Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism” or (...) other surrogates to realism. In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or independently probable in the light of available evidence; hence, they are no counterexamples to deployment realism, for the no miracles argument wouldn’t apply to them. In other instances, pace Lyon, the prediction was actually false, and could be reinterpreted as true only by interpreting as true also the claim from which it was derived; or again, a false claim was employed in the derivation of a true prediction, but inessentially, the essential role being played by a weaker true claim. But as soon as the paradoxical air of such historical cases is explained away in any of these manners, they cease to represent counterexamples to deployment realism. If, as I suggest, all of them can be dealt with by these strategies, a theoretical claim can still be assumed to be true if it is crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction. (shrink)

I. L'ordine della mente e le forme del pensiero al tempo delle rivoluzioni nelle tecnologie della comunicazione.

We propose a semantics for a connexive conditional based on the Lewis-Stalnaker conditional. It is a connexive semantics that is both classical and intuitive.

A discussion concerning whether to conceive Artificial Intelligence systems as responsible moral entities, also known as “artificial moral agents”, has been going on for some time. In this regard, we argue that the notion of “moral agency” is to be attributed only to humans based on their autonomy and sentience, which AI systems lack. We analyze human responsibility in the presence of AI systems in terms of meaningful control and due diligence and argue against fully automated systems in medicine. With (...) this perspective in mind, we focus on the use of AI-based diagnostic systems and shed light on the complex networks of persons, organizations and artifacts that come to be when AI systems are designed, developed, and used in medicine. We then discuss relational criteria of judgment in support of the attribution of responsibility to humans when adverse events are caused or induced by errors in AI systems. (shrink)

On the basis of Levin’s claim that truth is not a scientific explanatory factor, Michel Ghins argues that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) is not scientific, therefore scientific realism is not a scientific hypothesis, and naturalism is wrong. I argue that there are genuine senses of ‘scientific’ and ‘explanation’ in which truth can yield scientific explanations. Hence, the NMA can be considered scientific in the sense that it hinges on a scientific explanation, it follows a typically scientific inferential pattern (IBE), (...) and it is based on an empirical fact (the success of science). Scientific realism, in turn, is scientific in the sense that it is supported both by a meta-level scientific argument (the NMA), and by first level scientific arguments through semantic ascent and generalization. However, both the NMA and scientific realism are not purely scientific, since they go beyond properly scientific concerns, and require additional philosophical reasoning. In turn, naturalism is correct in the sense that philosophy is continuous with science, partly based on it, and potentially equally well warranted. Beside denying the scientific nature of the NMA, Ghins raises some objections to its cogency , to which I reply in the final section. (shrink)

La llamada “polémica en torno al psicologismo” (Psychologismusstreit) se compone en realidad de una serie de polémicas singulares que no poseen necesariamente vínculo factual entre sí. La discusión entre Herbart y Beneke es una de ellas, poseyendo particular importancia por encontrarse en el comienzo del conflicto. En ella el psicologista Beneke percibe con agudeza los puntos débiles de la posición herbartiana e inicia una línea de argumentación que, con variaciones, se mantendrá constante en el psicologismo y dará sentido a que (...) el último acto del drama llamado Psychologismusstreit sea dado por la fenomenología husserliana. (shrink)

Este artigo procura apresentar algumas considerações acerca do entrecruzamento do pensamento político de Hannah Arendt e a questão ambiental. Para tanto, o seguinte questionamento servirá de guia para a reflexão aqui pretendida: se o âmbito natural é perturbado pelas ações humanas, é razoável a crença de que a própria ação humana possa ser capaz de frear o atual cenário de catástrofe? Assim sendo, assume-se, aqui, como procedimento metodológico uma análise bibliográfica que recorre ao livro A condição humana (The human condition, (...) 1958 [2010]) e alguns ensaios da coletânea Entre o passado e o futuro (Between Past and Future, 1961 [2009]). De modo geral, busca-se desenvolver o argumento de que embora não se possa enquadrar Hannah Arendt no rol das “historiadoras das ciências”, tampouco uma “pensadora da ecologia”, é certo que ela nunca deixou de se interessar e comentar os eventos científicos de seu tempo, bem como de se preocupar com as consequências das ações humanas. Logo, os assuntos relacionados aos avanços tecnológicos e científicos constituem assuntos de primeira grandeza e importância tanto para o mundo quanto para a política. Em suma, pretende-se sustentar a hipótese de que para Hannah Arendt, a imagem adotada da natureza – ao menos desde a época moderna –, e as ações humanas cometidas a partir desta compreensão, afetam diretamente nossa existência política. (shrink)

This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view (...) apart from a “realist” theory of ethics. The reality of which he speaks is the reality of human life. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente ar:tículo quiere criticar el tradicional enfoque histórico-biográfico en la exégesis de la obra de Francesco Petrarca, para proponer, en cambio, la aplicación de unas herramientas de análisis propiamente poéticas, enfatizando así la exigencia de una lectura que atienda más a este tipo de función, en lugar de la referencial, causa de muchos malentendidos y de una importante pérdida de significado que afecta todo el mensaje petrarquesco. Para ello, el artículo se centrará en los nombres propios, elemento constitutivo (...) muy frecuente en las obras del poeta de Arezzo y nudos de un entramado semántico que es connotativo, más que denotativo. Un planteamiento, esto es, que discrepa de la gran mayoría de las interpretaciones, siempre orientadas hacia la consideración de ellos como meros referentes de identidades históricas. Entre estos nombres toma especial valor, como es debido, el propio nombre del poeta, que lejos de ser la simple identificación referencial entre escritor, autor, narrador y protagonista, resulta ser más bien la semilla de una construcción mitopoética vasta y articulada, vehículo preciso de una parte importante del mensaje poético que el autor legó a la posteridad y que atiene a la virtud y a la mejora ética y moral. Abstract: This article aims to criticize the traditional historical-biographical approach in the exegesis of the work of Francesco Petrarca, to propose, instead, the application of some properly poetic analysis tools, thus emphasizing the need for a reading that pays more attention to this type of function, rather than to the referential one, cause of many misunderstandings and an important loss of meaning that affects the entire Petrarchan message. To do this, the article will focus on proper names, a very common constituent element in the works of the poet of Arezzo, and knots of a semantic structure that is connotative, rather than denotative. An approach, that is, that disagrees with most interpretations, always oriented towards the consideration of them as mere referents of historical identities. Among these names, the poet's own name takes a special value, as it should, which far from being the simple referential identification between writer, author, narrator, and protagonist, turns out to be rather the seed of a vast and articulated mythopoetic construction, precise vehicle of an important part of the poetic message that the author bequeaths to posterity and that holds to virtue and ethical and moral improvement. (shrink)

In this work I try to show that there is a common thread between ekphrasis and prompt engineering, in spite of the temporal distance of almost thirty centuries between their respective earliest known instances, and despite the blatant disparity in technological tools supporting them. An investigation of the characteristics of such thread can shed light on a number of aspects of our experience of textual and visual works, including the role of our imagination, that of our emotions, and what happens (...) when human agency within these imaginative and emotive processes is substituted by the artificial agency of an AI system. (shrink)

Para Frege, o erro de base do psicologismo é a sua concepção de sujeito, que se concentra no princípio de que meus únicos objetos são conteúdos imanentes da consciência. Entretanto, essa tese não é meramente falsa, mas também refutável. A refutação da mesma aparece, não obstante, tardiamente em Der Gedanke. É esse o sentido último da crítica do idealismo oferecida neste texto. Ela é um passo necessário e imprescindível para assegurar a possibilidade de que captemos pensamentos, possibilidade com a qual (...) se ocupa boa parte do artigo de 1918. (shrink)

According to Zurek, decoherence is a process resulting from the interaction between a quantum system and its environment; this process singles out a preferred set of states, usually called “pointer basis”, that determines which observables will receive definite values. This means that decoherence leads to a sort of selection which precludes all except a small subset of the states in the Hilbert space of the system from behaving in a classical manner: environment-induced-superselection—einselection —is a consequence of the process of decoherence. (...) The aim of this paper is to present a new approach to decoherence, different from the mainstream approach of Zurek and his collaborators. We will argue that this approach offers conceptual advantages over the traditional one when problems of foundations are considered; in particular, from the new perspective, decoherence in closed quantum systems becomes possible and the preferred basis acquires a well founded definition. (shrink)

Evandro Agazzi’s volume Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts is here introduced. First, the genesis and the content of the book are outlined. Secondly, an overview of Agazzi’s philosophy of science is provided. Its main roots are epistemological realism in the Aristotelian/scholastic tradition, and contemporary science-oriented epistemology, especially in Logical Empiricism. As a result, Agazzi’s thought is nicely balanced between empiricism and rationalism, it avoids gnoseologistic dualism by stressing the intentionality of knowledge, and it insists on the operational and referential character (...) of science. Finally, an account is given of Agazzi’s view of the origin and nature of scientific objects, which allows to understand how his sophisticated and “perspectival” realism differs both from naïve realism and constructivism. (shrink)

The book introduces to the analytic philosophy of language by presenting the main classical authors and texts of the XX Century, as well as the key problems and concepts of this discipline in their historical context. Ch. I: general introduction to the philosophy of language. Ch. II: Frege. Ch. III: Russell. Ch. IV: Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Ch: V: Neopositivism and verificationism. Ch. VI: Carnap's intensional semantics. Ch. VII: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Ch. VIII: Quine. Ch. IX: theories of direct reference. Everything is (...) explained in plain but precise language, with many examples. Thus, the reader realizes how each author addresses the problems set by earlier investigations, in turn opening new problems for discussion and advancing the state of the art. The critical comparison among different positions raises possible objections and answers, introducing to the rational debate in the style of analytic philosophy. Whenever required the book also introduces basic notions of logics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, foundations of mathematics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. Each argument is dealt with on three distinct levels: introductory, intermediate, advanced. Therefore, the book can be helpful to beginners, to graduate students, and to researchers. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo plantea la tesis de que la filosofía fenomenológica de la percepción de Merleau-Ponty, en la medida en que es crítica tanto del empirismo como del idealismo, apunta hacia una forma de realismo. Para argumentar en favor de esta idea y mostrar la vigencia del pensador francés, se contrastan los planteamientos de éste con posturas del “realismo especulativo” de Meillassoux, del “nuevo realismo” de Gabriel y del “realismo plural” de Taylor y Dreyfus. Se propone el concepto de “realismo (...) ontológico” para apuntalar la postura de Merleau-Ponty y a los planteamientos de este ensayo.This essay claims that the thesis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, insofar that it criticizes both empirism and idealism, points towards a form of realism. To argue this, and to show the validity of the work of the French thinker, I contrast his thoughts with the approaches of “speculative realism” of Meillassoux, of the “new realism” of Gabriel and of “plural realism” of Taylor and Dreyfus. I propose the concept of “ontological realism” in order to support the posture of Merleau-Ponty and the arguments of this essay. (shrink)