Die sekundäre Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten hat großes Potenzial, biomedizinisches Wissen zu erweitern und die Patientenversorgung zu verbessern. Gleichzeitig sind für eine bessere Ausschöpfung dieses Potenzials diverse Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Dies gilt insbesondere in Deutschland, wo im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern, wie z.B. Dänemark oder Finnland, die sekundäre Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten unterentwickelt ist. Die Intensivierung der Nutzung der Daten aus Diagnose und Therapie von Patienten und die Entwicklung der dafür notwendigen Strukturen in Deutschland ist ethisch und politisch geboten: für die Verbesserung (...) der Gesundheitsversorgung durch neue Erkenntnisse, Therapien und Qualitätssicherung. Aus diesem Grund fordern die Autor:innen alle Akteure des Gesundheitssystems, von der Bundes- und den Landesregierungen über die Krankenkassen, Kliniken, Ärzt:innen und Patient:innen dazu auf, einen Beitrag dazu leisten, eine Kultur der sekundären Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten zu etablieren. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen eines dreijährigen Verbundprojekts beantworten die Autor:innen aus den Bereichen Medizin, Rechtswissenschaften, Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften die Frage was notwendig ist, damit in Deutschland die Daten von Patient:innen systematisch für medizinische Forschung und die Analyse der klinischen Versorgungsqualität verwendet werden können und wirklich auch verwendet werden. Sie nennen zehn zentrale Forderungen und legen eine Liste von 23 Empfehlungen mit konkreten Maßnahmen vor, welche von den genannten Akteuren umgesetzt werden sollten. (shrink)

Research question The secondary use of clinical data for research and learning activities has the potential to significantly improve medical knowledge and clinical care. To realize this potential, an ethical and legal basis for data use is needed, preferably in the form of patient consent. This raises the question: Do patients have a moral duty to provide their clinical data for research and learning activities? Methods On the basis of an ethical approach that we call “caring liberalism,” we evaluate plausibility (...) and moral weight of the following arguments in favor of a duty on patients to provide their clinical data for research and learning activities: the general duty to help; solidarity; the duty to act in the public interest; the free-rider argument; transgenerational justice; the principle of giving back; the do-not-harm principle; freedom of research and the value of science. Results The general duty to help and the duty to act in the public interest are strong reasons for a moral duty of patients to provide their clinical data for research and learning activities. Transgenerational justice and the principle of giving back are ethically weak reasons for such a duty but might be motivational factors. The other reasons are not appropriate to justify a duty. The results are relevant in several respects: for patients who are asked to consent to the secondary use of their clinical data; for the ethical discussion of the question whether and to what extent deviations from the classical specific consent are ethically justifiable under certain conditions; for the legal discussion of the conditions for a proportionate secondary use of clinical data for research and learning activities. (shrink)

Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified (...) in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments. (shrink)

The paper develops an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploits an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present on the basis of sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a “prediction of the past” on the basis of a minimal trace, i.e., an informationally sparse, merely causal link to a previous experience. The resulting notion of episodic memory (...) will be validated as a natural kind distinct from imagination. This trace minimalist view contrasts with two theory camps dominating the philosophical debate on memory. On one side, we face versions of the Causal Theory that hold on to the idea that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. The Causal Theory, however, fails to account for the epistemic generativity of episodic memory and is psychologically and information-theoretically implausible. On the other side, a new camp of simulationists is currently forming up. Motivated by empirical and conceptual deficits of the Causal Theory, they reject not only the necessity of preserving representational content, but also the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory. They argue that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination, peculiar only in that it has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one’s personal past. Albeit sharing their criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, rejecting its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, the paper argues that a causal connection to experience is still necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability. (shrink)

Li Zhi's iconoclastic interpretations of history, religion, literature, and social relations have fascinated Chinese intellectuals for centuries. His approach synthesized Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist ethics and incorporated the Neo-Confucian idealism of such thinkers as Wang Yangming. The result was a series of heretical writings that caught fire among Li Zhi's contemporaries, despite an imperial ban on their publication, and intrigued Chinese audiences long after his death. Translated for the first time into English, Li Zhi's bold challenge to established doctrines will (...) captivate anyone curious about the origins of such subtly transgressive works as the sixteenth-century play _The Peony Pavilion_ or the eighteenth-century novel _Dream of the Red Chamber_. In _A Book to Burn and a Book to Keep _, Li Zhi confronts accepted ideas about gender, questions the true identity of history's heroes and villains, and offers his own readings of Confucius, Laozi, and the Buddha. Fond of vivid sentiment and sharp expression, Li Zhi made no distinction between high and low literary genres in his literary analysis. He refused to support sanctioned ideas about morality and wrote stinging social critiques. Li Zhi praised scholars who risked everything to expose extortion and misrule. In this sophisticated translation, English-speaking readers encounter the best of this heterodox intellectual's vital contribution to Chinese thought and culture. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a philosophical account of actual mathematical infinity that does not demand ontologically or epistemologically problematic assumptions. The account is based on a simple metaphor in which we think of indefinitely continuing processes as defining objects. It is shown that such a metaphor is valid in terms of mathematical practice, as well as in line with empirical data on arithmetical cognition.

Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power of choice. I show that although there are (...) important senses in which Kant's conception of OIC differs from the way in which OIC is discussed in recent philosophy, his account raises important issues for contemporary theory: for instance, it highlights the extent to which acceptance or rejection of OIC reflects convictions about the sources of normativity. (shrink)

Leading linguists and philosophers report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. This book explores every dimension of this field, reporting critically on different lines of research, revealing connections between them, and highlighting current problems and opportunities.

Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...) mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism. (shrink)

Although we frequently acquire knowledge and skills through social interactions, the focus of most research on learning is on individual learning. Here we characterize Interaction Based Learning, which represents the acquisition of knowledge or skill through social interactions, and compare it to Observational Learning —learning by observation. To that end, we designed a movement synchronization paradigm whereby participants learned Tai-Chi inspired movement sequences from trained teachers in two separated sessions. We used a motion capture system to track the movement of (...) 40 dyads comprised of a teacher and learner, who were randomly divided into OL or IBL groups, and calculated time-varying synchrony of three-dimensional movement velocity. While in the IBL group both the learner and the teacher could see each other through a transparent glass, in the OL group dyads interacted through a one-way mirror, such that the learners observed the teacher, but the teacher could not see the learners. Results show that although the number of movements recalled was not different between groups, we found improved movement smoothness in the IBL compared to the OL group, indicating movement acquisition was better in the IBL group. In addition, we found that motor synchronization levels in dyads improved over time, indicating that movement synchronization can be learned and retained. In the first session, the IBL group, but not the OL group, showed a significant improvement in synchronization. This suggests that dyadic interaction is important for learning movement sequences, and that bidirectional communication of signals and mutual feedback are essential for the consolidation of motor learning. (shrink)

Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...) valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness. (shrink)

This paper describes the interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross to support a hospital in Afghanistan during the mid 1990s. We present elements of the interventions introduced in Ghazni, Afghanistan, and consider a number of ethical issues stimulated by this analysis. Ethical challenges arise whenever humanitarian interventions to deal with complex political emergencies are undertaken: among those related to the case study presented are questions concerning: a) whether humanitarian support runs the risk of propping up repressive and (...) irresponsible governments; b) whether humanitarian relief activities can legitimately focus on a narrow range of interventions, or need to broaden to address the range of challenges facing the health system; and c) whether sustainability and quality of care should be routinely considered in such settings. The paper concludes by highlighting the value of case studies, suggesting mechanisms for extending transparency and accountability in humanitarian health interventions, and highlighting the need of contextualising humanitarian work if the interventions are to be successful. (shrink)

This paper presents two cognitive models that simulate the production of referring expressions in the iMAP task—a task-oriented dialog. One general model is based on Dale and Reiter’s (1995)incremental algorithm, and the other is a simple template model that has a higher correlation with the data but is specifically geared toward the properties of the iMAP task. The property of the iMAP task environment that is modeled here is that the color feature is unreliable for identifying referents while other features (...) are reliable. The low computational cost of the incremental algorithm for generating referring expressions makes it an interesting starting point for a cognitive model. However, its explanatory power is limited, because it generates uniquely distinguishing referring expressions and because it considers features for inclusion in the referring expression in a fixed order. The first model extends the original incremental algorithm by an ability to adapt to feedback of whether a referring expression was used successfully, but it seems to overpredict the frequency with which distinguishing expressions are made and underpredict the frequency of overspecified referring expressions. The second model produces features for referring expressions purely based on its current estimate of a feature’s utility. Both models predict the observed human behavior of decreasing use of color terms and increasing use of useful feature terms. (shrink)

The doctrine that meanings are entitieswith a determinate and independent reality is often believed tohave been undermined by Quine's thought experiment of radicaltranslation, which results in an argument for the indeterminacy oftranslation. This paper argues to the contrary. Starting fromQuine's assumption that the meanings of observation sentences arestimulus meanings, i.e., set-theoretical constructions of neuronalstates uniquely determined by inter-subjectively observable facts,the paper shows that this meaning assignment, up to isomorphism,is uniquely extendable to all expressions that occur inobservation sentences. To do so, (...) a theorem recently proven byHodges is used. To derive the conclusion, one only has to assumethat languages are compositional, abide by a generalized contextprinciple and by what I call the category principle. Theseassumptions originating in Frege and Husserl are coherent withQuine's overall position. It is concluded that Quine'snaturalistic approach does not justify scepticism with regard tomeaning, but should rather result in a view that affiliatessemantics with neuroscience. (shrink)

The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics. There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against the claim (...) that our perceptions are ‘locally conjoined’ with any entity (namely, a soul). (shrink)

Recently the functional model of reduction has become something like the standard model of reduction in philosophy of mind. In this paper, I argue that the functional model fails as an account of reduction due to problems related to three key concepts: functionalization, realization and causation. I further argue that if we try to revise the model in order to make it more coherent and scientifically plausible, the result is merely a simplified version of what in philosophy of science is (...) known as mechanistic explanation. Hence, instead of analyzing reduction in philosophy of mind in terms of functional reduction, it should be analyzed in terms of mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

In a recent paper in 'Social Epistemology' Dimitri Ginev aims to show that Ludwik Fleck uses transcendental arguments in two contexts in his work that are closely intertwined: the context of comparative cognitive sociology and the context of socio-historical epistemology. I am skeptical about Ginev’s interpretation and my aim is to show that at least the part of Ginev’s argument in which he aims to show Fleck’s use of transcendental arguments in the context of socio-historical epistemology is not convincing. To (...) my mind, a much better interpretation of Fleck’s argument in this context is to see Fleck as using scientisticinstead of transcendental arguments. (shrink)

A systems theory for chemistry is proposed in order to provide a general framework, which covers different theoretical approaches used in the molecular sciences.The basic elements of systems theory are introduced and discussed.By construction, this systems chemistry offers classification and categorizationschemes that will help to identify the range of applicability of certain theoretical approachesas well as to find yet unanswered fundamental questions. Consequently, it will be of value not only to thosewho want to understand and study the structure of chemistry, (...) but it might also be of importance to daily research in chemistry. (shrink)

1. Bd. Die Grundlagen. Die spezielle Relativitätstheorie.- 2. Bd. Die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie.

In early analytic philosophy, one of the most central questions concerned the status of arithmetical objects. Frege argued against the popular conception that we arrive at natural numbers with a psychological process of abstraction. Instead, he wanted to show that arithmetical truths can be derived from the truths of logic, thus eliminating all psychological components. Meanwhile, Dedekind and Peano developed axiomatic systems of arithmetic. The differences between the logicist and axiomatic approaches turned out to be philosophical as well as mathematical. (...) In this paper, I will argue that Dedekind’s approach can be seen as a precursor to modern structuralism and as such, it enjoys many advantages over Frege’s logicism. I also show that from a modern perspective, Frege’s criticism of abstraction and psychologism is one-sided and fails against the psychological processes that modern research suggests to be at the heart of numerical cognition. The approach here is twofold. First, through historical analysis, I will try to build a clear image of what Frege’s and Dedekind’s views on arithmetic were. Then, I will consider those views from the perspective of modern philosophy of mathematics, and in particular, the empirical study of arithmetical cognition. I aim to show that there is nothing to suggest that the axiomatic Dedekind approach could not provide a perfectly adequate basis for philosophy of arithmetic. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Il dissenso (disagreement) è un tema molto discusso nella filosofia contemporanea, dal dissenso come categoria della filosofia politica all’analisi del dissenso in epistemologia. In questo articolo sostengo che il dissenso sia una categoria ontologica. Per articolare questa tesi, si sostiene che i fatti e le cose possano esistere solamente in quello che verrà denominato un “campo di senso”. Dato che vi è necessariamente una pluralità di campi di senso, tutte le cose e i fatti possono essere manifestati in diverse modalità (...) di senso. L’oggettività è, dunque, concettualmente legata all’esistenza di una pluralità di campi di senso. Di conseguenza, il disaccordo non è una caratteristica contingente delle nostre pratiche discorsive, ma piuttosto un riflesso della struttura oggettiva e pubblica dei fatti. Quest’idea è motivata da una critica a entrambe le concezioni, cartesiana e kantiana, dell’intenzionalità. (shrink)

The Philosophy ofLanguage belongs to the foundations of philosophical reflexion. In this volume, its central problems and strategies are explained, and the nature of sentences and other elements of language are analysed. The didactical exposition of the most important schools and thinkers makes the volume particularly interesting for readers new to the subject.

This volume covers a great range of topics within general metaphysics, featuring contributions by experts in the respective areas. The information contained is suitable for introductory as well as research purposes. The book equally targets laymen, students, and experts in their own right. Subjects range from the history of metaphysics, properties, objects, modality, structure, truth, etc. to methodological concerns of metaphysics.