This is a research report in which we present examples which should be of interest to those working on clausal embedding and dubitative verbs. Examples are presented which are relevant to the evaluation of claims and arguments in: (Karttunen 1977), (Uegaki 2021), (Huddleston 1994), (Biezma & Rawlins 2012), (Roelofsen; Herbstritt; & Aloni 2019), (Suñer 1993), and (Rawlins 2008). The examples are mostly from English, but we also present some examples from Italian, Spanish, and German.

Desde o Concílio Vaticano II, a Igreja Católica tem motivado o progresso social da humanidade em prol de uma educação que envolva o “bem comum” e o “direito universal”. O Papa Francisco propõe a celebração de um Pacto Educativo Global, unindo toda a sociedade para que se renove o amor por uma educação mais aberta e inclusiva em prol das futuras gerações. Através de políticas públicas coerentes com as múltiplas realidades, valorizando uma educação centrada na pessoa em consonância com o (...) coletivo, direcionando para uma educação humanizadora com a meta de formar seres humanos com valores éticos e morais. Uma educação em que o ato de ensinar e aprender seja ressignificado no que já se traz de bom e que realize, assim, transformações profundas nos espaços, nas culturas e nos diferentes ambientes institucionais, com os quais colabora-se na construção, melhoria e mudança em prol de um mundo mais solidário e fraterno, começando pela transformação de cada pessoa humana. (shrink)

Este artigo visa contribuir com o entendimento da formação humana ocidental e de seus desafios contemporâneos, em meio ao crescente desenvolvimento da natureza humana e de suas reflexões. Visando fazer frente a essas perspectivas, profundamente marcadas pela fraternidade, diálogo e compromisso, cujo pano de fundo é São Francisco de Assis, considerando que suas vivências contribuírem para a formação humana e educativa da humanidade. Nesta dimensão, o artigo pretende realizar um resgate de cunho teórico/filosófico, que possibilite a construção de uma abertura (...) dialógica capaz de evidenciar outras possibilidades de educar, nas quais se possa vislumbrar o emergir de outras experiências no campo educacional e pedagógico. Assim posto, o trabalho se concentrará em dois princípios básicos de atuação e entendimento teórico prático. Em primeiro lugar será efetuada uma discussão teórica sobre a temática, fraternidade como elemento motor da formação humana ocidental. Em seguida, será abordado o diálogo como caminho, elemento fundamental das relações no processo educacional. Com isso, se perceberá que o processo educativo é lugar de diálogo fraterno, no qual novos debates e saberes emergem, possibilitando, assim, novas possibilidades para a formação humana e integral. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende apresentar o tema da formação humana conectado à incapacidade de pensar, tecendo considerações sobre o problema do mal no pensamento de Hannah Arendt. A autora é conhecida como pensadora da política que concentrou atenção especial ao problema do mal que assolou o mundo na primeira metade do século XX. A partir da análise de Origens do Totalitarismo, de 1951, e de Eichmann em Jerusalém: um relato sobre a banalidade do mal, de 1963, pretende-se refletir acerca dos mecanismos (...) que produzem o adormecimento da capacidade de pensar frente à necessidade da formação humana. A partir dessa análise, se perceberá que o problema do mal assume um viés radical, uma possibilidade de destruição completa do humano. Na análise do caso Eichmann, Arendt percebeu que o réu agia banalmente, manifestando sua incapacidade de pensar, o que tornou possível a normalização da insensibilidade frente o diferente. Portanto, a banalidade do mal implica na incapacidade de pensar, uma ameaça sempre constante à formação humana. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa analisar a proposta construtivista rawlsiana na qual se pode visualizar a influencia da teoria da escolha racional da filosofia prática kantiana. Rawls, apesar de declarar-se herdeiro de Kant, assume sua própria concepção construtivista, a saber, um construtivismo político, enquanto que o filósofo alemão, segundo ele, apresenta um construtivismo moral fundamentado no idealismo transcendental. A posição original, por sua vez, situa as partes de maneira equitativa considerando-as iguais e livres. Assim, a construção dos princípios da justiça nesta (...) posição é autônoma, ou seja, a escolha é realizada sem influências heterônomas, tais como classe social, talentos pessoais, etc. A proposta da justiça como equidade é a construção de princípios básicos endossados publicamente os quais regem de maneira justa a estrutura básica da sociedade democrática. (shrink)

A IDENTIFICAÇÃO DO DIREITO AMBIENTAL MARÍTIMO.

A IMPORTÂNCIA DE TRATAMENTO DE ÁGUAS RESIDUAIS ATRAVÉS DA BIORREMEDIAÇÃO: UMA ANÁLISE PRINCIPIOLÓGICA.

Historicamente, as humanidades têm sido essenciais para a educação, uma vez que são consideradas como disciplinas fundamentais para a formação de cidadãos democráticos. A partir dessa conjectura, esse artigo visa refletir sobre a importância das competências no ensino de humanidades para a formação de cidadãos democráticos. Para isso, realizamos uma pesquisa de cunho bibliográfico, baseada no pensamento de Martha Nussbaum sobre as competências necessárias para o desenvolvimento de uma cidadania democrática (2015). O desenvolvimento de competências no ensino de humanidades promove (...) a autonomia do estudante no âmbito pessoal, profissional, intelectual e político para o enfrentamento dos desafios da sociedade. Essas competências permitem aos estudantes enfrentar a realidade e as necessidades humanas com senso crítico e consciência de sua responsabilidade como pessoa em um meio social, político e cultural. (shrink)

Nos primeiros anos de seu pontificado, Papa Francisco fez pouco uso da palavra ‘bioética’. Quando fez menção à palavra, empregou-a no sentido formal, para tratar de alguma comissão, e não para manifestar uma posição. Mas, a partir de 2018, Francisco assumiu uma posição bem definida em relação à bioética, afirmando que os nossos tempos precisam ampliar a visão tradicional da bioética para uma visão de bioética global, pois não é mais possível pensar a saúde, o bem-estar e a realização humanas (...) de forma independente da saúde da totalidade da vida da biosfera. Essa bioética global, afirma Francisco, tem as suas bases na Laudato Si. Se o posicionamento escrito de Francisco sobre a bioética não ocorreu de forma imediata ao iniciar seu pontificado, a opção do pontífice de “começar” seu pontificado em Lampedusa, acolhendo migrantes e refugiados, deixou evidente qual seria o compromisso de sua Igreja. As duras palavras proferidas em Lampedusa, de que nos tornamos insensíveis aos gritos dos outros e que globalizamos a indiferença, tornando-nos incapazes de chorar pelo outro, deram o tom da sua missão. Nesse sentido, este artigo pretende investigar o pensamento bioético defendido pelo Papa Francisco a partir de documentos, encíclicas, homílias e cartas por ele escritas. (shrink)

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified (...) substantive views about justice in outcome distributions. (shrink)

Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on (...) two main planks: first, there is a distinction between a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of belief-forming methods. Secondly, different kinds of decision-theoretic reasoning, i.e. expected-accuracy reasoning and accuracy-domination reasoning, must be paired with a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of methods, respectively. I argue that while the first pair is wholly irrelevant to the question of the truth-connection, the second affords the means to a permissivist explanation of the truth-connected value of rationality. (shrink)

The article investigates the significance of the so-called phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement for debates about the semantics of taste discourse. Two kinds of description of the phenomenon are proposed. The first ensures that faultless disagreement raises a distinctive philosophical challenge; yet, it is argued that Contextualist, Realist and Relativist semantic theories do not account for this description. The second, by contrast, makes the phenomenon irrelevant for the problem of what the right semantics of taste discourse should be. Lastly, the (...) following dilemma is assessed: either faultless disagreement provides strong evidence against semantic theories; or its significance should be considerably downplayed. (shrink)

The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher‐order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double‐checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher‐order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...) appeals to the notion of defeat. (shrink)

Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...) fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that transparency of machine learning algorithms, just as explanation, can be defined at different levels of abstraction. We criticize recent attempts to identify the explanation of black box algorithms with making their decisions (post-hoc) interpretable, focusing our discussion on counterfactual explanations. These approaches to explanation simplify the real nature of the black boxes and risk misleading the public about the normative features of a model. We propose a new form of algorithmic transparency, that consists in (...) explaining algorithms as an intentional product, that serves a particular goal, or multiple goals (Daniel Dennet’s design stance) in a given domain of applicability, and that provides a measure of the extent to which such a goal is achieved, and evidence about the way that measure has been reached. We call such idea of algorithmic transparency “design publicity.” We argue that design publicity can be more easily linked with the justification of the use and of the design of the algorithm, and of each individual decision following from it. In comparison to post-hoc explanations of individual algorithmic decisions, design publicity meets a different demand (the demand for impersonal justification) of the explainee. Finally, we argue that when models that pursue justifiable goals (which may include fairness as avoidance of bias towards specific groups) to a justifiable degree are used consistently, the resulting decisions are all justified even if some of them are (unavoidably) based on incorrect predictions. For this argument, we rely on John Rawls’s idea of procedural justice applied to algorithms conceived as institutions. (shrink)

More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers’ incentives, split between monetary and non-monetary, in relation to corporate social responsibility. We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO’s and shareholders’ interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has (...) important implications for the design of executive remuneration plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO’s decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables. (shrink)

This paper supports the personal data platform cooperative as a means of bringing about John Rawls’s favoured institutional realisation of a just society, the property-owning democracy. It describes personal data platform cooperatives and applies Rawls’s political philosophy to analyse the institutional forms of a just society in relation to the economic power deriving from aggregating personal data. It argues that a society involving a significant number of personal data platform cooperatives will be more suitable to realising Rawls’s principle of fair (...) equality of opportunity. (shrink)

Here, we provide an ethical analysis of discrimination in private insurance to guide the application of non-discriminatory algorithms for risk prediction in the insurance context. This addresses the need for ethical guidance of data-science experts, business managers, and regulators, proposing a framework of moral reasoning behind the choice of fairness goals for prediction-based decisions in the insurance domain. The reference to private insurance as a business practice is essential in our approach, because the consequences of discrimination and predictive inaccuracy in (...) underwriting are different from those of using predictive algorithms in other sectors. Here we focus on the trade-off in the extent to which one can pursue indirect non-discrimination versus predictive accuracy. The moral assessment of this trade-off is related to the context of application—to the consequences of inaccurate risk predictions in the insurance domain. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi was not the first to discuss the idea of group privacy, but he was perhaps the first to discuss it in relation to the insights derived from big data analytics. He has argued that it is important to investigate the possibility that groups have rights to privacy that are not reducible to the privacy of individuals forming such groups. In this paper, we introduce a distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The first, the “what happens in Vegas (...) stays in Vegas” privacy (in the following: WHVSV privacy), deals with confidential information shared with the member of a group and inaccessible to (all or a specific group of) outsiders. The second, to which we shall refer as inferential privacy, deals with the inferences that can be made about a group of people defined by a feature, or combination thereof, shared by all individuals in the group. We show why we unreservedly agree with Floridi that groups can have a form of privacy that amounts to more than the mere fact of being sets of individuals each of whom has individual privacy; moreover, like Floridi, we find it plausible that at least some groups (those satisfying our definition of type-a groups) may have a right to a species of group privacy (that is, WHVSV privacy) as groups (and not just as individuals who belong to those groups). However, by turning our attention to the context of big data analytics, we show that the relevant, new notion of group privacy is one of inferential privacy. We argue that an absolute right (either of individuals or groups) to inferential privacy is implausible. We also show that many groups generated algorithmically (those satisfying our definition of type-b groups) cannot be right holders as groups (unless they become type-a groups). (shrink)

In the past decade the central principles of western feminist theory have been dramatically challenged. many feminists have endorsed post-structuralism's rejection of essentialist theoretical categories, and have added a powerful gender dimension to contemporary critiques of modernity. Earlier 'women' have been radically undermined, and newer concerns with 'difference', 'identity', and 'power' have emerged. Destabilizing Theory explores these developments in a set of specially commissioned essays by feminist theorists. Does this change amount to a real shift within feminist theory, or will (...) feminism's links with an emancipatory modernism reinstate an older political agenda? Can we transcend the common counterposition of equality and difference, or is feminism condemned to argue within the terms of this binary opposition? (shrink)

More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

The presence of easily accessible yet unpossessed evidence seems to matter epistemically. In this chapter I offer an inquiry-theoretic explanation of this datum. I argue that agents in the target cases fail to be competent inquirers and gather the relevant easily accessible evidence. This offers a deflationary explanation of the initial datum. I then show how to inflate this explanation to vindicate the thought that unpossessed evidence has defeating power over the justificatory status of one’s beliefs. The inflationary explanation rests (...) on two main planks. First, the subject who believes that p in the target cases ought to have gathered the target piece of evidence that bears on p. Secondly, such a duty is incompatible with justifiedly believing p. Along the way, the chapter offers a framework for thinking about zetetic competence, comments on the existence of epistemic duties of inquiry, and discusses the relationship between such duties and traditional epistemic norms of belief. (shrink)

The concept of the digital phenotype has been used to refer to digital data prognostic or diagnostic of disease conditions. Medical conditions may be inferred from the time pattern in an insomniac’s tweets, the Facebook posts of a depressed individual, or the web searches of a hypochondriac. This paper conceptualizes digital data as an extended phenotype of humans, that is as digital information produced by humans and affecting human behavior and culture. It argues that there are ethical obligations to persons (...) affected by generalizable knowledge of a digital phenotype, not only those who are personally identifiable or involved in data generation. This claim is illustrated by considering the health-related digital phenotypes of precision medicine and digital epidemiology. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one’s judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.

Trust and monitoring are traditionally antithetical concepts. Describing trust as a property of a relationship of reliance, we introduce a theory of trust and monitoring, which uses mathematical models based on two classes of functions, including _q_-exponentials, and relates the levels of trust to the costs of monitoring. As opposed to several accounts of trust that attempt to identify the special ingredient of reliance and trust relationships, our theory characterizes trust as a quantitative property of certain relations of reliance that (...) can be quantified and expressed as a scalar quantity. Our theory is applicable to both human–human and human–artificial agent interactions, as it is agnostic with respect to the concrete realization of trustworthiness properties, and is compatible with many views differing on which properties contribute to trust and trustworthiness. Finally, as our mathematical models make the quantitative features of trust measurable, they provide empirical studies on trust with a rigorous methodology for its measurement. (shrink)

I present a puzzle about inquiry and discuss two potential solutions. The puzzle stems from two equally compelling sets of data suggesting that, on the one hand, there’s something epistemically defective with inquiring into questions that don’t have true answers. On the other hand, however, there can be scenarios in which we are epistemically permitted to inquire into questions that don’t have true answers. How is it that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers can both be defective and (...) permissible from an epistemic point of view? The first solution I consider maintains that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers are always impermissible but can be excusable. The second solution maintains that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers are bad inquiries that can be conducted by inquirers we can legitimately trust. I argue against the former and in favor of the latter. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new framework supporting the claim that some elements in science play a constitutive function, with the aim of overcoming some limitations of Friedman's (2001) account. More precisely, I focus on what I consider to be the gradualism implicit in Friedman's interpretation of the constitutive a priori, that is, the fact that it seems to allow for degrees of 'constitutivity'. I tease out such gradualism by showing that the constitutive character Friedman aims to track can (...) be captured by three features - namely, quasi-axiomaticity (QA), generative potential (GP), and empirical shielding (ES) - which are exhibited to a maximal degree by the examples Friedman deploys, particularly in his analysis of Newtonian mechanics. I argue that not all varieties of 'constitutivity' can be captured by the kind of gradualism implicit in Friedman's view, although developing the gradualism itself might provide useful insights. To show this, I analyse the function of the Hardy-Weinberg principle (HWP) in population genetics in terms of its QA, GP, and ES. Whereas the HWP does not count as constitutive in classical philosophical interpretations (Sober 1984), nor does it within Friedman's framework, it does nonetheless perform a minimally constitutive function. By means of historical details and considerations on the prospects of replacing the HWP, I show that the HWP is minimally constitutive by being a counterfactual instantiation of a paradigmatically constitutive stability principle, where the latter might itself be regarded as an enabling condition for a variety of modelling practices across the sciences. (shrink)

Digital apps using Bluetooth to log proximity events are increasingly supported by technologists and governments. By and large, the public debate on this matter focuses on privacy, with experts from both law and technology offering very concrete proposals and participating to a lively debate. Far less attention is paid to effective incentives and their fairness. This paper aims to fill this gap by offering a practical, workable solution for a promising incentive, justified by the ethical principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy (...) and justice. This incentive is a free phone optimised for running such app. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta e discute acontecimentos que emergiram no decorrer de uma pesquisa-intervenção com jovens, visando problematizar as contribuições para a formação ética, estética e política tanto dos pesquisadores como dos participantes. Oficinas estéticas mediadas por linguagens artístico-visuais consistiram no modus operandi da pesquisa-intervenção, sendo os acontecimentos relativos à oficina de graffiti o foco das análises aqui apresentadas. Participaram dessa oficina entre 20 a 25 jovens matriculados em uma escola pública municipal de Florianópolis/SC, com idades entre 13 e 16 (...) anos. As atividades foram coordenadas por bolsistas de IC e extensão, graduandos de psicologia, e um bolsista AT, grafiteiro. Os registros das atividades foram feitos via filmagens, fotografia e registros em diário de campo. As análises foram realizadas a partir de uma perspectiva dialógica, com foco na responsividade que conota as ações e pauta a condição alteritária da existência.ABSTRACT This paper presents and discusses events that emerged in the course of research involving an intervention conducted with youngsters. The objective was to discuss contributions to ethical, aesthetic and political formation of both the researchers and participants. Aesthetic workshops mediated by artistic-visual languages consisted of the modus operandi of the intervention research, and the events related to a graffiti workshop were the focus of this analysis. From 20 to 25 youngsters, aged between 13 to 16 years old and enrolled in a city public school in Florianópolis, SC, Brazil participated. The activities were coordinated by undergraduate research assistants, senior psychology students, and one graffiti artist who received a Technical Support scholarship. The activities were filmed, photographed and recorded in a field diary. The analyses were conducted from a dialogic perspective focusing on responsiveness that connotes the actions and grounds the otherness nature of existence. (shrink)

:In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific and philosophical interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out whether two theories are “equivalent” or not. In this article, we do something subtler. We provide a means to measure distances between formal theories. We introduce two natural notions for such distances. The first one is that of axiomatic distance, but we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable notion is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of (...) concepts that distinguish two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and classical kinematics are distinguished by one concept only. (shrink)

We report in this paper the result of three experiments on risk, ambiguity and time attitude. The first two differed by the population considered (students vs. general population) while the third one used a different protocol and concerned students and portfolio managers. We find quite a lot of heterogeneity at the individual level. Of principal interest was the elicitation of risk, time and ambiguity attitudes and the relationship among these (model free) measures. We find that on the student population, there (...) is essentially no correlation. A non negligible fraction of the population behaves in an extremely cautious manner in the risk and ambiguity domain. When we drop this population from the sample, the correlation between our measures is also non significant. We also raise three questions linked to measurement of ambiguity attitudes that come out from our data sets. (shrink)

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl argues that “sign” is an ambiguous word because it refers to two essentially different signitive functions: indication and expression. Indications work in an evidential way, providing information through a direct association of the sign and the presence of an object or state of affairs. Expressions work in a non-evidential way, pointing to possible experiences and displaying that the speaker or someone else has had such experience. In this paper I show that Husserl went back to (...) the distinction between indications and expressions in a much later text, a manuscript from 1931, in order to distinguish between two kinds of communication with different essential features. I call these indicative and expressive communication. My claim is that Husserl’s distinction between these two types of communication is a crucial contribution to the phenomenology of knowledge sharing. In knowledge sharing, we appropriate someone else’s knowledge as someone else’s knowledge. Husserl shows that only expressive communication, and not indicative communication, makes this appropriation possible. Since Husserl argues that only humans use expressive communication, his analysis of indicative and expressive communication is also a contribution to understanding the uniquely human capacity for accumulating knowledge. (shrink)

For nearly five years, bioethicists and neurologists debated whether Jahi McMath, an African American teenager, was alive or dead. While Jahi's condition provides a compelling study for analyzing brain death, circumscribing her life status to a question of brain death fails to acknowledge and respond to a chronic, if uncomfortable, bioethics problem in American health care—namely, racial bias and unequal treatment, both real and perceived. Bioethicists should examine the underlying, arguably broader social implications of what Jahi's medical treatment and experience (...) represented. On any given day, disparities in the quality of health care and health outcomes for people of color in comparison to whites are evidenced in American hospitals and clinics. These disparities are not entirely explained by differences in patient education, insurance status, employment, income, expressed preference for treatments, and severity of disease. Instead, research indicates that, even for African Americans able to gain access to health care services and navigate institutional nuances, disparities persist across a broad range of services, including diagnostic screening and general medical care, mental health diagnosis and treatment, pain management, HIV‐related care, and treatments for cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and kidney disease. (shrink)

__Neurotechnology and Direct Brain Communication__ focuses on recent neuroscientific investigations of infant brains and of patients with disorders of consciousness, both of which are at the forefront of contemporary neuroscience. The prospective use of neurotechnology to access mental states in these subjects, including neuroimaging, brain simulation and brain computer interfaces, offers new opportunities for clinicians and researchers, but has also received specific attention from philosophical, scientific, ethical and legal points of view. This book offers the first systematic assessment of these (...) issues, investigating the tools neurotechnology offers to care for verbally non-communicative subjects and suggesting a multidisciplinary approach to the ethical and legal implications of ordinary and experimental practices. The book is divided into three parts: the first and second focus on the scientific and clinical implications of neurological tools for DOC patient and infant care. With reference to these developments, the third and final part presents the case for re-evaluating classical ethical and legal concepts, such as authority, informed consent and privacy. Neurotechnology and Direct Brain Communication will appeal to researchers and postgraduate students in the fields of cognitive science, medical ethics, medical technology, and the philosophy of the mind. With implications for patient care, it will also be a useful resource for clinicians, medical centres and health practitioners. (shrink)

This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which (...) we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected. The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem. (shrink)

Clients may feel trapped into sharing their private digital data with insurance companies to get a desired insurance product or premium. However, private insurance must collect some data to offer products and premiums appropriate to the client’s level of risk. This situation creates tension between the value of privacy and common insurance business practice. We argue for three main claims: first, coercion to share private data with insurers is pro tanto wrong because it violates the autonomous choice of a privacy-valuing (...) client. Second, we maintain that irrespective of being coerced, the choice of accepting digital surveillance by insurers makes it harder for the client to protect his or her autonomy. The violation of autonomy also makes coercing customers into digital surveillance pro tanto morally wrong. Third, having identified an economically plausible process involving no direct coercion by insurers, leading to the adoption of digital surveillance, we argue that such an outcome generates further threats against autonomy. This threat provides individuals with a pro tanto reason to prevent this process. We highlight the freedom dilemma faced by regulators who aim to prevent this outcome by constraining market freedoms and argue for the need for further moral and empirical research on this question. (shrink)