Maurice Blondel’s philosophy has had a decisive influence on the theology of Henri de Lubac, but more than an influence, it goes of an encounter and a dialogue between two great Catholic thinkers. This article proposes, over the course of successive encounters and collaborations between Blondel and Lubac, a presentation of Lubac’s reflection in that it extends Blondel’s critique of extrinsicity to the field of theology. This friendship between Lubac and Blondel testifies to the inherent character of the mystical (...) question to both philosophy and theology. This anchoring signifies the Mystery of Christ at work in the gesture of reason and in the understanding of faith. At the same time, Lubac promotes, in philosophy itself, an intelligence through faith. Friendship has not been an empty word with Lubac who openly defended Maurice Blondel on several occasions, and even after Blondel’s death, when Lubac continued to make the philosopher’s thought known by publishing and annotating a large part of his correspondence. (shrink)

Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...) to collapse into the Perception View or any other view according to which emotions are evaluative at the level of content. In the latter case, the Attitudinal View does not stand up to an obvious alternative, namely that emotions can only be assessed with respect to extrinsic norms or conditions of correctness. (shrink)

How does literature illuminate the way we live? Maurice Natanson, a prominent champion of phenomenology, draws upon this method's unique power to show how fiction can highlight aspects of experience that are normally left unexamined. By exploring the structure of the everyday world, Natanson reveals the "uncanny" that lies at the core of the ordinary. Phenomenology--which involves the questioning of that which we usually take for granted--is for Natanson the essence of philosophy. Drawing upon his philosophical predecessors Edmund Husserl, (...) Alfred Schutz, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Natanson paves his own way with stories and examples that themselves bear witness to how phenomenology occurs in literature. In considering such works as Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain, and Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis, Natanson shows how literature opens us to the domain of possibility and how metaphor offers philosophical power when we think about freedom and change. This book, written by one of the twentieth century's leading phenomenologists, will interest students in philosophy and in literature. They will value the work particularly for its clarification of concepts and terms that frequently emerge in the contemporary intellectual climate. (shrink)

Children and adults from a remote Zafimaniry village in eastern Madagascar were probed for their intuitive understanding of the biological inheritance of bodily features. They were told a story about a baby adopted at birth, and were asked whether, when grown, he would be more likely to resemble his birth parents or his adoptive parents in bodily traits, beliefs, preferences, temperaments, and skills. In spite of the fact that the Zafimaniry, like other Southeast Asian and Malagasy peoples, profess explicit beliefs (...) concerning the fixation of individuals' properties that are at variance with Western folkbiology, Zafimaniry adults responded as do American adults on the task. Zafimaniry children, however, did not repond as did the adults, nor did they respond as did the majority of American children. Rather, they responded in the manner most consistent with what would be predicted, for children as well as for adults, from the ethnographic literature. That is, they tended to judge that an adopted boy would resemble his adoptive rather than his birth parents on virtually all traits, including bodily traits. The implications of these findings for current debates within cognitive science and anthropology are discussed. (shrink)

Buddhismus: Stifter, Schulen und Systeme. Hans Wolfgang Schumann. Diederichs Gelbe Reiher 99, 2nd expanded edition. Munich 1993. 259 pp.

The Seven Stages of Purification and the Insight Knowledges. Matara Sri Nanarma Mahathera. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1983. xii, 82 pp. $5.00.

SummaryOn its foundation in 1842, St Francis Xavier's College, Liverpool, was the first British manifestation of the renaissance of Jesuit day-schools throughout nineteenth-century Europe. Initially, the College developed along traditional Jesuit lines, imbibing the spirit of the Ratio Studiorum, the centuries-old educational code of the Society of Jesus.By 1875, a new era had hawned as the needs of one of the largest commercial and industrial centres in the British Empire forced the Jesuits to examine critically the type of education being (...) dispensed in their Liverpool college. The curriculum was rapidly extended away from its traditional roots in the Classics to embrace scientific and technical training. This paper seeks to show how the Jesuits in Liverpool adapted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to changing demands both at home and from their Superior General in Rome. (shrink)

Le méchant n'a pas droit à la part du juste", répond Créon à Antigone. Mais qui distribue les mérites, et selon quels critères? Les représentations du juste varient d'une époque à l'autre, d'un continent à l'autre et même au sein d'une société pourtant assez homogène quant à sa composition, son histoire et son mode de vie. En atteste suffisamment le regard que l'on a porté sur l'esclavage, que l'on porte encore sur la domination masculine, l'avortement ou le mariage entre personnes (...) du même sexe...0Peut-on affirmer, comme une vérité absolue, ceci est juste? Les valeurs fournissent les critères d'appréciation d'une norme morale, sociale ou juridique mais, pour la seule Raison, quelle est la valeur d'une valeur? Vaut-elle absolument, pour tous, ou relativement, en un certain temps, en un certain Beu? Certains sont-ils dans le vrai, d'autres dans l'erreur? Si l'on ne parvient pas à établir une vérité de la valeur, faut- il admettre que tout se vaut? Faut-il renoncer à lutter et laisser à ceux qui croient le soin de définir ce qui doit être? Ou bien faut- il s'en tenir à ce qui est, qui sera juste par cette seule vertu? Peut- on échapper à l'impuissance relativiste sans le secours de la métaphysique? Ces questions se posent depuis toujours.0Explorer les réponses qui leur ont été données, les soumettre à une analyse critique rigoureuse, tel est l'objet de cet ouvrage. (shrink)

In view of several accounts of Galileo (as an "anarchist", Aristotelian-Thomist, Platonist, empiricist, and apriorist), this paper argues that, though the continued vitality of these interpretations indicates the uniqueness of Galileo's place in the philosophy of science, the philosophical importance of each depends on denying the alternatives; then proposes a synthetic approach as a solution; identifies it as a tradition; discusses its best and latest example (Clavelin); accepts the essential point of his account of Galileo's method (the skillful combination of (...) thought and observation); and defines the novelty of his contribution as the analysis from that point of view of new elements of Galileo's work. However, it is argued that Clavelin's account of Galileo's theory of method does not do justice to the complexity and wealth of Galileo's philosophical remarks, and hence a new approach is suggested such that the essential feature of Galileo's philosophy of science becomes his skillful combination of scientific practice and philosophical theorizing. (shrink)

A constructive interpretation is given of Paul Feyerabend's philosophy'of science as being not really irrationalistic but only pseudo-irrationalistic, and as being in need of an account of how science is distinct and how related to other activities. To this end, Benedetto Croce's philosophy is considered, constructively criticized, and shown to be unexpectedly promising; its valuable element is not the instrumentalistic theory of science officially present in his Logica but the distinctionism-relationism that he practiced everywhere and especially in his literary criticism. (...) A summary is then given of results obtained or expected from an investigation of Galileo Galilei's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems carried out in the spirit of such a modified Crocean approach. (shrink)

This article presents an empirical study of approaches to ethical decision-making among nurses and doctors. It takes as its starting point the distinction between the perspectives of care and of justice in ethical thinking, and the view that nurses' thinking will be aligned with the former and doctors' with the latter. It goes on to argue that the differences in these approaches are best understood in terms of the distinction between partialist and impartialist modes of moral thinking. The study seeks (...) to determine the distribution of these modes of thinking between nurses and doctors, and finds that there are no signif icant differences between them. A 'two-level' philosophical view of the nature of moral thinking is appealed to in order to explain the study findings. (shrink)

Frequently, throughout the history of modern philosophy, it has been held that although claims to knowledge can be adequately defended against relativistic arguments, judgments of value cannot. Positions of this type were widely accepted in Anglo-American philosophy during the last half-century. To be sure, some philosophers have at all times attacked such a dichotomy, holding that arguments similar to those which justify a rejection of relativism is mistaken in both spheres. Recently, however, there has been an attack on the same (...) dichotomy from the opposite direction. An increasing number of philosophers have accepted positions that lead to a relativization of judgments of fact as well as of judgments of value. This tendency has many independent roots, and those who accept it in one form or another may hold antithetical positions on a variety of other issues. I shall therefore not attempt to disentangle the presuppositions which underlie contemporary relativistic theories of knowledge, though I shall indicate some of them in passing; rather, I shall confine myself to showing that an acceptance of relativism in the theory of knowledge frequently—and perhaps always—involves a prior commitment to non-relativistic interpretations of at least some judgments concerning matters of fact. Consequently, whatever may be the case with respect to judgments of value, epistemological relativism may be said to be self-limiting. (shrink)

One of the ideas elaborated in my recent book is what I called the hermeneutical\nprinciple of the asymmetry between negative and positive evaluation: ’this\nprescribes that the textual evidence needed to justify a negative, unfavourable\nevaluation must be of a high quality, strength, and rigor, whereas for a positive\nevaluation less exacting standards are sufficient’ (Finocchiaro, 1988: 247). There,\nI applied this principle to several cases, relating in one way or another to\nGramsci: some were his critiques of other authors, some were my own critiques\nof (...) his ideas, and some were critiques by others; and the issues involved such\nquestions as the status of Marxism as a religion, as a science, and as politics.\nI believe the principle ought to be applied to book reviews. Now, Geoffrey\nHunt’s recent review of my book in this journal (Hunt, 1990) seems to me to be a\nclear violation of this principle, and therefore an answer to it will not only set the\nrecord straight, but may prove generally instructive. That is, his review devotes a\ngreat deal of space to criticizing my work, and very little to analysing, describing,\nor even summarizing it; and whatever description we find, it is largely inaccurate,\nunfair, and one-sided. In short, what he advances is a negative evaluation of my\nbook not properly and adequately documented and justified. (shrink)