El uso descriptivo que exhibe la categoría de “normalidad filosófica” en el discurso de Francisco Romero sintetiza las representaciones y expectativas que el campo filosófico argentino tenía del desarrollo de la disciplina en el medio local, mostrándose como un índice de su propia experiencia histórica en tanto colectivo social. Las tensiones de esa experiencia se expresan en una paradoja inscripta dentro de la categoría, según la cual la situación presente de la filosofía en Iberoamérica se concibe a la vez como (...) una continuidad y como una novedad respecto del pasado filosófico. Esa paradoja acaba revelándose como un síntoma de las operaciones retóricas que están a la base del uso descriptivo de la categoría, y que apuntan a la fijación de una nueva identidad en la trama social del lenguaje, tal que aquel colectivo gane simbólicamente vida propia, legitimidad al interior de la cultura local y reconocimiento por parte del resto de las esferas sociales. Francisco Romero’s descriptive use of the term “philosophical normality” synthesizes the representations and hopes that the Argentinean philosophical field had regarding its own development in the local arena. So this term is an expression of the historical experience of this academic community, and shows the paradoxical tensions between continuity and change regarding the philosophical past. This paradox was a symptom of the rhetorical operations which underlay the descriptive use of “philosophical normality” and tried to establish a new identity in the social language. Consequently that field could symbolically obtain its vital strength, legitimacy in the local culture and the recognition from the other social spheres. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper I argue that an ontology of events is precise, flexible and general enough so as to cover the three main alternative formulations of quantum mechanics as well as theories advocating an antirealistic view of the wave function. Since these formulations advocate a primitive ontology of entities living in four-dimensional spacetime, they are good candidates to connect that quantum image with the manifest image of the world. However, to the extent that some form of (...) realism about the wave function is also necessary, one needs to endorse also the idea that the wave function refers to some kind of power. In the second part, I discuss some difficulties raised by the recent proposal that in Bohmian mechanics this power is holistically possessed by all the particles in the universe. (shrink)

In this paper I review three different positions on the wave function, namely: nomological realism, dispositionalism, and configuration space realism by regarding as essential their capacity to account for the world of our experience. I conclude that the first two positions are committed to regard the wave function as an abstract entity. The third position will be shown to be a merely speculative attempt to derive a primitive ontology from a reified mathematical space. Without entering any discussion about nominalism, I (...) conclude that an elimination of abstract entities from one’s ontology commits one to instrumentalism about the wave function, a position that therefore is not as unmotivated as it has seemed to be to many philosophers. (shrink)

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, (...) suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...) included within the class of happiness-constituting states. Second, I argue that a plausible theory of happiness should not include mood propensities, since their inclusion is either counterintuitive or unnecessary. (shrink)

Comment pouvons-nous analyser des relations de valeur non standards, comme la parité axiologique, en termes d’attitudes appropriées? Wlodek Rabinowicz suggère que deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est à la fois permissible de préférer l’une à l’autre et permissible d’avoir la préférence contraire. Dans un article récent, Johan Gustafsson soutient toutefois que l’analyse de Rabinowicz viole un principe de symétrie entre valeurs et préférences, selon lequel il existe pour toute relation de valeur une relation de préférence (...) correspondante (et vice-versa). À la lumière de ce principe, Gustafsson propose une analyse alternative, selon laquelle deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est requis d’entretenir ces choses en parité préférentielle. Dans cet article, j’examine en détail les arguments avancés par Gustafsson contre l’analyse de Rabinowicz et je montre qu’aucun d’eux n’est convaincant. (shrink)

We investigate the complexity of embeddings between bi-embeddable structures. In analogy with categoricity spectra, we define the bi-embeddable categoricity spectrum of a structure A as the family of Turing degrees that compute embeddings between any computable bi-embeddable copies of A; the degree of bi-embeddable categoricity of A is the least degree in this spectrum (if it exists). We extend many known results about categoricity spectra to the case of bi-embeddability. In particular, we exhibit structures without degree of bi-embeddable categoricity, and (...) we show that every degree d.c.e above 0(α) for α a computable successor ordinal and 0(λ) for λ a computable limit ordinal is a degree of bi-embeddable categoricity. We also give examples of families of degrees that are not bi-embeddable categoricity spectra. (shrink)

In this paper we argue, against a somewhat standard view, that pragmatic phenomena occur in mathematical language. We provide concrete examples supporting this thesis.

This paper is part of a project that is based on the notion of a dialectical system, introduced by Magari as a way of capturing trial and error mathematics. In Amidei et al. (2016, Rev. Symb. Logic, 9, 1–26) and Amidei et al. (2016, Rev. Symb. Logic, 9, 299–324), we investigated the expressive and computational power of dialectical systems, and we compared them to a new class of systems, that of quasi-dialectical systems, that enrich Magari’s systems with a natural mechanism (...) of revision. In the present paper we consider a third class of systems, that of p-dialectical systems, that naturally combine features coming from the two other cases. We prove several results about p-dialectical systems and the sets that they represent. Then we focus on the completions of first-order theories. In doing so, we consider systems with connectives, i.e. systems that encode the rules of classical logic. We show that any consistent system with connectives represents the completion of a given theory. We prove that dialectical and q-dialectical systems coincide with respect to the completions that they can represent. Yet, p-dialectical systems are more powerful; we exhibit a p-dialectical system representing a completion of Peano Arithmetic that is neither dialectical nor q-dialectical. (shrink)

We study the algorithmic complexity of isomorphic embeddings between computable structures.

Since 1993, when Hudelmaier developed an O(n log n)-space decision procedure for propositional Intuitionistic Logic, a lot of work has been done to improve the efficiency of the related proof-search algorithms. In this paper a tableau calculus using the signs T, F and Fc with a new set of rules to treat signed formulas of the kind T((A → B) → C) is provided. The main feature of the calculus is the reduction of both the non-determinism in proof-search and the (...) width of proofs with respect to Hudelmaier's one. These improvements have a significant influence on the performances of the implementation. (shrink)

The complexity of equivalence relations has received much attention in the recent literature. The main tool for such endeavour is the following reducibility: given equivalence relations R and S on natural numbers, R is computably reducible to S if there is a computable function f:ω→ω that induces an injective map from R-equivalence classes to S-equivalence classes. In order to compare the complexity of equivalence relations which are computable, researchers considered also feasible variants of computable reducibility, such as the polynomial-time reducibility. (...) In this work, we explore Peq, the degree structure generated by primitive recursive reducibility on primitive recursive equivalence relations with infinitely many equivalence classes. In contrast with all other known degree structures on equivalence relations, we show that Peq has much more structure: e.g., we show that it is a dense distributive lattice. On the other hand, we also offer evidence of the intricacy of Peq, proving, e.g., that the structure is neither rigid nor homogeneous. (shrink)

Cette conversation entre l’avocat et écrivain de science-fiction Jean Baret et Ariel Kyrou porte l’idée d’une double nécessité, à la fois d’expérimenter les IA génératives pour ce qu’elles permettent très concrètement et d’en extrapoler les interactions futures par les fictions les plus libres. L’enjeu est en effet d’en mener une critique qui ne soit ni technophile ni technophobe, consciente des défis créatifs et sociétaux de ces IA qui nous parlent comme à un ami en s’excusant de leurs erreurs.

Contrairement à ce qui est pris d’ordinaire pour acquis, le Commentateur Anonyme du Théétète est philosophiquement stimulant, comme le démontre la confrontation avec le Stoïcisme. Le Commentateur Anonyme déploie une stratégie subtile, ne visant pas tant à rejeter des doctrines nettement stoïciennes qu’à les incorporer dans son propre système platonicien, en présupposant que seul ce dernier peut assurer des fondements adéquats aux doctrines. Le Commentateur Anonyme peut de la sorte s’approprier le Stoïcisme et régler de manière définitive l’ancienne querelle entre (...) Stoïcisme et Platonisme. Qui plus est, le Stoïcisme n’est pas une question séparée, mais il fait partie d’une question plus large. Car la comparaison avec le Stoïcisme aide aussi le Commentateur Anonyme à défendre son interprétation unitaire de la tradition académique platonicienne. Commenter un texte n’est pas une pratique neutre, mais bien plutôt un des aspects les plus importants de la philosophie post-hellénistique. (shrink)

De Cette chère humanité en 1976 à Lothar Blues en 2008, Philippe Curval est l’auteur d’une série de romans qui mettent en scène un ou plusieurs futurs de l’Union européenne. Alors que l’Europe s’apprête peut-être à vivre des « années de chien », cette conversation entre Philippe Curval et Ariel Kyrou nous plonge dans les rêves ou les cauchemars imaginés par l’auteur de science-fiction, quelque part entre le danger d’un enfermement dans ses frontières, les risques d’effondrement, les promesses de (...) la fin du travail et l’espoir d’une renaissance du vieux continent. (shrink)

According to Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein composed TS 209 and handed it in to Russell in order to renew a grant from the Cambridge Council Cambridge in April-May 1930. Pichler and Rothhaupt challenged Rhees’ hypothesis, and claimed that Wittgenstein handed in TS 208 to Russell, and not TS 209. Against their view, I argue that Rhees’ hypothesis best explains the major motive for the composition of Philosophical Remarks, and that it best explains what Wittgenstein handed in to Russell. While I give (...) six reasons in favor of Rhees, I also try to explain how Russell, Moore, Littlewood, Schlick, and Waismann are linked with the composition of TS 208 and TS 209. (shrink)

In this paper we provide cut-free tableau calculi for the intuitionistic modal logics IK, ID, IT, i.e. the intuitionistic analogues of the classical modal systems K, D and T. Further, we analyse the necessity of duplicating formulas to which rules are applied. In order to develop these calculi we extend to the modal case some ideas presented by Miglioli, Moscato and Ornaghi for intuitionistic logic. Specifically, we enlarge the language with the new signs Fc and CR near to the usual (...) signs T and F. In this work we establish the soundness and completeness theorems for these calculi with respect to the Kripke semantics proposed by Fischer Servi. (shrink)

O estudo investigou a experiência de transição para a aposentadoria na perspectiva subjetiva dos sujeitos que a vivenciaram. Foram entrevistados 20 trabalhadores aposentados no período de até 18 meses após o desligamento de suas atividades laborais. As entrevistas seguiram roteiro semi-estruturado e..

We aim at providing a philosophical analysis of the notion of “proof by Church’s Thesis”, which is – in a nutshell – the conceptual device that permits to rely on informal methods when working in Computability Theory. This notion allows, in most cases, to not specify the background model of computation in which a given algorithm – or a construction – is framed. In pursuing such analysis, we carefully reconstruct the development of this notion (from Post to Rogers, to the (...) present days), and we focus on some classical constructions of the field, such as the construction of a simple set. Then, we make use of this focus in order to support the following encompassing claim (which opposes to a somehow commonly received view): the informal side of Computability, consisting of the large class of methods typically employed in the proofs of the field, is not fully reducible to its formal counterpart. (shrink)

This paper studies algorithmic learning theory applied to algebraic structures. In previous papers, we have defined our framework, where a learner, given a family of structures, receives larger and larger pieces of an arbitrary copy of a structure in the family and, at each stage, is required to output a conjecture about the isomorphism type of such a structure. The learning is successful if there is a learner that eventually stabilizes to a correct conjecture. Here, we analyze the number of (...) mind changes that are needed to learn a given family K. We give a descriptive set-theoretic interpretation of such mind change complexity. We also study how bounding the Turing degree of learners affects the mind change complexity of a given family of algebraic structures. (shrink)

Numerosa literatura ha señalado una transformación en las solidaridades políticas y sociales que estructuraron las sociedades de masas del siglo pasado. La constatación de que se han modificado las formas de constitución de los actores colectivos ha obligado a redefinir las herramientas teóricas y metodológicas para abordar los fenómenos políticos, planteando nuevos interrogantes. ¿Qué clase de dinámicas se instalan cuando las organizaciones tradicionales son desbordadas por otros actores que compiten en la enunciación política? ¿Cómo abordar desde la Sociología Política procesos (...) cuyos agentes son, en muchos casos, colectivos circunstanciales? El presente artículo propone interpretar la dinámica política contemporánea en los términos de una sucesión de procesos de identificación política, discontinuos desde el punto de vista de su cristalización en sujetos colectivos, pero hilvanados por la tematización de los asuntos públicos. (shrink)

SummaryenPhilosophical debates concerning the existence of entities postulated in scientific explanations have always characterized the most significant revolutions in the history of physics.Scientific realism — meant here as the doctrine according to which (i) theoretical entities in a mature science typically refer and (ii) the laws of a theory in a mature science are approximately true — can be given a clearer, pragmatic interpretation by suggesting sufficient conditions for both (i) and (ii).(i) Following I. Hacking, (a) manipulability and (b) measurability (...) of a theoretical entity T are each considered sufficient conditions for believing in the existence of T.(ii) The problem of verisimilitude or ‘approximate truth’ is restated in terms of sufficient conditions for “a good approximation of a model”, a problem yet to be studied; with this regard, N. Cartwright's approach to models is briefly criticized.The relevance of the so called “survivability argument”, put forth against the realist's claim that only philosophical realism can explain the success of science, is evaluated in the conclusion. RésuméfrLes débats philosophiques concernant l'existence des entités postulées dans les explications scientifiques ont toujours caractérisé les revolutions les plus significatives dans l'histoire de la physique. On peut donner au réalisme scientifique — entendu ici comme la doctrine selon laquelle (i) les entités théoriques d'une science mature ont typiquement une référence et (ii) les lois d'une théorie appartenant à une science mature sont approximativement vraies — une interprétation plus claire, pragmatique en suggérant des conditions suffisantes pour (i) et (ii).(i) D'après I. Hacking, (a) manipulabilityé et (b) mesurabilité d'une entité théorique T sont considérées toutes deux comme des conditions suffisantes pour croire en l'existence de T.(ii) Le problème de la vérisimilitude ou de la ‘vérité approchée’ est reformulé en termes de conditions suffisantes pour une «bonne approximation d'un modèle», un problème qui est encore àétudier; dans cette perspective, la manière dont N. Cartwright aborde les modèles est brièvement critiqueée.En conclusion, est évaluée la pertinence de ce qui est appelé l'«argument de la capaciteé a survivre» avancé contre la prétention réaliste que seul le réalisme philosophique peut expliquer le succès de la science. ZusammenfassungdePhilosophische Auseinandersetzungen, die die Existenz von in den wissenschaftlichen Erklärungen postulierten Entitäten betreffen, haben immer die wichtigsten Revolutionen in der Geschichte der Physik charakterisiert. Unter wissenschaftlichem Realismus verstehe ich die Lehre, wonach (i) die theoretischen Entitäten einer reifen Wissenschaft typisch eine Referenz haben und (ii) die Gesetze einer zu einer reifen Wissenschaft gehörigen Theorie approximativ wahr sind. Man kann dem wissenschaftlichen Realismus eine klarere, pragmatische Interpretation geben, indem man hinreichende Bedingungen für (i) und (ii) angibt.(i) Nach I. Hacking sind (a) Manipulierbarkeit und (b) Messbarkeit einer theoretischen Entität T hinreichende Bedingungen, um an die Existenz von T zu glauben.(ii) Das Problem der Wahrheitsnähe oder der ‘approximativen Wahrheit’ wird umformuliert, indem wir nach den hinreichenden Bedingungen für eine «gute Approximation eines Modelles» fragen — ein Problem, das noch zu untersuchen bleibt. In dieser Hinsicht wird N. Cartwrights Art, Modelle anzugehen, kurz kritisiert.Zum Schluss wird die Relevanz des sog. «Überlebensargumentes» beurteilt, das gegen die Behauptung des Realisten, dass allein der philosophische Realismus den Erfolg der Wissenschaft zu erklären vermag, ins Feld geführt wird. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.