And at the End They Took Care of the Science Museum… This is the story of history of science, and why in the twenty‐first century it ended up curating the legacy of science, as we knew it. Once upon a time, history of science lived quietly and studious next to the Natural and the Medical Sciences and their wax models, their herbaria, the geological collections, and all the scientific instruments that once had been modern. Suddenly, around 1980, new interests in (...) Philosophy, Sociology and Cultural Studies arose. Provocative research questions as for example the history of rationality, the history of the subaltern technicians in the laboratory, and the ontology and epistemology of the hybrids between nature and culture inspired the intellectual discussions. Although the field flourished, received an abundance of funding and could even build up its own research institutes, after the Millennium, its very existence became gradually jeopardized. Science as we knew it since the Enlightenment lost grounds. The New Economy and not the state anymore provided the funding for research. History of science didn't succeed to survive as expert for data, blind spots, fakes, misinformation, lies, conspiracy theories, and historical thinking in times of scientific accelerations. It began with the loss of reputation, followed by the loss of the job. At the end, history of science lived, not unhappily, ever after as curators of the legacy of Science as we knew it. (shrink)

Tandis que la science descriptive des normes les traite comme faits sociaux et les expose du dehors, la science dogmatique des normes cherche à élaborer les normes positives en un système cohérent de normes. Elle part de la réalité des normes dans la culture, mais elle est pensée à Vintérieur du système de normes. Il s’agit ici non d’un point de vue de simple connaissance, mais d’un point de vue normatif. La science philosophique des normes, ou Éthique, cherche à se (...) situer au-dessus des normes valides pour les expliquer et les ramener à des principes fondamentaux : les valeurs morales foncières ne peuvent être fondées dans une réalité. (shrink)

Briefeschreiben in der Antike -- Epikur und seine Briefe -- Paulus und seine Briefe -- Paulus und Epikur : ein Vergleich.

In spite of his tragically short life, Ramsey made extensive contributions in the fields of mathematics, logic, economics and philosophy. In this article we focus on Ramsey's investigations into the notions of belief and judgement, their truth conditions and probability theory. We show that the central role given by Ramsey to belief and action together with his pragmatism allows for a new interpretation of the theories of truth and probability, paving the way for a modern decision theory.

Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the (...) implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail: monika[email protected]. (shrink)

Different types of consent are used to obtain human biospecimens for future research. This variation has resulted in confusion regarding what research is permitted, inadvertent constraints on future research, and research proceeding without consent. The National Institutes of Health Clinical Center's Department of Bioethics held a workshop to consider the ethical acceptability of addressing these concerns by using broad consent for future research on stored biospecimens. Multiple bioethics scholars, who have written on these issues, discussed the reasons for consent, the (...) range of consent strategies, and gaps in our understanding, and concluded with a proposal for broad initial consent coupled with oversight and, when feasible, ongoing provision of information to donors. This article describes areas of agreement and areas that need more research and dialogue. Given recent proposed changes to the Common Rule, and new guidance regarding storing and sharing data and samples, this is an important and tim.. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

Over the past decade, there has been an extensive debate about whether researchers have an obligation to disclose genetic research findings, including primary and secondary findings. There appears to be an emerging (but disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose some genetic findings to some research participants. The contours of this obligation, however, remain unclear. -/- As this paper will explore, much of this confusion is definitional or conceptual in nature. The extent of a researcher’s obligation to return (...) secondary and other research findings is often limited by reference to terms and concepts like “incidental,” “analytic validity,” “clinical validity,” “clinical relevance,” “clinical utility,” “clinical significance,” “actionability,” and “desirability.” These terms are used in different ways by different writers to describe obligations in different sorts of cases. -/- Underneath this definitional confusion is a general notion, supported by much of the literature, that findings only need to be disclosed when they surpass certain presumably objective or measureable thresholds, such as medical importance or scientific reproducibility. The problem is that there is significant variability in the way that these terms and concepts are used in the literature and, as such, in defining the scope of an obligation to return findings that surpasses the relevant thresholds. -/- The goal of this paper is to analyze the definitional muddle underlying the debate about returning genetic research findings, with the hope of answering a few questions. First, what is the range of definitions being used in this debate? Based on an extensive literature review, Part 1 will lay out a range of articulated definitions for each relevant term, with the goal of categorizing them into a handful of distinct types. Part 2 explains the definitional redundancy and confusion in the current literature, and, drawing from the terminological patterns identified in Part 1, outlines more cohesive building blocks to inform the development of future disclosure frameworks.Our minimum goal in articulating these conceptual building blocks is to promote clearer articulations of, and distinctions between, future disclosure frameworks. More ambitiously, we suggest which definitions and conceptualizations we consider most appropriate to use in future disclosure frameworks. Here, we seek to balance benefits to participants through the disclosure of important information with the minimization of undue burdens on individual researchers and the research enterprise more generally. -/- Our analysis builds upon the central philosophical distinction between concepts and conceptions. The basic idea is that the “concept” of X refers to the general (and relatively uncontroversial) structure/shape of X, while various “conceptions” of X are more particular, filled out, and controversial elaborations of the concept. In other words, “concepts” of X will be formal representations of X, while “conceptions” of X will be substantive interpretations of the key elements and relationships operating within that formal framework. (Implicit in this distinction is an important point about the nature of disagreement – namely, that in order for two or more parties to “disagree” about X as opposed to simply talk past one another, there must be at least enough shared agreement about X to know that the parties are referring to the same thing. A concept of X provides this point of common agreement, while competing conceptions of X mark the areas where disagreement arises.) In this paper, we will employ this distinction in a fundamental way to clarify exactly where the primary disagreements arise in the debate over disclosing genetic research findings. -/- We propose that, underlying all the seeming confusion and disagreement, there are three central and widely agreed upon concepts at work in this debate—validity, value, and volition. The first two concepts concern the nature of the information itself. An obligation to disclose only exists when findings are valid and have value but there are competing conceptions of how to determine or define validity and valuableness. The third concept—volition—pertains not to the information but rather to the person to whom it will be disclosed. Does that person want or not want the information, and what is the best way of determining this? Here, too, competing conceptions arise. Our key point, though, is that almost all of the ethical disagreement arises because of competing conceptions of these three concepts. Understanding and appreciating this key point can help to refocus the substantive debate by providing some common ground to start from in determining how best to interpret these shared concepts. This refocusing can, ideally, produce more productive debate and facilitate some progress in resolving it. (shrink)

Willing and Understanding elucidates a variety of issues in and approaches to debating the will-intellect interplay in the late Middle Ages. Authored by prominent scholars in the field, the contributions offer different perspectives on the development of late medieval theories of the will. Charting a dense map of voluntarist and epistemological ideas - entrenched leitmotifs of late medieval philosophy, seminal insights sparking original trends, and ephemeral novelties - the volume is a testimony to the conceptual multidimensionality and ethical complexity of (...) the past and present iterations of the debate on the will. Contributors are Pascale Bermon, Magdalena Bieniak, Michael W. Dunne, Riccardo Fedriga, Giacomo Fornasieri, Tobias Hoffmann, Severin V. Kitanov, Monika Michałowska, Riccardo Saccenti, Sonja Schierbaum, Michael Szlachta, Łukasz Tomanek, and Francesco Omar Zamboni. (shrink)

“Is logic a physical variable?” This thought-provoking question was put forward by Michael Heller during the public lecture “Category Theory and Mathematical Structures of the Universe” delivered on 30th March 2017 at the National Quantum Information Center in Sopot. It touches upon the intimate relationship between the foundations of physics, mathematics and philosophy. To address this question one needs a conceptual framework, which is on the one hand rigorous and, on the other hand capacious enough to grasp the diversity of (...) modern theoretical physics. Category theory is here a natural choice. It is not only an independent, well-developed and very advanced mathematical theory, but also a holistic, process-oriented way of thinking. (shrink)

The sixth edition of the Manual for Research Ethics Committees is a unique compilation of legal and ethical guidance which will prove invaluable for members of research ethics committees, researchers involved in research with humans, members of the pharmaceutical industry and students of law, medicine, ethics and philosophy. Presented in a clear and authoritative form, it incorporates the key legal and ethical guidelines and specially written chapters on major topics in bioethics by leading academic authors and practitioners, pharmaceutical industry associations (...) and professional bodies. In the sixth edition there are fifteen new chapters covering key issues from participation in clinical trials to cloning, and for the first time the manual has been produced in one easy-to-search hardback volume. (shrink)

Personal narratives in which medical students and clinicians reflect on their education and practice, or recipients of health care reflect on their journey though the system can provide valuable insights which can usefully be shared. In this paper, a medical student describes the effect of a humanities-based student-selected component on her understanding of anatomy and dissection, and a junior doctor in Iraq learns some painful lessons about medicine and society during a night shift in the casualty department.

Tinguelys gesamtes Œuvre scheint vom Vanitas-Motiv grundiert: seine sinnlosen Maschinen aus Schrott, sich selbst vernichtenden, ephemeren Artefakte, die in Form von Flügelaltären stattfindende Auseinandersetzung mit dem Tod und erst recht der eine barocke Tragikomödie referierende Cenodoxus. Dass dieser Eindruck trügt, zeigt sich sobald das scheinbar Evidente mit den frühneuzeitlichen Spielarten der Vanitas konfrontiert wird. Dennoch adaptiert und inszeniert Tinguely das Motiv mit dem melancholischen Gestus des seines Heilshorizonts verlustig gegangenen Subjekts.

In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, little attention is paid to the father-child relationship. The aim of this theoretical study is to introduce methods for assessing the father-child relationship in early childhood. There are two methodologies for assessing sensitive and challenging play by fathers – the Sensitive and Challenging Interaction Play Scale – SCIP (Grossmann et al., 2002) and the quality of the father-child activation relationship – Risky Situation – RS (Paquette & Bigras, 2010). The study describes the SCIP and (...) offers a theoretical definition of the basic constructs tackled in the SCIP methodology. The paper then describes the new RS procedure. Special attention is paid to activation theory, which forms the basis of the RS procedure. Finally, the paper contains suggestions for future in-depth investigations of the father’s role using adequate tools that take into consideration the uniqueness of the father-child relationship. The need to validate existing methods – also within Slovak culture – is emphasized. (shrink)

Extrapolation from a well-understood base population to a less-understood target population can fail if the base and target populations are not sufficiently similar. Differences between laboratory mice and humans, for example, can hinder extrapolation in medical research. Mice that carry a partial or complete human physiological system, known as humanized mice, are supposed to make extrapolation more reliable by simulating a variety of human diseases. But what justifies our belief that these mice are similar enough to their human counterparts to (...) simulate human disease? I argue that, unless three requirements are met in the process of humanizing mice, very little does. My requirements are not meant to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee a particular outcome. Instead, they serve as a heuristic for guiding scientific judgments involving extrapolation. In developing each requirement, I engage with philosophical issues concerning the nature of model-based science and the mechanistic approach (and its limits) to making generalizations in the life sciences. (shrink)

After World War II political science, especially comparative politics, was transformed by a "scientific revolution." Harry Eckstein, an influential spokesman in the revolution's forefront, went on to make a great variety of contributions in subsequent decades. These eleven essays, written over thirty years, cover the major issues in comparative politics, from civil war to "civic inclusion"—that is, "the tendency over time to include in politics, in workplace decision-making, in education, and in other institutional realms, people previously excluded from participation." (...) Eckstein also deals with political science as a field: how it relates to political practice, how it developed in the prewar period, and how it emerged from the first postwar reshaping. In this first collection of his work, Eckstein reflects on the issues and events—his personal experiences as a refugee from Nazi Germany and as an observer of European politics and cultures—that underlie and unify his thinking. _Regarding Politics_ presents in one powerful volume the career of one of the leading comparative political scientists of our times. (shrink)

Our daily lives unfold continuously, yet our memories are organised into distinct events, situated in a specific context of space and time, and chunked when this context changes (at event boundaries). Previous research showed that this process, termed event segmentation, enhances object-context binding but impairs temporal order memory. Physiologically, peaks in pupil dilation index event segmentation, similar to emotion-induced bursts of autonomic arousal. Emotional arousal also modulates object-context binding and temporal order memory. Yet, these two critical factors have not been (...) systematically studied together. To address this gap, we ran a behavioural experiment using a paradigm validated to study event segmentation and extended it with emotion manipulation. During encoding, we sequentially presented greyscale objects embedded in coloured frames (colour changes defining events), with a neutral or aversive sound. During retrieval, we tested participants’ memory of temporal order memory and object-colour binding. We found opposite effects of emotion and event segmentation on episodic memory. While event segmentation enhanced object-context binding, emotion impaired it. On the contrary, event segmentation impaired temporal order memory, but emotion enhanced it. These findings increase our understanding of episodic memory organisation in laboratory settings, and potentially in real life with perceptual changes and emotion fluctuations constantly interacting. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...) better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship. On the other hand, it is precisely... (shrink)

Human embryo models formed from stem cells—known as embryoids—allow scientists to study the elusive first stages of human development without having to experiment on actual human embryos. But clear ethical guidelines for research involving embryoids are still lacking. Previously, a handful of researchers put forward new recommendations for embryoids, which they hope will be included in the next set of International Society for Stem Cell Research guidelines. Although these recommendations are an improvement over the default approach, they are nonetheless unworkable, (...) because they rely on a poorly conceived notion of an embryoid’s ‘potential’ to trigger stringent research regulations. (shrink)

To showaffective empathyis to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits, that the ideal of universal empathy cannot (...) be built upon affective empathy, and that affective empathy cannot be the basis of morality. (shrink)

Eine nähere Untersuchung des semantischen Wahrheitsbegriffes von Tarski ergibt, daß diesen die von konsenstheoretischer Seite gegen ihn vorgebrachten Einwände nicht zu treffen vermögen. Indem Tarski den Wahrheitsbegriff auf eine nur für formale Systeme anwendbare Definition zusammenzieht, vermag er den Aporien der älteren korrespondenztheoretischen Versuche zu entgehen, muß dafür allerdings eine weitgehende praktische Bedeutungslosigkeit in Kauf nehmen, weil er weder ein Wahrheitskriterium noch gar einen Weg der Verifikation angibt. Dies nun jedoch stellt genau die Leistung der Konsenstheorie dar: der Konsens der (...) Beratenden liefert Definition, Kriterium und Verifikation der Wahrheit zugleich. Die Aufgabe einer schlüssigen Begründung dieser Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit wird am Beispiel von Habermas untersucht, wobei sich ergibt, daß eine transzendental vorgehende Argumentationsstrategie sich in Naturalismus- und Idealismusprobleme verstrickt. (shrink)

_Reinventing Film Studies_ Edited by Christine Gledhill and Linda Williams London: Arnold Publishers, 2000 ISBN 0-340-67723-6 464 pp.