Mackie examines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is argued that Locke's distinction supports the claim that he held a representative theory of perception. Mackie discussed Locke's arguments for the distinction. The relation of Locke's account to Molyneaux's problem is considered. Mackie critically compares his reformulation of the primary/secondary distinction with that of Jonathan Bennett.

Is consciousness multisensory? Obviously it is multisensory in certain ways. Human beings typically possess the capacity to have experiences in at least the five familiar sensory modalities, and quite possibly in a number of other less commonly recognised modalities as well. But there are other respects in which it is far from obvious that consciousness is multisensory. This chapter is concerned with one such respect. Οur concern here is with whether consciousness contains experiences associated with distinct modalities at the same (...) time. We will describe those who endorse a positive answer to this question as endorsing a multisensory view (MSV) of the structure of consciousness, and those who endorse a negative answer to this question as having a unisensory view (USV) of the structure of consciousness. (shrink)

Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...) though unwarranted assumption of such a power may account for the intuitive appeal of the one-box response in Newcomb's Problem. (shrink)

Much of contemporary knowledge is generated by groups not single individuals. A natural question to ask is, what features make groups better or worse at generating knowledge? This paper surveys research that spans several disciplines which focuses on one aspect of epistemic communities: the way they communicate internally. This research has revealed that a wide number of different communication structures are best, but what is best in a given situation depends on particular details of the problem being confronted by (...) the group. (shrink)

The paper''s broad aim is to provide a wider understanding of a complex virtue, "meekness". This interest is pragmatic. Contemporary research by Collins (2001) has identified "meekness" as a personal quality for highest-level leadership at great businesses, a theme identifiable also in religious and ancient philosophical narratives. Two strands of enquiry are pursued. Firstly, features of "meekness" are inferred by reference to Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon, as also to the gospel writer, Matthew, source of the title''s quotation. It concludes that (...) "meekness" is not about powers foregone but "powers controlled and exercised with discernment". The second strand addresses whether there are intrinsic differences between the ethics of business and religious activities. Narrative of a New Testament incident, apparently condemning traders, is briefly explored as a case study. Closer examination points how an inappropriate fusing of regulatory and commercial roles had created market abuses. The timeless account warns against inadequately controlled powers and provides an enduring example of how "the meek" should respond assertively against unethical conduct and avoid it themselves. While the paper acknowledges that there may be distinctive "guardian" and "commercial" syndromes for ethical prioritisation, a spiritual virtue, such as "meekness", transcends individual and organisational purposes, being aspirational for any activities that involve providing services and being accountable. (shrink)

Journals regulate a significant portion of the communication between scientists. This paper devises an agent-based model of scientific practice and uses it to compare various strategies for selecting publications by journals. Surprisingly, it appears that the best selection method for journals is to publish relatively few papers and to select those papers it publishes at random from the available “above threshold” papers it receives. This strategy is most effective at maintaining an appropriate type of diversity that is needed to solve (...) a particular type of scientific problem. This problem and the limitation of the model is discussed in detail. (shrink)

Ethical conduct in practice has been increasingly recognised as vital to the accountancy profession following the collapse of Andersen. The foundational principles underpinning accountancy ethics receive relatively uniform recognition worldwide so that this paper concentrates on exploring how to introduce these concepts into established courses at undergraduate level. Historically, the teaching of accounting techniques has been isolated from the personal assimilation of accountancy's ethical values by students. Alternative approaches are considered, of a dedicated 'capstone' ethical course or through more progressive (...) integration within existing parts of an established curriculum. An opportunistic example of the latter is then described with the rationale, potential benefits, student reactions and practical difficulties assessed. Overall, the paper explains why, alongside technical skills, their personal development requires undergraduates to develop how to apply for themselves given professional values. It contributes suggestions as to methodologies, content and material for short modules within financial reporting, taxation, auditing and social/environmental accountancy courses while reflecting on the limitations and potential of their use. (shrink)

In my paper I present David Hume's philosophy from the perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs. I argue that by interpreting impressions and ideas as iconic signs it is possible to avoid many inconsistencies in Hume's philosophy. Apart from that it makes possible to avoid Hume's scepticism about the existence of the external world by introducing Peirce's concept of the dynamic and immediate object. What is more, the generative structure of signs helps us to deal with the "gmissing (...) shade of blue" problem. (shrink)

In this article we provide an in-depth description of a new model of informed consent called ‘meta consent’ and consider its practical implementation. We explore justifications for preferring meta consent over alternative models of consent as a solution to the problem of secondary use of health data for research. We finally argue that meta consent strikes an appropriate balance between enabling valuable research and protecting the individual.

THESE are difficult days in which to philosophize, and not only for institutional, historical, or political reasons. Nor is it a matter mainly of a disconcertingly eclectic pluralism of possible ways of doing philosophy; this has been a problem, or at least a temptation, ever since the disciples of Plato clustered into competing sects. More alarming, and more challenging, is the fact that the very idea of thinking and writing reflectively in various ways hitherto acknowledged by a broad consensus (...) as "philosophical" has come into serious question. The particular form in which such doubting has emerged is itself various. In Europe, it has taken the shape of undermining the self-assurance of the "metaphysics of presence" by attempting to show that the notion of determinate presence is constricting and groundless, or self-deceptive and self-deconstructing, or relative to historical epistemes or epochs of Being. In Anglophone countries, strikingly complementary efforts have been made to dissolve traditional philosophical concerns with knowledge and reality, mind and other persons, into a tenuous tissue of language, of word-play and word-use: all becomes "wordwork" in Joyce's prophetic term. Or else--in a move that expressly conjoins continental and analytic tendencies--all becomes "conversation" of an unending and self-reabsorbing sort. (shrink)

Metaphysical determinism argues that God divinely predetermines everything, including human suffering. Contrary to metaphysical determinism, free will or libertarianism argues that not everything is predetermined by God. Therefore, evil does not serve any divine purpose. Libertarianism argues that metaphysical determinism is simply incoherent because it holds that God can predetermine an action and, at the same time, holds that He could stop such an action. This study seeks to find out which of these two views might be promising in responding (...) to the problem of suffering. Contrary to these two positions, this study argues that suffering must be understood contextually. The above-stated responses do not always provide viable answers to the problem of suffering because they are often generalised and conceived from the God-eye view without considering the sufferers’ perspectives.Contribution: Although there are a plethora of publications on metaphysical determinism and freewill, this study re-examined both and sheds a nuance for a further development of these two competing views. The article argues that none of these two responses offers the best response to the problem; rather, each has its strengths and weaknesses because they seem to focus on God rather than the sufferer. (shrink)

The ‘Hutton Prize for Professional Ethics’ of The Chartered Institute of Bankers in Scotland is awarded annually to the author of an essay that addresses most convincingly the question, ‘what do you now do?’ in response to an ethically sensitive, case‐study scenario. This paper makes available the Scenarios from 2004 and 2005, together with commentary thereon. Scenario 2004 stresses the importance of moral imagination and empathy. It addresses borrowing arrangements for a mother and daughter where illness has created past and (...) continuing problems and there is the possibility that a wealthy relative will be made an unwitting guarantor. Scenario 2005 explores the boundaries inhibiting an opportunity for showing ‘mercy’ by one employee for another. Particular attention is paid to the difficulties that practising this ethical virtue could cause in a professional context, including tracing back to similar ambiguities discernible within foundational texts for Christian ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric and AngerKenneth S. Zagacki and Patrick A. Boleyn-FitzgeraldSince most believe anger can be either good or bad, rhetors face a moral problem of determining when anger is appropriate and when it is not. They face a corresponding rhetorical problem in deciding when and how to express anger and determining the role that it might play in public discourse, with specific audiences and in particular rhetorical situations. (...) Rhetorical scholars have catalogued whole genres of angry rhetoric—apocalyptic genres, jeremiads, the demonizing rhetoric of religious and political leaders—wherein the rhetorical display of anger is explained in terms of situational conventions and cultural norms.1 Yet these scholars have not easily resolved the moral problems associated with angry rhetoric. Aristotle suggested the earliest and most obvious solutions to these problems. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he outlines a typology for discerning the moral limits of anger and, by implication, angry rhetoric. And in Book II of the Rhetoric he asserts that the orator needs to know the structure of emotions like anger and how to intensify and dissipate them. Or, in other words, the orator must know how to make it reasonable to be angry. Some contemporary philosophers have gone further, suggesting that a failure to feel and express anger in public betrays an insufficient concern for justice and self respect.In this essay, we follow Aristotle in arguing that anger is sometimes the emotion we expect people to feel or the rhetorical response we expect them to display and evoke in others. But we also challenge part of Aristotle's argument by asking: "Even when angry rhetoric would appear to be a reasonable, morally appropriate response, is there a way in which rhetors might manage anger in their public discourse in order to achieve ends which are both morally and pragmatically productive?" The answer, we propose, lies in what we call "non-angry" rhetoric, which involves transforming and reflecting upon anger in public discourse. Because such rhetoric often promotes noble ends such as reconciliation and forgiveness, it is at least morally permissible and more likely morally virtuous.2 In order to establish these claims, our analysis focuses on the case of Nelson Mandela and his "Address to the Interfaith Commissioning Service for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission."3 In this speech, Mandela, as our [End Page 290] analysis demonstrates, managed anger and turned it into an object of reflection, thereby illustrating what opportunities for reconciliation and democratic deliberation would look like during the difficult period attending the political transition in South Africa in general and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in particular. His "Address" exemplified a unique moment when the rhetoric and the ethics of anger came together in a public performance. While acknowledging the understandable anger of blacks, Mandela (who may in fact have harbored considerable anger himself) simultaneously suggested that by engendering a less hostile social-political context, in which participants maintained their self-respect without necessarily sacrificing justice, a new democratic community could emerge. This would be a community where, as he described it, individuals began to reconcile with and no longer persecute one another. As Aristotle might explain, the purpose of Mandela's speech was to manage the anger of blacks, so that they would then be able to deliberate properly about the issues before the TRC and about the larger democratic transition. As the philosopher Eugene Garver says, the particular passions Aristotle chooses to explore in the Rhetoric serve a role necessary for the kind of public, political decision making he assigns to rhetoric. These emotions serve to integrate—or segregate, as the case may be—"distinct individuals into a deliberative or judging body, or demos" (1994, 131).What we are recommending, then, is that rhetoric encompasses both considerations of moral desert as well as broader moral concerns. While there are times when individuals seem to deserve our angry rhetoric, it may not be justified from a broader moral perspective, especially when the goal is the good of the state or the community—viz., if angry rhetoric leads to the violent dissolution of democratic community. Ultimately, we argue that the moral constitution of political, deliberative communities must be viewed in terms... (shrink)

We compare astronomers' removal of Pluto from the listing of planets and psychiatrists' removal of homosexuality from the listing of mental disorders. Although the political maneuverings that emerged in both controversies are less than scientifically ideal, we argue that competition for "scientific authority" among competing groups is a normal part of scientific progress. In both cases, a complicated relationship between abstract constructs and evidence made the classification problem thorny.

The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism and (...) Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on. (shrink)

Logic is concerned with the design or structure of arguments. It describes the forms of valid argument and is concerned with the public presentation and reception of arguments. Hence it has a close connection with politics and the public sphere, and with rhetoric as the science of persuasion. Philosophers have analysed the objective conditions of validation, that is, the justifiability of assertions about the world. This quest for objective and scientific validity in argumentation about the nature of reality dominated much (...) of the development of logic in the 20th century. Logical arguments are held to be successful as a result of the ‘force of reason’ rather than because one's opponents have been bribed or coerced. Logic involves the study of the abstract, deductive moves in argumentation rather than an empirical study of how actual arguments are conducted. However, there is also a tension between rhetoric and philosophy; Plato drew a clear distinction between knowledge and persuasion. Logic is intended to give security to the former. The historical drift of logic is towards abstraction, especially the use of mathematical forms of representation. The study of logic is an important component of any project on encyclopaedic knowledge, that is, with knowledge that circulates in the public sphere, but the globalization of culture has raised an important problem about the universalistic claims of traditions of logic, namely, are there different forms of logical reasoning? (shrink)

Central to Kuhn's notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. Such a notion of incommensurability is based on a particular understanding of what a scientific language is. In this paper we first attempt to understand this notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability. We consider the consequences of the essential multisemiotic character of scientific theories and show how this leads to even a single theory (...) being potentially 'internally incommensurable'. We then discuss Kuhn's lexicon-based approach to incommensurability and the problems associated with it. Finally we argue that this approach by Kuhn has interesting overlaps with the problem of meaning associated with multisemiosis, particularly the challenge of understanding the process of symbolization in scientific theories. (shrink)

In this article Christian ethicist Michael S. Jones introduces the work of Princeton University ethicist Thomas Pogge on the areas of global poverty and global justice. He then applies Pogge’s ideas to an ethical issue of continuing importance: racism. He discusses the history of racism in the United States and Romania, pointing out numerous parallels both historical and contemporary. He discusses the appropriate attitude for Christians to adopt on the issue, arguing that while Christian sources are not univocal on the (...) subject, there is an egalitarianism at the heart of Christianity that rules out racism as a Christian attitude. He concludes that Christians can contribute significantly to overcoming racism in the U.S. and Romania by addressing the underlying attitudinal problem from the podium and the pulpit, with the pen, and through their daily interactions with each other. (shrink)

CLASSICAL THEISM HAS USED THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY TO EXPRESS GOD’S SIMULTANEOUS TRANSCENDENCE OF, AND IMMANENCE WITHIN, THE WORLD, BUT HERE A TWOFOLD DISTINCTION, SUCH AS THAT PROPOSED BY RICHARDSON OR HARTSHORNE, WILL DO: GOD AS ABSOLUTE AND GOD AS RELATED. WHITEHEAD HAS SEEN A DOUBLE PROBLEM, FOR THE WORLD ALSO TRANSCENDS, AND IS IMMANENT WITHIN, THE WORLD. FOR THIS DOUBLE PROBLEM A THREEFOLD DISTINCTION IS NECESSARY: THE PRIMORDIAL ENVISAGEMENT, THAT DIVINE INSTANTIATION OF CREATIVITY WHICH UTTERLY TRANSCENDS (...) THE WORLD, THE PRIMORDIAL NATURE OR LOGOS, PART OF WHICH IS INDIVIDUALLY IMMANENT WITHIN EACH CREATURE AS ITS INITIAL AIM, AND THE CONSEQUENT NATURE, WHICH IS THE WAY EACH CREATURE, TRANSCENDENT TO GOD IN ITS BECOMING, IS ULTIMATELY INCLUDED WITHIN THE ONGOING TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE OF GOD. (shrink)

That the thirteenth Idyll of Theocritus and the Hylas episode in the first book of Apollonius are not independent of each other was perhaps first pointed out by Casaubon, who supposed T. to be the earlier of the two. The opposite view was upheld, whether for the first time or not I do not know, by Wilamowitz in his lectures, and it was assumed, without much argument, by his pupil G. Knaack, who presently defended it, with little more, against an (...) attack by G. Türk. Gercke and Susemihl were persuaded, and later on Wilamowitz himself touched briefly on the matter. Legrand, who had doubted before, remains unconvinced, and Cholmeley, to whose chronology this theory was disastrous, took shelter behind the unsubstantial shades of Antimachus and Philetas. In Italy, G. Perrotta has supported Wilamowitz's view, but L. Bignone says that the problem is insoluble. I have myself no doubt that Wilamowitz was right, but the arguments employed have not been very cogent, and, as the evidence has not been well set out, it may be useful to outline it here and to add a little to it. (shrink)

A major difficulty for currently existing theories of inductive inference involves the question of what to do when novel, unknown, or previously unsuspected phenomena occur. In this paper one particular instance of this difficulty is considered, the so-called sampling of species problem.The classical probabilistic theories of inductive inference due to Laplace, Johnson, de Finetti, and Carnap adopt a model of simple enumerative induction in which there are a prespecified number of types or species which may be observed. But, realistically, (...) this is often not the case. In 1838 the English mathematician Augustus De Morgan proposed a modification of the Laplacian model to accommodate situations where the possible types or species to be observed are not assumed to be known in advance; but he did not advance a justification for his solution. (shrink)

Current general restrictions on performance-enhancing drugs pose a collective action problem that cannot be solved and bring a variety of adverse consequences for sport. General prohibitions of PEDs are grounded in claims that they violate the integrity of sport. But there are decisive arguments against integrity of sport-based prohibitions of PEDs for elite sport. We defend a harm prevention approach to PED prohibition as an alternative. This position cannot support a general ban on PEDs, since it provides no basis (...) for prohibiting non-harmful PED use. We argue that a harm prevention approach to restricting PEDs is ethically justified, has better prospects of compliance, is consistent with respecting the integrity of sport, and holds at least a modest prospect of resolving the collective action problem around PED restriction. (shrink)

In this response to Neil Manson’s latest intervention in our debate about the best consent model for biobank research we show, contra Manson that the ‘expiry problem’ that affects broad consent models because of changes over time in methods, purposes, types of data used and governance structures is a real and significant problem. We further show that our preferred implementation of meta consent as a national consent platform solves this problem and is not subject to the cost (...) and burden objections that Manson raises. (shrink)

In this paper I have not, of course, presented all the embryological data that can be collected from the Talmudic and Midrashic literature. More details can be found in Julius Preuss' classical work on biblical and talmudic medicine, now available in Fred Rosner's English translation and in a French M.D. thesis by Martine Michel.75 I also did not present any data on teratology, and did not deal with the very rich Jewish mystical lore, the Cabbala. But a few comments are (...) in order here about the material on embryology.There are very few original ideas in the Talmudic corpus on embryology, but it is obvious that the Sages were well aware of the Greek and Roman theories on embryology.The fact that the Talmud is a compilation that was built up slowly, during several centuries, explains why the information recorded in it cannot be ascribed solely to one school of thought or one clear-cut influence.When a definite problem was difficult to solve because there were many different theories about it, the Sages based their opinion on a famous experiment that seemed to offer guarantees of validity. This was the case with the controversial problem of the formation of the embryo and its sexual differentiation, where the Sages made use of an experiment allegedly initiated by Cleopatra.The Sages were ready to discuss scientific problems with non-Jewish scholars and even to accept their arguments. This was the case with the important topic of the time of the entry of the soul into the embryo. But the legal conclusions drawn from the Sages' opinion were not consistent with those declared by Churth Fathers such as Tertullian. Embryotomy, for instance, was permitted by Jewish law.Wide interest, scholarly discussions, suggestive descriptions and readiness to inquire and to obtain detailed information characterized the Talmudic discussions of embryology.In conclusion, I quote a Talmudic text that reviews the whole process of embryological development through the sequence of prayers of a faithful Jew who learns that his wife is expecting a baby.The first three days, [he should pray to the Lord] that the seed should not putrefy.From the third to the fortieth day: that the child should be a male.From the fortieth day to the third month: that there should not occur any superfetation, which could lead the first embryo to be a fetus compressus.From the third to the sixth month: that an abortion should not occur.From the sixth to the ninth month: that the birth should be without problems.76. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a description of the life of Josiah Royce. It then discusses the following themes from Royce: proof of the existence of God, ethical theory, and the problem of evil in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy; the panpsychism of The Spirit of Modern Philosophy; the four conceptions of being in The World and the Individual; time and eternity and the worlds of description and acquaintance mainly in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy; and the notion of the (...) beloved community in The Philosophy of Loyalty and The Problem of Christianity. Some comments on Royce as a religious thinker and man are presented. (shrink)

The problem of understanding how statistical inference is, and can be, applied in empirical sciences is important for the methodology of science. It is the objective of this paper to gain a better understanding of the role of statistical methods in scientific modeling. The important question of whether the applicability reduces to the representational properties of statistical models is discussed. It will be shown that while the answer to this question is positive, representation in statistical models is not purely (...) structural. In spite of the fact that representation in statistical models is based on the structural similarities between the statistical model and the empirical systems under study, these relationships are shown to be appropriate for representing relations in the target system by agent function, too. A second aspect of the paper involves the claim that agent-based components of statistical modeling are: a) interpretation of random variables, b) selection of the goal of statistical research, and c) selection of estimator properties. To justify these claims, a preliminary discussion will be presented on the role of statistics in modeling, as in regression and other structural models. This role will be explored and realized using a structural viewpoint. Also the role of statistical estimation in statistical modeling is discussed to explain the representational role of models and the inferential role of the agent in modeling. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can see our lives as a snapshot happening now or as a moving picture extending across time. These dual ways of seeing our lives inform how we conceive of the problem of age group justice. A snapshot view sees age group justice as an interpersonal problem between distinct age groups. A moving picture view sees age group justice as a first-person problem of prudential choice. This paper explores these different ways of thinking (...) about age group justice and illustrates them using a principle of respect for human dignity, understood in terms of reasonable support for floor level central human capabilities at each stage of life. I argue that different frames are suitable for different kinds of decisions, and each provides a true, but partial, picture of aging and age group justice. (shrink)

Simple heuristics that make us smart presents a valuable and valid interpretation of how we make fast decisions particularly in situations of ignorance and uncertainty. What is missing is how this intersects with thinking under even greater uncertainty or ignorance, such as novice problem solving, and with the development of expert cognition.

The author analyses the problem of weak will in Leo Tolstoy’s story Father Sergius. She ponders why the protagonist, a man with such heightened awareness of good and evil, at some point in his life chooses evil. She places the problem of weak will (akrasia) first into the context of the various iterations of determinism and subsequently of the considerations raised by Socrates and Aristotle. As their answers are not fully applicable to the problem of Tolstoy’s titular (...) character, she looks for an explanation to Saint Augustine’s philosophy of free will. (shrink)

This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...) mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Context: Is non-dualist epistemology, based on the unity of descriptions and objects, logically consistent? Problem: What is the status of the infinite regresses that the non-dualist Josef Mitterer, in his book The Beyond of Philosophy, censures in dualist thought? Their academic discussion is still in its infancy. Method: An attempt to reconstruct and differentiate Mitterer’s infinite regress accusations against dualism (originating from the 1970s) with today’s means and distinctions. Results: A weak and a strong linguistic principle are presented (non-dualism (...) being subsumed under the strong linguistic principle), which are defined as such depending on whether the infinite regresses of dualism are interpreted as benign or as vicious. Implications: Further penetrating investigation of the infinite regresses highlighted by Mitterer is of crucial importance because these regresses have not yet been discussed and classified in relevant current publications on infinite regress arguments by authors such as Rescher or Gratton. Such proper classification is indispensable, however, if the value of the non-dualist alternative to, and its critique of, dualist thought is to be assessed adequately. (shrink)

This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient for (...) logical reliability in what I call simple enumerative induction. This answer to Hume's problem rests on interpreting PI as a normative claim justified by a non-empirical epistemic means-ends argument. In such an argument, a rule of inference is shown by mathematical or logical proof to promote a specified epistemic end. Since the proof concerning PI and logical reliability is not based on inductive reasoning, this argument avoids the circularity that Hume argued was inherent in any attempt to justify PI. (shrink)

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so?called mind?body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti?biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind?brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based (...) on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ?represent? anything, that brains do not ?read? or ?transform? representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal?directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self?organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end?state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined. (shrink)

This article examines an allegedly Humean solution provided by J. Baird Callicott to the problem of the is/ought dichotomy. It also examines an allegedly Humean argument provided by him for the land ethic's summary moral precept. It concludes that neither the solution nor the argument is Humean or cogent.

The primary problem we face when educating for social justice involves making problems and issues ‘real’ in ways that enable deep comprehension of the nature of injustice, the effects of systemic and dynamic causes, and the interaction of structures and policies on the lives of individuals. To address this problem, I examine work from behavioral economics and moral psychology as theoretical resources. I argue that we can glean insights from the notions of behavioral nudges and virtue labeling and (...) propose a new account of nudges, which I call experiential nudges. Experiential nudges provide an important mechanism in educating for social justice, in particular, and can be extended within moral education more broadly. (shrink)

John White; The Problem of Self-interest: the educator’s perspective, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–175, https.

Clark & Thornton are too hasty in their dismissal of uninformed learning; nonmonotonic processing units show considerable promise on type-2 tasks. I describe a simulation which succeeds on a “pure” type-2 problem. Another simulation challenges Clark & Thornton 's claims about the serendipitous nature of solutions to type-2 problems.

The article compares the functions of religious faith and religious experience as structural components of religious consciousness. Traditionally, in scientific studies, the problem of religious belief and religious experience is viewed separately from the perspective of psychology and philosophy of religion. However, the author of this article, while researching the structure of religious consciousness, noticed that at the present stage of the development of religious traditions, religious faith and religious experience perform rather related functions. This work is devoted to (...) the substantive disclosure of the relevance of this hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper presents the idea, structure, history, goals, and accomplishments of mathematics and science laboratories as they have been organized and taught at Trinity College. The laboratories are designed to develop specific science and mathematics problem-solving skills, presenting them within the context of humanities-related inquiry (e.g. neural network theory within the context of philosophy of mind). These laboratories are especially valuable in providing humanities students with literacy in advanced science and mathematics materials that, since they are not requisite for (...) humanities majors, humanities students would not be exposed to otherwise. Especially in the case of philosophy, laboratories bear the additional benefit of dissolving insularity, opening up study onto directly relevant fields and enriching and informing philosophical inquiry. The author concludes by considering philosophy’s relationship to science and mathematics, what these relationships imply for how a philosophy education should be structured, and the important role that science and mathematics laboratories play in that education. (shrink)

The transitive closure of a binary relation R can be thought of as the best possible approximation of R "from above" by a transitive relation. We consider the question of approximating a relation from below by transitive relations. Our main result is that every thick relation (a relation whose complement contains no infinite chain) on a countable set has a transitive thick subrelation. This allows for a solution to a problem arising from previous work by the author and Alan (...) Taylor. We also exhibit a thick relation on an uncountable set with no transitive thick subrelation. (shrink)

I print the text as given in Pearson. I agree with Jebb and Sheppard that the strophe is sound, and therefore I would retain at 866–7. The problem now lies with the antistrophe, where with the manuscript reading at 877 we lack either or-to give proper responsion with 867. The manuscript text can be vindicated if we detect that simplest of scribal errors, haplography. Thus for 876–7 I would read.

Introduction -- Overview of religious realism -- A realist interpretation of religious diversity -- Religious exclusivism : the problem of being arbitrary -- Overview of religious irrealism -- Religious non-realism : neither realist nor anti-realist -- Religious non-realism pushed beyond its limits -- Conclusion.

Kyle Stanford’s reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics’ insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists’ failure to conceive of their successors’ theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford’s critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new induction.” (...) The possibility of unconceived alternatives pushes us to question our contemporary expectation for scientists to reason outside of their historical moment. (shrink)

Context: Neurophenomenology is a relatively new field, with scope for novel and informative approaches to empirical questions about what structural parallels there are between neural activity and phenomenal experience. Problem: The overall aim is to present a method for examining possible correlations of neurodynamic and phenodynamic structures within the structurally-coupled work of Alexander Technique practitioners with their pupils. Method: This paper includes the development of an enkinaesthetic explanatory framework, an overview of the salient aspects of the Alexander Technique, and (...) the presentation of an elicitation interview technique as part of a neurophenomenological method. It will propose a way of testing the hypothesis that if, in the effective practice of Alexander Technique, there is a union between the nervous systems of teacher and pupil, it should be visible neurologically and affective phenomenologically, and thus it should be possible to investigate both its neural and phenomenal signatures. Results: The proposed means of testing the hypothesis is to use the elicitation interview technique alongside neural monitoring during the teaching of the Alexander Technique in four paired sets of subjects. Constructivist content: At the heart of this paper is the claim that all activity is co-activity. I make no assumption of an ontological primacy of mental or physical, or explanatory primacy of any methodology. Implications: This has important ramifications for somatic education and therapies, for establishing frameworks of co-engagement and care in health-care situations, and for understanding empathy. (shrink)