O presente artigo tem como objetivo relatar uma experiência de Filosofia com Adolescentes na cidade de Araraquara. Buscamos fazer uma relação entre Filosofia e Adolescência e procuramos mostrar uma forma alternativa de se discutir Filosofia com jovens, diferenciada das propostas que partem da História da Filosofia.

El desafío científico-político de coproducir y proveer "servicios climáticos" en el sudeste de Sudamérica / Cecilia Hidalgo -- Coproducción, ciencia y activismo : empoderamiento epistémico y retórico de activistas seropositivos en la Argentina / Emiliano Marello -- Coproducción en lactancia materna y alimentación del niño pequeño / Pablo Duran -- Coproducción de conocimientos entre especialistas y docentes mediados por una plataforma virtual gubernamental / Marisa Álvarez, Verónica Xhardez y Marcela Pologna -- Conocimiento científico, performatividad e interacción social: compromisos filosófico-sociológicos (...) / María de los A. Martini -- Aportes para un lenguaje de la coproducción / María Laura Martínez -- Ciencia, retórica y semiótica / Robert C. Marafioti -- La cuestión de la agencia en el discurso coproduccionista / Sergio Russo -- Aprendices de brujos : interludios y variaciones en la antropología de la ciencia / Adriana A. Stagnaro -- Una teoría sociológica del conocimiento humano / Florencia Rimoldi -- El conocimiento en la comunicación : aportes pragmatikstas apra la disoluciónd e la imagen clásica del conocimiento científico / Paula Rossi. (shrink)

The epistemic barriers to interdisciplinarity are understudied. To fill this gap, we ask whether a university initiative designed to reduce structural barriers to interdisciplinarity also facilitates the dissolution of epistemic ones. Through analytical autoethnography of graduate training in two disciplines, sociology and ecology, we develop the concept of asymmetric epistemology to better understand the unique epistemological position that emerges for interdisciplinarians. Building from feminist science and technology studies (STS) and scholarship on epistemic identities, our work illuminates how epistemologies are embodied (...) by individuals, leading to tensions around identity, materiality, and spatiality during the practice of interdisciplinarity. While some epistemic barriers recede and others remain, we reveal that the navigation of these boundaries deeply impacts individuals’ epistemic identities. (shrink)

Inner speech has been shown to vary in form along several dimensions. Along condensation, condensed inner speech forms have been described, that are supposed to be deprived of acoustic, phonological and even syntactic qualities. Expanded forms, on the other extreme, display articulatory and auditory properties. Along dialogality, inner speech can be monologal, when we engage in internal soliloquy, or dialogal, when we recall past conversations or imagine future dialogs involving our own voice as well as that of others addressing us. (...) Along intentionality, it can be intentional (when we deliberately rehearse material in short-term memory) or it can arise unintentionally (during mind wandering). We introduce the ConDialInt model, a neurocognitive predictive control model of inner speech that accounts for its varieties along these three dimensions. ConDialInt spells out the condensation dimension by including inhibitory control at the conceptualization, formulation or articulatory planning stage. It accounts for dialogality, by assuming internal model adaptations and by speculating on neural processes underlying perspective switching. It explains the differences between intentional and spontaneous varieties in terms of monitoring. We present an fMRI study in which we probed varieties of inner speech along dialogality and intentionality, to examine the validity of the neuroanatomical correlates posited in ConDialInt. Condensation was also informally tackled. Our data support the hypothesis that expanded inner speech recruits speech production processes down to articulatory planning, resulting in a predicted signal, the inner voice, with auditory qualities. Along dialogality, covertly using an avatar’s voice resulted in the activation of right hemisphere homologs of the regions involved in internal own-voice soliloquy and in reduced cerebellar activation, consistent with internal model adaptation. Switching from first-person to third-person perspective resulted in activations in precuneus and parietal lobules. Along intentionality, compared with intentional inner speech, mind wandering with inner speech episodes was associated with greater bilateral inferior frontal activation and decreased activation in left temporal regions. This is consistent with the reported subjective evanescence and presumably reflects condensation processes. Our results provide neuroanatomical evidence compatible with predictive control and in favor of the assumptions made in the ConDialInt model. (shrink)

Background No studies have been conducted in Mexico to ascertain what ethical problems doctors working at hospitals deal with. This article aims to describe the ethical conflicts most commonly identified by Mexican internists and the importance they attribute to each of these conflicts. Methods Voluntary survey to the members of the Internal Medicine Association of Mexico. Results Responses were submitted by 347 internists. Half of those face ethical conflicts almost always or frequently. The most commonplace and relevant conflicts are those (...) resulting from the clinical relationship (communication, confidentiality, informed consent, assessment of mental capacity, decisions involving incapacitated patients, and conflicts with family members), and secondly those problems related with the end of life (palliative care, withholding or withdrawing treatment, and “No CPR orders”). To resolve conflicts they seek support through protocols, Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs), and consultations with colleagues and, occasionally, with bioethics experts. Protocols and IECs are the tools most in demand among them. Conclusions 1) the most frequent and relevant conflicts are those caused by the clinical relationship, above all those due to doctor–patient communication, and secondly those due to problems which arise at the end of life; 2) though nearly all of them have doubts about how to resolve conflicts, the vast majority are satisfied with the way in which they do so; 3) to deal with conflicts, they seek support mainly in protocols, IECs, and consultation with colleagues; and 4) in order to resolve them better, what they most demand are protocols and IECs, but also bioethics consultants. (shrink)

The COVID-19 disease has caused thousands of deaths worldwide and required the rapid and drastic adoption of various protective measures as main resources in the fight to reduce the spread of the disease. In the present study we aimed to identify socio cognitive factors that may influence adherence to protective measures toward COVID-19 in a Spanish sample. This longitudinal study analyzes the predictive value of perceived severity and vulnerability of infection, self-efficacy, direct exposure to the virus, and instrumental focused coping (...) style for adhering to infection protection behaviors during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also tests sex and age differences in these factors and changes over time. A two-wave longitudinal study was conducted in March and April 2020 starting the day after a strict national lockdown was decreed in Spain. A path analysis was used to test direct and indirect effects between vulnerability and the adherence to protective behaviors. Results suggest that individuals' perceived severity and vulnerability to COVID-19 and instrumental coping strategies are related to the use of more protective behaviors. This coping strategy mediates the effect of perceived vulnerability on engaging in protective behaviors, and this effect depends on direct exposure to COVID-19 and perceived self-efficacy moderators. Results suggest that recognizing one's own abilities to engage in instrumental actions may facilitate adherence to protective measures in people who had not been directly exposed to COVID-19. Therefore, adopting instrumental coping strategies to manage an individual's perceived vulnerability to infection may positively impact the adherence to protective behaviors, especially during the onset of an unexpected threat and when there is no prior direct experience with the situation. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende analisar as interfaces da produção científica feminina no início do século XX com a constituição do espaço psi no Brasil, utilizando para tanto um artigo do periódico católico "A Ordem" e uma tese da Faculdade de Medicina do Rio de Janeiro. Para sermos mais precisos, nosso recor..

Introducción: La relación entre la comida y cultura es bastante amplia, por ello, se expone la agenda de investigación en torno al tema, a través de la revisión de artículos indexados publicados entre el 2016 y el 2022. Objetivo: sintetizar la producción académica de los últimos años teniendo en cuenta los temas claves, los países de producción y las corrientes teórico-metodológicas utilizadas en los diseños de investigación. Metodología: Revisión documental integrativa. Conclusiones: La literatura encontrada se presenta a través de seis (...) ejes temáticos grandes: alimentos y medicina, identidad y nación, transmisión de saberes, relaciones G-locales y dimensiones sociales. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es describir la percepción de riesgo y los factores de protección y de riesgo frente al consumo de sustancias psicoactivas legales e ilegales en estudiantes de la Universidad de Boyacá. Es un estudio cuantitativo y descriptivo de corte transversal, para el cual se tomó una muestra de 573 estudiantes que fueron seleccionados mediante muestreo estratificado probabilístico. El instrumento utilizado fue la encuesta sobre consumo de drogas, factores y percepción de riesgo en estudiantes universitarios (CODEU) diseñado (...) por Beverido, Salas, De San Jorge, Pavón, Blázquez, Gogeascoechea y Cruz (2012), que consta de 73 preguntas. Este instrumento fue validado y obtuvo un alpha de Cronbach de 0.787. Los hallazgos muestran que entre los factores protectores se encuentran: adecuadas relaciones familiares y practicar un deporte, como factores de riesgo se identifican principalmente: la permisividad social y las construcciones de reconocimiento social presentes ante el consumo de sustancias legales. De las sustancias ilegales, la marihuana es la que se percibe como de menor riesgo frente a la cocaína, el bazuco, los inhalantes y la heroína. (shrink)

Colombia is the second country with the highest number of internally displaced persons. In the last 10 years, more than 400,000 young people carry, in their life experiences, the title of victims. The psychological and social circumstances that determine the lives of displaced young people in the world are not unknown. Fear, the poor resources for social adaptation available to them, and the possible reproduction of the cycle of violence, represent psychosocial risk factors in the young and displaced population. In (...) this context, the Victims Law in Colombia stipulated various measures of repairment, including Relocation and Return provided the conditions of voluntariness, security, and dignity are present. A hypothesis that well-being will be better in the returnees was set, since they would strengthen the social support networks between neighbors and other victims in their old spaces of life. To test the hypothesis, the scales of Psychological Well-being, Social Well-being, the Satisfaction with Life Scale, and the Psychosocial Trauma Scale were applied to young returnees and relocated in Colombia. The Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed to extract the general measure of well-being and psychosocial trauma followed by the comparison between the groups. Significance, power, and effect size indicators were obtained, and finally, the partial correlation between the groups was made in relation to psychosocial trauma and well-being. Results showed that returnees have greater well-being and clearer indicators, with respect to that of relocated. In addition, the well-being of returnees has fewer trauma factors, who in turn are quasi-moderated by the situation of return or relocation. (shrink)

The World Health Organization defined COVID-19 as a pandemic on March 11, due to the spread of the new SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus in all continents. Italy had already witnessed a very fast spread that brought the Government to place the entire country under quarantine on March 11, reaching more than 30,700 fatalities in 2 months. We hypothesized that the pandemic and related compulsory quarantine would lead to an increase of anxiety state and protective behaviors to avoid infections. We aimed to investigate (...) whether protective behaviors might have been enhanced or limited by anxiety and emotional reactions to previous experience of stressful conditions. We collected data from 618 Italian participants, by means of an online survey. Participants were asked to rate their level of worry for the pandemic, and to complete two questionnaires measuring the anxiety level: the state-trait anxiety inventory and the Pre-traumatic stress reaction checklist. Finally, the respondents were also asked to report about their compliance with protective behaviors suggested to avoid the spread of the virus. Results show that respondents with higher levels of worry reported higher levels of anxiety and pre-traumatic reactions, with positive correlations among the three measurements, and that higher frequency of the three protective behaviors were put in place by respondents with higher levels of worry. Moreover, regression analysis showed that worry for COVID-19 was most predicted by age, anxiety levels, and Pre-traumatic stress. These results could be interpreted in an evolutionary framework, in which the level of worry leads persons to become more cautious maximizing long-term survival at the cost of short-term dysregulation. (shrink)

Alfred Mele presents an influential argument for incompatibilism which compares an agent, Ernie, whose life has been carefully planned by the goddess Diana, to normal deterministic agents. The argument suggests both that Ernie is not free, and that there is no relevant difference between him and normal deterministic agents in respect of free will. In this paper, I suggest that what drives our judgement that Ernie is not free in the Diana case is that his actions are merely an extension (...) of Diana's—he is akin to a tool, which she uses solely for her own purposes, and his behaviour occurs only because of the interest Diana takes in its occurring. This contrasts with normal deterministic universes, in which normal agents are not such tools. (shrink)

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for (...) our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of moral luck. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for two main hypotheses. First, that self-control is not a natural mental kind and, second, that there is no dedicated mechanism of self-control. By the first claim, I simply mean that those behaviors we label as “self-controlled” are a somewhat arbitrarily selected hodgepodge that do not have anything in common that distinguishes them from other behaviors. In other words, self-control is a gerrymandered property that does not correspond to a natural mental or psychological kind. By (...) the second claim, I mean that self-controlled behaviors are not produced by a mechanism that is not utilized in the production of other behaviors. Not only is there no natural mental property of self-control, there is no mechanism that is dedicated to producing self-controlled behavior. I further evaluate whether this account of self-control has enough explanatory power to account for a range of phenomena related to self-control. I argue that my account does a better job of explaining these phenomena than accounts which appeal to a dedicated self-control mechanism. (shrink)

Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it. In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is plausibly required for moral responsibility. However, (...) even though we argue that situational factors lower the degree of our reasons-responsiveness, we propose that agents remain moderately reasons-responsive to the degree required for moral responsibility. Nonetheless, those affected by situational factors are arguably less morally responsible than those who are not subject to similar situational factors. We further evaluate an understanding of reasons-responsiveness which relativizes reasons-responsiveness to agents’ circumstances. We argue that the situationist data do not warrant this kind of divergence from Fischer’s and Ravizza’s account. We conclude by discussing what situationist experiments tell us about our relationship to non-reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions (such as some spontaneous actions) are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions (...) is thus false. (shrink)

The result of Hannah Arendt’s study of bourgeois revolutions reflects not only the contradictions and dichotomies of her thought, but is an important diagnosis of the impact of liberal policies, their contradictions and evolution within the history of democracy. Modern republicanism, although critical of liberalism, assimilated elements inherent to liberal democracy, for example, the importance of the law, always imputed based on ideological political precepts of its time. The relevance of this analysis allows us not only to understand the bases (...) of the philosopher’s political thought, but its development in what she calls: public space. This must be a place for the expression of opinions, and therefore, for Arendt, without plurality, politics and public freedom are compromised to the extent that they make it impossible to maintain a space for the realization of freedom. However, in an unequal world, who can exercise their citizenship freely in public space? Was the liberal promise capable of providing these guarantees? In dialogue with Habermas and beyond, we intend with this investigation to outline the weaknesses of a bourgeois notion of the public sphere and to enunciate the urgency of building an ideal of republicanism based on popular demands. (shrink)

Libet’s timing experiments have resulted in some strong and unsavoury claims about human agency. These range from the idea that conscious intentions are epiphenomenal to the idea that we all lack free will. In this paper, I propose a new type of response to the various sceptical conclusions about our agency occasioned by both Libet’s work and other experiments in this testing paradigm. Indeed, my argument extends to such conclusions drawn from fMRI-based prediction experiments. In what follows, I will provide (...) a brief description of these experiments, sketch arguments one may be tempted to draw on their basis, and argue that such arguments rely on a questionable premise: that experimental subjects have relevant proximal intentions. (shrink)

I argue that we do not intentionally and rationally shape our character and values in major ways. I base this argument on the nature of transformative experiences, that is, those experiences which are transformative from personal and epistemological points of view. The argument is roughly this. First, someone who undergoes major changes in her character or values thereby undergoes a transformative experience. Second, if she undergoes such an experience, her reasons for changing in a major way are inaccessible to her (...) beforehand. Third, if such reasons are inaccessible beforehand, she cannot act on them and thus cannot rationally and intentionally shape her character or values. I also explore some consequences of my argument, especially those related to control and responsibility. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper analyzes Dolores's case of collective spirit possession as a paroxysmic form of possession idiom, serving as a powerful and creative internal mechanism that both safeguards and revitalizes the core structure of ancestor worship. Drawing on my ethnographic research in North Honduras since 2009, my study reveals that rather than leading to the erosion of possession rituals, entropic forces, such as resistance, modernity, and impiety serve as vital resources, reinforcing the foundations of ancestor worship. This paper explores possession idioms (...) and striking events, such as contagion, abduction, dramatization, illness, and death to highlight the resilience of a possession-based religion as a self-sustaining total social system rooted in “tradition,” yet shaped by a dynamic interplay of historical, cultural, and personal experiences. While traditional interpretations of spirit possession have viewed possession cults as forms of protest against hegemonic power—“a weapon of the weak” used to gain respect and process trauma—I suggest that spirit possession is multifaceted, ambiguous and underdetermined, operating within a social theater where critique, social irony, impiety, historical consciousness, and the carnivalesque intersect. (shrink)

Self-control is a fundamental part of what it is to be a human being. It poses important philosophical and psychological questions about the nature of belief, motivation, judgment, and decision making. More immediately, failures of self-control can have high costs, resulting in ill-health, loss of relationships, and even violence and death, whereas strong self-control is also often associated with having a virtuous character. What exactly is self-control? If we lose control can we still be free? Can we be held responsible (...) for loss of self-control? -/- In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of self-control, the authors examine and assess the following topics and questions: • The importance of self-control • What is self-control? • Self-control and the law of desire • Mechanisms of self-control • How is it possible to lose self-control? • Blameworthiness and (the loss of) self-control • Externalist self-control • Pathologies of self-control. -/- Combining philosophical analysis with surveys of the latest psychological research, and including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary of key terms, Self-Control is essential reading for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, moral psychology, free will, and ethics. It will also be of interest to those in related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

The thesis of situationism says that situational factors can exert a signi cant in uence on how we act, o en without us being consciously aware that we are so in uenced. In this paper, I examine how situational factors, or, more speci cally, our lack of conscious awareness of their in uence on our behavior, a ect di erent measures of control. I further examine how our control is a ected by the fact that situational factors also seem to (...) prevent us from becoming consciously aware of our reasons for action. I argue that such lack of conscious awareness decreases the degree of control that agents have. However, I propose that while being in uenced by situational factors in such ways may impair and diminish one’s control, it (typically) does not eradicate one’s control. I further argue that being in uenced by situational factors, in the way set out above, also decreases one’s degree of moral responsibility. (shrink)

Reseña de ‘Filosofía y experimentación sonora’ de Gustavo Celedón Bórquez, realizada por Marcela Rivera Hutinel, Dra. en Filosofía, académica de la Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación. Gustavo Celedón Bórquez Filosofía y experimentación sonora Ediciones Metales Pesados 2023 Santiago 376 páginas ISBN: 9789566203100.

Certain aspects of our situations often influence us in significant and negative ways, without our knowledge (call this claim “situationism”). One possible explanation of their influence is that they affect our abilities. In this paper, we address two main questions. Do these situational factors rid us of our abilities to act on our sufficient reasons? Do situational factors make it more difficult for us to exercise our abilities to act for sufficient reasons? We argue for the answer ‘sometimes’ to both (...) these questions. We then explore the consequences of this view for moral responsibility. (shrink)

Exposición realizada por la Doctora en Filosofía Marcela Rivera Hutinel, en el ciclo de conversaciones “Crítica a la Epidemiología Política. Prácticas y racionalidad neoliberales en tiempos de pandemia”, organizado por el equipo editorial de la Revista de Filosofía Otrosiglo, octubre – diciembre 2020. Disponible en Youtube, canal Revista Otrosiglo. Lecture by Marcela Rivrea Hutinel, Ph. D., in the cycle of conversations “Criticism to the Political Epidemiology. Neoliberal practices and rationality in times of pandemics”, event organized by the editorial (...) team of the Philosophy Magazine Otrosiglo, october – december 2020. Available on Youtbe, channel Revista Otrosiglo. (shrink)

In this paper I set out to investigate the claim that addicts lack su cient control over their drug-taking and are thus not morally responsible for it. More speci cally, I evaluate what I call the Simply Irresistible Argument, which proceeds from the claim that addictive desires are irresistible to the conclusion that addicts are not responsible for acting on such desires. I rst propose that we have to disambiguate the notion of an irresistible desire according to temporal criteria, and (...) revise the original argument accordingly in two di erent ways; one involving proximally irresistible desires and one involving permanently irresistible desires. I propose that both versions of the Simply Irresistible Argument fail, and, as a result, that considerations about irresistible desires and control cannot extricate addicts from responsibility for their drug-taking. (shrink)

The central thesis developed in this paper is that sexual violence is a possibility founded in the — historical — constitutive conditions of the female body, which means that sexual violence against women is possible because of the availability of their bodies. The availability of the female body as a condition for rape is established in three principal moments: 1) The historical and spiritual determination of the subjective female identity as founded in the materiality of her own body —or her (...) reproductive specificity—. 2) The socially ambiguous configuration of the «femenine-I can» derived from the reproduction/sensuality difference; and, 3) The sexual rape as a reassertion of the gender availability in such a way that the rape sexualizes the gender as vulnerable, establishing or adding a wrapping meaning of feminity as something vulnerable. Being an other-body is being, originally, an available body, violable in essence, sexually vulnerable. (shrink)

This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with (...) reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism. (shrink)

I argue against elements of Alfred Mele’s picture of the nature of intentions and the triggers of intentional actions. Mele (Philosophical Studies 176:2833–2853, 2019) offers rebuttals to my (Herdova, Philosophical Studies, 173(3), 573–587, 2016; Herdova, Philosophical Explorations, 21(3):364–383, 2018) and Ann Bumpus’s (2001) arguments which limit the scope of proximal intentions as triggers of intentional actions. Here I offer a response to Mele and provide further arguments in favor of my alternative understanding of intentions and the causes of intentional actions. (...) Contra Mele, I argue for the following interrelated theses. First, intentions, including proximal intentions, have an array of functions or dispositions beyond that of triggering intentional actions. Second, states other than proximal intentions can trigger at least some types of intentional actions. Therefore, it is not the case that all intentional actions need to be triggered by proximal intentions. (shrink)

Schelling’s late philosophy is characterized by its division of philosophy into a “negative” and a “positive” approach. After developing positive philosophy, Schelling goes back in his last work (Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophie) to a negative philosophy that is to play a critical role within Schelling’s late system by showing pure rationally the limits of pure reason. This critical task requires the failure and crisis of negative philosophy. In the article, I show why Schelling understands his late negative project as a (...) radicalization of Kantian criticism, undertaken by recourse to Aristotle and his notion of actuality. By taking the Aristotelian inspiration into account, I propose a new way of understanding two problems of Schelling scholarship: the need for a late negative philosophy, and the problem of the transition from negative into positive philosophy. (shrink)

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests (...) that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives. Key Words: apes; associative learning; concepts; convergence; deception; evolution of intelligence; folk psychology; imitation; mental state attribution; monkeys; parsimony; perspective-taking; primates; role-taking; self-recognition; social cognition; social intelligence; theory of mind. (shrink)

Este artículo indaga, fundamentalmente, en los posibles vínculos que puedan establecerse entre las condiciones materiales y procedimientos escriturales de La filial de Matías Celedón y el concepto «muerte del autor» (1968) de Roland Barthes. También revisa la estructura y la atmósfera burocrática y agobiante de la oficina en la que se desarrolla la trama, planteando una comparación con dos obras clásicas sobre el tema: Bartleby el escribiente (1853) y Bouvard y Pécuchet (1880). Finalmente, alude a referentes de la poesía experimental (...) como Martín Gubbins, Guillermo Deisler, Elsa Werth y Sergio Chejfec, entre otros, con el objetivo de perfilar una suerte de «escritura de oficina» que trasciende las diferencias habituales entre los géneros narrativo y poético. (shrink)

I. There is a deep tension in the laws of war. The laws that regulate the resort to war (jus ad bellum) are independent from the laws that regulate conduct in war (jus in bello). This implies that...

Este artículo tiene como objetivo desarrollar el concepto de voluntad en Pietro Pomponazzi, utilizando como texto central de análisis su tratado _De fato, libero arbitrio et praedestinatione_. Siguiendo la dinámica propia del pensamiento del autor, se exploran los alcances y limitaciones de la voluntad en el ámbito de la razón natural y la teología. Estos dos campos, delimitados con claridad y frecuentemente en conflicto en la obra de Pomponazzi, constituyen el fundamento para comprender las sutilezas de la voluntad. La presentación (...) se divide en dos momentos: el primero aborda la voluntad en el ámbito de la razón natural y el segundo se adentra en su dimensión teológica. Por último, se adjunta la traducción de la _quaestio _“Utrum detur voluntas agens” del MS París, BnF, lat. 6449. (shrink)