In response to contagion, competing and contradictory movements emerge that engender openness to new modes of life and reactionary defenses of old ones, that acknowledge mutual dependency and vulnerability and that heighten the policing and surveillance of borders. Through reading the Empire project, this article articulates these as struggles over measure that unfold on the terrain of sovereignty and biopolitical economy. We show that the passage from modern to imperial sovereignty hinges on the former’s inability to adequately impose calculatory regimes, (...) to which the latter’s flexibility and fluidity responds. This accompanies the passage from industrial to biopolitical command, from regulation through the wage to rearbitration through extractivism. Having articulated the contemporary coordinates within which the multitude finds itself, we then propose an educational weapon for the struggle against sovereignty and capital: stupidity. Turning to Jean-François Lyotard, we demonstrate just how fundamentally the rule of Empire depends on the outside of measure for its continual reproduction, and how Empire frames the communicative networks of biopolitical labor, a framing from which Hardt and Negri haven’t adequately broken. As the other of thought, as that which can’t be articulated, commanded, or absorbed by capital, stupidity remains totally useless and unproductive for Empire, which is exactly where its potency lies for the multitude. By critically engaging stupidity, we can refrain from reducing the pandemic to a need for heightened immunity and enclosure achieved through articulation. (shrink)

いま最も注目される気鋭の哲学者、待望の初対談集。第一線で活躍する論客たちと、哲学、文学、社会、精神医学、サブカルチャーなどを横断し、現代の問題を縦横無尽に語りつくす。思考の前衛がここにある!

Utterances of explicit performatives, such as “I order you to close the door,” have the forces named by the appearing verbs; here, the utterance has the force of ordering. These utterances utilize declarative sentences, which usually indicate the force of statements, rather than of any verbs contained in them. This leads many to theorize that explicit performatives are statements that cause their hearers to infer the forces they name. This article argues against this account on the grounds that it is (...) based on the false premise that hearers can unconsciously recognize illocutionary forces. Instead, I put forward the account that explicit performatives are nothing but the acts with the forces that they name. (shrink)

This paper compares two philosophical views from vastly different intellectual traditions: the views typical of neo-Aristotelian naturalism and the views that Kitarō Nishida describes in his An Inquiry into the Good. I concentrate on the following points. Nishida and neo-Aristotelian naturalists share the view that the mind tends to construct experience as it characterizes phenomena. It evaluates those that fulfill this tendency positively and those that fail to fulfill it negatively. Moral judgment is one manifestation of this tendency. This allows (...) both approaches to claim that the natural goodness/defect that characterizes human beings results from the capacity of rational choice, and that normalcy in developing and exercising this capacity provides criteria for evaluating the moral status of individuals. Nevertheless, they diverge on whether or not the application of these criteria is agent-neutral or agent-relative. Based on these considerations, I argue that Nishida’s view is free from a major difficulty that the neo-Aristotelian naturalist encounters. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

L’expression « phénoménologie de la vie » indique une visée commune entre les pensées de Michel Henry et de Bin Kimura. La « phénoménologie historique », telle que conçue par Husserl, trouve l’essence des phénomènes dans le mode d’apparaître des objets par la médiation de la différenciation temporelle. La phénoménologie de la vie saisit cette essence dans une dimension verticale, appelée « immédiateté » par Kimura, qui unit le présent caractéristique de l’être du soi avec la Vie absolue. Elle situe (...) ainsi le fondement de la temporalité dans la genèse spontanée du présent à partir de la Vie absolue. On examine d’abord ici la particularité des phénomènes (soi, monde et autrui) dans l’expérience de l’immédiateté du point de vue de la phénoménologie de la vie, puis on montre que Kimura voit dans la Vie absolue non seulement le principe de la vie, mais aussi celui de la mort. (shrink)

Nous pouvons distinguer chez Michel Henry « phénoménologie de la vie » et « phénoménologie de la culture » comme étant opposées à la « phénoménologie de la nature ». Avant d’être objective et naturelle, la réalité est toujours vitale et pathétique, et son apparaître sous la forme d’une culture est son mode d’être originel. Par conséquent, la « phénoménologie de la vie », phénoménologie qui, en comprenant ainsi la réalité, cherche dans la vie le fondement de cette réalité toujours (...) apparaissant en tant qu’originairement culturelle, devrait être entendue comme « phénoménologie de la culture ». Dans cette perspective, nous prendrons ici la phénoménologie henryenne comme « phénoménologie de la culture » et on tentera de savoir comment elle comprend la naissance de la culture à partir de la vie, autrement dit, comment elle conçoit la naissance de la culture qui ne fait qu’une avec l’auto-engendrement de la vie. (shrink)

This paper examines assumptions concerning the relationship between citizenship, justice, and well-being, based on representative political philosophies, including egoism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, liberalism, and communitarianism. A previous paper raised the possibility of an inter-disciplinary framework for collaboration between psychology and political philosophy. This study picks up that thread and attempts to actualize a collaborative research effort based on a framework grounded in positive political psychology. The first part of this study reflects on the methodology situated between empirical psychology and philosophy in (...) reference to the debates caused by psychological and philosophical situationism. In response to its criticism against virtue ethics, the possibility of reconstructing it on empirical psychology has paradoxically emerged. Similarly, this study validates assumptions on political philosophies employing the psychological method concerning well-being. Accordingly, the central part examines the plausibility of the assumptions by empirical evidence obtained from two internet surveys in Japan. The relationships between citizenship, justice, and well-being are the most substantial in the communitarian assumption. The exploratory factor analysis of the two surveys illuminates that the correlations between citizenship, justice, and well-being are substantial. This relationship denies the egoism assumption. Moreover, almost all correlations between the three are higher based on virtue-related indicators than hedonic ones. These findings are not in tune with the utilitarian assumption and are most congruent to the communitarian assumption. In addition, citizenship and justice correlate more with political well-being than overall well-being. As these are more directly associated with political well-being in the communitarian assumption, this result aligns with the assumption. Furthermore, the positive relationship between disparity elimination and well-being fits the liberal rather than the libertarian assumption. Nevertheless, the substantial correlation between ethical justice and well-being is higher by virtue-related indicators than hedonic indicators, suggesting distributive justice is associated with the ethical dimension. Again, this fits the communitarian assumption rather than the liberal assumption. Thus, philosophical psychology empirically verifies the interdependence of the three conceptions and the relative plausibility of the communitarian assumption. Moreover, as the relationship between the three is essential for political philosophies, the result increases the reliability of communitarianism. (shrink)

In the natural deduction system for classical propositional logic given by G. Gentzen, there are some inference rules with assumptions discharged by the rule. D. Prawitz calls such inference rules improper, and others proper. Improper inference rules are more complicated and are often harder to understand than the proper ones. In the present paper, we distinguish between proper and improper derivations by using sequent systems. Specifically, we introduce a sequent system \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\) for classical propositional logic with only structural rules, (...) and prove that \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\) does not allow improper derivations in general. For instance, the sequent \(\Rightarrow p \to q\) cannot be derived from the sequent \(p \Rightarrow q\) in \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\). In order to prove the failure of improper derivations, we modify the usual notion of truth valuation, and using the modified valuation, we prove the completeness of \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\). We also consider whether an improper derivation can be described generally by using \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\). (shrink)

Examining the interconnections between genes and culture is crucial for a more complete understanding of psychological processes. Genetic predispositions may predict different outcomes depending on one's cultural context, and culture may predict different outcomes depending on genetic predispositions - that is, genes and culture interact. Less is understood, however, about how genes and culture interact, or the psychological mechanisms through which gene–culture interactions occur. In this Element, Joni Y. Sasaki and Heewon Kwon review key findings and theories in gene–culture (...) interaction research. They then go on to discuss current issues and future directions in gene–culture research that may illuminate the path toward an explanatory framework. (shrink)

The simple substitution property provides a systematic and easy method for proving a theorem by an axiomatic way. The notion of the property was introduced in Hosoi [4] but without a definite name and he showed three examples of the axioms with the property. Later, the property was given it's name as above in Sasaki [7].Our main result here is that the necessary and sufficient condition for a logicL on a finite slice to have the simple substitution property is (...) thatL is finite. Here the necessity part is essentially new, for the sufficiency part has been proved in Hosoi and Sasaki [5]. Also the proof of sufficiency part is improved here. (shrink)

Hobbs (2010) introduced ‘clause-internal coherence’ (CIC) to describe inferences in, e.g., ‘A jogger was hit by a car,’ where the jogging is understood to have led to the car-hitting. Cohen & Kehler (2021) argue that well-known pragmatic tools cannot account for CIC, motivating an enrichment account familiar from discourse coherence research. An outstanding question is how to compositionally derive CIC from coherence relations. This paper takes strides in answering this question. It first provides experimental support for the existence of CIC (...) via offline evidence that attributive (non-)deverbal adjectives can trigger the same causal inferences within clauses that their predicative counterparts can trigger across clauses, albeit more weakly. To explain the experimental results, we use tools in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT), which allows us to show that causal inferences can be derived in various ways, depending on whether deverbal adjectives are used attributively or predicatively. If the former, they are presupposition triggers and the coherence relations Elaboration/Continuation compete with Background; if the latter, Explanation/Result compete with Background. These different competitions -- cashed out in terms of interaction between default axioms -- correlate with the difference in the relative salience of the causal inferences. (shrink)

本書は、人間的営みとしての学びの広さ・深さ・自由さを確認していく。人間の成長、人間形成という視点から、学びの実践を通して「学び」の人間学的原理、学ぶ主体にとっての意味を考察。個人の具体的な経験を通して 、多様な学びのあり方を提示。日本人の学び方、教え方の伝統や特徴とその問題について考察。.

The simple substitution property provides a systematic and easy method for proving a theorem from the additional axioms of intermediate prepositional logics. There have been known only four intermediate logics that have the additional axioms with the property. In this paper, we reformulate the many valued logics S' n defined in Gödel [3] and prove the simple substitution property for them. In our former paper [9], we proved that the sets of axioms composed of one prepositional variable do not have (...) the property except two of them. Here we provide another proof for this theorem. (shrink)

0 From Sansui to Keshiki My subject here is the nature of landscape. The word “landscape” is to be understood in what follows in the aesthetic sense: I wish to clarify what we experience in landscape as a typical scene of natural beauty. For most people, the nature of this experience may be so transparent that its analysis is superfluous. I don’t, however, find the matter so straightforward. The fact that “a landscape” can also signify a landscape painting would seem (...) to indicate that landscap... (shrink)

Ageing is basically a natural or physical phenomenon. For a human being, it belongs to the body. When this fact is noticed, a drama of oldness and life/death begins: ageing is a problem of experience. There are losses and gains in this experience. Indeed, a particular respect was paid to a rhapsodist/bard and a hermit because of their memory power and deep wisdom respectively. Since we recognize in these cases accumulation and maturation, the core subject in the experience of ageing (...) is memory and the time structure. Vis-à-vis the hard memories such as stone monuments and IC memory, the live memory is characterised by a creativity, which vivifies our past time. I pay a particular attention to friendship, because one of the most painful experiences of ageing consists in the loss of dear friends. Recollecting creatively the time shared with them, we can vivify our past, i.e. our being: that is the appropriation of ourselves. (shrink)

This paper describes the situation of philosophy in Japan with respect to the question of internationalism. For more than a hundred years, Japan took Western culture as its model and European philosophy as the authentic philosophy. This tendency was paradoxically strengthened by the post‐war humanism. It gave us Japanese philosophers a clear discipline to work in but cut us off from our own native culture, history, and philosophical traditions. In wishing to recover this loss, I argue that it is necessary (...) to distinguish between two forms of internationalism: humanistic and merely fashionable. The latter in fact derives from domestic reasons. (shrink)

In the natural deduction system for classical propositional logic given by G. Gentzen, there are some inference rules with assumptions discharged by the rule. D. Prawitz calls such inference rules improper as opposed to proper ones. Improper inference rules are more complicated than proper ones and more difficult to understand. In 2022, we provided a sequent system based solely on the application of proper rules. In the present paper, on the basis of our system from 2022, we classify improper inference (...) rules. (shrink)

The idea of interpretability logics arose in Visser [Vis90]. He introduced the logics as extensions of the provability logic GLwith a binary modality. The arithmetic realization of A B in a theory T will be that T plus the realization of B is interpretable in T plus the realization of A. More precisely, there exists a function f on the formulas of the language of T such that T + B C implies T + A f.The interpretability logics were considered (...) in several papers. An arithmetic completeness of the interpretability logic ILM, obtained by adding Montagna ''s axiom to the smallest interpretability logic IL, was proved in Berarducci [Ber90] and Shavrukov [Sha88]. [Vis90] proved that the interpretability logic ILP, an extension of IL, is also complete for another arithmetic interpretation. The completeness with respect to Kripke semantics due to Veltman was, for IL, ILMand ILP, proved in de Jongh and Veltman [JV90]. The fixed point theorem of GLcan be extended to ILand hence ILMand ILP. The unary pendant "T interprets T + A" is much less expressive and was studied in de Rijke [Rij92]. For an overview of interpretability logic, see Visser [Vis97], and Japaridze and de Jongh [JJ98]. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss semantical properties of the logic \(\textbf{GL}\) of provability. The logic \(\textbf{GL}\) is a normal modal logic which is axiomatized by the the Löb formula \( \Box (\Box p\supset p)\supset \Box p \), but it is known that \(\textbf{GL}\) can also be axiomatized by an axiom \(\Box p\supset \Box \Box p\) and an \(\omega \) -rule \((\Diamond ^{*})\) which takes countably many premises \(\phi \supset \Diamond ^{n}\top \) \((n\in \omega )\) and returns a conclusion \(\phi \supset (...) \bot \). We show that the class of transitive Kripke frames which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) and the class of transitive Kripke frames which strongly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) are equal, and that the following three classes of transitive Kripke frames, the class which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), the class which weakly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), and the class which is defined by the Löb formula, are mutually different, while all of them characterize \(\textbf{GL}\). This gives an example of a proof system _P_ and a class _C_ of Kripke frames such that _P_ is sound and complete with respect to _C_ but the soundness cannot be proved by simple induction on the height of the derivations in _P_. We also show Kripke completeness of the proof system with \((\Diamond ^{*})\) in an algebraic manner. As a corollary, we show that the class of modal algebras which is defined by equations \(\Box x\le \Box \Box x\) and \(\bigwedge _{n\in \omega }\Diamond ^{n}1=0\) is not a variety. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss semantical properties of the logic \(\textbf{GL}\) of provability. The logic \(\textbf{GL}\) is a normal modal logic which is axiomatized by the the Löb formula \( \Box (\Box p\supset p)\supset \Box p \), but it is known that \(\textbf{GL}\) can also be axiomatized by an axiom \(\Box p\supset \Box \Box p\) and an \(\omega \) -rule \((\Diamond ^{*})\) which takes countably many premises \(\phi \supset \Diamond ^{n}\top \) \((n\in \omega )\) and returns a conclusion \(\phi \supset (...) \bot \). We show that the class of transitive Kripke frames which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) and the class of transitive Kripke frames which strongly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) are equal, and that the following three classes of transitive Kripke frames, the class which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), the class which weakly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), and the class which is defined by the Löb formula, are mutually different, while all of them characterize \(\textbf{GL}\). This gives an example of a proof system _P_ and a class _C_ of Kripke frames such that _P_ is sound and complete with respect to _C_ but the soundness cannot be proved by simple induction on the height of the derivations in _P_. We also show Kripke completeness of the proof system with \((\Diamond ^{*})\) in an algebraic manner. As a corollary, we show that the class of modal algebras which is defined by equations \(\Box x\le \Box \Box x\) and \(\bigwedge _{n\in \omega }\Diamond ^{n}1=0\) is not a variety. (shrink)