Rendre hommage à un auteur, ce n'est pas seulement célébrer ce qu'il fut mais c'est aussi alerter sur ce que son oeuvre apporte au présent et à l'avenir de la connaissance. C'est bien le sens donné à cet hommage à André-Jean Arnaud. Repenser le droit, c'était pou r cet auteur érudit : repenser les lieux, les conditions et les façons de l'étudier en dépassant les frontières géographiques en même temps que les frontières disciplinaires. En montrant en quoi André-Jean (...) class='Hi'>Arnaud fut, hors des sentiers battus et des orthodoxies de la production et de la transmission des savoirs en la matière, un exceptionnel précurseur et l'infatigable artisan d'un nouveau régime de connaissance sur le droit, le présent ouvrage s'adresse à toutes celles et à tous ceux, enseignants, chercheurs, étudiants ou simples citoyens, pou r qui l'étude du droit permet de mieux comprendre ce que sont et ce que sont susceptibles de devenir nos sociétés. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than as a supervenience (...) or identity relation. To begin, I discuss some reasons for being a (neo-)Brentanian about the mind and briefly introduce the main characteristics of Brentano’s internalist description program. Then, I turn to the current “inseparatist” way of dealing with intentionality and phenomenality, focusing on the demand for unity coming from advocates of phenomenal intentionality. I suggest that the unity of the mind may be put in a new light if we put aside metaphysical–epistemological questions, go back to Brentano’s description program, and endorse his thesis that the mental is something unified in which various parts must be distinguished. In the last section, I draw some lessons from this approach, holding that, for any representational content R, R is (in Brentano’s terms) an abstractive or “distinctional” part of the relevant state and that, for any qualitative aspect Q, Q is an abstractive or “distinctional” part of the relevant representational content R. (shrink)

This volume addresses key aspects of the philosophical psychology elaborated by Alexius Meinong and some of his students. It covers a wide range of topics, from the place of psychological investigations in Meinong's unique philosophical program to his thought-provoking views on perception, colors, "Vorstellungsproduktion," assumptions, values, truth, and emotions.

Textes d'anciens élèves et amis de Jean Brun analysant son projet philosophique et sa pensée. Comporte également plusieurs de ses articles qui témoignent de sa quête de la vérité et du chemin, termes bibliques souvent utilisés par lui.

En 1961, un article de Souriau relevant une difficulté signalée en 1953 par Dufrenne porte sur la juste part à accorder à la contemplation dans la relation à l’art. La zone d’ombre concernant la relation humaine et intellectuelle entre les deux hommes fera l’objet d’un premier examen. L’hypothèse souralienne d’une transmutation de conceptions théologiques dans le domaine de l’art sera ensuite examinée par rapport à Dufrenne sans évacuer la question de sa pertinence par rapport aux études phénoménologiques ultérieures. La question (...) de la relation à l’art, telle que Souriau l’envisage ressurgira dans sa pleine actualité jusque dans le face à face avec les œuvres. (shrink)

This article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed at all and traces the answer back to (...) Mill’s view that psychological laws are class-specific. Section 4 and 5 connect the second premise of Brentano’s argument to Comte’s principle of comparative likeness and Mill’s insistance that class membership is determined by the possession of common characteristics. And section 6 briefly discusses the evidence Brentano provides for the first premise. (shrink)

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner‐awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, (...) they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor. (shrink)

Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit (...) or explicit knowledge. (shrink)

This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school, in their pursuit of (...) a unique research programme according to which the analysis of meaning is inseparable from philosophical inquiries into what goes on in the mind and what there is in the world. In three parts, the volume first reconstructs Brentano’s pathbreaking thoughts on meaning and grammatical illusions, exploring their strong connections with the Austro-German tradition and analytic philosophy. It then addresses the multifaceted debates on the objectivity of meaning in the Brentano School and its aftermath. Finally, part three explores Brentano’s wider legacy, namely: Husserl’s theory of modification and typicality, Bühler’s theory of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on guidance and rule-following. The result is a unique collection of essays which shows the significance, originality and timely character of the Brentanian philosophy of language. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : This paper contributes to explor the historical background of contemporary conceptualism. It suggests that a step forward toward a more promising understanding of this historical background can be made if we focus, not on the much-discussed, controversial position of Kant, but rather on the straightforward position of some main representatives of classical neo-Kantianism. My main hypothesis is that criticisms of Kant’s transcendantal aesthetics coming from Paul Natorp and Bruno Bauch may be regarded as a significant historical source for (...) the so-called “content” conceptualism, insofar as they imply that the contents of perception are conceptual contents. (shrink)

Despite epistemological and ideological obstacles, the reasons of which are briefly recalled in this article, the relationship between law and religion in the medieval West has been extensively explored, notably through studies devoted to canon law, ecclesiastical procedures and legal qualifications. Yet the boundaries, contact zones and connections between these two “regimes of normativity” and “veridiction” have been left in the dark. This paper does not claim to encompass all the aspects of such a titanic investigation. Instead, it intends to (...) point out some of the problems that arise as soon as one approaches (as a historian) the relations that the Catholic Church – that established the Christian religion – has maintained with the law, and to indicate the paths currently explored in this direction. (shrink)

The interventionist account of causation offers a criterion to distinguish causes from non-causes. It also aims at defining various desirable properties of causal relationships, such as specificity, proportionality and stability. Here we apply an information-theoretic approach to these properties. We show that the interventionist criterion of causation is formally equivalent to non-zero specificity, and that there are natural, information-theoretic ways to explicate the distinction between potential and actual causal influence. We explicate the idea that the description of causes should be (...) proportional to that of their effects. Then we draw a distinction between two ideas in the existing literature, the range of invariance of a causal relationship and its stability. The range of invariance is related to specificity and range of causal values. Stability concerns the effect of additional variables on the relationship between some focal pair of cause and effect variables. We show how to distinguish and measure the direct influence of background variables on the effect variable, and their influence on the relationship between the focal cause and the effect variable. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the information-theoretic approach, and offer prospects for complementary approaches. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that perceptual experiences provide us with some “normative support” for beliefs or judgments about our surroundings. Provided that the normative force of perceptual justification is something that manifests itself in consciousness or something we commonly experience, what are its phenomenal features? To put it differently: What is it to experience the normative force of perceptual justification? In the first section I will briefly comment on the demand of a unified theory of perceptual experiences, viz. a theory which (...) is capable of integrating relevant epistemological and phenomenological aspects of perceptual experiences. In section two I will argue for a way of connecting the epistemological problem and the phenomenological problem by appealing to a compare-and-contrast strategy. Eventually, in section three, I will try to draw some lessons for our understanding of the normative force of perceptual justification. (shrink)

The aim of the study by Arnaud Bouaniche, “Bergson on the cinematographical Schematism of Intelligence”, is to understand the role of cinema in the fourth chapter of Bergson’s Creative Evolution in the light of a precise comparison with the Kantian doctrine of schematism of pure concepts of understanding. A thesis then becomes clear : for Bergson, cinema is not, as is often believed, only a machine for producing illusion — the illusion of movement — but this “hidden art” — (...) now made visible — which controls our spontaneous knowledge of reality. (shrink)

Sarah Arnaud C’est par une affirmation provocatrice que Hacking propose un ratio pour représenter le rapport entre science et militantisme dans le façonnement des notions sur l’autisme. Selon lui, la définition et la compréhension actuelles de l’autisme proviennent à 99 % de personnes « personnellement connectées à une personne autiste » plutôt que de la science. Kendler rejette un tel point de vue en suggérant au contraire que notre compréhension de l’autisme est le résultat d’un travail scientifique approfondi, notamment (...) par la recherche en génétique. Je considère que leur désaccord se fonde sur une fausse dichotomie selon laquelle seule la recherche scientifique est à même d’envisager l’autisme de manière empirique, alors que le discours des « p-c-a » construirait au contraire une conception socioculturelle de l’autisme. J’envisage les problèmes éthiques inhérents à un tel ratio et suggère que la perspective des personnes autistes elles-mêmes représente une étape nécessaire à l’atteinte d’une validité scientifique. (shrink)

Le présent article tente de se demander pourquoi Schopenhauer demeure un philosophe important pour nous aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire qu’il vise à déterminer quel fut le geste propre de cet auteur en philosophie. Pour cela, nous cherchons à situer son point de rupture avec Kant, et nous pensons le trouver dans la question des rapports entre temps et causalité, à l’occasion de laquelle Schopenhauer institue une critique de Kant. Nous présentons quatre observations au sujet de cette critique, qui concernent respectivement les notions (...) de corps et de volonté, de rêve, de connaissance, enfin d’objet, de perception et d’expérience. À l’issue de cette analyse, l’innovation de Schopenhauer apparaît dans un certain retournement qu’il fait subir à la question critique elle-même. (shrink)

In 1952, Heinrich Scholz published a question in The Journal of Symbolic Logic asking for a characterization of spectra, i.e., sets of natural numbers that are the cardinalities of finite models of first order sentences. Günter Asser in turn asked whether the complement of a spectrum is always a spectrum. These innocent questions turned out to be seminal for the development of finite model theory and descriptive complexity. In this paper we survey developments over the last 50-odd years pertaining to (...) the spectrum problem. Our presentation follows conceptual developments rather than the chronological order. Originally a number theoretic problem, it has been approached by means of recursion theory, resource bounded complexity theory, classification by complexity of the defining sentences, and finally by means of structural graph theory. Although Scholz' question was answered in various ways, Asser's question remains open. (shrink)

Arnaud Milanese | : La philosophie pratique de Hobbes est problématique parce que son déterminisme ne semble pas permettre une théorie de l’action : comment penser l’imputation des actes, si l’on soutient que le libre-arbitre n’existe pas ? 1) Son analyse se construit à travers la critique de la théorie scolastique du libre arbitre (dans la controverse avec Bramhall), et, à cette fin, Hobbes semble puiser dans l’analyse d’Aristote pour y reprendre sa distinction entre actions volontaires et involontaires. 2) (...) Mais il ne peut penser cependant la spécificité des actions humaines, comme d’Aristote, par la contingence. 3) Il ne lui reste alors, pour penser l’imputation dans une ontologie déterministe, qu’à constituer une conception de l’individualité de l’agent qui repense le motif aristotélicien de la détermination intérieure à agir, mais sans libre-arbitre ni contingence. 4) Si les difficultés théologiques subsistent, c’est parce que, pour Hobbes, aucune philosophie ne peut résoudre les mystères de la foi. | : The hobbesian philosophy of action is problematical because his determinism seems unable to frame a theory of action : how could it be possible to conceive imputation of actions, if free will does not exist ? 1) This analysis is built on a criticism of scholastic theory of free will (in controversy with Bramhall), and, to this end, Hobbes seems to draw in the aristotelian analysis and makes use of his distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. 2) But however, he cannot conceive the specificity of human actions the same way Aristotle did, that is, by the concept of contingency. 3) So, the only remaining way of thinking imputation in his determinist ontology seems to suppose a certain conception of the individuality of agents, and to rethink this way the aristotelian concept of inner determination to act, but without free will nor contingency. 4) Theological difficulties remains, of course, but only because, according to Hobbes, philosophy cannot solve the mysteries of faith. (shrink)

A supposer que le concept de valeur soit un concept empirique, qui a sa source dans l'expérience, de quel type est l'expérience de la valeur? Dans les pages suivantes, je suggère qu’Ehrenfels et Meinong ont apporté certaines améliorations substantielles à la position de Brentano. Ces améliorations résident essentiellement dans les deux points suivants : (1) les volitions se caractérisent par une dimension « active » ou conative qui fait défaut aux sentiments, ce qui interdit de les ranger dans une seule (...) et même « classe » de phénomènes psychiques ; (2) le concept de valeur trouve son origine empirique dans les volitions ou les phénomènes conatifs, non dans les sentiments ou phénomènes affectifs. (shrink)

Partant du constat que la majeure partie des débats concernant un éventuel « primat de la raison pratique » se jouent pour ainsi dire en amont de la phénoménologie husserlienne, j’entreprends d’abord de retracer les deux sources de la thèse du « primat de la raison pratique », telle qu’elle est défendue dans l’école néokantienne de Bade, à savoir la source kantienne-fichtéenne, qui concerne le caractère « normatif » du critère de validité de la connaissance, et la source brentanienne-bergmannienne, qui (...) concerne le caractère « pratique » des actes judicatifs. J’examine ensuite brièvement les deux stratégies développées respectivement par Rickert et par Lask pour écarter l’objection de « moralisme » : l’idée d’un « parallélisme logico-éthique » (Rickert) et la critique du concept de Sollen (Lask). (shrink)

The text focuses on reflecting on the role of modern university in a man intellectual development, starting from Nietzsche’s ideas. By drawing up some of the main methodological and philosophical concepts of the German philosopher, the text highlights a series of aspects on the Humboldian nature of current universities – a state of tension under the political, economic and social factors. Thus, the classic concepts of Bildung and Kultur specific to the XIX-century University are analyzed in relation with the crisis (...) that marked the Prussian state of Bismarck period. Higher education being available to the masses is a current problem Nietzsche didn’t avoid to call „savageness” and „decline” of the higher educational system. The purpose of the text is to point out if Nietzsche’s ideas can be still applied nowadays. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge la temporalité de la santé : il s’efforce de démontrer que les phénomènes de santé et de maladie peuvent être dits temporels non pas accidentellement, mais essentiellement. Il met au jour quatre aspects temporels de la santé : son épaisseur de durée, sa relation avec l’avenir, la nature partiellement rétrospective des jugements dans lesquels elle entre, et son irréversibilité.

L’idéal démocratique de l’égalité devant la loi ( isonomia ) et devant la prise de parole ( isègoria ) suppose une éducation de tous les citoyens à l’art de la parole (logos), c’est-à-dire à la maîtrise écrite et orale des discours. Malgré les critiques des philosophes qui voient dans la rhétorique ou l’art de bien discourir le risque d’une dérive sophistique et démagogique, Isocrate veut croire à son accord possible avec une philosophie entendue comme « paideia tôn logôn », c’est-à-dire (...) formation de tous à la discursivité, éducation humaniste à la parole rationnelle. (shrink)

Il y avait l'imaginaire doucereux de l'onirisme baroque, stipulant que le monde est un songe, auquel une rationalité arrogante a voulu opposer un réalisme têtu : la fiction est une chose, la réalité en est une autre. Renvoyant dos à dos le baroquisme rêveur et le réalisme sec, Nietzsche fait valoir la convertibilité réciproque du rêve et de la veille, de l'imaginaire et du réel, de la fiction et du vécu. En examinant l'étoffe dont le monde est fait, le philosophe (...) allemand nous montre comment la réalité et l'imaginaire s'entre-tissent. Et si le rêve n'était que l'archive des veillées anciennes? Cela ne voudrait-il pas dire que ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui "réalité" apparaîtra à l'avenir comme une manière d'avoir rêvé le monde? Pourtant, entre les différentes moutures du monde ne cesserait de percer et de repercer un air de famille opiniâtre. Ainsi, loin de se contempler narcissiquement dans un monde taillé à son image, l'imaginaire humain ne cesserait de rêver le monde à partir de l'amour qu'il 'porte à cette altérité si étrangement familière, celle du visage fraternel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'inattendu peut transformer le cours du temps.

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644–1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281–295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1–7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can be related to non-expected (...) utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability. (shrink)