) aveuglement ni sotte crédulité. Elle est lucide, mais têtue. J’y repense chaque matin à l’aube, quand je vois rosir le ciel au-dessus des toits de Paris ou monter la lumière derrière la forêt, chez moi, en Charente... L’espérance a partie liée avec cet infatigable recommencement du matin. Elle vise l’avenir mais se vit aujourd’hui, les yeux ouverts. Avec passion." [Source : 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...) been advanced in the literature; it would be impossible to examine each thoroughly in a single paper. We can show, however, that the major functional roles ascribed to volition are nicely filled by a triad composed of intention, trying, and information feedback. Sections I and II below develop an account of the connection between intention and trying. Section III examines leading arguments for the existence of volitions and decomposes volitions into members of the triad just identified. (shrink)

A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the function- al roles of intentions in intentional action. In this paper we sketch and defend a position on this issue while attacking a provocative alternative. Our position has its roots in a cybernetic theory of purposive behavior and is only part of the larger task of understanding all goal-directed behavior. Indeed, a unified model of goal-directed behavior, with appropriate modifications for different types of systems, is a long-range (...) ambition. (shrink)

Before one can give a fully adequate account of action, one must know where the action is. This amounts to understanding the nature of basic or unmediated action, the performance of which does not require performing any other act as a means. There is little consensus on what sort of act is basic. Volitionists such as H. A. Prichard, Brian O'Shaughnessy, Jennifer Hornsby and Carl Ginet, hold that a special type of mental act is basic and underlies all overt bodily (...) action. They believe that action, in its fundamental form, occurs in the head or mind of the agent that performs it. "Corporealists" like Donald Davidson hold that the basic act is one of bodily movement. Finally, "environmentalists" include events beyond the body as part of the basic act. ;The dissertation is devoted to establishing the viability and exploring the ramifications of the environmentalist conception of basicness. Ideas of various theorists are discussed, including Donald Davidson, G. E. M. Anscombe, George Wilson, Gilbert Harman, John Searle, Alfred Mele, Tyler Burge, and John Perry. I address a number of arguments for volitionism or corporealism which draw upon some aspect of action, such as its individuation , its description , its rationalization , and its intentionality or content--in particular its self-referential content . Discussions of these topics serve to further articulate the environmentalist notion that in acting we can have an unmediated or direct effect upon our surroundings. A defense of environmentalism offers, in turn, a new understanding of these various aspects of action. (shrink)

This article discusses the role of moment-to-moment affect dynamics in mental disorder and aims to integrate recent literature on this topic in the context of complex dynamical system theory. First, we will review the relevance of temporal and contextual aspects of affect dynamics in relation to psychopathology. Related to this, we will discuss recent insights resulting from a network view on affect dynamics in psychopathology. Next, we explore how we can reconcile literature findings from a perspective of complex dynamical system (...) theory. Finally, future directions with regard to personalized assessment of risk and diagnostic use are discussed. (shrink)

Introduction By the late fifth century BCE Panini had composed the Astadhyayi, consisting of nearly 4000 rules giving a precise and fairly complete ...

I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned:(i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of (...) the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics. (shrink)

'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they (...) amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen. (shrink)

Today's modern car is an assemblage of mechanical and digital components, of metal panels that comprise its structure and silicon chips that run its functions. Communication and information studies scholars have interrogated the problematic aspects of the programs that run those functions, revealing serious issues surrounding privacy and security, worker surveillance, and racial, gendered, and class-based bias. This article contributes to that work by taking a step back and asking about the issues inherent not in the software running on these (...) chips, but on the microchips themselves. Using the lens of “chipification”—the process by which a device is rendered capable of reading and processing data through the embedding of microchips—this article explores how the integration of microchips also involves processes that are often borne from, replicate, or create troubling power dynamics of their own. It takes light-duty passenger vehicles as a case study into how chipification is radically reshaping such processes as resource allocation, labor flows, and cultural practices around car manufacture, use, repair, and modification. By naming the process of chipification, this article allows researchers to identify and analyze the ways that integrating data processing capabilities into everyday devices is not a frictionless practice, but rather one that implicates a variety of power dynamics within these massive industries. (shrink)

We argue that there is no metaphysically possible world with two or more omnipotent beings, due to the potential for conflicts of will between them. We reject the objection that omnipotent beings could exist in the same world when their wills could not conflict. We then turn to Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith’s argument that two coexisting beings could remain omnipotent even if, on some occasions, their wills cancel each other out so that neither can bring about what they (...) intend. We argue that this argument has an absurd consequence, namely having to regard an utterly powerless being as omnipotent. (shrink)

This article explores yet another paradox – aside from the privacy paradox – related to the datafication of media: citizens trust least the media they use most It investigates the role that daily life plays in shaping the trust that citizens place in datafied media. The study reveals five sets of heuristics guiding the trust assessments of citizens: characteristics of media organisations, old media standards, context of use and purpose, experiences of datafication and understandings of datafication. The article discusses the (...) use of these heuristics and the value that everyday life holds in assessing trust in datafied media. It concludes that, guided by a partial ‘structure of perception’ and enticed into trusting datafied media in the context of their daily lives, citizens may be highly concerned by the datafication of media but use them nevertheless. (shrink)

In Contingent Computation, M. Beatrice Fazi offers a new theoretical perspective through which we can engage philosophically with computing. The book proves that aesthetics is a viable mode of investigating contemporary computational systems. It does so by advancing an original conception of computational aesthetics that does not just concern art made by or with computers, but rather the modes of being and becoming of computational processes. Contingent Computation mobilises the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead in order to (...) address aesthetics as an ontological study of the generative potential of reality. Through a novel philosophical reading of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and of Turing’s notion of incomputability, Fazi finds this potential at the formal heart of computational systems, and argues that computation is a process of determining indeterminacy. This indeterminacy, which is central to computational systems, does not contradict their functionality. Instead, it drives their very operation, albeit in a manner that might not always fit with the instrumental, representational and cognitivist purposes that we have assigned to computing. (shrink)

In the past decades, an enormous amount of precious information has been collected about molecular and genetic characteristics of cancer. This knowledge is mainly based on a reductionistic approach, meanwhile cancer is widely recognized to be a ‘system biology disease’. The behavior of complex physiological processes cannot be understood simply by knowing how the parts work in isolation. There is not solely a matter how to integrate all available knowledge in such a way that we can still deal with complexity, (...) but we must be aware that a deeply transformation of the currently accepted oncologic paradigm is urgently needed. We have to think in terms of biological networks: understanding of complex functions may in fact be impossible without taking into consideration influences outside of the genome. Systems Biology involves connecting experimental unsupervised multivariate data to mathematical and computational approach than can simulate biologic systems for hypothesis testing or that can account for what it is not known from high-throughput data sets. Metabolomics could establish the requested link between genotype and phenotype, providing informations that ensure an integrated understanding of pathogenic mechanisms and metabolic phenotypes and provide a screening tool for new targeted drug. (shrink)