Il lavoro esamina criticamente i presupposti di cinque differenti approcci alla Scienza Cognitiva, (simbolico, connessionista, dinamico, della cognizione incarnata e della vita artificiale) e sostiene che tutti e cinque condividono tacitamente un’ipotesi metodologica molto generale. Tale ipotesi, che propongo di chiamare simulazionismo , postula che i fenomeni cognitivi di un qualunque sistema reale possono essere adeguatamente spiegati sulla base di opportuni modelli di simulazione del sistema stesso. Tuttavia, a causa della loro costituzione, i modelli di simulazione hanno forti limitazioni, sia (...) al livello descrittivo che esplicativo. Il limite descrittivo sta nel fatto che la corrispondenza fra i risultati di una simulazione e i dati relativi al fenomeno reale non è diretta e intrinseca ma, al più, indiretta e estrinseca. Il limite esplicativo consiste nel fatto che le spiegazioni supportate dal modello non sono mai compiute e realistiche ma, piuttosto, solo in linea di principio e romanzesche. Queste difficoltà potrebbero essere superate ricorrendo ai modelli Galileiani , costituiti da sistemi dinamici in cui ciascuna componente ha un’interpretazione precisa e definita, in quanto essa corrisponde ad una proprietà misurabile (grandezza) del fenomeno reale che il modello descrive. (shrink)

The paper delves into the nature and origin of ideas, words, meanings, and language from the perspective of Indian mystics and philosophers Abhinavagupta and Sri Aurobindo. We begin with the Eastern viewpoint, commencing with the Vedic interpretation, in which the origin of all speech lies in the transcendent sound, known as the ‘Word’. Abhinavagupta delineates the genesis of words as a four-level process within consciousness, where mystic sounds gradually acquire concreteness in the form of human language. Sri Aurobindo extends this (...) insight by recognizing that all words stem from mind-impressions elicited by seed-sounds bearing psychological qualities. Moreover, according to Sri Aurobindo, the universe and its natural phenomena represent the expression of a creative transcendental Real-Idea, which serves as the foundation for all meanings, signs, words, and human language and Nature itself. Language, therefore, becomes an instrument for the expression of divine consciousness in manifestation. This comprehensive perspective transcends the confines of language philosophy, expanding into a universal spiritual outlook. Finally, it is shown how the integration of Western and Eastern philosophies reconciles many apparent inconsistencies within modern philosophy and science (especially in the philosophy of language, cognitive sciences, neuroscience, and AI.) This integral perspective surpasses a naturalistic viewpoint, providing a synthetic framework that unifies the diverse East-West philosophical positions. (shrink)

This essay pushes the history of a scientific discipline, morphology, toward a broader philosophically informed and cross-disciplinarily engaged history of knowledge. It shows that by looking at how knowledge and practices circulated between scientific disciplines (such as biology) and technoscientific ones (like architecture and design) we can better understand how (morphological) knowledge was produced. By doing so, the analysis contributes to the study of the mechanisms of knowledge exchange between the organic and the technical worlds and, more broadly, to the (...) study of the dynamics of knowledge circulation. First, the essay analyzes the engineering studies of organic form conducted by the Austro-Hungarian botanist Raoul Heinrich Francé (1874–1943) and the Scottish polymath D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1860–1948). Subsequently, the essay moves to twenty-first-century morphogenesis. It examines the transfer of the notion of morphospace, a paleontological practice of data visualization, into biology-inspired architectural design. The conclusion deals with the broader features of knowledge transfer and circulation. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century morphologists successfully translate and transfer morphogenetic processes from nature into technical artifacts to achieve technical solutions to given problems. In the translation of organic morphogenesis into a technical process, evolution’s intrinsic historical contingency was deliberately left behind. (shrink)

The theorization of culture in psychology continues to gain momentum in spite of little agreement concerning the most suitable theoretical frameworks for examining cultural phenomena. We explore two contemporary approaches to culture--social constructionism and cultural studies--and examine their relevance for psychology. In juxtapositioning them we map their continuities and discontinuities in terms of ontological and epistemological stances on language, representation, knowledge, identity, history, ideology, social action and emancipation. We propose a bridge between the two, and discuss ways in which the (...) dialogue between social constructionism and cultural studies can deepen psychology's understanding of culture in the postmodern world. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals introduces the ‘sovereign individual’ as ‘responsible’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. Does this affirmative use of moral terminology reveal an unexpected affinity between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical modernity? In the last decades, this issue has been at the heart of a vast and controversial debate. My analysis shows that, rather than throwing light on Nietzsche’s general position, the specific use of Kantian terms in this passage of GM is due to a polemical intention. Implicitly, (...) Nietzsche rejects Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism of the ‘absolute sovereignty of the individual’. The author of the Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1879) sees the most radical herald of this ‘sovereignty’ in Max Stirner. From Nietzsche’s point of view, Hartmann’s rejection and Stirner’s affirmation share a reductive conception of ‘sovereignty’. Reinterpreting and ‘revaluing’ Kant’s moral terminology, Nietzsche aims to give an interpretation of individual sovereignty that is at the same time antithetical to Stirner’s and wholly at odds with Hartmann’s ethical views. In showing this, the paper gives a new answer to an old question; for already in the 1890s, Hartmann himself, accusing Nietzsche of plagiarizing Stirner, raised the issue of the historical relationship between the two philosophers. More generally, the paper shows that Nietzsche employs a specific textual strategy, which consists in taking Kantian terms in an ‘anti-Kantian’ sense and systematically cultivating the art of using ‘a moral formula in a supramoral sense’. (shrink)

In tis paper I examine the notion of innate knowledge maintained by N. Chomsky.

This volume collects 17 case studies that characterize the various kinds of translations of the European culture of the last two and a half millennia from ancient Greece to Rome, from the medieval world to the Renaissance up to the ...

This paper argues that the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics suggests a form of holism for which the whole (total ensemble of paths) has properties that are not strongly reducible to the properties of the parts (the single trajectories). Feynman’s sum over histories calculates the probability amplitude of a particle moving within a boundary by summing over all the possible trajectories that the particle can undertake. These trajectories and their individual probability amplitudes are thus necessary in calculating the total (...) amplitude. However, not all possible trajectories are differentiable, thus suggesting that they are not physical possibilities, but only mathematical entities. It follows that if the possible differentiable trajectories are taken to be part of the physical system, they are not sufficient to calculate the total probability amplitude. The conclusion is that the total ensemble is weakly non-supervenient upon the physically possible trajectories. (shrink)

Cuando Alejandro examina De anima II 5 de Aristóteles, se enfrenta al problema de explicar qué tipo de alteración es la sensación. Su respuesta fue muy influyente, especialmente después de la Quaestio III 3 que había sido traducida al latín por Gerardo de Cremona basada en una versión árabe. De hecho, aún es muy influyente, pues en general es tomada en cuenta por los comentadores modernos del De anima. Pero un examen detallado de De anima II 5 puede generar dudas (...) acerca de las teorías que Alejandro adscribió a Aristóteles acerca de la relación entre ser afectado o alterado y senso-percepción. Zingano se propone mostrar que mostrar cómo la lectura que Alejandro hace de De anima II 5 de Aristóteles contiene un elemento crucial para la adopción de la tesis, según la cual el ser afectado tiene poca o ninguna relevancia en la explicación de la sensación como facultad discriminadora. (shrink)

A interpretação tradicional de Metafísica Z 16 1040b5-16 é defendida aqui, contra a nova leitura, segundo a qual devem ser eliminadas da lista de substâncias sobre as quais há comum acordo em Z 2 não somente as partes dos seres vivos, mas também os corpos simples.

Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the same category end up rebranding it under a different (...) category. Finally, we show that this last equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction; that is, the unique equilibrium agreement may be inefficient. (shrink)

Fission of cellular membranes is ubiquitous and essential for life. Complex protein machineries, such as the dynamin and ESCRT spirals, have evolved to mediate membrane fission during diverse cellular processes, for example, vesicle budding. A new study suggests that non-specialized membrane-bound proteins can induce membrane fission through mass action due to protein crowding. Because up to 2/3 of the mass of cellular membranes is contributed by proteins, membrane protein crowding is an important physiological parameter. Considering the complexity of membrane shape (...) transitions during a fission reaction, spatial and temporal variability in protein distribution, and the abundance of intrinsically disordered regions in proteins on an invaginating membrane, protein crowding can have diverse consequences for fission in the cell. The question is, how and to what extent this mechanism combines with the action of dedicated fission machineries. Membrane fission, which is required for formation of vesicles or cytokinesis, can be carried out by specialized proteins like dynamin and the ESCRT complex. Recent work suggests that fission of cellular membranes, which are densely packed with proteins, can also be induced by protein crowding due to high entropic tension. (shrink)

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The conventional interpretation that Pierre Duhem condemned outright any type of thought experiment in Ernst Mach’s sense should be, at least in large part, rejected. Although Duhem placed particular emphasis on the perils of thought experiments that Mach had overlooked or at least underestimated, he retained the core idea of Mach’s theory, according to which thought experiments cannot break free from the ultimate authority of real-world experiments. This similarity between Duhem’s and Mach’s views about thought experiments is not the only (...) one. Just as there was in Duhem’s criticism of “expériences fictives” a tendency leading him to give voice to one of Mach’s basic empiricist claims, so also there was in Mach’s interpretation of thought experiments a tendency in the direction of Duhem’s conventionalism. If Mach’s and Duhem’s conceptions of thought experiments are compared, there results an importantly similar, although not identical, tension that should properly be taken into account in the more general comparison between Mach and Duhem. (shrink)

According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children's acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to early childhood. Against the facilitation—and also the maturation—hypothesis, I report empirical data attesting that children and even adults never come to understand false beliefs when deprived of proper social and linguistic interaction. In contrast to the attunement hypothesis, I argue that alleged mindreading (...) abilities in infancy differ significantly from those required to pass the false belief test at age four. I conclude that children's success in the false belief test reflects the acquisition of a novel psychological competence, and argue that social experience in the form of conversation about mental states teaches children to exploit belief reports to predict intelligent behaviour, and induces their acquisition of a capacity to recognize and track others' beliefs across contexts. (shrink)

In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes (desires, values, etc.) along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views (...) of responsibility, on which the agent’s past is relevant to whether she is responsible for a specific action. In a recent paper, Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman bring these theoretical discussions on moral responsibility to bear on practical issues regarding neurological modifications of individuals. After proposing and arguing for a historical view, Sharp and Wasserman offer some insight into how such a view may help us in determining the responsibility of subjects who have undergone Deep Brain Stimulation. This paper aims to join this discussion, by arguing that the correct historical view to be applied will also appeal to the agent’s control over her mental life and the fact that this was bypassed. I conclude with some brief comments on the practical implications of such a historical view. (shrink)