Environmental, physiological, and pathological stimuli induce the misfolding of proteins, which results in the formation of aggregates and amyloid fibrils. To cope with proteotoxic stress, cells are equipped with adaptive mechanisms that are accompanied by changes in gene expression. The evolutionarily conserved mechanism called the heat shock response is characterized by the induction of a set of heat shock proteins (HSPs), and is mainly regulated by heat shock transcription factor 1 (HSF1) in mammals. We herein introduce the mechanisms by which (...) HSF1 tightly controls the transcription of HSP genes via the regulation of pre‐initiation complex recruitment in their promoters under proteotoxic stress. These mechanisms involve the stress‐induced regulation of HSF1‐transcription complex formation with a number of coactivators, changes in chromatin states, and the formation of phase‐separated condensates through post‐translational modifications. (shrink)

There was a time when 'logic' just meant classical logic. The climate is slowly changing and non-classical logic cannot be dismissed off-hand. However, a metatheory used to study the properties of non-classical logic is often classical. In this paper, we will argue that this practice of relying on classical metatheories is problematic. In particular, we will show that it is a bad practice because the metatheory that is used to study a non-classical logic often rules out the very logic it (...) is designed to study. (shrink)

What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws (...) of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds. (shrink)

Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...) it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving together the main threads of thought that are salient in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīti’s texts, I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge. (shrink)

The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply (...) to Grove’s sphere system, a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some philosophical implications of the examination. (shrink)

Wright’s “adaptive landscape” has been influential in evolutionary thinking but controversial, especially because the landscape that organisms encounter is altered by the evolutionary process itsel...

BackgroundRegulations on forgoing life-sustaining treatment (LST) have developed in Asian countries including Japan, Korea and Taiwan. However, other countries are relatively unaware of these due to the language barrier. This article aims to describe and compare the relevant regulatory frameworks, using the (more familiar) situation in England as a point of reference. We undertook literature reviews to ascertain the legal and regulatory positions on forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England.Main textFindings from a literature review are first presented to (...) describe the development of the regulatory frameworks surrounding the option of forgoing LST in each country. Based on the findings from the four countries, we suggest five ethically important points, reflection on which should help to inform the further development of regulatory frameworks concerning end-of-life care in these countries and beyond. There should be reflection on: (1) the definition of – and reasons for defining – the ‘terminal stage’ and associated criteria for making such judgements; Korea and Taiwan limit forgoing LST to patients in this stage, but there are risks associated with defining this too narrowly or broadly; (2) foregoing LST for patients who arenotin this stage, as is allowed in Japan and England, because here too there are areas of controversy, including (in England) whether the law in this area does enough to respect the autonomy of (now) incapacitated patients; (3) whether ‘foregoing’ LST should encompass withholdingandwithdrawing treatment; this is also an ethically disputed area, particularly in the Asian countries we examine; (4) the family’s role in end-of-life decision-making, particularly as, compared with England, the three Asian countries traditionally place a greater emphasis on families and communities than on individuals; and (5) decision-making with and for those incapacitated patients who lack families, surrogate decision-makers or ADs.ConclusionComparison of, and reflection on, the different legal positions that obtain in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England should prove informative and we particularly invite reflection on five areas, in the hope the ensuing discussions will help to establish better end-of-life regulatory frameworks in these countries and elsewhere. (shrink)

This article extends the concept of symmetry to ethics. Using the case of canola in Canada, the authors argue that grades and standards simultaneously subject humans and nonhumans to rites of passage that test their "goodness. " Then, they further develop a tentative typology of standards. The authors argue that these standards allow something resembling the neoclassical market to be established, create the conditions for economic analysis, and allocate power among human actors.

Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...) validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers have investigated the techniques and methodologies of debate and argumentation which are important aspects of Buddhist intellectual life. This was particularly the case in India, where Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy originated. But these investigations have also engaged philosophers in China, Japan, Korea and Tibet, and many other parts of the world that have been influenced by Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. Several elements of the Buddhist tradition of philosophy are thought to be part of this investigation. -/- There are (...) interesting reasoning patterns discernible in the writings of Buddhist philosophers. For instance, the Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna presents arguments for the emptiness of all things in terms of catuṣkoṭi (four ‘corners’: roughly speaking, truth, false, both, neither). There are also the Indian vāda (debate) literature and Tibetan bsdus grwa (collected topics) that list techniques of debates. -/- The main interest here is the tradition of Buddhist philosophy, sometimes referred to as Pramāṇavāda, whose central figures are Dignāga (approx. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (6th– 7th CE). This philosophy is understood to be the Buddhist school of logic-epistemology. ‘Pramāṇavāda’ is not a doxographical term traditionally used to refer to a recognised school of Buddhist philosophy. It is a conventional term that is sometimes used in modern literature. Nevertheless, in what follows, we think of it as a tradition within Buddhist philosophy and ‘Buddhist logic’ refers to what is developed in this tradition. -/- Buddhist logicians have systematically analysed the kind of reasoning involved in acquiring knowledge. They hold that there are valid ways to reason that are productive of knowledge. In what follows, some of the main elements of their analyses will be described. Note, however, that, while exegetical studies of Buddhist texts are important, we must step back from them and consider what is involved in taking a Buddhist approach to logic in light of modern formal logic. This analysis will be done against the backdrop of the contemporary literature on logic and related subjects in contemporary philosophy to make sense of the logical studies by Buddhist logicians. (shrink)

In [10], we have shown that the statement that all ∑ 1 1 partitions are Ramsey is deducible over ATR 0 from the axiom of ∑ 1 1 monotone inductive definition,but the reversal needs П 1 1 - CA 0 rather than ATR 0 . By contrast, we show in this paper that the statement that all ∑ 0 2 games are determinate is also deducible over ATR 0 from the axiom of ∑ 1 1 monotone inductive definition, but the (...) reversal is provable even in ACA 0 . These results illuminate the substantial differences among lightface theorems which can not be observed in boldface. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of recognizing a face holistically and examines the experimental paradigms that serve as the “gold standards” for holistic perception. It discusses the contribution of featural and configural information to the holistic process and the controversy surrounding these often misunderstood concepts. It claims that the recruitment of holistic processes is what distinguishes faces from most types of object recognition. The discussion focuses on the kind of featural and configural information that is impaired in an inverted face (...) as well as the information that is spared. Finally, the article considers the concept of a “perceptual field” that allows for the preservation of both featural and configural information within a restricted spatial region of an inverted face. (shrink)

Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...) and ask what sense can be made of explosive reasoning. While I acknowledge a bias on this issue, it is not clear that even classical logicians can answer this question. (shrink)

In Japan, terminating life-sustaining treatment in non-terminal patients is legally and ethically problematic given the lack of legal regulations regarding the termination of LST, including dialysis treatment. This article describes an ethically problematic case that happened at a hospital in Tokyo in March 2019, in which a patient died after a physician withdrew kidney dialysis upon the patient’s request. Most national newspapers in Japan reported the case extensively and raised the question of ethical and legal permissibility of withdrawing dialysis treatment (...) from non-terminal patients. In this article, we first examine the case within the current policy framework in Japan and then discuss how Japan can improve its end-of-life practice, focusing specifically on the patient’s right to self-determination and treatment refusal. We recommend that policymakers consider legalizing the termination of LST and the patient’s right to refuse treatment based on the principle of respect for autonomy. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers have developed a rich tradition of logic. Buddhist material on logic that forms the Buddhist tradition of logic, however, is hardly discussed or even known. This article presents some of that material in a manner that is accessible to contemporary logicians and philosophers of logic and sets agendas for global philosophy of logic.

Kripke completeness of some infinitary predicate modal logics is presented. More precisely, we prove that if a normal modal logic above is -persistent and universal, the infinitary and predicate extension of with BF and BF is Kripke complete, where BF and BF denote the formulas pi pi and x x, respectively. The results include the completeness of extensions of standard modal logics such as , and its extensions by the schemata T, B, 4, 5, D, and their combinations. The proof (...) is obtained by extending the correspondence between the representation of modal algebras and the completeness of propositional modal logic to infinite. (shrink)

Some spatio-temporal structures are easier to transfer implicitly in sequential learning. In this study, we investigated whether the consistent reversal of triads of learned components would support the implicit transfer of their temporal structure in visuomotor sequence learning. A triad comprised three sequential button presses ([1][2][3]) and seven consecutive triads comprised a sequence. Participants learned sequences by trial and error, until they could complete it 20 times without error. Then, they learned another sequence, in which each triad was reversed ([3][2][1]), (...) partially reversed ([2][1][3]), or switched so as not to overlap with the other conditions ([2][3][1] or [3][1][2]). Even when the participants did not notice the alternation rule, the consistent reversal of the temporal structure of each triad led to better implicit transfer; this was confirmed in a subsequent experiment. These results suggest that the implicit transfer of the temporal structure of a learned sequence can be influenced by both the structure and consistency of the change. (shrink)

Toyoichi Tanaka's pioneering work in biophysics made major contributions to the science of gels and polymers. His research centered on the physics of gels, their fundamental structures and characteristics, their dynamics, and their roles in living organisms. This volume collects twenty-five major research papers originally published in Science, Nature, Physical Review Letters, and other leading journals between 1973 and 2000. The English texts are supplemented with Japanese summaries and critiques written by a group of Dr. Tanaka's colleagues and (...) students. (shrink)

A logic is said to be paraconsistent if it does not allow everything to follow from contradictory premises. There are several approaches to paraconsistency. This paper is concerned with several philosophical positions on paraconsistency. In particular, it concerns three ‘schools’ of paraconsistency: Australian, Belgian and Brazilian. The Belgian and Brazilian schools have raised some objections to the dialetheism of the Australian school. I argue that the Australian school of paraconsistency need not be closed down on the basis of the Belgian (...) and Brazilian schools’ objections. In the appendix of the paper, I also argue that the Brazilian school’s view of logic is not coherent. (shrink)

Within a weak subsystem of second‐order arithmetic WKL0, we develop basic part of non‐standard analysis up to the Peano existence theorem.

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...) implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 87-92 [Access article in PDF] Christian Prayer Seen from the Eye of a Buddhist Kenneth K. Tanaka Musashino Women's University, Tokyo When I think about Christian prayer, the image I get is that of a young girl of about eight years old with long brown hair. Wearing a nightgown, she is kneeling next to her bed with her hands clasped and her head bowed. (...) I have often queried myself about the source of this image. This is an interesting question in itself. I personally don't know of anyone who fits that description or who has actually witnessed someone like her in prayer. Nevertheless, it is interesting how a Buddhist raised in a predominately Christian society comes to form his image of Christian prayer.Working further with this image, I see this little girl—let's call her Megan—doing two things in her evening prayer. One is that she is giving thanks to God for the benefits she has received. She thanks him for her food, clothing, friends, and family. Then, she also makes a request. In this petitionary element of her prayer, she is asking God to make her sick father get well soon. As she does so, her expression turns more serious, and she clasps her hands more firmly and brings them closer to her chest. She then looks up toward the ceiling, expressing her heartfelt wish for her father's early recovery. What is noteworthy is that Megan's prayers are spoken aloud as in a human conversation.I realize that this image does not do justice to a topic as enormous as "Christian prayer," but I believe that it provides a glimpse into how one Buddhist imagines the topic. I have a number of questions about Megan's prayer, particularly as I try to understand what may be going on inside of her. I wonder first and foremost, what God looks like to her. Is God a male or a female, or neither? I would think that even for her (in this gender-sensitive age), God is still a male. If so, does she see him as an elderly man with a long white beard, holding a cane and sitting in a throne? Next, where does God reside? If he is in heaven, what is heaven like to her? I wonder if heaven is located somewhere amidst the lofty, puffy clouds. In regards to her father's illness, how does she think God can make her father get well? What is the mechanism by which a personified God can heal? Perhaps I am being too analytical and overly rigorous with my questions about a spiritual act, and that of an eight-year-old at that.Perhaps I should, instead, turn the questions toward me, asking how I would [End Page 87] answer the same questions about a Buddhist girl "praying" before the Buddha or a bodhisattva for the same kind of wish? The image that immediately crops up in my mind is of a girl of about twelve and her mother whom I saw at a pagoda in Rangoon, Burma, a number of years ago. The girl is wearing a large, red fresh flower in her hair and has on traditional apparel. She sits with her mother on a marble floor of a spacious area in front of Buddha images that are several meters in height. She holds a bouquet of flowers held upright between the palms of hands in a gesture of reverence. She sits with her legs folded but thrown out to her side, a style common in her country as well as in Thailand. Her eyes appear closed, and her head is slightly bowed down toward the Buddha images. She stays in that posture for what seems like several minutes; her mother does the same. I don't know, of course, what is going on inside, but she is certainly not meditating.I believe this is an important point to make here, for Buddhists are stereotypically seen to only meditate. However, the vast majority of lay Buddhists... (shrink)

Although numerous disciplines recognize multiple ways of conceptualizing time, Stefan Tanaka argues that scholars still overwhelmingly operate on chronological and linear Newtonian or classical time that emerged during the Enlightenment. This short, approachable book implores the humanities and humanistic social sciences to actively embrace the richness of different times that are evident in non-modern societies and have become common in several scientific fields throughout the twentieth century. Tanaka first offers a history of chronology by showing how the social (...) structures built on clocks and calendars gained material expression. Tanaka then proposes that we can move away from this chronology by considering how contemporary scientific understandings of time might be adapted to reconceive the present and pasts. This opens up a conversation that allows for the possibility of other ways to know about and re-present pasts. A multiplicity of times will help us broaden the historical horizon by embracing the heterogeneity of our lives and world via rethinking the complex interaction between stability, repetition, and change. This history without chronology also allows for incorporating the affordances of digital media. (shrink)

My life as a quantum physicist / M. Nakahara -- A review on operator quantum error correction - Dedicated to Professor Mikio Nakahara on the occasion of his 60th birthday / C.-K. Li, Y.-T. Poon and N.-S. Sze -- Implementing measurement operators in linear optical and solid-state qubits / Y. Ota, S. Ashhab and F. Nori -- Fast and accurate simulation of quantum computing by multi-precision MPS: Recent development / A. Saitoh -- Entanglement properties of a quantum lattice-gas model on (...) square and triangular ladders / S. Tanaka, R. Tamura and H. Katsura -- On signal amplification from weak-value amplification / Y. Shikano -- Topological protection of quantum information / K. Fujii -- Quantum annealing with antiferromagnetic fluctuations for mean-field models / Y. Seki and H. Nishimori -- A method to change phase transition nature - Toward annealing methods / R. Tamura and S. Tanaka -- Computational analysis of the first stage of the photosynthetic system, the light-dependent reaction, by quantum chemical simulation method / M. Tada-Umezaki -- Two-qubit gate operation on selected nearest neighboring qubits in a neutral atom quantum computer / E. Hosseini Lapasar... [et al.] -- A simple operator quantum error correction scheme avoiding fully correlated errors / C. Bagnasco, Y. Kondo and M. Nakahara -- Black hole predictability, classical and quantum / A. Ishibashi -- Classical field simulation of finite-temperature Bose gases / T. Sato -- Atomic quantum simulations of lattice gauge theory: Effect of gauge symmetry breaking / K. Kasamatsu, I. Ichinose and T. Matsui -- Recursive construction of noiseless subsystem for qudits / U. Gungordu... [et al.] -- Composite quantum gates for precise quantum control / M. Bando... [et al.] -- New formulation of statistical mechanics using thermal pure quantum states / S. Sugiura and A. Shimizu -- Thermodynamics in unitary time evolution / T. N. Ikeda -- Second law of thermodynamics with QC-mutual information / T. Sagawa. (shrink)

How can Buddhists prove that non-existent things do not exist? With great difficulty. For the Buddhist, this is not a laughing matter as they are largely global error theorists and, thus, many things are non-existent. The difficulty gets compounded as the Buddhist and their opponent, the non-Buddhist of various kinds, both agree that one cannot prove a thesis whose subject is non-existent. In this paper, I will first present a difficulty that Buddhist philosophers have faced in proving that what they (...) take to be non-existent does not exist. I will then survey two main solutions that they have provided. Those 'solutions' may not solve the problem or solve the problem but creates other problems. I will not survey the Buddhist treatment of the problem of proving about non-existence in order to present a new solution that we have yet to see. Instead, I will articulate a problem about non-existence that is unique to Buddhist philosophers. I will do so in order to present an interesting puzzle about non-existence that has largely escaped attention in the 'Western' literature. (shrink)

In this paper, we show within RCA 0 that weak Konig's lemma is necessary and sufficient to prove that any (separable) compact group has a Haar measure. Within WKL 0 , a Haar measure is constructed by a non-standard method based on a fact that every countable non-standard model of WKL 0 has a proper initial part isomorphic to itself [10].

In his book review of Graham Priest's The Fifth Corner of Four, Mark Siderits, while criticising Priest's philology, suggests that Priest's work is 'of considerable interest' for two reasons. First, 'when two independent traditions use similar methods to work on similar issues, it is always possible that one may have hit on approaches that the other missed'. Second, 'the decentering that can be induced by looking at another tradition may trigger fresh insights, even if those insights are not ones that (...) were actually developed by the tradition marked 'other''. The main task of this paper is to unpack Siderits' thought. By analysing some of Priest's work, I will suggest a decentering that must have taken place in China when Buddhism was 'exported to China in Buddhist shipping containers'. For anyone familiar with the forms of Buddhist philosophy developed in India, various forms of Chinese Buddhism can often look strange. Some ideas that were debated and defended by Indian Buddhists do not appear anywhere in Chinese Buddhism and some assumptions have been quietly added to Buddhism by Chinese Buddhists. By showing that Priest's work brings out the 'innovation' that Chinese Buddhists gave to Buddhism, I will suggest that it is this decentering that Siderits suggests Priest makes use of. (shrink)

Fuzzy logic has become an important tool for a number of different applications ranging from the control of engineering systems to artificial intelligence. In this concise introduction, the author presents a succinct guide to the basic ideas of fuzzy logic, fuzzy sets, fuzzy relations, and fuzzy reasoning, and shows how they may be applied. The book culminates in a chapter which describes fuzzy logic control: the design of intelligent control systems using fuzzy if-then rules which make use of human knowledge (...) and experience to behave in a manner similar to a human controller. Throughout, the level of mathematical knowledge required is kept basic and the concepts are illustrated with numerous diagrams to aid in comprehension. As a result, all those curious to know more about fuzzy concepts and their real-world application will find this a good place to start. (shrink)

In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism’s implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my (...) view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On’s neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework. (shrink)

In one of his key texts, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence.1 He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially—that is, that things are empty of essence or inherent existence. The doctrine of emptiness has been variously understood by traditional and contemporary commentators. Most radical is the recent interpretation presented by Garfield and Priest. They have rationally reconstructed Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness as an endorsement of the contradictory nature of reality. According (...) to them, Nāgārjuna can be seen to be arguing that the way in which things exist in reality and what we can truly say about them must be... (shrink)