We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do (...) so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others. (shrink)

This book explores the thesis that legal roles force people to engage in moral combat, an idea which is implicit in the assumption that citizens may be morally required to disobey unjust laws, while judges may be morally required to punish citizens for civil disobedience. Heidi Hurd advances the surprising argument that the law cannot require us to do what morality forbids. The 'role-relative' understanding of morality is shown to be incompatible with both consequentialist and deontological moral philosophies. In (...) the end, Hurd shows that our best moral theory is one which never makes one actor's moral success turn on another's moral failure. Moral Combat is a sophisticated, well-conceived and carefully argued book on a very important and controversial topic at the junction between legal and political philosophy. It will be of interest to moral, legal, and political philosophers, as well as teachers and students of professional ethics in law. (shrink)

This paper examines the competing ‘languages’ of line in Julie Mehretu’s series, Grey Area (2007–9) and elaborates on the implications these lines have for theories of space, bodies and, in particular, the relationship between the two. Grey Area explores what Mehretu describes as a grey and in-between space. The series is composed of seven large abstract canvases covered in an assortment of gestural tracings and neatly traced rational lines (e.g. architectural lines). The juxtaposition of these competing linely narratives not only (...) creates a grey space visually, but compels viewers to stretch their bodies across the canvases and between the lined layers thus, facilitating a brief inhabitance of grey space. Building from this analysis, the paper reflects on the relevance of the lines and the stretching they elicit for examining the complexities of contemporary modes of inhabitation that often extend across multiple geographical sites and temporal modes. Thus, engaging with Mehretu’s lined abstractions draws attention to the importance of space in the production of bodily boundaries, what I call geographical and temporal bodily outlines. In addition to contributing to body-space theories, the paper also demonstrates the valuable insights gained by attending to the unique social-aesthetic analyses of visual art and artists. (shrink)

Epistemic modality concerns what is possible given a body of knowledge or evidence. Cases involving epistemic modals, present an interesting semantic challenge: in order to give a semantic treatment of epistemic modals, we must explain how informational states figure in the semantic representation of these terms. According to John MacFarlane’s (2011, 2014) view – Assessor Relativism – epistemic modal claims are assessment-sensitive in that their truth depends on what is known by the assessor at the time he or she assesses (...) the claim. Hence, truth for epistemic modal claims varies with the context of assessment. Critics of MacFarlane’s approach, such as Anthony Gillies and Kai von Fintel (2008) point to so called “ignorant assessor cases,” ones in which the assessor knows less than the speaker. They claim that such cases pose a serious problem for Assessment Relativism. I argue, however, that these cases do not uncover a flaw in the assessment relativist’s semantics. The apparent problems only seem to arise because the authors have not given adequate attention to the epistemic details of the cases. In making my argument, I present a larger methodological point about the role of epistemic data in semantic theory construction. I claim that, it is often difficult to distinguish the boundary between semantics and epistemology when discussing epistemic modals. As a result, linguists and philosophers of language sometimes fail distinguish between epistemic intuitions that are directly relevant to the semantics and those that are indirectly relevant. I conclude that we do not have to complicate the semantics of epistemic modals in order to accommodate epistemic data such as intuitions about epistemic warrant. (shrink)

This article presents a case study of how one school introduced a one-credit course for philosophy majors focused on effective searching for and critical evaluation of primary and secondary sources. The course curriculum is based on departmental learning outcomes, and is also aligned with the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL) standards.

Non-suicidal self-injury has consistently been associated with self-reported difficulties in emotion reactivity and the regulation of negative emotions; however, less is known about the accuracy of these self-reports or the reactivity and regulation of positive emotions. The present study sought to investigate differences between women with and without a history of NSSI on: self-reported general tendencies of negative and positive emotion reactivity, self-reported general tendencies of negative and positive emotion regulation, and emotion regulation reported in response to a positive and (...) negative mood induction. The sample consisted of 36 women with a recent history of NSSI within the last 2 years and a comparison group with no history of NSSI. Participants completed self-report measures of negative and positive emotion reactivity and regulation. In a separate session, participants underwent both a negative and positive mood induction using a counterbalanced design and reported their experienced emotions. Results from two-way MANOVAs and ANOVAs revealed those with a history of NSSI reported significantly greater difficulties in negative emotion reactivity and regulation than the no-NSSI comparison group; however, no group differences emerged in self-reported reactivity or regulation of positive emotions. In contrast, repeated measures ANOVAs on data from the mood induction task found no group differences in reactivity or regulation for either negative or positive emotions. These findings highlight the possibility that although individuals with a history of NSSI evaluate their ability to manage negative emotions as significantly worse than individuals with no history of self-injury, this may not reflect their actual emotion regulatory processes. (shrink)

While restorative justice is seen as a valuable means for conflict resolution in many kinds of conflict, in the context of domestic violence cases it is still heavily debated. This article posits that the notion of hospitality makes a fruitful contribution to that debate. The urgency of domestic violence against women seems to challenge any hospitable approach between the victim and the offender. However, this article claims that in the light of radical hospitality, restorative justice even in domestic violence cases (...) can become meaningful. (shrink)

This paper tests the comparative effectiveness of spokes-characters, both ‘celebrity’ and ‘non-celebrity’, in promoting healthy versus non-healthy foods. An experimental study among 6- to 7-year-old children in Belgium demonstrates that adding a spokes-character to a food product increases the appetite, the wished-for frequency of consumption and the expected number of purchase requests for that product. This finding holds true for healthy foods as well as for unhealthy foods. The effect of the celebrity spokes-character exceeds that of a similar gnome. Nevertheless, (...) the latter is also capable of promoting the healthy and unhealthy products. These findings suggest that using ‘celebrity’ spokes-characters to promote healthy foods to children might indeed be an effective strategy to change children’s diets. Even the use of similar, non-celebrity spokes-characters could be quite fruitful. (shrink)

Empathy is one of the most talked about and widely studied concepts of recent years. Some argue it can help create a more just society, improve medical care and even avert global catastrophe. Others object that it is morally problematic. Who is right? And what is empathy anyway? Is it a way of feeling with others, or is it simply feeling sorry for them? Is it a form of knowledge? What is its evolutionary origin? In this thorough and clearly-written introduction (...) to the philosophy of empathy Heidi Maibom explores these questions and more, examining the following topics: The nature of empathy and key themes in the literature Empathy as a way of understanding others, particularly 'simulation theory' and 'perspective-taking' Empathy, emotional contagion, and sympathy Empathy's role in moral understanding or motivation Empathy and art appreciation, with examples from film, music and fiction Empathy and mental disorder, such as psychopathy and autism. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Empathy is an excellent resource for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, psychology, and cognitive science, as well as for those in related subjects such as art, literature and politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Susan Laird, “Musical Hunger: A Philosophical Testimonial of Miseducation”Heidi WesterlundCan hunger and satisfaction, which according to John Dewey form “the arsis and thesis of a child’s life,”1 create the rhythm and heartbeat of music education? Susan Laird shows us through her autobiographical experiences how this heartbeat was missed in her case, while the undertone of her narrative and testimonial begs a wider self-reflection upon the (...) culture of music education. Indeed, Laird’s testimonial assumes that musical hunger has something to do with professional music educators; that musical hunger and satisfaction while setting the beat for a person’s musical life are not simply biological functions—something that exists and stays no matter how and what the person is fed or where and with whom the person eats. As Dewey wrote,[t]he very tendency of the child, while hungry, to recall his previous satisfaction, and to anticipate the coming one, is the beginning of the recognition of time. It grows more definite and accurate just in the degree in which all experiences are related to each other as members of one whole.2The imaginative musical dinner table that Laird’s testimonial lays out calls for music educators to reflect upon what kind of meal is served, not only from their own perspective but also from that of their students. Yet, reconstructing the menu is demanding in a profession that struggles with the pros and cons of a tradition in which teachers have learnt to teach in the same way that they themselves have been taught, also teaching using the same order in which they have learned—only hoping to do it more effectively.Quite recently, when visiting the recording studio at the Sibelius Academy department of music education to listen to one of my student’s work with her own rock band, I was reminded by my own remembrances of the difficulty, as well as the necessity, of reconstructing traditions in music teacher education. My thoughts led me fleetingly back to the ‘70s when making arrangements, improvisations, or working in recording studios were part of my musical life, until they were overwhelmed by the then-prevalent diet of professional music studies. Although my experiences of general music education were similar to those of Laird, teachers in the specialized music school fed me with goal-directed instruction in more than one instrument, in music theory, solfege, and the history of Western [End Page 81] art music. Looking back, however, I was lucky in more ways than one: my adolescent leisure time was blessed with numerous choirs, orchestras, and gigging bands—bringing a self-organized satisfaction and motivation to all kinds of music and musical activities. Multiple diets were feeding my musical life: I obtained the strengthening vitamin drops and enjoyed my self-made smorgasbord with family and friends, none of which had been enough by themselves to lead me into the profession. Yet, when entering the university to pursue my professional music studies, I experienced events in reverse order to that which Lucy Green describes in How Popular Musicians Learn.3 As I then did not have a piano of my own, I only had the opportunity to practice what was necessary for exams and so I practically stopped playing for fun. I also realized that not all flute teachers were able to accompany their students as did my first teacher, and so I had to play my flute repertoire for most of the year only imagining how the pieces would sound as a whole with no community with whom to share the joy of music making. While watching my student working in front of the studio desk searching for the right bass sound for her own song—a song that she was performing with friends and fellow students—to give the song the final touch for her work for the pedagogy of African-American music (popular music) course, to my own surprise I suddenly felt a long-forgotten hunger and desire. I was reminded of the challenges facing teacher education in exemplifying by its own practices a music education that does not take for granted that particular subject content or official... (shrink)

Empathy plays a central role in the history and contemporary study of ethics, interpersonal understanding, and the emotions, yet until now has been relatively underexplored. _The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy_ is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting field and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, the _Handbook_ is divided into six parts: Core issues History of empathy Empathy and understanding (...) Empathy and morals Empathy in art and aesthetics Empathy and individual differences. Within these sections central topics and problems are examined, including: empathy and imagination; neuroscience; David Hume and Adam Smith; understanding; evolution; altruism; moral responsibility; art, aesthetics, and literature; gender; empathy and related disciplines such as anthropology. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, particularly ethics and philosophy of mind and psychology, the _Handbook_ will also be of interest to those in related fields, such as anthropology and social psychology. (shrink)

Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, (...) we can say what we know. (shrink)

In modern urbanized and densely populated societies - such as the contemporary Netherlands, which forms the geographical setting of the present analysis - hunting has lost its meaning as a mode of subsistence to become a symbolic strategy. Hunting is a cultural enclave in which the boundaries between humans and animals are blurred and the relations of dominance and submission symbolically reversed. Hunting challenges the legitimacy of apparently "given" power relations between humans and animals. Hunters construct, reproduce and legitimize hunting (...) by crossing the boundaries between humans and animals. Hunting "for pleasure" is regarded as truly pleasurable only if it allows a reversal of the asymmetrical power relations between humans and animals, attributing almost human characteristerics to the game-species. In theircognitive schemes hunters measure their power and abilities with strong, cunning and preferably male opponents. Game-species share an ambivalent status between the human and the animal realms, the tame and the wild, and between their instrumental and expressive signifccance. Hunting "for pleasure" is justified by this very ambivalence. (shrink)

In a recent article,1Riisfeldt attempts to show that the principle of double effect (PDE) is unsound as an ethical principle and problematic in its application to palliative opioid and sedative use in end-of-life care. Specifically, he claims that (1) routine, non-lethal opioid and sedative administration may be “intrinsically bad” by PDE’s standards, (2) continuous deep palliative sedation (or “terminal sedation”) should be treated as a bad effect akin to death for purposes of PDE, (3) PDE cannot coherently be applied in (...) cases where death “indirectly” furthers an agent’s intended end of pain relief via medically appropriate palliative care, and (4) application of PDE requires sacrificing common beliefs about the sanctity of human life. I respond by showing that Riisfeldt’s understanding of PDE is seriously mistaken: he misattributes Kantian and Millian reasoning to the principle and conflates acts’ intrinsic properties with their effects. Further, a corrected understanding of PDE can address Riisfeldt’s case-specific objections. (shrink)

Numerous grounds have been offered for the view that healthcare workers have a duty to treat, including expressed consent, implied consent, special training, reciprocity (also called the social contract view), and professional oaths and codes. Quite often, however, these grounds are simply asserted without being adequately defended or without the defenses being critically evaluated. This essay aims to help remedy that problem by providing a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these five grounds for asserting that (...) healthcare workers have a duty to treat, especially as that duty would arise in the context of an infectious disease pandemic. Ultimately, it argues that none of the defenses is currently sufficient to ground the kind of duty that would be needed in a pandemic. It concludes by sketching some practical recommendations in that regard. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness (...) as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness. (shrink)

Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potentialcontributorsto knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can sufferepistemic trust injusticeswhen potentially powerful forms (...) of knowing such as scientific understandings are generated in isolation from them, and when the social conditions required for aresponsibly-placed trustto be formed relative to the relevant epistemic institutions fail to transpire. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag werde ich die Wege untersuchen, auf denen Moraltheoretiker philosophischen Sinn in der These entdecken könnten, daß das Gesetz die moralische Schlechtigkeit von Personen dadurch tolerieren sollte, daß es den Bürgern Rechte zuerkennt, moralisch Falsches zu tun. Dabei vernachlässige ich Fälle, in denen diese Toleranz deshalb angemessen erscheint, weil die Moralität des in Rede stehenden Verhaltens ungewiss oder jedenfalls unter gleichermaßen vernünftigen Personen hinreichend umstritten ist, so daß die Gewährung von Freiheit auch für den Staat als das angemessene (...) Mittel erscheint, die Problematik zu lösen. Stattdessen werde ich mich auf Fälle konzentrieren, in denen der Gesetzgeber davon überzeugt ist, daß das betreffende Verhalten tadelnswert ist, so daß weder Zweifel noch Uneinigkeit über die Bewertung des Verhaltens als ausreichende Gründe dafür genannt werden können, daß der Staat sich der Sache nicht annimmt.Wie ich im 1. Teil zeige, kann sowohl von konsequentialistischen als auch von deontologischen Moraltheorien angenommen werden, daß sie unmoralisches Verhalten erlauben, das keine Verletzung von konsequentialistischen bzw. deontologischen Pflichten darstellt. Regel-Konsequentialisten verlangen Toleranz für akt-konsequentialistisch betrachtete Verstöße, sofern sie im Rahmen ihrer Regeln erfolgen; und Deontologen fordern Toleranz für kategorisch erlaubte Taten, die sub-optimale Konsequenzen haben. Im Hinblick darauf, daß wir eine Tugenpflicht haben könnten, uns zu Personen zu entwickeln, die deontologische Erlaubnisse nicht mißbrauchen, untersuche ich eine Reihe von Gründen, die es nahe legen, daß diejenigen, die sich einer Moraltheorie der Tugendpflichten verbunden fühlen, die die Besorgnis um Handlungen durch eine Besorgnis um den Charakter der Person ersetzt, gleichwohl gute Gründe dafür hat, die Kultivierung eines guten Charakters außerhalb der Reichweite des Staates zu belassen.Die Problematik wird schwieriger, wenn wir von den unmoralischen Handlungen, die keine Pflichten verletzen , zu den unmoralischen Handlungen übergehen, die solche Pflichten verletzen. Kann ein Konsequentialist sich damit einverstanden erklären, daß der Staat Personen die Freiheit zugesteht, etwas zu tun, was konsequentialistisch verboten ist? Kann ein Deontologe nicht nur die Freiheit, Erlaubnisse zu missbrauchen, verteidigen, sondern auch die Freiheit, kategorische Verbote zu verletzen? Im 2. Teil des vorliegenden Beitrages vertrete ich die These, daß es durchaus einleuchtende Gründe dafür geben mag, daß Freiheit entweder intrinsisch oder instrumentell gut ist, um andere intrinsisch gute Dinge zu bewirken, in welchem Fall Konsequentialisten gute Gründe dafür haben, daß der Staat grundsätzlich moralische Schlechtigkeit tolerieren sollte, oder sie zumindest dann tolerieren sollte, wenn dies der Preis dafür ist, größeres Gutes zu befördern. Im 3. Teil behaupte ich, daß selbst unsere beste deontologische Theorie Maximen in sich aufnehmen kann, die es dem Gesetzgeber kategorisch verbieten, den Bürgern die Verletzung kategorischer Maximen zu verbieten. So kann es dem Gesetzgeber z.B. verboten sein, in die Privatsphäre der Bürger einzugreifen, um das Fehlverhalten von Bürgern zu ermitteln. Oder es kann dem Gesetzgeber auferlegt sein, nicht etwas zu verbieten, wenn er dieses Verbot nicht gegenüber allen Bürgern durchsetzen kann.Das Ergebnis meiner Analyse ist, daß die Theorie liberaler Toleranz nicht von der Behauptung vernünftigen Zweifels und der Uneinigkeit zwischen Gesetzgeber und Bürgern abhängt, wie es unter liberalen Politikwissenschaftlern oftmals voraus-gesetzt wird. Selbst dann, wenn vernünftige Personen sich darüber einig sind, daß eine bestimmte Art von Verhalten unmoralisch ist, und selbst dann, wenn bei dem Gesetzgeber kaum Zweifel an der Unmoralität des Verhaltens vorhanden sind, gibt es doch schwerwiegende moralische Gründe dafür, weshalb der Gesetzgeber moralisch verpflichtet sein kann, die Begehung unmoralischer Handlungen zu tolerieren. In this article I explore the ways in which moral theorists might make philosophical sense of the claim that the law ought to tolerate moral wickedness by according citizens legal rights to do moral wrongs. I set aside cases in which tolerance is proper because the morality of the conduct in question is uncertain or sufficiently contested by equally reasonable persons so as to make liberty the appropriate default solution for the state. Instead, I confine my inquiry to cases in which lawmakers are confident that the conduct in question is blameworthy, so that doubt and disagreement cannot be said to be sufficient reasons for staying the hand of the state. As I argue in Part I, both consequentialist and deontological moral theories can be thought to permit immoralities that are not violations of consequentialist or deontological obligations. Rule-consequentialists require tolerance of act-consequential wrongs that are done in the name of their rules; and deontologists require tolerance of consequentially sub-optimal deeds that are categorically permitted. While we may have aretaic obligations to become the kinds of persons who do not abuse deontological permissions, I explore a series of reasons to think that those who subscribe to an aretaic moral theory that substitutes concerns for character for concerns for actions will nevertheless have good grounds to place the cultivation of good character beyond the scope of the state. The question is harder when we move from immoralities that do not violate obligations to immoralities that do violate such obligations. Can consequentialists make sense of the state according persons liberty to do what is consequentially prohibited? Can deontologists defend not just the liberty to misuse permissions but the liberty to violate categorical prohibitions? I argue in Part II that there may be sound arguments for why liberty is either intrinsically good or instrumentally good for the achievement of other intrinsically good things, in which case, consequentialists have sounds reasons for supposing that the state ought to tolerate wickedness, tu cour , or tolerate it when it is a price that purchases greater goods. And I argue in Part III that our best deontological theory may contain within it maxims that categorically prohibit legislators from prohibiting violations of categorical maxims on the part of citizens. For example, they may be enjoined from invading citizens' privacy in the ways required to detect citizens' wrongdoing; or they may be enjoined not to prohibit what they cannot equally enforce against all. The upshot of my analysis is that a theory of liberal tolerance does not depend upon claims of reasonable doubt and disagreement amongst lawmakers and citizens, as is so often supposed amongst liberal political theorists. Even if reasonable persons agree that a kind of conduct is immoral, and even if lawmakers are in little doubt about its immorality, there are powerful moral reasons why lawmakers might be morally obligated to tolerate its persistence. (shrink)

It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...) have either due to their lacking empathy or practical reason. In the first part of the paper, I argue that psychopaths do not lack the abilities required for deep moral understanding, although they have deficits in those areas. According the M’Naghten Rules, therefore, psychopaths are not insane. Under a less strict formulation of the insanity plea, like the Model Penal Code, however, there is a good case to be made for their lacking substantial capacity. I argue that because psychopathy is an essentially moral disorder, and because of the nature of psychopathic violence, psychopaths should not be excused under the insanity plea. It would be tantamount to excusing someone for committing a crime because they are bad. Arguably, this contravenes the entire system of law. (shrink)

Some people are now quite optimistic about the possibility of treating psychopathy with drugs that directly modulate brain function. I argue that this optimism is misplaced. Psychopathy is a global disorder in an individual’s worldview, including his social and moral outlook. Because of the unity of this Weltanschauung, it is unlikely to be treatable in a piecemeal fashion. Recent neuroscientific methods do not give us much hope that we can replace, in a wholesale manner, problematic views of the world with (...) more socially desirable ones. There are, therefore, principled reasons that psychopathy is so singularly treatment resistant. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman's argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than (...) simply following the standards of "normal science". On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as "good ways of knowing". Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of "knowledge-sharing whistleblowers" to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Hegelian philosophy offers insights that are particularly important for feminists: 1) a descriptive analysis of the historic family as a social system whose inherent oppressiveness needs to be transcended; and 2) a model of intrapsychic and social liberation and harmony as precisely the true path of emergence from and rational transformation of the family. Although a clear advocate of the traditional bourgeois family, Hegel, perhaps paradoxically, also took a critical posture toward the family, (...) identifying and formulating theoretically the nature of its oppressiveness and the - or, at least, a - route toward its transcendence. This paper offers, first, a new angle from which to view Hegel’s concepts of woman and the family, and, second, draws some implications for a contemporary understanding of women and the family from Hegel’s theory of human liberation as the transcendence of the unindividuated harmonious communities of the family and the Greek city. (shrink)

Much of Barnes’s critique depends on a misunderstanding of my position and, where we do substantively disagree, Barnes’s arguments fail to take into account important distinctions. As a result, his arguments are not persuasive. In my reply, I begin by clarifying my position and then proceed to address specific points of disagreement, identifying those distinctions that Barnes needs to take into account in critiquing my view.

This article argues why and how a participatory approach to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a cluster would be beneficial for small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) who are members of the NCE -Subsea cluster in Bergen, Norway. The political and strategic reasons as well as internal motivation for SMEs to incorporate CSR into their business strategies are discussed with support from relevant literature. Furthermore, we offer a discussion on the characteristics of different approaches to incorporating CSR as part of business (...) strategy and provide examples from the Norwegian context. As part of this discussion, we look into some of the clusters in Europe which have adopted a systematic approach to implement CSR as part of their agenda. We propose a means to undertake CSR as part of the cluster through a network model to address the limitations faced by the SMEs when they try to implement CSR individually. A network model (cluster approach) to CSR will motivate the uptake of CSR among SMEs when the network (cluster) is characterized by close geographical proximity and operates in the same sector. The uptake of CSR as part of the network (cluster) agenda can also lead to innovation through cooperation and competition. The particular challenges faced by the SMEs in implementing and sustaining CSR can be also minimized by being part of a network (cluster). (shrink)

Two self-report experiments examined how religiosity affects attributions made for the outcome of a tornado. Undergraduate students and online adults read a fictional vignette about a tornado that hits a small town in the United States. The townspeople met at church and prayed or prepared emergency shelters for three days before the tornado; either no one died or over 200 people died from the tornado. Participants made attributions of cause to God, prayer, faith, and worship. In both studies, individuals identifying (...) as Christian made more attributions to God, prayer, faith, and worship, but only when no one died; when townspeople died, Christian participants made fewer attributions to God, prayer, faith, and worship. Individuals identifying as agnostic or atheist did not show this bias. Directions for future research in terms of implicit religious beliefs and normative evaluations of religion are discussed. (shrink)

The study addresses the issue of the Christian scholarly interest in the Hebrew language since the rise of Humanism. Though the main focus of that interest in Hebrew grammar and vocabulary was to get a better understanding of the “Old Testament”, the subsequent reformation fostered the notion that a better knowledge of both the Hebrew language and the Jewish culture, can promote the conversion of Jews to Christianity. The article inspects possible other underlying motives and discourses behind the translation of (...) Hebrew and Old Yiddish blessings into Latin as the most important lingua sacra, taking into account twentieth century theories about power and hegemony by Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. The study examines the chapter about Jewish greetings and blessings in the original dictionary Šemot Devarim – Nomenclatura Hebraica Autore Helia Levita (Isny, 1542) and the revised translation as Nomenclator Eliae Levitae Germani by Johannes Drusius and son (Franeker, 1652). Also included are transliterated editions of both texts, with translations. (shrink)

In healthcare, grieving on the job is common and often goes unaddressed, leading to prolonged and compounded emotional distress among healthcare professionals. Reflecting on personal narratives written by healthcare providers and trainees working in emergency medicine, pediatrics, and other medical specialties, I highlight how grief can be prolonged when anticipated, chronic, delayed, or inhibited and how it may be influenced by the closeness of the patient-provider relationship, relatable circumstances in the patient or family's life, and the level of support provided (...) by colleagues, peers, and institutions. The NIB narratives emphasize the need for better support systems, particularly for early career-stage workers, and stress the importance of addressing grief to foster well-being and job satisfaction. Fewer narratives by more experienced professionals were included in the narrative symposium, hinting that as a coping strategy, healthcare professionals may eventually develop enhanced compartmentalization skills to deal with emotionally difficult cases. Finally, I highlight how, for many of the authors, their experiences with grief have been professionally formative, and I briefly reflect upon my own personal experience with grieving on the job while working in the emergency department at a level-one trauma center. (shrink)