While “meaning negotiation” has become an ubiquitous term, its use is often confusing. A negotiation problem implies not only a convenience to agree, but also diverging interest on what to agree upon. It implies agreement but also the possibility of disagreement. In this chapter, we look at meaning negotiation as the process through which agents starting from different preferred conceptual representations of an object, an event or a more complex entity, converge to an agreement through some communication medium. We shortly (...) sketch the outline of a geometric view of meaning negotiation, based on conceptual spaces. We show that such view can inherit important structural elements from game theoretic models of bargaining – in particular, in the case when the protagonists have overlapping negotiation regions, we emphasize a parallel to the Nash solution in cooperative game theory. When acceptable solution regions of the protagonists are disjoint, we present several types of processes: changes in the salience of dimensions, dimensional projections and metaphorical space transformations. None of the latter processes are motivated by normative or rationality considerations, but presented as argumentation tools that we believe are used in actual situations of conceptual disagreement. (shrink)

The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most impor tant schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen. (...) The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brent ani sm. The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive inter est in the theoretical complexity of Brentano' s thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration. We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory es says followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays re construct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then ex the essential features amines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians. (shrink)

There is growing public interest in developing biomedical technologies capable of extending the human lifespan. This chapter discusses the desirability of a substantial life extension with regard to its implications for personal identity over time. The possibility of significant lifespan extension involves two different personal‐identity questions. First, it raises the question of whether one is identifiable as the very same person throughout a lifetime; secondly, it challenges our self‐conception. The chapter describes the way in which personal identity as “sameness” might (...) be affected by the prospect of substantial life extension. It then focuses on the significance of the conception of personal identity as “selfhood” for radically extended lifespans. Finally, the chapter argues that a substantial life extension raises important concerns about the continuity of one's identity over time and is not straightforwardly desirable for the individual. (shrink)

As the subtitle reveals, this is a book devoted to one of the most distinguished philosophers of our time, Robert Brandom, a thinker whose importance for the debate on topics such as meaning, truth, rationality, objectivity, agreement, holism, compositionality – to name just a few of them – is hardly deniable. Thousands among articles and books have been dedicated in the last two decades to the evaluation of Brandom’s thought, but still considerably few are the works in the Italian panorama (...) d... (shrink)

Christiansen & Chater (C&C) have taken the interactionist approach to linguistic universals to an extreme, adopting the metaphor of language as an organism. This metaphor adds no insights to five decades of analyzing language universals as the result of interaction of linguistically unique and general cognitive systems. This metaphor is also based on an outmoded view of classical Darwinian evolution and has no clear basis in biology or cognition.

We find a short way to construct a formula which axiomatizes a given finite frame of the modal logicK, in the sense that for each finite frameA, we construct a formula A which holds in those and only those frames in which every formula true inA holds.To obtain this result we find, for each finite model and each natural numbern, a formula which holds in those and only those models in which every formula true in , and involving the firstn (...) propositional letters, holds. (shrink)

This paper is about the development of a face-to-face collaborative technology to support shifting attitudes of participants in conflict via a narration task. The work is based on two cultural elements: conflict resolution theory and the design of a collaboration enforcing interface designed specifically for the task. The general claim is that participants may achieve a greater understanding of and appreciation for the other’s viewpoint under conditions that support partaking in a tangible joint task and creating a shared narration. Specifically, (...) a co-located interface for producing a joint narration as a tool for favoring reconciliation is presented and discussed. The process based on this technology implicitly includes classical steps in conflict resolution approaches, such as escalation and de-escalation. Our goal is to show that this interface is effective and constitutes an alternative to a typical face-to-face moderated discussion. (shrink)

”The last remnant of physical objectivity of space-time” is disclosed in the case of a continuous family of spatially non-compact models of general relativity. The physical individuation of point-events is furnished by the autonomous degrees of freedom of the gravitational field, which represent -as it were -the ontic part of the metric field. The physical role of the epistemic part is likewise clarified as embodying the unavoidable non-inertial aspects of GR. At the end the philosophical import of the Hole Argument (...) is substantially weakened and in fact the Argument itself dis-solved, while a specific four-dimensional holistic and structuralist view of space-time emerges, including elements common to the tradition of both substantivalism and relationism. The observables of our models undergo real temporal change: this gives new evidence to the fact that statements like the frozen-time character of evolution, as other ontological claims about GR, are model dependent. (shrink)

This paper considers the nature of schizophrenic autism and urges its importance for understanding the phenomenological core of schizophrenia. Different clinical manifestations of schizophrenic autism are demonstrated, and it is asked whether these might reflect different aspects of one underlying phenomenologically intelligible phenomenon. Four phenomenological hypotheses are put forward: that autism is a function of semantic drifting, emotional drifting, ontological incompleteness, or a particular ethic rejecting common sense. By way of conclusion an integrative hypothesis is considered: that autism is intelligible (...) in terms of the experience of disembodiment. (shrink)

"The last remnant of physical objectivity of space-time" is disclosed, beyond the Leibniz equivalence, in the case of a continuous family of spatially non-compact models of general relativity. The physical individuation of point-events is furnished by the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field, (viz, the "Dirac observables") that represent - as it were - the "ontic" part of the metric field. The physical role of the "epistemic" part (viz. the "gauge" variables) is likewise clarified. At the end, a (...) peculiar four-dimensional "holistic and structuralist" view of space-time emerges which includes elements common to the tradition of both substantivalism and relationism. The observables of our models undergo real "temporal change" and thereby provide a counter-example to the thesis of the "frozen-time" picture of evolution. (shrink)

This article links to the Symposium on Causation in War by Carolina Sartorio, Helen Beebee and Alex Kaiserman, and Lars Christie.

After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various sources of law (...) to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In this paper we carve out a _reformist_ agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework. We are deeply sympathetic to this reformist program since we think that, despite strong criticism of the concept of computation and the related notion of representation, computational models should still be at the core of the study of mind. At the same time, we recognize the need for a (...) liberalization of the computational and representational framework that can address deep dissatisfaction with the anti-biologism and radical internalism of classical cognitive science. However, reform is a difficult task, so in this article we focus on two open questions within the reformist agenda. The first concerns the possibility of combining mechanistic-computational and dynamical explanations. The second concerns related changes in the notion of representation and its use (with special attention to Andy Clark’s radical predictive processing). _Keywords_: Continuum of Representational Genera;_ _Enactivism; Predictive Processing; Radical Embodied Cognition Thesis; Representationalism _ Due problemi aperti nell’agenda riformista della filosofia della scienza cognitiva _ _Riassunto_: In questo lavoro identifichiamo un’agenda _riformista_ nel dibattito sui fondamenti della scienza cognitiva che incorpora alcune idee centrali provenienti dalla letteratura sulla cognizione 4E all’interno di una cornice computazionalista e rappresentazionalista. Tale agenda considera il quadro computazionalista e rappresentazionalista ancora imprescindibile ai fini dello studio integrato della mente e del cervello, ma ne persegue una liberalizzazione nell’intento di renderlo idoneo ad accogliere alcuni importanti spunti emersi dalla letteratura sulla cognizione delle 4E. Tuttavia, riformare è un compito difficile. In questo articolo ci concentriamo su due problemi aperti nell’agenda riformista. Il primo riguarda la possibilità di mettere assieme le spiegazioni meccaniciste e computazionaliste con quelle dinamiche. Il secondo riguarda i cambiamenti relativi alla nozione di rappresentazione e al suo impiego (con particolare attenzione all’elaborazione predittiva radicale di Andy Clark). _Parole chiave_: Continuum dei generi rappresentazionali;_ _Elaborazione predittiva; Enattivismo; Tesi della cognizione incarnata radicale; Rappresentazionalismo. (shrink)

Il presente articolo intende riflettere su come l’analogia sia intesa e trattata dalla classe di metodi formali di trattamento dell’informazione che si occupano di analizzare il testo scritto. In particolare, si considera come si possano costruire macchine che “comprendono” le analogie. A tal fine ci si avvarrà di esemplificazioni tratte dal _De Civitate Dei_ di Agostino d’Ippona. Le prime indagini compiute su tale corpus, seppure limitato, conducono a riflettere sulla portata teorica e storiografica del trattamento automatico dell’analogia anche nel formulare (...) o avvalorare ipotesi interpretative. _This article aims to reflect on how analogy is understood and treated by the class of formal information processing methods that deal with analysing written text. In particular, we consider how machines that ‘understand’ analogies can be constructed. For this purpose, exemplifications from Augustine of Hippo’s _De Civitate Dei _will be used. The initial investigations carried out on this corpus, albeit limited, lead one to reflect on the theoretical and historiographical significance of the automatic treatment of analogy also in formulating or supporting interpretative hypotheses._. (shrink)

The articles in this issue reflect the results of the 25th Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology on ‘‘The Meaning of ‘Theory’ in Biology’’ held at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Altenberg, Austria, 30 June–3 July, 2011.

In introducing the present issue, we make clear that the concept of the other is susceptible to so multifarious declinations that it actually forms a conceptual galaxy. It is precisely this galaxy that the ten essays in the issue aim to shed light on. We then account for the basic ideas of each essay, and we stress the remarkable fact that they help to clarify how the concept of the other represents a useful means to undermine the purported divide between (...) continental and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Bloom masterfully captures the state-of-the-art in the study of lexical acquisition. He also exposes the extent of our ignorance about the learning of names for non-observables. HCLMW adopts an innatist position without adopting modularity of mind; however, it seems likely that modularity is needed to bridge the gap between object names and the rest of the lexicon.

We prove ExpTime-membership of the satisfiability problem for loosely ∀-guarded first-order formulas with a bounded number of variables and an unbounded number of constants. Guarded fragments with constants are interesting by themselves and because of their connection to hybrid logic.