ZusammenfassungIn diesem Aufsatz wird eine kommunikations- und medientheoretische Untersuchung ausgewählter Divinationspraktiken unternommen. Im Zentrum stehen hierbei das Giftorakel der zentralafrikanischen Zande sowie die arabisch-islamische Geomantie. Dieses Unternehmen hat den Zweck, drei Thesen bezüglich Medien religiöser Kommunikation zu erproben, die sich dem Autor aus der Auseinandersetzung mit Ritualen und speziell Divinationsformen aus unterschiedlichen soziokulturellen Kontexten ergeben haben:1) Divinationsmedien unterscheiden sich in frappierender Weise von Medien der Alltagskommunikation; 2) diese besonderen Medien ermöglichen eine Kommunikation zwischen Wirklichkeitsbereichen und verkörpern damit ein fundamentales „Dazwischen“; (...) 3) von einer Innenperspektive betrachtet, werden Divinationsmedien oft als aktive Kommunikationspartner konzipiert und wahrgenommen – selbst wenn diese aus einer Beobachterperspektive unbelebte Paraphernalia sind.Um eine Grundlage für die Plausibilisierung dieser Thesen zu schaffen, ist anfänglich von Kommunikation und Medien sowie den Besonderheiten religiöser Kommunikation und Medien religiöser Kommunikation die Rede. Auf die detaillierte Beschreibung der Divinationspraktiken folgen ihre kommunikationstheoretische Analyse sowie eine zeichen- und medientheoretische Deutung dieser Ergebnisse.Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes liegt neben der Plausibilisierung seiner Thesen auch darin, Impulse für die religionswissenschaftliche Debatte um Medien, Materialität und Performanz zu liefern. Gerade in den Ergebnissen der Divinationsforschung sieht David Morgan, wie er jüngst in Material religion schrieb, ein ertragreiches Feld. (shrink)

Cantus firmus der analytischen Sprachphilosophie als der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts ist die Theorie des Sprachverstehens, die für die Human- und die Sozialwissenschaft immer mehr in den Mittelpunkt tritt. Das Buch führt in die Problemsituation der sprachanalytischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie ein, die dann eintritt, wenn die metaphysische Bestimmung der Sprache (Scheitern des logischen Atomismus) und die Zurückführung der Rekonstruktion von Verstehen mit semantischen Begriffen, die sich auf den Ausdrucksgebrauch und die Satzwahrheit als Analysans beziehen, strittig wird. Die Problemsituation wird konstruktiv (...) an den beiden Traditionen der analytischen Philosophie, der klassischen Debatten logische versus begriffliche Analyse, semantische versus pragmatische Präsuppositionen und der nach-empiristischen Bedeutungstheorie dargestellt. Eine Orientierung über die sprachanalytische Handlungstheorie ergänzt die Untersuchung. Die Perspektive geht dahin, dass in der Frankfurter Schule der Sprechakttheorie eine Sprachpragmatik Weichen für eine Protosoziologie stellt. (shrink)

The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by revealing their motivating presupposition: the plausibility of an (...) exclusivist explication of explanation which appeals either to the unity-of-method thesis or some implicit notion of analytic equivalence, both problematic philosophical doctrines. The metaphysical objection fails with the rejection of the idea, in Mink's phrase, of an "untold story." The argument against history as an "untold story" develops from Danto's image of an Ideal Chronicler recording ideal events. A consequence of rejecting this view is that it no longer makes sense to speak of historical narratives as true or false. However, this failure engenders no special problem for assessing the objectivity or explanatory utility of narratives qua explanations. (shrink)

This collection of essays, originally published in 1970 by Random House, gathers together some of the best initial responses to the problems raised by Edmund Gettier's celebrated critique of the traditional analysis of knowledge. Designed for upper-level courses and seminars in undergraduate philosophy programs and is intended as an introduction to epistemology from the analytic point of view.

What is the relation of epistemology, understood as the study of the evaluation of knowledge claims, and empirical psychology, understood as the study of the causal generation of a person's beliefs? Quine maintains that the relation is one of “mutual containment”.Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology. … We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and we appreciate that our (...) position in the world is just like his. Our very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book—all this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology. (shrink)

This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when psychoanalytic explanations are construed as a type of historical or narrative explanation. The chief problem is this: If one rejects the claim of narratives to verisimilitude, this appears to divorce the notion of explanation from that of truth. The author examines, in particular, Donald Spence's attempt to deal with the relation of narrative explanations and truth. In his critique of Spence's distinction between narrative truth and historical truth, the (...) author develops some suggestions regarding the role of truth in narrative explanations. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement concerning (...) the norms of rationality, despite its theoretical and practical importance, is one which is, or so I argue, irresolvable. Moreover, the series of disagreements which I examine in the context of the debate between Rorty and MacIntyre is not peculiar or idiosyncratic to them. Their dispute reflects presumptions common to contemporary analytical philosophy. And while analytical philosophers have not made discussions of human nature one of their characteristic concerns, I indicate that such concerns do play a central role in the controversy which I examine. Differences of opinion concerning the political and social nature of human beings are reflected up and down the philosophical line. My argument is in no way concerned with issues of psychological priority or causality (e.g. whether having certain views disposes one psychologically to accepting other views). What I establish are the logical relations, and the points of philosophical contention, among certain epistemo logical and political theses. In Part I, I rehearse Rorty's epistemological views and examine how these views are connected to his views on morality and human nature. In Part II, I begin with MacIntyre's position concerning the virtues and modern moral philosophy and then reconstruct, ex pede Herculem, his views on rationality. Part III examines the prospects of reconciling the perspectives discussed in the first two sections. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic poses a major challenge to policy makers on how to encourage compliance to social distancing and personal protection rules. This paper compares the effectiveness of two policies that aim to increase the frequency of responsible health behavior using smartphone-tracking applications. The first involves enhanced alert capabilities, which remove social externalities and protect the users from others’ reckless behavior. The second adds a rule enforcement mechanism that reduces the users’ benefit from reckless behavior. Both strategies should be effective (...) if agents are expected-value maximizers, risk averse, and behave in accordance with cumulative prospect theory or in accordance with the Cognitive Hierarchy model. A multi-player trust-game experiment was designed to compare the effectiveness of the two policies. The results reveal a substantial advantage to the enforcement application, even one with occasional misses. The enhanced-alert strategy was completely ineffective. The findings align with the small samples hypothesis, suggesting that decision makers tend to select the options that lead to the best payoff in a small sample of similar past experiences. In the current context, the tendency to rely on a small sample appears to be more consequential than other deviations from rational choice. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's A Defense of Abortion) and the other legal (D. Regan's Rewriting Roe v. Wade), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that (...) abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics stand to change many aspects of our lives, including our values. If trends continue as expected, many industries will undergo automation in the near future, calling into question whether we can still value the sense of identity and security our occupations once provided us with. Likewise, the advent of social robots driven by AI, appears to be shifting the meaning of numerous, long-standing values associated with interpersonal relationships, like friendship. Furthermore, powerful actors’ and institutions’ (...) increasing reliance on AI to make decisions that may affect how people live their lives may have a significant impact on privacy while also raising issues about algorithmic transparency and human control. In this paper, building and expanding on previous works, we will look at how the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technology may lead to changes in identity, security, and other crucial values (such as friendship, fairness, and privacy). We will discuss what challenges we may face in the process, while critically reflecting on whether such changes may be desirable. Finally, drawing on a series of considerations underlying virtue ethics, we will formulate a set of preliminary suggestions, which—we hope—can be used to more carefully guide the future roll out of AI technologies for human flourishing; that is, for social and moral good. (shrink)

Feminist work in the history of philosophy has been going on for several decades. Some scholars have focused on the ways philosophical concepts are themselves gendered. Others have recovered women writers who were well known in their own time but forgotten in ours, while still others have firmly placed into a philosophical context the works of women writers long celebrated within other disciplines in the humanities. The recovery of women writers has challenged the myth that there are no women in (...) the history of philosophy, but it has not eradicated it. What, we may ask, is impeding our progress? This paper argues that so often we treat early modern women philosophers’ texts in ways that are different from, or inconsistent with, the explicit commitments of the analytic tradition, and in so doing, we may be triggering our audiences to reject these women as philosophers, and their texts as philosophical. Moreover, this is the case despite our intention to achieve precisely the opposite effect. (shrink)

We begin by introducing our readers to the Extended Mind Thesis and briefly discuss a series of arguments in its favour. We continue by showing of such a theory can be resisted and go on to demonstrate that a more conservative account of cognition can be developed. We acknowledge a stalemate between these two different accounts of cognition and notice a couple of issues that we argue have prevented further progress in the field. To overcome the stalemate, we propose to (...) focus on the ethical implications of these theories. We link work conducted on the Extended Mind Thesis with contemporary transhumanist research and claim that extended may be ethically preferred over embedded because it is a more progressive and inclusive theory. (shrink)

Many governments have seen digital health technologies as promising tools to tackle the current COVID-19 pandemic. A much-talked example in this context involves the recent deluge of digital contact tracing apps aimed at detecting Covid-19 exposure. In this short contribution we look at the bio-political justification of this phenomenon and reflect on whether DCT apps constitute, as it is often argued, a serious potential breach of our right to privacy. Despite praising efforts attempting to develop legal and ethical frameworks for (...) DCT apps’ usage; we argue that such endeavours are not sufficient to tackle the more fundamental problem of mass surveillance, which will remain largely unaddressed unless we deal with the biopolitical arguments presented and resort to a technical and structural defence. (shrink)

I saggi di questo testo gravitano attorno a due fuochi: una diagnosi della soggettività contemporanea e il tentativo di sviluppare una critica all'altezza della sua vocazione emancipativa. Ciò che viene descritto è un processo di tendenziale emersione in superficie della relazione tra soggettività e politica; nessuna utopia col torcicollo, nessun nostalgismo, nessuna lamentela sulla superficialità della politica o paternale sulla superficialità dei soggetti. La scommessa, piuttosto, è quella di prendere le apparenze sul serio e quindi rinunciare a ogni forma di (...) ventriloquismo teorico, restituendo ai soggetti la parola senza per questo rinunciare alle ambizioni emancipative di una teoria sociale capace di fotografare, tracciare, scandagliare le trasformazioni della soggettività contemporanea e contemporaneamente le sue potenzialità e le sue contraddizioni. (shrink)

I feel the urge to express my solidarity with Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, the authors of the much‐discussed article “After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” that appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics in February. Both their argument and, more sadly, they themselves suffered a violent attack by people who obviously do not consider freedom of expression an important value. Censorship does not fit well with the mission of scholarship—particularly when the scholarship depends on a method of speculation (...) and hypothetical argument, as in the case of philosophy and bioethics—and the level of hatred and extremism expressed about the article seem out of proportion. Having said this, though, I want to consider why publishing the article was nonetheless inappropriate. (shrink)

La logique intervient doublement dans les discussions sur l'identité personnelle. D'une part, certaines théories de l’identité personnelle ont été critiquées pour ne pas respecter les propriétés logiques de l’identité, d'autre part, l’identité personnelle a été présentée comme un contreexemple à Ia logique de l’identité, justifiant une révision radicale de celle-ci.Ainsi, Ia logique de l’identité est le garde fou des théories de l’identité personnelle et l’identité personnelle est Ia pierre d'achoppement de Ia théorie logique de l’identité.L’identité logique est caractérisée par le (...) fait d'être une relation d'équivalence, et par le principe de substitutivité. Or certaines situations comme par exemple les cas de dedoublement de personnalité, semblent déroger à ce principe. Si l'on peut dire que a et b sont le même homme mais pas Ia même personne, alors le principe, selon lequel si deux individus sont identiques ce qui est prédicable de l'un est prédicable de l'autre, ne s'applique plus. (shrink)