Ron Giere’s recent book Scientific perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical anti-realism on the other. The key for Giere is to treat both scientific observation and scientific theories as perspectives, which are limited, partial, contingent, context-, agent- and purpose-dependent, and pluralism-friendly, while nonetheless world-oriented and modestly realist. Giere’s perspectivism bears significant similarity to earlier ideas of Paul (...) Feyerabend and John Dewey. Comparing these to Giere’s work not only uncovers a consilience of ideas, but also can help to fill out Giere’s account in places where it is not fully developed, as well as helping us understand the work of these earlier authors and their continuing relevance to contemporary concerns in philosophy of science.Keywords: Ronald Giere; Paul Feyerabend; John Dewey; Perspectivism; Pragmatism; Pluralism. (shrink)

In his provocative book Matthew Kramer offers a systematic theory of freedom that challenges most of the other major contemporary treatments of the topic.

The term “Electronic Health Records” means something different to each of the stakeholders in health care, but it always seems to carry a degree of emotional baggage. Increasingly, EHRs are advertized as a nearly unmitigated good that will transform medical care, improve safety and efficiency, allow better patient engagement, and open the door to an era of cheap, effective, timely, and patient-centered care. Indeed, for some EHR proponents the benefits of adopting them are so obvious that adoption has become an (...) end in itself. But for others — and especially for a number of skeptical practitioners and patients — EHR is a code word that portends the corporate transformation of health care delivery, the loss of patient privacy, the demand that patients bear more responsibility in health care, and the unreflective takeover of the health care system by people who do not understand medical care or how health care relationships unfold. (shrink)

We often knowingly teach false science. Such a practice conflicts with a prima facie pedagogical value placed on teaching only what’s true. I argue that only a partial dissolution of the conflict is possible: the proper aim of instruction in science is not to provide an armory of facts about what things the world contains, how they interact, and so on, but rather to contribute to an understanding of how science as a human endeavor works and what sorts of facts (...) about the world science aims to provide. Such an aim legislates for an increased prominence of history and philosophy in even secondary science education. (shrink)

Whether or not we would be happy to do without sounds, the idea that our expe- rience of sounds is of things which are distinct from the world of material objects can seem compelling. All you have to do to confirm it is close your eyes and reflect on the character of your auditory experience.

How should the field of bioethics grapple with a history that includes ethicists who supported eugenics, scientific racism, and even Nazi medicine and also ethicists who created the salutary policy and practice responses to those heinous aspects of medical history? Learning humility from studying historical errors is one path to improvement; finding courage from studying historical strengths is another, but these can be in tension. This commentary lays out these paths and seeks to apply them both to a contemporary challenge (...) facing the field: why hasn't bioethics been more at the forefront of efforts to address inequities in health and health care? (shrink)

The comic dramatists of the fifth centuryb.c.were notable for their preoccupation with poetics – that is, their frequent references to their own poetry and that of others, their overt interest in the Athenian dramatic festivals and their adjudication, their penchant for parody and pastiche, and their habit of self-conscious reflection on the nature of good and bad poetry. I have already explored these matters at some length, in my study of the relationship between comedy and literary criticism in the period (...) before Plato and Aristotle. This article continues the story into the fourth century and beyond, examining the presence and function of poetical and literary-critical discourse in what is normally called ‘middle’ and ‘new’ comedy. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider ways of responding to critiques of natural kinds monism recently suggested from the pluralist camp. Even if monism is determined to be untenable in certain domains (say, about species), it might well be tenable in others. Chemistry is suggested to be such a monist‐friendly domain. Suggestions of trouble for chemical kinds can be defused by attending to the difference between monism as a metaphysical thesis and as a claim about classification systems. Finally, I consider enantiomers (...) as a test case for the monism/pluralism debate. The question of whether enantiomers differ in kind does not appear easily answerable. I suggest that this legislates for pluralism in chemistry. (shrink)

I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under tension in judgments. The separation comes in attending to content as a device for recuperation of scale. For Bradley that involves scaling material of immediate presentations under limits. As unrealised commitments of so- called real and ideal are an exclusionary condition of singular comprehension, singularity of judgments is mark of singular reflex with privative force; not some singularity in objects taken in episodic correspondence (...) forming distinctively in singular judgment. The distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real. I want to approach Bradley in this slightly negative sense as imposing via inversion some sensible restrictions under some conditions of scaling rather than in direct contact with materials to which one stands in some act of obversion, finally. (shrink)

We argue for a new conventionalism about many kinds of evolutionary groups, including clades, cohesive units, and populations. This rejects a consensus, which says that given any one of the many legitimate grouping concepts, only objective biological facts determine whether a collection is such a group. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This is a novel pluralism underlying most any one group concept, rather than a (...) familiar pluralism claiming many concepts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help biological facts determine grouphood, even when given a single grouping concept. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed mental activities as conscious calculation and deliberation. An argument is offered for the claim that the mental acts in question must involve phenomenally conscious mental events that have temporal extension. The problem the chapter goes on to address is how to reconcile this line of thought with Geach's arguments (...) for the claim that mental acts like judging lack temporal extension. (shrink)

Credal reductivism is the view that outright belief is reducible to degrees of confidence or ‘credence’. The most popular versions of credal reductivism all have the consequence that if you are near-maximally confident that p in a low-stakes situation, then you outright believe p. This paper addresses a recent objection to this consequence—the Correctness Objection— introduced by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath and further developed by Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder. The objection is that near-maximal confidence cannot entail outright (...) belief because when you believe a false proposition, you are wrong or incorrect, whereas you can be highly confident of a false proposition in a low-stakes situation without being incorrect. Both Fantl and McGrath’s and Ross and Schoeder’s versions of the Correctness Objection admit of multiple interpretations. But it is argued that even on the most charitable interpretations the objection fails. (shrink)

Libertarian Papers is delighted to welcome Jakub Wiśniewski to our editorial board. Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski is a four-time summer fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, a three-time fellow at the Institute for Humane Studies, an affiliated lecturer with the Polish-American Leadership Academy, and an affiliated lecturer and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Ludwig von Mises ….

This paper examines the puruṣa concept in the Caraka Saṃhitā, an early text of Ayurveda, and its relation to Indic thinking about phenomenal worldhood. It argues that, contrary to the usual interpretation, early Ayurveda does not consider the person to be a microcosmic replication of the macrocosmos. Instead, early Ayurveda asserts that personhood is worldhood, and thus the person is non-different from the phenomenal totality of his existence. This is confirmed by the CS’s several definitions of puruṣa, which are alternately (...) posed in terms familiar to Vaiśeṣika, early Sāṃkhya, early Buddhism, and Upaniṣadic monism. It is likewise confirmed by the Ayurvedic logic of sāmānya, which governs the meaning of the list of person-to-world correspondences in CS 4.5 and its often misinterpreted claim, puruṣo’yam lokasaṃmitaḥ. Finally it is confirmed in the program of Ayurvedic therapeutics, which aims at establishing various kinds of “appropriateness” for the sake of effecting samayoga—the “harmonious joining” of person and world. (shrink)

The story of the rise and fall of pragmatism is sometimes called the eclipse narrative. This paper addresses a specific version of this narrative that the logical empiricists arrived in North America in the 1930s and within 30 years had supplanted the pragmatists as the dominant philosophy there. Philosophers such as Alan Richardson and Cheryl Misak have challenged this view by emphasizing the similarities between these two movements. While both seem to admit that there is a distinction between the two (...) when it comes to values, I point out that the issue of values feeds into all aspects of pragmatist thinking, and so despite what seems on the surface to be agreements between the two movements, they were still quite different in all areas of their thinking. I challenge the degree of similarities by arguing that there were some sharp distinctions between the two movements, with the most important being the fact-value distinction and its impact on how each conceived of the term “practical.” I close by addressing how these distinctions should affect how we conceive of the eclipse narrative. (shrink)

In this paper, I answer a fundamental question facing any view according to which natural selection is a population‐level causal process—namely, how is the causal process of natural selection related to, yet not preempted by, causal processes that occur at the level of individual organisms? Without an answer to this grounding question, the population‐level causal view appears unstable—collapsing into either an individual‐level causal interpretation or the claim that selection is a purely formal, statistical phenomenon. I argue that a causal account (...) of realization provides an answer to the grounding question. By applying this account of realization to the natural selection of melanism in rock pocket mice, I show how an alternative, formal account of realization, favored by proponents of the statistical interpretation, misses biologically important features. More generally, this paper shows how metaphysical issues about realization normally discussed in the philosophy of mind apply to debates in philosophy of biology. Thus, it is a first step toward fleshing out the oft‐noted similarities between debates in these areas. (shrink)

"This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. He has published extensively on philosophy and applied ethics. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book defends a mixed (...) view that recognizes the strength of both of these intuitions. By this account, the legislature should develop institutional policies and statutory penalties that maintain the social order, that is, consequentialism. It establishes punishment policies to deter criminal activity. By contrast, the criminal judiciary should give individual defendants what they deserve, that is, retributivism and thus expressing the community's appropriate sense of resentment at being wronged. The book justifies the two-tiered model by showing how it accords with our moral intuitions, our assumptions about how what we know affects our moral obligations, and a commonly held theory of freedom. This approach is developed by engaging classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law, and shows its advantages over competing approaches from contemporary retributivists and other mixed theorists. The work also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. It draws on cutting-edge criminological research to show how punishment theory can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug laws, and mass incarceration. The book will also be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists"--. (shrink)

This chapter delineates two types of ideal theory that are found in Rawls’s corpus of work. The first is ideal-method theory, which is theory constructed using idealizing assumptions that do not directly correspond with the actual world. The second is ideal-content theory, namely criteria for assessing whether something is a perfectly justice institution. The chapter provides an independent justification for both types of theory, arguing that ideal-method theory is valuable within certain parameters; for instance, the idealizing assumption of strict compliance (...) helps to clarify the distinction between distributive and retributive justice. The chapter illuminates the value of ideal-content theory by clarifying and defending Rawls’s claim that nonideal theory depends on ideal-content theory. In particular, it argues that in order to gain a systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of nonideal theory it is plausible to argue that ideal-content theory is necessary. -/- . (shrink)

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this (...) paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is. (shrink)

Background: The objective of this research was to review reporting of ethical concerns and community involvement in peer-reviewed systematic reviews or meta-analyses concerning American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native Hawaiian (AI/AN/NH) health. Methods: Text words and indexed vocabulary terms were used to query PubMed, Embase, Cochrane Library, and the Native Health Database for systematic reviews or meta-analyses concerning AI/AN/NH health published in peer-reviewed journals, followed by a search through reference lists. Each article was abstracted by two independent reviewers; results were (...) discussed until consensus was reached. Results: We identified 107 papers published from 1986 through 2012 that were primarily about AI/AN/NH health or presented findings separately for AI/AN/NH communities. Two reported seeking indigenous reviewer feedback; none reported seeking input from tribes and communities. Approximately 7% reported on institutional review board (IRB) approval of included studies, 5% reported on tribal approval, and 4% referenced the sovereignty of AI/AN tribes. Approximately 63% used evidence from more than one AI/AN/NH population study, and 28% discussed potential benefits to communities from the synthesis research. Conclusions: Reporting of ethics and community involvement are not prominent. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses making community-level inferences may pose risks to communities. Future systematic reviews and meta-analyses should consider ethical and participatory dimensions of research. (shrink)

This paper examines one nascent entrepreneurial endeavour intended by Canada's Stem Cell Network to catalyze the commercialization of stem cell research: the creation of a company called "Aggregate Therapeutics". We argue that this initiative, in its current configuration, is likely to result in a breach of public trust owing to three inter-related concerns: conflicts of interest; corporate influence on the university research agenda; and the failure to provide some form of direct return for the public's substantial tax dollar investment. These (...) concerns are common to many efforts to commercialize academic science but are rendered particularly acute in this case given the therapeutic promise of stem cell research and the considerable number of resources related to stem cell research in Canada, which Aggregate Therapeutics is expected to pool. We do, however, believe that the company can be altered to guard against a violation of the public's trust, and so we present concrete modifications to its structure, which we contend should be given immediate consideration. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a system, Sentence Planning Using Description, which generates collocations within the paradigm of sentence planning. SPUD simultaneously constructs the semantics and syntax of a sentence using a Lexicalized Tree Adjoining Grammar (LTAG). This approach captures naturally and elegantly the interaction between pragmatic and syntactic constraints on descriptions in a sentence, and the inferential and lexical interactions between multiple descriptions in a sentence. At the same time, it exploits linguistically motivated, declarative speci- fications of the discourse (...) functions of syntactic constructions to make contextually appropriate syntactic choices. (shrink)

Psychiatric interviewing highlights the apparent tension between psychiatry's quest for objectivity and its aim to chart the particular experiences and values of individuals. Neo-Kantian philosophy can help to shed light on this apparent tension. There need be no conflict between an exploration of individual values and scientific inquiry, not least because values play a central role in the selection of facts in scientific observation in general and psychiatric history taking in particular.

It might be suggested that in auditory experience elements of the material world are not apparent to us in the way they are in vision and touch, and that this constitutes a shortcoming in the kind of cognitive contact with the world provided by auditory perception. I develop this suggestion, and then set out a way of thinking about the appearances of sound-producing events that might provide a response.

This essay reconsiders Paul Ramsey’s “medical indications” policy and argues that his reconstruction of the case of Joseph Saikewicz demonstrates that there is more room for caretakers to decline treatments for “voiceless dependents” than his interlocutors have sometimes thought. It furthermore draws on Ramsey’s earlier work to propose ways that Ramsey might have improved his policy, and argues that the shortcomings of Ramsey’s view arise from his bracketing of age in making determinations about what form of medical care is owed. (...) The reading of Ramsey set forth here suggests Cathleen Kaveny’s depiction of the ‘medical indications’ policy in Ethics at the Edges of Law is too rigid and inflexible, even while it affirms other aspects of her critique. (shrink)

The Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics(EJPE) interviewed Adler about his formative years (section I); his work on the theoretical foundations of public policy, zooming in onwelfare-consequentialism and social welfare functions(section II), welfarism and interpersonal comparisons(section III), the ethical deliberator and the role of the philosopher (section IV); and, finally,his views and visions for interdisciplinary work in law, economics, and philosophy,as well as his advice for graduate students in the field (section V).

Arguments figure prominently in our practices of reason-giving. For example, we use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to justify believing something, to explain why we believe something, and to persuade others to believe something. Intuitively, using arguments in these ways requires a certain degree of self-reflection. In this paper, I ask: what cognitive requirements are there for using an argument to advance reasons for its conclusion? Towards a partial response, the paper’s central thesis is that in (...) order to so use an argument one must believe the associated inference claim to the effect that the premises collectively are reasons that support the conclusion. I then argue against making it a further cognitive requirement that one be aware of one’s justification for believing such an inference claim. This thesis provides a rationale for the typical informal-logic textbook characterization of argument and motivates a constraint on adequate accounts of what are referred to as inference claims in the informal logic and argumentation literatures. (shrink)

Currently there is an unattached link between the study of social influence in experimental psychology and bad faith in the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. The methods of psychology and philosophy differ significantly and can be integrated into a unified whole to provide enhanced insight into a topic of investigation compared to what can be achieved separately in each of these disciplines. The goal of this paper is to review the social influence literature with the aim of expositing, integrating and (...) synthesising the findings with Sartre’s analysis of bad faith and authenticity. As a result, this paper aims to uncover the scientific findings that provide clarification to the findings of bad faith in Sartre’s existential philosophy. Precisely, this paper will provide concrete and descriptive empirical examples of the experimental causes and conditions that appear to be identified by participants as a reason to act in bad faith. Specifically, this paper provides evidence that bad faith appears to arise when an individual believes she should be accurate or affiliated with the group. An analysis of the concepts that are necessary to understand bad faith will also be reviewed to uncover the arguments that provide clarification to understanding conformity found in the social influence literature. This paper will benefit both psychologists and philosophers by bridging these two fields of investigation. Further work with the integration of these findings into existential psychotherapy is encouraged and described throughout. (shrink)

There has been increasing awareness of the medical and moral challenges in the care of unrepresented patients: those who cannot make their own medical decisions, do not have any surrogate decision maker, and have not indicated their treatment preferences. Most discussions have focused on procedural questions such as who should make decisions for these patients. An issue that has not gotten enough attention is the ethical standard that should govern medical decision making. I explore the question of which ethical standard (...) provides better justification for end-of-life decisions for unrepresented patients. Two options are considered: the conventional and less demanding best interest standard, and the novel and more demanding medical futility standard. I explain the similarities and differences between these two standards, examine arguments for and against each one, and suggest that the medical futility standard is ethically superior and should replace the established best interest standard. (shrink)

This commentary provides a legal analysis of the extent to which changes proposed by scholars to promote care for substance use disorder or other under-treated illnesses through risk adjustment could be implemented administratively, without legislation, in federal risk adjustment systems: Medicare's privatized component, Medicare's pharmaceutical component, and the individual and small group market. As the article explains, federal laws governing risk adjustment provide broad discretion to regulators and can reasonably be interpreted to permit full and final implementation through the administrative (...) process of almost all of the changes that scholars have proposed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT After the tragedies of the twentieth century, the utopian impulse was subject to searching criticism by a host of liberal intellectuals including Karl Popper, Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, and Jacob Talmon. Looking to history and political philosophy, these thinkers impugned utopianism for so frequently destroying the freedoms it appeared to pursue. Defined by its theoretical contradictions, the utopian project, rooted in the politics of the Enlightenment, bore some responsibility for the totalitarianism and genocide that had shaped their lives. As (...) this critique became liberal orthodoxy, a heretic group of anarchist thinkers challenged these conclusions. While travelling some distance with the liberal critics, for Paul Goodman, Marie Louise Berneri, and Herbert Read, the twentieth century, rather than invalidating the utopian urge made its boldness and experimentalism all the more vital. Their act of heresy was defending utopianism as a central component of their anarchist critique of the present. (shrink)

In his theoretical philosophy, Immanuel Kant argues that experience comes from two sources that are radically different but equally necessary: the rule-governed activity of thinking and the givenness of sensations. He supposes that both could be traced to some common root but concludes that whatever it is, is in principle unknowable. Kant's idealist successors, J.G. Fichte and F.W.J. Schelling, each attempt to provide a unified account of experience by identifying the ultimate basis of subject and object—Fichte by referring to the (...) I's activity and Schelling by referring to the Absolute. Because we can know only appearances, an implication of Kant's transcendental inquiry, Fichte and Schelling have difficulty... (shrink)

This article discusses the writings of the devout Christian physicist James Clerk Maxwell (best known for his epochal work in electromagnetism and statistical mechanics) on the concept of conscious free-will. To Maxwell a correct understanding of free will, as personified in the example of the railway pointsman, was essential to clear conceptions of both man as a religious creature and of the limits of science. Understanding human volition, then, was not an end unto itself. It was a foundation on which (...) one could build reliable theories of man and matter. (shrink)

We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.

On initial analysis, Indian Buddhist philosophers seem to have an inconsistent set of commitments with regard to the nature of action. First, they are committed to the reality of karman (Skt: action), which concerns the moral quality of actions and the short- and long-term effects of those actions on the agent. Second, they are committed to an understanding of karma as deeply connected with intention or volition (cetanā). Third, they are committed to the idea that, through Buddhist practice, one may (...) become liberated from the afflictions of craving, aversion, and ignorance and achieve nirvāṇa. Yet, fourth, while Buddhist philosophers are committed to the reality of action and its results, they are also committed to the unreality of any substantial self or agent of actions. How can one affirm the reality of volition, action, efficacious practice, and liberation, while denying the existence of agents, practitioners, or liberated beings? Reconciling the doctrine of no-self (anātman) with an account of agency and karma was a central task of great Buddhist philosophers such as Vasubandhu (fl. 4th to 5th century CE). This chapter will discuss Buddhist philosophy of action in the context of their views of the self, general ontology, ethics, and soteriology. (shrink)

We are living in an era where global university schemes only offer narrow conceptions of quality, relying too heavily on international ranking systems. This timely book present an alternative perspective on evaluating 'world-class universities', showcasing how eight very different higher education institutions have defined and are pursuing excellence in their own way. Each case study highlights how institutions can align their work with shared values and goals, and strive to uphold these principles in all they do and say. The portraits (...) offer insights into the ways institutions can create cultures of excellence tied to a vision of how to make a difference for their students and society. Their success suggest that policy makers should reward institutions that adopt and strive to fulfil particular educational purposes rather than continuing to perpetuate the status quo. It is essential reading for researchers and students of education research, education policy, and international education reform. (shrink)